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Thesis Summary 
 
This PhD thesis examines two empirical issues. Firstly, the study examines the effects of industry 
specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit quality. Secondly, the study investigates the 
effects of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on earnings quality. These two 
empirical research questions are examined under three different level of analysis for auditor industry 
specialisation: 1) the firm national-city framework, 2) the partner national-city framework, and 3) the 
joint firm-partner national-city framework. The corporate governance characteristics examined in this 
thesis are female directorship, foreign directorship, internal audit function, and audit committee 
characteristics relating to size, independence, expertise and activity. Audit quality in this study, is 
measured by the variation in the level of audit effort, as reflected in audit fees. The earnings quality 
measures examined in this study are the client’s level of discretionary accruals, accrual estimation 
error and likelihood of reporting a profit (or avoiding a loss). The study’s sample includes initially all 
companies listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2008 and 2011. The findings from the 
first empirical study suggest that the audit partner industry leadership at the national level drives the 
fee premium for auditor industry specialisation in the U.K., above and beyond the audit firm industry 
leadership. Nevertheless, the evidence that non-industry leading partners within the industry leading 
audit firms are still able to charge a fee premium indicates that some form of knowledge sharing and 
transfer of industry expertise do exists between the partners within the Big 4 audit firms. In addition, 
the results also suggests that foreign directors and active audit committee demand additional and 
extensive audit effort from their auditor in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in the 
charging of higher audit fees. Next, the findings from the second empirical enquiry suggest that audit 
firm industry leadership plays a more important role than audit partner industry leadership in 
promoting higher earnings quality, as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, lower accrual 
estimation error and lower likelihood of reporting a profit. In addition, the study also finds that the 
female directors, audit committee independence, and audit committee’s accounting or financial 
expertise contribute to accruals manipulation. This finding is interesting given the data is tested in the 
period during and following on the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, suggesting that some corporate 
governance mechanisms may be less effective in constraining earnings management, but somehow the 
effect is moderated by the presence and the role of industry specialist auditors. Overall, the empirical 
findings on auditor industry specialisation seem to support the product differentiation theory, given the 
consistent evidence between fee premium and higher earnings quality offered by industry specialist 
auditors. The findings from the corporate governance analyses are consistent with the institutional 
theory and/or the managerial hegemony theory, as the role of board is viewed to be passive and more 
of ceremonial in nature during the sample period investigated. The thesis’s findings are of potential 
interest to policy makers, practitioners and investors as the issues relating to audit quality, earnings 
quality and corporate governance are pertinent for investor protection in the financial market. 
 
Keywords: auditor industry specialisation, corporate governance, United Kingdom, audit quality, 
earnings quality 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
A study on auditor industry specialisation, corporate governance, audit quality and earnings quality 
remains important to policy-makers, investors and regulators. This is because the quality of company 
reported earnings affects investors’ confidence and allocation of resources in the financial markets. 
Company reported earnings are prone to management legitimate manipulations, and the functions of 
corporate governance and external auditing serve as direct monitoring mechanisms of the company’s 
financial reporting processes. As these two functions also potentially have a direct impact on the 
degree of earnings management exercised by the companies’ management, the importance of their role 
and effectiveness cannot be overemphasised.  
 
The global financial crisis that started in 2007/2008 has focused a great deal of attention and scrutiny 
by investors, the media, governments and others, on various aspects of accounting, auditing, and 
financial reporting. The effectiveness of the corporate governance function, auditor and the regulatory 
framework has also become a global concern. This is because the recent 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis resulted in the downfall of many high profile companies, with many critics blaming the auditors 
and corporate governance for their failure to prevent such a crisis from happening.  
 
Following the financial crisis, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the U.K. introduced, in 2010 
(with updates in 2012 and 2014), the new then Corporate Governance Code, the U.K. Stewardship 
Code and the Audit Firm Governance Code with the aim of improving the quality of governance and 
financial reporting in the public listed companies in the U.K., after taking into account lessons learned 
from the 2007/2008 financial crisis (FRC, 2010). Hence, corporate governance research using more 
recent data is important, considering the changing financial reporting landscape and regulatory 
environment which has impacted the role played by corporate boards and external auditors. Moreover, 
there has been no published study jointly examining the relationship between corporate governance, 
external audit and earnings management in the U.K., generally, and in the period during and 
subsequent to the financial crisis, specifically.  
 
The PhD thesis supports the argument that a company’s corporate governance function and the 
auditor’s quality characteristics cannot be isolated from one another when analysing their effect on 
audit quality and earnings quality, as the auditor’s monitoring role varies depending on the strength of 
the company’s corporate governance structure (Larcker and Richardson, 2004). Consistently, 
empirical research provides support for the notion that characteristics of effective company corporate 
governance, such as the board of directors and the audit committee function, as well as the internal 
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audit function, contribute to less earnings management activities
3
. In addition, findings from prior 
auditor choice studies suggest that the auditor’s differentiation strategy (such as auditor’s industry 
specialisation) is valued by the board of directors, audit committee and shareholders as signalling a 
higher quality audit, as they are more likely to choose industry specialist auditors instead of relying 
just on a blanket brand name (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Chen et al., 2005; 
Velury et al., 2003; Kane and Velury, 2004).  
 
The PhD thesis examines the effects on audit pricing and earnings quality when the U.K. public listed 
companies are audited by industry specialist auditors. As audit quality is not easily observable, 
researchers typically examine the quality of reported earnings to ascertain the quality of audits 
(Francis, 2011). It is generally presumed that high audit quality translates into high quality of earnings 
(Velury, 2003). Hence, this PhD thesis fills the gap in the literature examining whether the U.K. audit 
fee premium differential signals high quality audit which, in turn, constrains earnings management 
practices in the U.K. public listed companies, given the existing corporate governance regulation, and 
whether it ultimately enhances earnings quality. 
 
This effort is fruitful given the latest research development in the identified sources of auditor industry 
specialisation. Whether industry specialist auditors earn a fee premium has yet to be convincingly 
documented, as the existence of a specialisation premium appears to be conditional on the market 
examined and measures of industry specialisation used (Causholli et al., 2010; Habib, 2011). Until 
now, there has been no strict guideline in the profession on the definition of industry specialist auditor 
and the requirements that the audit firm need to fulfil in order to become one. While earlier research 
defines industry specialist auditor as the audit firm with the largest market share in a particular 
industry (Francis et al., 2005; Craswell et al., 1995; Balsam et al., 2003), more recent studies provide 
evidence that the industry specialist auditor phenomenon is more accurately reflected in the audit 
firm’s city-specific industry leadership (Ferguson et al., 2003; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Hay and 
Jeter, 2011). Whether the audit pricing is dominated by firm-level or office-level industry expertise 
might explain the strength of knowledge sharing and transfer of industry expertise between the city 
offices of the audit firms. So far, the results from this line of research are still inconclusive.  
 
More recently, researchers have started focusing on the partner industry expertise, based on the 
argument that audit partners’ depth of knowledge, experience and expertise dealing with clients within 
a specific industry is a somewhat unique “private human capital” to the partner and cannot be easily 
shared with other partners or staff residing within the same audit office or even the same audit firm 
(Chi and Chin, 2011). Thus, this would mean that audit quality is not only attributed to the brand name 
and industry leadership of the audit firm, but, instead, is also affected by the individual partner’s 
                                                     
3 Earnings management is estimated in the prior literature using various proxies such as discretionary accruals (Peasnell, 
2000, 2005: Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003: Koh, 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005), earnings restatements (Ferguson et al., 2004), income smoothing (Chung et al., 2002) and accounting 
conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008), amongst others.  
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characteristics and reputation (Goodwin and Wu, 2014). Research in this area is still scarce. Whether 
audit quality is homogenous across an individual audit firm, at the city-specific offices and at the 
partner level is yet to be investigated in the U.K. This is an important research question given the 
findings by Basioudis and Francis (2007) that the Big Four industry specialisation premium for their 
national and office-level industry leadership in the U.K. is priced differently as compared to other 
developed markets such as the U.S. and Australia.  
 
In respect of earnings quality, the PhD thesis employs a rigorous approach in measuring earnings 
quality using proxies such as discretionary accruals, accrual estimation error and likelihood of 
reporting a profit rather than a loss. This is because earnings quality is an elusive concept to tackle, 
and there is no single measure that can be claimed to be ultimately better than others and in all 
decision models (Vafeas, 2005; Dechow et al., 2010). This rigorous application of multi-techniques 
and methodologies applied in the thesis makes the research findings more robust in generating 
conclusive and confirmatory predictions of the relationships identified. While this section of the 
chapter set the scene, the next section explains the motivation of the study. 
 
1.2 Motivation of the study 
This study is motivated by several interrelated factors: 
 
1) A review of the prior auditor industry specialisation literature reveals a paucity of research in 
the U.K. examining the audit partner industry expertise on financial reporting quality. Recent 
audit quality frameworks proposed by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council (2008) and 
Knechel et al. (2013) indicate that audit partner skills, knowledge, and expertise are important 
drivers of audit quality. However, there is a paucity of research with regards to the use of the 
individual audit partner as the unit of analysis. Furthermore, the disclosure of the name of the 
senior statutory auditor (or engagement partner) signing off the auditor’s report for and on 
behalf of the audit firm was only made mandatory in the U.K. for financial years beginning on 
or after 6 April 2008 (Section 503 of Companies Act 2006). This study represents a response 
to the call from academics (DeFond and Francis, 2005; Carcello, 2005) and policy makers for 
more scrutiny and understanding of audit quality at the individual audit partner level. Besides 
this, whether the audit firm’s industry expertise contributes to better financial reporting quality 
in the U.K. audit market has yet to be researched.  
 
2) A review of the prior governance literature reveals a scarcity of research in relation to board 
diversity. The effect of female directorship, foreign directorship and internal audit function on 
various measures of audit quality and earnings quality have yet to be thoroughly investigated, 
particularly in the U.K. Although the issues might have been examined in different countries, 
those findings may not apply in the U.K., given the different size of the capital markets, the 
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cultural differences, the unique regulatory and economic environments, as well as the 
effectiveness of the governance mechanisms and investor protection.  
 
3) This prior review also reveals a scarcity of research relating to the role of the industry 
specialist auditor using the national-city framework in constraining earnings management 
practice in the U.K. Also, the partner national-city framework and the joint firm-partner 
national-city framework are identified as areas that require attention and empirical analysis in 
the U.K. There is, therefore, a strong incentive to investigate, empirically, the effect of those 
attributes on earnings management. 
 
4) Prior research on financial crises (e.g. the Asian crisis and the 2007/2008 financial crisis) has 
shown that the motivation for earnings management is higher during the financial crisis period 
due to the unstable economic and financial conditions (e.g. Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2008; 
Lang and Maffett, 2011; Habib et al., 2013). Consequently, various governance reforms have 
taken place following the 2007/2008 financial crisis (for example, the implementation of the 
U.K. Corporate Governance Code, U.K. Stewardship Code and the Audit Firm Governance 
Code in 2010) with the aim to improve the quality of governance and audit in the public listed 
companies, given that directors and auditors have been heavily criticised and blamed for lack 
of necessary diligence, contributing to the crisis. Therefore, the financial crisis setting makes 
it interesting to analyse the effect of the industry specialist auditor and corporate governance 
on audit quality and earnings quality to see whether the findings would turn out differently as 
compared to prior studies carried out during non-crisis periods.  Also, corporate governance 
research using more recent data is important, considering the changing financial reporting 
landscape and regulatory environment in the U.K. which has recently impacted the role played 
by corporate boards and external auditors. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of the PhD thesis are two-fold:  
 
1) To examine the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit 
quality. The audit quality in this study is measured by the variation in the level of audit effort 
as reflected in audit fees. 
 
2) To examine the effectiveness of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance in 
promoting earnings quality. Earnings quality in this study is measured using three different 
proxies – discretionary accruals (both in magnitude and direction), accrual quality (based on 
the level of accrual estimation error), and company likelihood of reporting a profit rather than 
a loss.  
 
The study covers the period from 2008 to 2011, which is the period affected by the financial crisis. 
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1.4 Contribution of the study 
This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways: 
 
1) The PhD thesis examines various sources of auditor industry specialisation in relation to audit 
pricing and earnings quality in the U.K. context.  
 
- The study examines Big 4 auditor industry specialisation in the U.K. under three different 
national-city frameworks: 
(i) The firm national-city framework 
(ii) The partner national-city framework 
(iii)  The joint firm-partner national-city framework 
 
 - While the firm national-city framework analysis in this study represents an extension of 
prior research work using the same approach (e.g. Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Reichelt and 
Wang, 2010; Hay and Jeter, 2011), this study contributes to the auditor industry specialisation 
literature by examining the effect of industry specialist auditor on audit quality for the first 
time in the U.K. and globally using the partner national-city framework and the joint firm-
partner national-city framework. 
 
- The overall results from the audit pricing analysis indicate that audit partner industry 
leadership at the national level seems to drive the fee premium for auditor industry 
specialisation in the U.K. above and beyond the audit firm industry leadership. This supports 
the argument that industry expertise is uniquely attributable to the individual audit partner’s 
human capital in terms of their knowledge and experience gained from leading audit 
engagements in a particular industry. 
 
- Interestingly, the evidence of a fee premium for industry leadership at the firm level is only 
supported in the large client sample. This finding is consistent with evidence from New 
Zealand, Australia and the U.S. where fee premiums for industry leadership are only reported 
for large clients (Craswell et al., 1995; Francis et al., 2005; Hay and Jeter, 2011).  On the 
other hand, the corresponding analysis at the partner level suggests that the fee premium for 
industry leadership in the U.K. is driven by partner leadership at the national level in both the 
large and small client segments. 
 
- Evidence from the sensitivity test also indicates that there is a fee premium attached to 
female partners, but not the duration of the partner tenure with the client. 
 
- There is no evidence of an audit fee discount applied in the U.K. audit market as reported in 
the study. Thus, the empirical finding of the fee premium attached universally to the firm and 
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partner industry leaderships indicates a support for the product differentiation theory and 
reputation theory. This, in turn, suggests that auditors choose to differentiate themselves 
through industry specialisation to meet clients’ demands for better quality audits. This 
differentiation strategy is valued in the audit market as it is priced at a differentially higher 
rate above and beyond the generic Big 4 brand name reputation premium.   
 
- The results of the earnings quality analysis indicate that the audit firm joint national and city 
industry leadership matters more than the partner industry leadership in constraining 
discretionary accruals (both in magnitude and direction), in reducing accruals estimation error 
and reducing the likelihood of reporting a profit. 
 
2) This is the first study jointly examining the effect of industry specialist auditors (under the 
national-city framework) and the corporate governance function on both audit pricing and 
earnings quality.  
 
- Prior studies on auditor industry specialisation by Francis et al. (2005), Basioudis and 
Francis (2007), Reichelt and Wang (2010), Minutti-Meza (2013), and Nagy (2014) have not 
considered the effect of corporate governance function in their analyses of audit quality or 
earnings quality. This does not necessarily reflect the actual reality where it is expected that 
interdependencies potentially exist between the role of external auditor and company’s 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. Prior literature supports this argument, for 
example, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) suggest that auditors take into consideration clients’ 
strength of internal control, risk of earnings manipulation and effectiveness of corporate 
governance in making audit planning and pricing decisions, and then adjust their audit effort 
and billing rates accordingly. Cohen et al. (2007) have reported that auditors’ control risk 
assessments and audit planning decisions are affected by the client board’s characteristics and 
effectiveness. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of industry specialist auditors (under 
the three national-city frameworks, as discussed in the No. 1 bullet point above) and corporate 
governance on both audit pricing and earnings quality. By doing so, the study uniquely 
contributes to the extant literature. 
 
3) The PhD thesis employs various alternative measures of earnings quality in order to have 
more vigorous and conclusive findings. 
 
- Earnings quality in this study is measured using three different proxies – discretionary 
accruals (both in magnitude and direction), accrual quality (based on the level of accrual 
estimation error), and the company’s likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss. Prior 
literature has yet to examine these measures of earnings quality in relation to the firm national-
city framework in the U.K. On top of that, the relationship between these various measures of 
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earnings quality have never been examined in relation to auditor industry specialisation under 
the partner national-city framework and the joint firm-partner national city framework within 
the whole of the prior research literature. Thus, this study fills this gap in the literature 
globally by examining for the first time, using the firm national-city framework in the U.K., 
and the partner national-city framework and the joint firm-partner national city framework 
globally, the effect of auditor industry specialisation on discretionary accruals (both in 
magnitude and direction), accrual quality (based on the level of accrual estimation error) and 
the company’s likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss. 
 
4) This PhD thesis is based on an analysis of more recent data from the period 2008-2011, which 
is the period during and subsequent to the financial crisis. This is important given the 
changing financial reporting landscape (higher risk of earnings management) and more 
regulatory reforms taking place since then, which might yield different results as compared to 
prior studies. Consistently, research on financial crises (e.g. the Asian crisis and the 
2007/2008 financial crisis) has shown that there are various factors that motivate managers to 
engage in earnings management during the financial crisis period (e.g. Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn, 2008; Lang and Maffett, 2011; Habib et al., 2013), and accruals manipulation is one 
of the tools that could be used by management to stabilise earnings of current and consecutive 
periods. 
 
- In the audit quality analysis, the study provides evidence that the audit fee is higher in the 
presence of an active audit committee and foreign directors on the board. This suggests the 
presence of foreign directors and an active audit committee contributes to a more extensive 
and expensive audit.  
 
- Interestingly, the study documented that female directors, audit committee independence and 
financial expertise contributes to lower earnings quality – higher discretionary accruals and 
accrual estimation error. This finding is surprising and contrary to the expectations based on 
the agency theory and the stewardship theory propositions, where the board and audit 
committee are expected to provide stewardship to shareholders to safeguard their interest. 
Instead, this finding supports the managerial hegemony theory assertions that the company 
board’s decisions and actions are dominated by the management’s pursuit of their self-serving 
interest; whereas, other corporate governance variables examined provide insignificant results, 
implying that the role of corporate governance in U.K. public listed firms is only ceremonial 
in nature, given that the variation between these characteristics among the companies does not 
contribute to improved quality of financial reporting. This conclusion is also consistent with 
the proposition underlying institutional theory where companies are assumed to conform to 
their environmental pressures (for example, to meet the various requirements of the corporate 
governance best practices such as the Combined Code, 2008, or the U.K. Corporate 
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Governance Code, 2010) simply to maintain their legitimacy, instead of intending to achieve 
an effective governance and monitoring role, particularly in the financial reporting process. 
This interesting finding in respect of corporate governance effectiveness during the sample 
period 2008 to 2011 could be argued to be partly motivated by the economic and financial 
conditions during the recent financial crisis where companies were facing a difficult time 
trying to maintain and improve their performance in the public equity market. 
 
- As the monitoring role of auditors depends on the strength of a firms’ corporate governance 
structure (Larcker and Richardson, 2004), it is possible that the auditor monitoring roles 
outweigh the oversight functions of boards and audit committees, and hence contribute to the 
insignificant results for corporate governance variables and earnings management. Taken 
together, it seems that the ineffective monitoring role of corporate governance in constraining 
accruals manipulation has been moderated by the presence of industry specialist auditors in 
the U.K. and in the period 2008-2011. 
 
5) The study contributes to the company board diversity literature in terms of board gender and 
board nationality, as their monitoring effects on audit fees and different measures of earnings 
quality is thoroughly examined. There has been a paucity of research of such type in the U.K.; 
thus, this study fills this gap in the literature and complements other similar board diversity 
studies carried out in other countries – mostly in the U.S. The findings from this study indicate 
that higher proportion of foreign directors on the company board contributes to higher audit 
fees, given their unfamiliarity with the local financial reporting requirements, rules and 
regulations and management methods that could possibly leads to them exercising a poor 
monitoring role (Masulis et al., 2012). This, in turn, may necessitate the foreign directors to 
request from the auditor to perform extra work to verify the quality of the financial reports 
prepared by the management, resulting in the charging of higher audit fees. The study also 
finds that female directors contribute to lower earnings quality – higher accrual estimation 
error.  
 
6) This is the first study to examine the effect of competitive pressure on the ability of the 
industry specialist auditor to extract a fee premium and constrain earnings management in the 
U.K. setting.  
 
- Consistent with Numan and Willekens (2012) finding in the U.S. audit market, the results of 
this study indicate that the fee premium for auditor industry specialisation in the U.K. earned 
by the audit firms, who are joint national and city industry specialists, is not merely due to its 
successful differentiation strategy, but is also partly driven by the fee pressure from its closest 
competitor in the city-industry audit market. Nevertheless, the audit firm’s position as a joint 
national and city industry leader in the U.K. already gives it a sufficient market power to 
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extract a fee premium. This is because there is a distinct (non-interdependency) fee premium 
attached either to the audit firm joint national and city industry leader or to its distance with 
the closest competitor. This is completely new evidence and needs to be tested over the course 
of time, as this new evidence is documented during and after the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis.  
 
- Also, the study documents that the competitive pressure has an adverse effect on earnings 
quality. This is based on the evidence that discretionary accruals and accrual estimation error 
are larger when the distance between the audit firm with its closest competitor is decreasing. 
Again, this new evidence is documented during and after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis 
and needs to be tested over the course of time.  
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
This chapter has discussed the background for this study, outlined the study's motives and the research 
objectives. The contributions made by this study have also been highlighted. The remainder of this 
thesis is organised as follows.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on auditor industry specialisation and corporate 
governance and their relation to audit quality and earnings quality. The review of each section 
concludes with identifying the literature gap and suggestions for bridging this gap. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework underlying the study, which is employed to explain and 
analyse the association between audit quality and earnings quality with both industry specialist 
auditors and corporate governance attributes. Illustrations of the theory adopted for this study are 
offered and its selection is justified. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the development of hypotheses to be examined in the study.  
 
Chapter 5 outlines the methodological aspects adopted in this study, including the sample selection 
process, source of data, model specifications, definition of variables and data diagnostics. 
 
Chapter 6 to Chapter 8 present and discuss the results for the first empirical study on the effect of 
industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit quality: Chapter 6 presents the 
descriptive statistics, Chapter 7 discusses the multivariate analysis, and Chapter 8 discusses the 
sensitivity analysis and robustness test for the first empirical study. 
 
Chapter 9 to Chapter 11 present and discuss the results for the second empirical study on the effect of 
industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on earnings quality. Chapter 9 presents the 
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descriptive statistics, chapter 10 discusses the multivariate analysis, and Chapter 11 discusses the 
sensitivity analysis and robustness test for the second empirical study. 
 
Finally, Chapter 12 presents the conclusion of the thesis. This chapter also highlights the study's 
potential limitations and provides recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the key literature pertaining to the topic of the study which involves the generic 
topics of corporate governance, auditor industry specialisation, earnings management and the 
relationship that exists between them. At the same time, this section also highlights the gaps in the 
existing literature and explains how this study can address those gaps and make a contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge. 
 
2.2 Audit quality 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability that material misstatements will be 
detected and consequently reported by the auditor. Because audit quality is an unobservable concept, 
various measures have been used to operationalise audit quality. This includes audit fees, the brand 
name reputation of the Big 4 audit firms, auditor tenure, auditor independence, and auditor industry 
specialisation, amongst others (Francis et al., 1999, Davidson et al., 2005; Lin and Hwang, 2010). In 
this study, audit effort will be measured based on the variation in the level of audit fees charged by 
auditors. It is assumed that firms pay more to their auditor to receive a higher quality audit (Simunic, 
1980). It is not possible to measure audit effort in terms of audit hours, the time, scope and resources 
contributed by the auditor from outside the black box.  However, a study by Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008) managed to test this using audit fees in terms of audit hours using proprietary data in Greece. 
 
2.3 Earnings quality 
The quality of reported earnings is important to investors in the financial market, as investors and 
analysts heavily rely on the company’s reported earnings in making investment decisions. Earnings 
management is the inverse measure of earnings quality. The generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) provide flexibility for managers to choose the type of accounting policy or procedures that 
suit their business operating environment when making assumptions and estimations in the financial 
reporting process. Hence, managers would be most likely to choose the type of accounting policy or 
procedure that will maximise the wealth of all the contracting parties (Watt and Zimmerman, 1990). 
This flexibility in GAAP provides opportunity for earnings management where the company’s actual 
performance is being masked so that shareholders, debt holders and investors at large are being misled 
about the true economic value of the company (Watt and Zimmerman, 1990; Fields et al., 2001).  
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Whereas Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as intentional intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the aim of attaining personal benefit either for managers or 
shareholders, for Healey and Wahlen (1999) earnings management happens when managers apply 
their judgements and structure the transactions to modify the company’s financial reporting outcome 
with the intention either to mislead certain parties about the true economic performance of the 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that rely on the reported figures. Schipper‘s (1989) 
definition is broader than Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) as it emphasis that earnings management is an 
intentional action, and does not limit the types of accounting manipulation that can be done to include 
both legitimate (within GAAP) and illegitimate practices (such as accounting fraud). Schipper (1989) 
also highlights that such earnings management practices could either be opportunistic (for the benefit 
of managers) or informative (for the benefit of shareholders).  
 
This PhD thesis adopts the Healy and Wahlen (1999) definition of earnings management, which 
specifically refers to managerial opportunism that is carried out in a legitimate way (within GAAP) to 
conceal the deteriorating economic performance of the company. Such practices are not informative 
for shareholders, investors and debt holders as they are being misled about the true economic value of 
the company. There are a number of reasons why management are involved in earnings management, 
and these incentives are explained in the next section. 
 
2.3.1 Earnings management incentives 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify four main types of earnings management incentives, namely capital 
market incentives, management compensation contracts incentives, debt contracts incentives and 
political and regulatory requirements incentives.  
 
Capital market incentives exist because market participants and stakeholders appear to reward 
companies with positive or higher earnings more than companies with negative or lower earnings. 
Therefore, managers have incentives to manipulate earnings to meet or beat market expectations 
(analyst forecasts) and thus to influence share prices. This is very true in the U.K. as it is a developed 
country with a highly dispersed share ownership as well as efficient and liquid stock markets, where 
investors rely heavily on analyst forecasts in making investments. Bugstahler and Dichev (1997) 
provide evidence that managers manipulate earnings in order to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
They found that low frequencies of small earnings decreases and small losses, and high frequencies of 
small increases in earnings and small positive incomes are unusual. Barth et al. (1999) suggest that 
companies with patterns of increasing earnings are more likely to have higher firm valuation, as 
reflected in larger earnings multiples (e.g. higher coefficient of earnings).  
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The management compensation contract incentives are based on agency theory where the principal 
monitors agent’s behaviour through their compensation contracts in order to align their divergent 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since compensation contracts are usually linked to accounting 
numbers, such contracts create incentives for managers to manipulate reported earnings results that 
maximise the value of their compensation, share options, bonuses and other performance related 
payments tied to their earnings (Watt and Zimmerman, 1978). According to Healy (1985), when the 
bonus plans are binding at the minimum or maximum levels, managers are likely to manage accruals 
upwards (income-decreasing accruals), whereas when the bonus plans are not binding, managers are 
likely to manage the accruals downward (income-increasing accruals) to drive the earnings higher. 
When managers are denied bonuses in the current year because the current earnings are extremely low 
and fail to meet/beat target, they may engage in “big bath accounting” by differing the recognition of 
revenue or accelerating write-offs to drive the current earnings lower, and reverse these transactions in 
future years to meet future earnings targets to secure their future bonuses.  
 
The debt contracts incentives are related to the restrictive covenants written in debt agreements with 
the purpose to constrain the likely conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt holders. The 
restrictive covenants may include restrictions on payment of dividends or issuance of new debts, or 
emphasise debt holders’ rights to command early debt repayment when certain accounting-based 
targets are not achieved. Hence, managers’ accounting decisions are normally influenced by debt 
covenants in the year before and the year during the occurrence of the violation (Defond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994). In order to reduce their debt constraints, managers of defaulting companies are 
likely to engage in income-increasing accruals when approaching the covenants’ violation (Sweeney, 
1994).  
 
Finally, political and regulatory requirements incentives such as accounting standards, industrial 
regulations, tax laws, and listing requirements, amongst others, could also motivate companies to 
engage in earnings management activities. For example, in the banking industry, managers in banks 
are likely to manipulate accruals when their capital competence requirements are close to the 
minimum level (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al., 1997). In the import sector, managers are likely to 
engage in income-decreasing accruals during the year of an application for import relief to obtain 
benefits such as higher tariff or reduced quota (Jones, 1991).  
 
In the context of the PhD thesis, all these four incentives are expected to motivate earnings 
management practices in the U.K. public listed companies. Some incentives may be stronger than 
others for certain companies, depending on the nature of the industry, financial performance, 
dispersion of ownership and regulatory constraints affecting their business operation. As earnings 
management is an unobservable construct (Vafeas, 2005), various measures have been used by 
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researchers in their studies as surrogates. The next section explains the various proxies that will be 
used to measure earnings management.   
 
2.3.2 Earnings management measurement 
Earnings management can be carried out legitimately in several ways, either through manipulation of 
accrual accounting, income smoothing, earnings restatements, or flexibility of accounting 
policies/procedures used in financial reporting. Amongst other methods, accrual accounting seems to 
be the most favourable method for management as it cannot be easily observed and does not involve 
high cost to practice (Young, 1999). Accruals can be distinguished into two parts, namely the 
discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The discretionary accrual is a topic of interest in 
earnings management research as it can be manipulated by management using their judgement and 
discretion to produce higher or lower earnings in their favour. The measurement of discretionary 
accruals can be classified into three categories, namely the aggregate accruals models, specific 
accruals models and the frequency distribution approach (McNichols, 2000).   
 
Aggregate accrual models include Healy’s (1985) model, DeAngelo’s (1986) model, Jones’s (1991) 
model, the modified Jones model from Dechow et al. (1995), and the Kothari et al. (2005) 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model. These different models apportion the non-
discretionary accruals parts from the total accruals in different ways and have different ability to cope 
with changes in the company’s economic condition. It is argued that the assumption of constant non-
discretionary accruals in the Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models is unrealistic as the change in 
accounting accruals is dependent on the company’s economic condition (Kaplan, 1985). However, the 
Jones (1991) model, the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) and the Kothari et al. (2005) 
performance adjusted discretionary accruals model resolve this problem as they takes into account the 
changes in a company’s economic conditions as measured by the fluctuation in revenues, assets, 
receivables and return on assets (performance). The Jones (1991) and modified Jones models are 
recognised in the literature as the most powerful models for detecting earnings management (Dechow 
et al., 1995; Young, 1999). However, the limitation of the aggregate models is the risk of 
misspecification due to their inefficiency in isolating the discretionary component of total accruals 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  
 
The specific accruals models estimate the discretionary accruals based on a single accrual item such as 
residual provision for bad debts (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), loan loss provisions (Beaver and 
Angel, 1996; Collins et al., 1995), provision for tax expenses (Philips et al., 2003) and the loss 
reserves of property and casualty insurers (Petroni, 1992). As compared to the aggregate accruals 
models explained earlier, the specific accrual model is less comprehensive and could be misleading 
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when it does not capture the full earnings management if the manipulation also affects other parts of 
the discretionary accrual component (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). 
 
The frequency distribution approach is introduced by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et 
al. (1999). The approach is more focused as it examines the earnings behaviour when it is carried out 
with a specific intention or target such as to avoid earnings decreases or losses, to sustain recent 
performance, to report positive profits, and to meet or beat analysts’ forecast. However, it is argued 
that the frequency distribution approach only provides specific predictions on whether companies 
engaged in earnings management activities but do not actually measure the magnitude of managers’ 
opportunistic earnings (McNichols, 2002).  
 
For this  PhD thesis, three measures of accruals have been selected, where the discretionary accruals 
and the accrual estimation error falls under the aggregate accruals category, while the likelihood of 
reporting a profit rather than a loss falls under the specific accruals category. The aggregate accruals 
measure allows the study to examine the magnitude of earnings management in relation to the role of 
corporate governance and industry specialist auditors. However, the frequency distribution approach 
can only suggest predictions, and does not confirm the act and magnitude of earnings management 
(McNichols, 2002). The respective earnings management models that will be used in the study are 
further discussed in Chapter 5 on Research Methodology. 
 
2.4 Auditor industry specialisation 
This section explains the role of an industry specialist auditor and the developments in the identified 
sources of auditor industry specialisation. In addition, this section also discusses the effect of industry 
specialist auditors on audit fees and the various financial reporting outcomes. 
 
2.4.1 Role of industry specialist auditor  
Auditor industry specialisation is a product differentiation strategy adopted by the audit firms to 
differentiate themselves from competitors in fulfilling clients’ demands for better financial reporting 
quality (Krishnan, 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) and to compete on other than cost-price strategy 
alone (Gramling and Stone, 2001; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Habib, 2011). By concentrating 
resource and technology investments in a particular focus industry or a number of industries, audit 
firms are able to gain efficiency through economies of scale (Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Cairney 
and Young, 2006) and build their reputation as an industry expert. The reputation gained from being 
an industry specialist auditor would provide them competitive advantage and greater market power 
(bargaining power) over their rivals, which will allow them to charge a differentially high audit fee 
premium (Hay and Jeter, 2011), both over existing or potential clients (Causholli et al., 2010).  
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The extensive industry-specific experience of the industry specialist auditor (Gramling and Stone, 
2001) allows them to identify and address industry specific problems and issues more thoroughly than 
auditors who do not have that domain-specific knowledge (Craswell and Taylor, 1991; Eichenseher 
and Danos, 1981). Industry specialist audit firms are also more likely to make investments of expertise 
beyond the general expertise of the audit firms (in personnel, technologies, and control systems) so as 
to improve their reputation and quality of audits in their focus industries (Simunic and Stein, 1987; 
Craswell et al., 1995). Experimental research on auditing also reported evidence that industry 
expertise generally enhances auditor judgment (Moroney, 2007), improves the quality of the auditor’s 
risk assessment (Taylor, 2000; Low, 2004), as well as improves the accuracy of error detection 
(Solomon et al., 1999; Owhoso et al., 2002). Industry specialist auditors are also more likely to 
recognise loss in a timely manner (Krishnan, 2005). 
 
Researchers of archival studies developed their own measures of industry specialist auditors based on 
within industry market share approach as an indirect proxy for industry specialisation (Ferguson et al., 
2003; Francis et al., 2005; Minutti-Meza, 2013). This is because the industry expertise of the audit 
firm at the national, city and partner level is not directly observable (Minutti-Meza, 2013). Thus, 
industry specialist is defined as the auditor that has “differentiated itself from its competitors in terms 
of market share within a particular industry” (Neal and Riley, 2004: 170).   
 
Kwon et al. (2007) investigate the role of auditor industry specialisation in an international context. 
Using a sample from 28 countries in the period 1993 to2003, they found that clients of industry 
specialist auditors have low discretionary accruals and high earnings response coefficients (ERC). 
They also find that auditor industry specialisation has a more positive effect on earnings quality in 
countries with a weak legal environment than in countries with a strong legal environment. Their 
findings suggest that auditor industry specialisation may be a substitute for other corporate governance 
mechanisms, as corporate governance is usually weaker in weak legal environments than in strong 
legal environments (La Porta et al., 1997; DeFond and Hung, 2004). 
 
Given that auditor industry specialisation is associated with higher audit quality, it is important to 
understand the different sources of auditor industry specialisation and its implication on audit quality. 
The next section further discusses this.  
 
2.4.2 Different sources of auditor industry specialisation  
Researchers to date have identified three sources of auditor industry specialisation: the firm-wide 
level, the city-industry level or the partner level. Prior studies have also found evidence of a 
differential fee premium and financial reporting quality attached to each of these different levels of 
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industry specialisation, or combination of them, which will be discussed further in the following 
sections. 
 
2.4.2.1 National level industry specialisation 
Initial studies on auditor specialisation focused their attention on national level audit industry 
specialisation (e.g. Palmrose, 1986; Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al., 2000; Ferguson and Stokes, 
2002), and assumed that audit quality and industry expertise are homogeneous within the audit firms, 
and across their offices of various sizes situated in different cities (Ferguson et al., 2003; Choi et al., 
2010). The argument is that all the individual offices of the same audit firm received standardised 
national training programmes, adopted standardised audit programmes, and engaged in sharing of 
audit staff between the offices in different locations either through physical travel or through the use of 
information and communication technologies (Ferguson et al., 2003). This is apparent given the 
claims made by large audit firms on their websites and in the media that they have “ firm-wide 
operations organised along industry lines” (Ferguson et al., 2003) and have a standardised audit 
quality throughout all their offices around the world due to the existence of standardised quality 
control procedures. From this perspective, auditor industry expertise is measured using the audit firm’s 
market share based on client total assets, total sales, audit fees or number of clients in an industry with 
a specific cut-off (e.g., 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent) in order to separate industry specialist 
auditors from non-industry specialist auditors (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; 
Hay et al., 2006). In cases where there are two top audit firms with the highest market share per 
industry, then the alternative measurement of ranking is made by determining which one of them is 
also a city-specific industry leader (Ferguson et al., 2003).  
 
2.4.2.1.1 The relationship between audit firm national level industry specialisation, audit 
quality and earnings quality 
Studies on fee premium attached to auditor industry specialisation at the national level produce mixed 
results. While many studies find evidence of fee premium (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995; DeFond et al., 
2000; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Casterella et al., 2004; Carson, 2009), other studies find no relation 
(e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002) or even a fee 
discount (e.g., Ettredge and Greenberg, 1990). Palmrose’s (1986) study using U.S. data obtained from 
a questionnaire survey between the period 1980 to 1981 reports that Big 8 auditors do not earn any 
specialist premium. Pearson and Trompeter’s (1994) study of U.S. insurance companies between the 
period 1982 to 1986 documented that Big 8 auditors also do not earn any specialist premium using 
national market share measures of industry expertise. On the other hand, a study in Australia by 
Craswell et al. (1995) using 1987 data found evidence of fee premium for the Big 8 auditors but only 
if the specialisation measure uses a less than 20 percent market share threshold. The issue was 
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revisited by Ferguson and Stokes (2002) who found that, in the same setting, a premium for 
specialisation no longer applied after the mergers that reduced the Big 6 firms to the Big 5. 
 
Fields et al. (2004) conducted a study of U.S. financial institutions in the year 2000 and also reported 
an absence of a fee premium attached to Big 5 industry specialists. A study by Casterella et al. (2004) 
in the U.S.A. using survey data from 1993 documented that the Big 6 industry specialists only earned 
a premium for small companies in the sample. Ferguson and Stokes’ (2002) study in Australia 
between 1990 and 1998 found limited support for the existence of a specialist premium. Using 1992 
Hong Kong data, DeFond et al. (2000) found evidence of a fee premium for Big 6 industry specialists, 
while Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) selected a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) and found that 
audit firms that possessed significantly higher market shares than their industry competitors earned fee 
premiums. A study by Casterella et al. (2004) in the U.S. used self-reported audit fee data to provide 
evidence of fee premiums for industry specialists, but only for smaller companies that have little 
bargaining power. Huang et al. (2007) extended the Casterella et al. (2004) study by using the 
disclosed audit fee data from 2000 to 2004 and found a negative association between client bargaining 
power and audit fees for both the small and large client segments in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) 
period. However, Carson and Fargher’s (2007) study in Australia from 1998 to 2004 reported that Big 
6 audit firms who national-level industry specialists only earned fee premiums from servicing their 
large clienteles. Finally, a cross country study by Carson (2009) covering 62 countries in 2000 and 60 
countries in 2004 reported that there is a fee premium attached to global industry specialists. Cahan et 
al. (2015) attribute this mixed finding to the failure of academic researchers to consider audit firm 
strategies for achieving high market shares. The authors find significantly higher (lower) audit fees 
when the auditors attain a high market share by auditing a relatively lower (higher) proportion of 
clients in the market. 
 
Prior studies using the national measure of auditor industry specialisation report evidence of higher 
audit quality and earning quality provided by audit firms who are national industry leaders as 
compared to their non-specialist counterparts. These studies demonstrated that audit firm national 
industry leadership contributes to lower discretionary accruals (Krishnan, 2003; Balsam et al., 2003), 
higher ERC (Krishnan, 2003), higher disclosure quality (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004),  lower incidence 
of financial fraud (Carcello and Nagy, 2004),  increased reporting conservatism through timely loss 
recognition (Krishnan, 2005; Lim and Tan, 2009), reduced propensity of earnings to just meet or beat 
analyst forecasts (Payne, 2008) and lesser likelihood of financial restatements (Romanus et al., 2008). 
Carson (2009) documents a fee premium at the global audit firm network level, suggesting that global 
industry specialists possess a competitive advantage in terms of international expertise relative to 
national expertise alone. 
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Nevertheless, evidence of a fee premium documented for industry specialisation seems to favour 
certain client segments only. For instance, studies by Craswell et al. (1995), Ferguson and Stokes 
(2002), Ferguson et al. (2003), and Carson and Fargher (2007) in Australia report that the fee premium 
only applied to large clients. In the U.S., however, the evidence is inconclusive: Casterella et al. 
(2004) and Huang et al. (2007) report a premium that applies only to large clients, but Francis et al. 
(2005) did not find evidence of premiums for large clients. Casterella et al. (2004) assert that larger 
clients exert greater influence on their auditor in negotiating fee premiums.  
 
In respect of earnings quality, Carcello and Nagy (2004) document evidence that industry specialist 
auditors are more likely to constrain fraudulent reporting practices, but this effect is only stronger in 
small clients. This indicates that the larger clients have greater bargaining power and are able to 
influence the auditor to be less aggressive in the financial reporting (McKeown et al. 1991). Another 
possible explanation is that the auditor might face challenges in dealing with larger, more complex 
clients with wide business portfolio across different industries (Carcello and Nagy, 2004). In addition, 
Stanley and DeZoort (2007) found that those industry specialist auditors are more likely to reduce 
financial restatements during initial engagement periods.  
 
2.4.2.2 City or office level industry specialisation 
However, it is important to realise that despite the large audit firms having an international and 
country level organisational structure, their operation is decentralised to a network of semi-
autonomous practice offices (Wallman 1996; Francis et al. 1999: Ferguson et al., 2003). In this sense, 
each individual practice office of the large audit firm should be treated as a unique and relevant unit of 
analysis. The argument is that audit contracting is done through local offices, audit engagements are 
managed by the audit team usually located in the same city as the audit client's headquarters, and audit 
reports are issued on office-specific letterhead of the Big Four engagement office managing the audit 
(Wallman 1996; Francis et al. 1999; Reynolds and Francis 2000, Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis, 2004). 
Hence, industry expertise represents an investment in the unique professional staff (human capital of 
the firm) and this expertise is gained by working with clients in specific industries, and, hence, tend to 
be client-specific and office-specific (Solomon et al., 1999; Ferguson et al., 2003). From this 
perspective, industry specialist auditors are either ranked based on a city-specific industry leadership 
framework (e.g. Basioudis and Francis, 2007) or the overall city leadership framework (e.g. Ferguson 
et al., 2006) where the audit firm’s city-specific market share is calculated based on client total assets, 
total sales, audit fees or number of clients. In the overall city leadership framework (e.g. Ferguson et 
al., 2006), however, the industry specialist auditor market share is calculated based on the overall 
client total assets, audit fees or number of clients for the individual offices of the same audit firms 
located in different cities. The fact that city-specific industry leadership is a more accurate measure of 
an industry specialist auditor relative to national leadership is evidenced by the findings that industry 
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leaders alone do not earn any audit fee premium unless they are also a city leader or city-specific 
industry leader (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Ferguson et al., 2006; McMeeking et al., 
2006; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Reichelt and Wang, 2010).  
 
The argument for the city-specific perspective has been further extended recently to the size of the 
local practice office (hereon referred to as the “office size”) of audit firms located in different cities 
(Francis and Yu, 2009; Choi et al., 2010). It is argued that the larger the office size, the better the 
professional staff in-house experience and expertise in performing the audit for large clients, as 
compared to smaller size offices of the same audit firm. Also, it is argued that because large offices 
normally have a larger client base and there is shared monitoring among partners, they would be less 
economically dependent on any specific or individual client, and are less pressurised by clients for 
sub-standard reporting (Francis and Yu, 2009). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that auditors in large 
offices are more likely to provide higher audit quality to protect their large client base as compared to 
smaller size offices with a smaller client base (Choi et al., 2010). Accordingly, studies have reported 
that discretionary accruals (proxy for earnings management) is lower for companies audited by the 
large city offices of audit firms as compared to small city offices (Francis and Yu, 2009; Choi et al., 
2010). Taking this view, the office size is measured in two different ways based on: 1) the number of 
audit clients in each office, and 2) the total auditor fees earned by each office (Choi et al., 2010). 
 
2.4.2.2.1 The relationship between the audit firm city level industry specialisation, audit 
quality and earnings quality 
Using each engagement office as the unit of analysis, a study by Reynolds and Francis (2000) in the 
U.S. documented that the Big 5 city-specific industry leaders are more conservative in their large 
client’s reporting. Similarly, Carson and Fargher (2007) documented that an industry specialisation 
premium is only gained from auditing large clients at the city level. Recent research on auditor 
industry specialisation examines the effect of the Big 4 industry leadership on audit pricing using the 
national-city framework developed by Ferguson et al. (2003) to determine whether national (firm-
level) reputations or city reputations (office-level) for industry expertise are more valued and more 
highly priced in the audit market (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Basioudis and Francis, 
2007; Hay and Jeter, 2011). Whether the audit pricing is dominated by firm-level or office-level 
industry expertise might explain the strength of knowledge sharing and transfer of industry expertise 
between the city-offices of the audit firms. The results of this line of research have so far been 
inconclusive. In the U.S. and Australia, auditors’ industry expertise based on joint national and city 
reputation matters more in the Big 4 audit market as they are priced at a higher rate  compared to 
national industry leadership alone or city-specific industry leadership alone (Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005). On the contrary, in New Zealand the industry specialisation premium for city-
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specific industry leadership alone appears to be higher than joint national-city industry leadership 
(Hay and Jeter, 2011).  
 
Using data from the period 1985 to 2002, McMeeking et al. (2006) found evidence of an audit fee 
premium for large audit firms in the U.K.. However, the existence of such a premium for auditor 
industry specialisation is only significant when the industry specialist auditor is both a national leader 
and a city-industry leader. No premium is reported when the audit firm is a national leader alone. A 
subsequent study by Basioudis and Francis (2007) documented similar findings using 2002 and 2003 
data. They found that the city-specific industry leader earns an audit fee premium of about 19 percent, 
whereas the national leader alone does not earn any. However, the audit fee premium drops to 12 
percent when the industry specialist is a joint national and city-specific industry leader. The results of 
both studies by McMeeking et al. (2006) and Basioudis and Francis (2007) reinforce that there is 
either no or  low distribution of knowledge between offices of the audit firms in the U.K., and that the 
U.K. national industry leadership is mainly city-specific, as national leadership alone in the U.K. does 
not earn any fee fermium. This is in contrast to findings in the U.S. and Australia, where there is 
evidence of at least some knowledge sharing across the Big Four offices (Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005). This is evidenced by an average premium of 24 percent in Australia, and 17 
percent in the U.S. when the audit is jointly affected by the city and national industry leadership, but 
not for national industry leadership alone (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005). The findings by 
McMeeking et al. (2006) and Basioudis and Francis (2007) overturn the earlier expectation that 
national level industry leadership might be relatively more important than city-specific reputations in a 
smaller country with a relatively centralised economy like the U.K. (Basioudis and Francis, 2007). 
However, the U.K. evidence to date is similar to New Zealand in showing that the Big 4 city-specific 
industry leadership alone matters more than joint national and city-specific industry leadership, as it is 
able to earn higher fee premiums. Also, no significant fee premium is reported for Big 4 national 
industry leaders in the U.K. relative to other Big 4 auditors that are not national industry leaders. The 
prior U.K. results imply that knowledge sharing and transfer in respect of industry expertise does not 
occur across the city-offices of the Big 4 firms.  
 
In respect of the audit office size, Choi et al. (2010) show that the office size has a stronger positive 
effect on fee premium size and has significantly positive relations with audit quality (measured by 
lower level of accruals), even after controlling for national-level audit firm size and office-level 
industry expertise. Consistently, Francis and Yu (2009) also found that the Big 4 office size is 
positively associated with accruals, auditors’ likelihood to issue going-concern opinion and the 
likelihood of meeting earnings benchmarks. 
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This premium is further supported by evidence showing that city-specific industry specialist auditors 
are associated with lower discretionary accruals (Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Sun and Liu, 2013), are 
less likely to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts by one penny per share (Reichelt and Wang, 
2010) and are more likely to be issued a going-concern audit opinion (Reichelt and Wang, 2010). 
Gunny et al. (2007) documented that auditor industry expertise at the city level is more important than 
the auditor tenure in mitigating the possibility of receiving both audit and serious deficiency reports 
from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  
 
2.4.2.3 Partner level industry specialisation 
Nevertheless, more recent and concurrent studies have pushed the local analysis one step further to the 
engagement partner-level. This is based on the argument that industry expertise is uniquely 
attributable to the individual audit partner human capital in terms of their knowledge and experience 
from leading audit engagements in a particular industry (Chi and Chin, 2011). It may not be possible 
to fully transfer the audit partner deep expertise between offices and among other audit partners 
practicing in the same audit firm due to the reasons that 1) not all types of knowledge within the audit 
firm can be documented and transferred, 2) an individual audit partner’s professional judgement is 
unique, 3) information technology expert knowledge systems are not automatically embraced by 
everyone, and that 4) “evaluation apprehension, performance based compensation schemes and 
individual auditors' pursuit of personal benefits and power may deter auditors from sharing what they 
know with others” (Vera-Munoz et al., 2006). Furthermore, the additional industry-specific and client-
specific information held by the audit engagement partner places him/her in a better competitive 
position relative to his/her peers, which may result in higher economic benefits in terms of 
remuneration and reputation. In addition, studies on tacit knowledge suggest that industry expertise 
develops from individual personal beliefs, experiences and values and is not easily transferred because 
it is subconsciously understood and applied (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; 
Nagy, 2014). Hence, it would be acceptable to claim that audit quality is not only a product of an audit 
firm’s brand name, but also the characteristics and reputation of the audit partner itself. 
 
2.4.2.3.1 The relationship between the audit firm national level industry specialisation, audit 
quality and earnings quality 
Goodwin and Wu (2014) in their study in Australia, reported evidence of fee premium only for 
companies audited by partners who are industry leaders at the city level, suggesting that partner level 
expertise is the driver of the audit fee premium for industry expertise. Their results are consistent 
when they control for either the top first, top second or the top three ranked city partners. On the other 
hand, Nagy (2014) found evidence using U.S. data to suggest that auditor specialisation at both the 
partner- and office-levels is associated with a fee premium and that there is no significant difference 
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between partner- and office-level specialisation effects in regards to fee premiums. Zerni et al. (2011) 
also report a premium for partner industry specialisation in Sweden. Consistent with this, a study in 
Taiwan by Chin and Chi (2009) documents that partner industry specialists reduce restatements. Chi 
and Chin (2011) further provide evidence that differential discretionary accruals due to industry 
expertise are driven by a combination of firm and partner expertise, whereas the differential likelihood 
of a modified audit opinion is primarily attributable to signing auditor specialists.  
 
2.4.2.4 Additional literature on auditor industry specialisation  
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) find premiums only for specialists who have a significantly larger market 
share than their competitors. Cahan et al. (2011) find the specialist premium to be inversely related to 
the proportion of industry clients audited by the specialists. Minutti-Meza (2013) found that while 
positive association exists between industry specialist auditors and audit fees and audit quality, the 
study found that there are no statistically significant differences in any of the audit quality proxies 
between the two groups of auditors, and no consistent evidence supporting the existence of a specialist 
fee premium after matching clients of specialist and non-specialist auditors on a number of 
dimensions, as well as controlling for client fixed-effects. 
 
Fung et al. (2002) examined the effects of city-level auditor industry specialisation and scale 
economies on audit pricing in the U.S. during the 2000 to2007 period, where the scale measure was 
based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level. They document 
significant specialisation premiums and scale discounts in both the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. 
However, the effects of industry specialisation and scale economies on audit pricing are highly 
interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees is only obtained for clients of 
specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they 
enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are forced to pass on scale economies to 
clients with greater bargaining power. 
 
Cahan et al. (2015) documented that the ability of an industry specialist auditor to charge fee 
premiums is reduced in the case of clients who are highly differentiated based on firm-specific 
investment opportunity sets (IOS), as the knowledge gathered in auditing other clients within the 
industry is often not applicable to clients in more unique IOS environments. This study contributes to 
the literature by showing that industry specialist premiums are not constant for firms in the same 
industry; rather, they reflect a trade-off between firm- and industry-specific knowledge.  
 
Using the spatial competition theory, Numan and Willekens (2012) examined the effect of market 
share distance between the industry specialist audit firm and its closest competitor within the city-
industry audit market on the fee premium of the industry specialists in the U.S.. They document that 
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audit fees increase in both auditor-client industry alignment and industry market share distance to the 
closest competitor. They also found that the fee premium of the industry specialist auditor drops as the 
distance with the closest competitor becomes smaller. Their study has important implications as it 
indicates that the market share-based measures of industry specialisation pick up both auditor-client 
alignment effects (market power through specialised knowledge) as well as market share distance 
effects (market power through differentiation from the closest competitor). Subsequently, Numan and 
Willekens (2014) examined the effect of competitive pressure from close competitors on audit quality 
provided by the industry specialist auditor. They found that audit quality diminishes with increased 
competitive pressure from close competitors within the city-industry audit market. This is evidenced 
by the lower likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion to a financially distressed company, higher 
discretionary accruals and higher likelihood of financial restatements as the market share distance with 
the closest competitor becomes smaller. They also found that the industry expertise dominance that an 
industry specialist auditor has over its closest competitor is the primary driver of audit quality, instead 
of industry leadership per se.  
 
2.5 Corporate governance  
This section provides a definition of corporate governance from various perspectives and highlights 
the issues surrounding it. It also discusses the three important dimensions of corporate governance, 
namely the board of directors, audit committee and the internal audit function.  
 
2.5.1 Corporate governance definition 
Corporate governance has been defined in various ways based on different theories adopted, 
perspectives and interests of the parties which are involved and affected by the corporate governance 
system (Solomon, 2007). The most widely recognised definition of corporate governance is offered by 
Sir Adrian Cadbury (Cadbury Report, 1992), which succinctly and clearly defines corporate 
governance as “the whole system of controls, both financial and otherwise, by which a company is 
directed and controlled”. From the shareholder’s point of view, Denis (2001: 192) describes corporate 
governance as “a set of institutional and market mechanisms that aim to motivate self-interested 
managers to maximise the shareholders’ wealth, measured by the value of the residual cash flows of 
the companies”. Focusing more on investors’ protection, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) describe 
corporate governance as “dealing with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting return on their investment”. These definitions are based on agency theory, which 
associates corporate governance with the issue of ownership and control and maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth. Based on the above definitions, it can be seen that corporate governance is a 
relatively new discipline which is still evolving. It began from the original idea of corporate 
governance being the relationship between a company and its shareholders, to the web of relationships 
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between a company and all its stakeholders. According to Mallin (2010: 13), “corporate governance 
has only relatively recently come into prominence in the business world, and the term ‘corporate 
governance’ itself and its everyday usage in the press is a new phenomenon in the last 15 years”. 
 
Based on the more recent corporate governance regulatory developments in the U.K., the Walker 
Review (2009: 19) describes the role of corporate governance as one which “protects and advances 
the interests of shareholders through setting the strategic direction of a company and appointing and 
monitoring capable management to achieve this”. The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010:1) 
refers to the purpose of corporate governance as being to “facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and 
prudent management that can deliver the long-term success of the company”.  Hence, the role of 
corporate governance is to be distinguished from the management executive role, as it focuses on 
monitoring and directing activities instead of being involved in the daily operation of the business. 
Consistent with this, Du Plessis et al. (2011: 81) summarise the board functions and responsibilities as 
being to “direct, govern, guide, monitor, oversee, supervise and comply”. “The board sets the link 
between managers and investors, and is essential to good corporate governance and investor relations” 
(Mallin, 2010; 164). 
 
The board structure in the U.K. takes the form of a unitary (“one-tier”) board, where all the directors 
are working to achieve the same purpose. This is in contrast to the dual (“two-tier”) board system 
practiced in other European countries such as Germany, where the board function is divided into two 
boards, namely the supervisory board and the management board, so that there is a clear distinction 
between management and control. Given the U.K.’s unitary board system, structural issues such as the 
separation of the role of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the balanced composition of 
executive and non-executive directors, and the appointment of sub-committees such as an audit 
committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee and risk management committee becomes 
important. This is to ensure that all the board decisions are made in the best interests of the company 
and that the decisions are made objectively without any individual or group of individuals dominating 
the board’s decision making. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that rewards are linked to the performance of the directors gives rise to 
accountability problems and scrutiny issues. For example, the recent financial crisis can be linked to 
the corporate governance failures in the banking industry, specifically 1) the failure of the boards of 
directors, particularly the independent non-executive directors in their monitoring role over risk 
management activities, and 2) the inappropriate and lucrative performance-related remuneration 
packages provided to the directors and managers of the banks encouraging them to engage in risk 
taking activities (MacNeil, 2010: 518; Walker Review, 2009). In addition, the bank failures raise 
questions about the value of company audits, auditor independence and quality of audit work, as well 
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as the competency and knowledge base of the auditors (Sikka, 2009). These accountability issues raise 
the need to examine the effectiveness of the existing corporate governance regulations and 
implementation, as well as the quality of the audit, particularly in the public listed firms where the 
interests of a large number of stakeholders are at stake.   
 
Accordingly, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010), published in June 2010, was drafted by the 
FRC to accommodate the lessons learned from the financial crisis, and was subsequently revised in 
2012 and 2014. This code of best practices is proposed for the U.K. public listed companies to comply 
with, or if not, to explain in their annual report reasons for such non-compliance (FRC, 2010). The 
subsequent sections will discuss the corporate governance characteristics that will be examined in this 
study in light of their contribution to the financial reporting process.  
  
2.5.2 Board diversity 
The board of directors represents the cornerstone of corporate governance as they have the power to 
override management decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Based on prior literature and the recent 
regulatory developments in the U.K., the characteristics of board effectiveness that are examined in 
this study is board diversity in terms of gender and nationality.  
 
2.5.2.1 Female directors 
Female directorship is one of the core characteristics of corporate governance in the U.K., and it is 
believed that it contributes to better overall financial reporting quality.  
 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2012, 2014) recommends that board members be 
appointed “on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the 
board, including gender” (Principle B.2). Also, in 2010, the U.K. government commissioned Lord 
Davies to carry out an investigation identifying the reasons for why women have been precluded from 
holding top executive positions in U.K. publicly listed companies, and to provide recommendations 
for improvements in gender diversity on boards.  
 
Prior research pertaining to gender differences identified a few factors which differentiate the 
effectiveness of male and female workers in their board representations which can be observed in 
terms of leadership style (Nielsen and Huse, 2010), behaviour and skills (Yukl, 2002) and greater 
demand for effective monitoring in order to protect their reputation in the capital markets (Gilson, 
1990). 
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Thomas and Ely (1996) assert that the representation of female directors on boards brings more 
synergy to the board functionality, and the effect of such synergy is double if new male board 
members are recruited given the same level of qualification and capabilities. Several studies (Clarke, 
2005; Huse and Solberg, 2006) have stressed  that boards with female directors are more deliberate 
and thorough in their discussion and decision making, and are more likely to give due consideration to 
difficult issues that are normally taken for granted by all male boards.  Joy (2008) highlighted that 
female directors’ communication skills help facilitate more effective communication between the 
board and investors. Improvements in board deliberation and communication are expected to 
contribute to better monitoring ability (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
 
Female directors are reported to exercise greater diligence in their monitoring role, as evidenced by 
their ability to improve board attendance rate, improve CEO accountability, and higher participation in 
committees charged with governance and auditing (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In terms of financial 
reporting outcome, prior studies have reported that the presence of female directors on board and audit 
committees reduces earnings management activities through accruals manipulation (Srinidhi et al., 
2011). Gul et al. (2008) documented that auditors exert higher levels of effort in auditing companies 
with female directors as compared to male directors given their high concern for audit and risk 
oversight and controls (Rosener, 2003). Female directors also contribute to increased disclosure and 
decreases in the cost of capital (Gul et al., 2010). A U.S. study by Gul et al. (2011) found that “stock 
prices of companies with gender-diverse boards reflect more company-specific information after 
controlling for corporate governance, earnings quality, institutional ownership and acquisition 
activity”. Taken together, female participation on board and audit committees is viewed as 
contributing to better financial reporting quality and improved investor confidence in the quality of the 
reported earnings. 
  
Nevertheless, there are also studies suggesting the negative effect of having female directors on 
boards, such as increased firm costs due to higher turnover and absenteeism (Cox and Blake, 1991), 
the notion that women are more risk-averse than men (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998), and the 
increased likelihood of conflict when women are the minority gender representative (Richard et al., 
2004). In other words, more gender diversity may not necessarily contribute to more effective 
monitoring as they are discriminated against and not given fair and equal say in their role relative to 
men (Carter et al., 2003). 
  
On the other hand, prior research on other countries besides the U.S. has failed to find a significant 
relationship between the percentage of female members of U.S. boards and several accounting 
measures of financial performance. This includes studies from the U.S. (Shrader et al., 1997), Sweden 
(Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000),  Denmark (Smith et al., 2006; Rose, 2007) as well as cross-country 
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studies of over 500 of the largest firms from three Scandinavian countries, namely Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden (Randøy et al., 2006). Ye et al. (2010) report that in China the gender of top executives 
has no effect on earnings quality, as measured by i) the accuracy of current earnings in forecasting 
future cash flows, ii) earnings persistence, iii) absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals and iv) the 
association between earnings and stock returns. These findings indicate that the effect of gender 
diversity between countries varies. Nevertheless, none of these studies have explored the effect of 
gender diversity in the U.K. market. 
   
2.5.2.2 Foreign directors 
Given the increasing internationalisation of business, there has been a higher demand for nationality 
diversity of board members in order to gain easy access to the knowledge and contacts in foreign 
markets where the directors originate (Carpenter et al., 2001).  
 
The literature suggests that foreign directors go beyond financial contributions and extend to the 
provision of managerial expertise and technical collaborations, increasing creativity and innovation. 
Directors with different nationalities introduce heterogeneity of ideas, experiences and points of view 
(Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012). Further, diversity on boards may reduce information 
asymmetry and the associated agency costs, improve the financial flexibility of domestic firms by 
increasing the pool of potential investors and financing opportunities, and expand cross-border flows 
of knowledge and technology (Fogel et al., 2013). Following this line, Carter et al. (2003) found a 
significant positive relationship between the percentage of ethnic minority directors on the board and 
Tobin’s Q (as a measure of firm performance). Similarly, by using a sample of firms with headquarters 
in Korea, Choi et al. (2007) indicate that there is a significantly higher value for firms that have 
outsider Anglo-American board members.  
 
Nevertheless, reviews of diversity research (Konrad and Kramer, 2006; Ruigrok et al., 2007) assert 
that task-related diversity contributes to positive cognitive and signalling consequences (e.g. creativity, 
innovation) but relations-oriented diversity leads to negative communication and affective 
consequences such as lower decision speed, misunderstandings, and conflicts (Konrad and Kramer, 
2006; Ruigrok et al., 2007). These dissimilar others are likely to show lower commitment to the 
organisation, express less satisfaction, perceive more discrimination, and display a variety of other 
negative behavioural and attitudinal outcomes (Jayne and Dipboye, 2004). According to Masulis et al. 
(2012), foreign directors are likely to be less familiar with national accounting rules, laws and 
regulations, governance standards, and management methods, making it more difficult for them to 
evaluate managerial performance or challenge managerial decisions. Their results find that firms with 
foreign directors in the U.S. exhibit significantly lower performance (returns on assets), especially 
when they do not have a significant business presence in their home region. In this line, relational 
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demography research in psychology has also shown that working with demographically dissimilar 
others is often associated with negative outcomes (Riordan, 2000). Another reason to expect a 
negative influence of foreign directors on firm performance is that on bank boards most foreign 
directors represent investors who have different investment horizons and who are primarily oriented 
towards stock market-based measures of performance. As a result, foreign directors who represent 
foreign fund managers may be much more likely to be concerned about selling the shares of an 
underperforming company than investing time and energy in instituting a process of corporate 
restructuring (Douma et al., 2006). Based on the theory and conflicting empirical evidence, the effect 
of foreigners on banks’ boards can be negative or positive.  
 
2.5.3 Internal audit  
The International Auditing Standard (ISA 610) prescribe that the auditor could rely on the work of the 
internal audit of the client, and consider its effectiveness in determining the nature, timing and extent 
of audit procedures to be performed during the audit. A review study on the auditor reliance on 
internal audits by Bame-Aldred et al. (2013) concludes that the auditor reliance on the client’s internal 
audit function has an impact on litigation risk, audit efficiency, audit fees, financial statement quality, 
and internal control quality. Consistent with this, Felix et al. (2001) report evidence of decrease in 
audit fees by 18 percent as a result of effective coordination with the internal audit function of the 
client’s company.  
 
In recent years, the role and scope of the internal audit does not solely focus on evaluating and 
improving the firm’s internal control, but also includes corporate governance and risk management 
(IIA, 1999; Cohen et al., 2004; Gramling et al., 2004). This emerging role of the internal audit would 
surely have an effect on the external auditors’ reliance decisions (Munro and Stewart, 2010; Schneider 
2009). According to Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), companies are more likely to use an internal 
audit when agency costs are high (Adams, 1994). The internal audit function plays an important role in 
facilitating the audit committee in its financial reporting oversight role (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; 
Goodwin, 2003). Given the current business environment, due importance has been given to the 
relationship between internal and external auditors (Gramling et al., 2004), considering its role as a 
“detection and deterrent mechanism that moderates earnings management” (Prawitt et al., 2009).  
 
Abbott et al. (2012) and Pizzini et al. (2011) report evidence that external auditors’ reliance on the 
internal audit function of the client helps increase audit efficiency, resulting in reduced audit delay.  
Lin et al. (2011) further examine data from a study by Pizzini et al. (2011) and document that internal 
audit and external audit coordination leads to improved weakness disclosure.  
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Felix et al. (2001) and Prawitt et al. (2009) find a significant negative relationship between audit fees 
and high quality internal audit function, while Anderson et al. (1993) report an inverse relationship 
between internal audit budgets and external audit fees. Hay et al. (2008), Hay (2013) and Zain et al. 
(2015) also find a positive association between internal controls and audit fees. Prawitt et al. (2011) 
and Abbott et al. (2012) report that the time spent by the internal auditor in directly assisting external 
auditors reduces audit fees. Zain et al. (2015) extend the work of Felix et al. (2001) by showing that 
the reliance of external auditors on the internal auditor’s work is contingent on the quality of the 
client’s internal audit function. 
 
There are two opposing views on the contribution of the internal audit to the external auditor. Studies 
that report a positive association between the internal audit and audit fees support the view that the 
internal audit and external audit play a complementary role in promoting a strong control environment 
within a company (Singh and Newby, 2010). Firms with effective corporate governance have a higher 
likelihood of engaging in greater levels of internal auditing and external auditing, or, in other words, 
this indicates their willingness to make more investment in achieving a high quality internal audit 
function, as well as pay for a higher quality external audit (Zain et al., 2015).  
 
On the other hand, studies which find a negative association between the internal audit and audit fees 
support the argument that the internal audit, either partly or in full, could represent a substitute for the 
external audit (Singh and Newby, 2010). The substitutive mechanism takes place when the strong 
control environment safeguarded by the internal audit function leads to high reliance by the external 
auditor, contributes to lower assessment of audit risk, and causes the auditor to reduce his/her audit 
effort, thus, resulting in lower audit fees (Wallace, 1984; Felix et al., 2001; Zain et al., 2015). 
 
There are a few possible explanations for why studies fail to find a significant relationship between the 
internal audit and audit fees: 1) there may be no underlying relationship between the internal audit and 
audit fees; 2) the proxy used to measure the internal audit is not strong enough; 3) the auditor may 
choose not to reduce their audit effort despite their reliance on the internal audit function; and 4) there 
may be a simultaneous negative and positive effect which offsets each other simultaneously (Singh 
and Newby, 2010). 
 
 A study by Davidson et al. (2005) in Australia is the first to examine the effect of the internal audit 
function on earnings management. Their study failed to find any evidence to suggest that the presence 
(versus absence) of the internal audit function within a company is associated with lower levels of 
earnings management. A more recent study by Prawit (2009) examined the same issue, but used a 
more sophisticated measure of internal audit quality based on a composite variable that captures 
multiple characteristics specified by external auditing standards as indicators of a high-quality internal 
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audit function obtained from the Institute of Internal Auditor’s unique GAIN data archive. Prawit 
(2009) examined the effect of internal audit quality on earnings management in the U.S. between 2000 
and 2005. He reported evidence of a significant negative relationship between overall internal audit 
function quality with absolute abnormal accruals, negative abnormal accruals and likelihood to meet 
analysts’ forecasts.  
 
2.5.4 Characteristics of audit committee effectiveness 
An audit committee is a sub-committee appointed by the board, and is responsible for the financial 
reporting oversight. The existence and effectiveness of the audit committee strengthens the control 
environment for the auditors which they rely on when conducting their audit (Muniandy, 2007; 
Krishnan, 2005). In the auditing process, the audit committee influence the selection of high quality 
auditors (Knapp, 1991; Abbott and Parker; 2000, Chen et al., 2005; Abbott and Parker, 2001), protect 
auditors’ independence (Abbott et al. 2003b), and assess the appropriateness and adequacy of the audit 
plan (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001; Simunic and Stein, 1996). The U.K. Corporate Governance Code 
(2010: 19) requires the board to establish an audit committee comprised of at least three members who 
are independent non-executive directors, with at least one member having recent and relevant financial 
experience.  
 
2.5.4.1 Audit committee size 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010: 19) requires the establishment of an audit committee 
comprised of a minimum of three independent non-executive directors, or in the case of smaller 
companies, two independent non-executive directors. Previous research has reported that the average 
size of an audit committee is between three to four members (Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; 
Vafeas, 2005). A large size audit committee represents greater resources, talents, skills and knowledge 
to rely on in overseeing the financial reporting process (Norman et al., 2007; Lin and Hwang, 2010). 
Accordingly, the size of the audit committee is measured based on the number of directors in the 
committee (Abbott et al., 2004). A larger size audit committee contributes to diversity in terms of 
skills and knowledge for the committee monitoring process (Norman et al., 2007). Larger audit 
committees are also found to be more concerned about auditors’ reputations, and prefer the Big Four 
as their auditors (Chen and Zhou, 2007). Too small of a size of an audit committee might result in 
problems with spreading assignments among members, whereas too large a size of an audit committee 
might be detrimental to the members’ performance due to the possible problems in coordination and 
process, leading to poor monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 2005).     
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2.5.4.2 Audit committee independence 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010:9) requires the board to establish an audit committee of 
at least three, or in case of smaller companies, two, independent non-executive directors. Literature 
suggests that audit committees that are independent preserve the objectivity of the internal and 
external auditors (Vicknair et al., 1993; Deli and Gillan, 2000; Abbott et al. 2003a), are more 
questionable of management actions (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), are more conservative and 
supportive of the proposed audit adjustment and auditor’s effort (Dezoort et al., 2003), and reduce 
management threat to replace or dismiss the existing auditor when modified opinion is being issued 
(Carcello and Neal, 2003a; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Knapp, 1985; Carcello and Neal, 2000). Audit 
committee independence is measured by the proportion of non-executive directors in the committee 
(Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Klein, 2002). 
 
Besides this, audit committees with independent members are associated with a lower likelihood of 
internal control problems (Krishnan, 2005), fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley et al., 2000; 
Abbott et al., 2000), and earnings restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). 
Abbott and Parker (2001) found that a fully independent audit committee that meets more than two 
times annually prefers Big 6 auditors in the event of auditor switches, while Abbott and Parker (2000) 
and Chen et al. (2005) reported that firms with higher proportion of independent non-executive 
directors in audit committees are more likely to select industry specialist auditors. The findings by 
Abbot and Parker (2001) and Chen et al. (2005) suggest that independent audit committees have a 
demand for higher audit quality.   
 
2.5.4.3 Audit committee financial expertise 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010:19) requires the audit committee to be comprised of at 
least one member who has recent and relevant financial experience. Audit committees which are 
comprised of financially expert members, especially ones equipped with auditing knowledge, have a 
higher likelihood of communicating detected material misstatements and correcting them in a timely 
manner (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). This suggests that knowledge and experience in auditing and 
internal control improves the audit committee performance and judgements in their financial oversight 
role, allowing them to function in a similar capacity as an expert practicing auditor. Audit committee 
members with financial expertise in accounting are able to effectively assess the nature and 
appropriateness of accounting choices, constrain aggressive accounting policies and provide incentives 
to avoid the risk of litigation (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). 
 
Research on audit committee expertise reported that markets react positively to the appointment of 
audit committee members with financial expertise (Davidson et al., 2004). DeFond et al. (2005) assert 
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that this positive reaction only occurs when the audit committee member has accounting-related 
expertise and only when the appointing firm has relatively strong corporate governance. This suggests 
that investors value audit committee accounting expertise more than its financial expertise (DeFond et 
al., 2005). Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) documented that audit committees comprised of 
financially expert members are associated with increased levels of accounting conservatism. The 
findings of strong effects of audit committee financial expertise by Defond et al. (2005) and Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2008) were concentrated on firms with effective functioning corporate boards. 
DeFond et al. (2005) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) measured audit committee expertise in 
three ways: accounting financial experts (directors with experience as certified public accountants, 
controllers or chief finance officers), non-accounting financial experts (directors with experience as 
CEOs or presidents) and non-financial experts (directors who are neither accounting nor non-
accounting financial experts). Other measurements of audit committee expertise used in previous 
research include SEC’s definition of a financial expert (Abbott et al., 2004), audit partner experience 
(Naiker and Sharma, 2009), auditing expertise (Barua et al., 2010), and industry expertise (Cohen et 
al. 2010). These advances in the precision of audit committee expertise measures have deepened our 
understanding of audit committee effectiveness (Carcello et al., 2011) and indicate that the knowledge 
base of the audit committee members is of important consideration in determining its effectiveness in 
performing its financial reporting oversight role (Cohen et al., 2002). 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned research, Carcello et al. (2006) document that companies with at 
least one financial expert in the audit committee (with an accounting background) are positively 
associated with subsequent common stock or debt issuance and institutional ownership, and negatively 
associated with having a Big Four auditor. Krishnan and Lee (2009) found that the presence of 
accounting expertise on the audit committee is positively related to litigation risk, but only in 
companies with stronger corporate governance, while Coates et al. (2007) reported that companies that 
improved their apparent audit committee financial literacy had higher stock returns than those that did 
not.  
 
2.5.4.4 Audit committee activity 
It is also important that the audit committee members allocate sufficient time to meet and discuss the 
performing of their monitoring role in the firm’s financial reporting process (Lin and Hwang, 2010). 
Active audit committee that meet frequently are likely to be better informed and more diligent in 
performing their duties (Abbott et al. 2003a). Consistently, prior research has used the frequency of 
audit committee meetings as an indication of its diligence and level of activity (Peasnell et al., 2005; 
Yang and Krishnan, 2005). A study by Gendron et al. (2004) on audit committee meeting processes 
documented that audit committee members placed emphasis on financial statement accuracy, financial 
report wording, control effectiveness, and audit quality discussions in their meetings, and also sought 
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to pose tough questions to management and the auditors. The audit committee members develop their 
sense of audit committee effectiveness by considering member backgrounds (independence and 
expertise), substantive and ceremonial features of audit committee meetings, and informal activities 
outside of audit committee meetings (Gendron and Bedard, 2006). Cohen et al. (2010) documented 
that audit committees in the post-SOX era are perceived to have more knowledge and authority, and to 
be more diligent and active.  
 
Audit committees that frequently meet are associated with lower incidence of errors, irregularities and 
illegal acts (McMullen, 1996), lower likelihood to be sanctioned for fraud and aggressive accounting 
(Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley et al., 2000), and lesser prior period restatements (Abbott et al., 2004). 
Audit committees that meet frequently demand more assurance and audit effort from the auditor 
(larger audit scope and more testing performed), contributing to higher audit fees and higher audit 
quality (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). Hence, it seems that inactive audit committees are unlikely 
to monitor management effectively (Menon and Williams, 1994). Active audit committees that meet 
frequently are likely to be better informed and more diligent in performing their duties (Abbott et al., 
2003a). During the meeting, the audit committee members emphasise financial statement accuracy, 
control effectiveness and audit quality discussions, financial report wording, and questioning 
management and auditors on their actions/decisions (Gendron et al., 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, the argument exists as to whether the number of audit committee meetings is a good 
indication of their activeness or diligence, as it does not reflect the quality of the discussion carried out 
by the audit committee members (Menon and Williams, 1994). Cohen et al. (2010) found evidence 
that audit committees in some companies are passive with respect to resolving disagreements between 
management and the auditor. Beasley et al. (2009) study of the post-SOX era found evidence of both 
substantive audit committee monitoring and ceremonial actions, with lack of consensus regarding the 
audit committee’s oversight on financial statement fraud risk. Spira (1999) and Gendron et al. (2004) 
found that a great deal of audit committee activity occurs outside of formal meetings. This is further 
supported by a case study finding by Turley and Zaman (2007) on the U.K. listed companies which 
suggests that audit committees influence governance outcomes through informal meetings with the 
auditors, instead of raising complex and probing questions and opinions during the meeting itself.  
 
2.5.5 The relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting quality 
This study will examine empirically whether an effective board, audit committee and internal audit  
function limits the opportunistic earnings management practices of the client, which as a result also 
reduces the company’s agency cost. Research to date provides mixed results on the relationship 
between the effectiveness of board, audit committee and internal audit function in promoting earnings 
quality. Positive findings in support of the effectiveness of corporate governance role in constraining 
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earnings management are more prevalent in Anglo-American countries as compared to communitarian 
and developing countries (Gracia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009). The differences are driven by 
country-specific characteristics such as ownership concentration, legal system and level of investor 
protection (Millar et al., 2005) which are likely to influence the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and earnings management (Gracia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009).  
 
Most of the extant research has focused on the U.S. market (Warfield et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 
1996; Abbott et al., 2000; Bushee, 2001; Klein, 2002; Jiambalvo et al., 2002; Xie at al., 2003, Larcker 
and Richardson, 2004; Bédard et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2004; Vafeas, 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 
2005; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Charitou et al., 2007; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008; Naiker and Sharma, 2009; Cheng and Reitenga, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Gul 
et al., 2011). Xie at al. (2003) report that a more independent, diligent and financially expert board and 
audit committee contributes to lower levels of discretionary current accruals, but the audit committee 
size is found to have an insignificant effect on earnings management. Larcker and Richardson (2004) 
divide their samples into three clusters and report that for companies with strong governance 
(measured using their developed Corporate Governance Index), no relationship or a weak relationship 
exists between non-audit services and accruals quality. A statistically significant positive relationship 
is only found for companies that have weak corporate governance levels such as higher management 
ownership, lower institutional ownership, and a lower percentage of independent board members.  
 
Klein (2002) reports negative association between discretionary accruals and audit committee 
independence when the proportion of independent members is 50 percent, but not 100 percent, 
suggesting that it is not necessary for the audit committee to be fully comprised of independent 
directors in order for it to effectively function. Bédard et al. (2004), though, document a significant 
decrease in the probability of aggressive earnings management when the audit committee is larger in 
size, fully independent, and comprised of financially expert members, but no association is found with 
audit committee meeting frequency. However, as their sample is selected from companies “at the 
extremes of the abnormal accrual distribution”, the generalisability of their findings is limited.  
 
Vafeas (2005) report that more “insiders” in the audit committee are associated with a higher 
likelihood that companies avoid earnings decline and negative earnings surprises, while small earnings 
increases are associated with companies with less frequent audit committee meetings. Using both 
Jones’ (1991) total discretionary accruals model and Teoh et al. (1998) current discretionary accruals 
model, Yang and Krishnan (2005) document that the audit committee independence, financial 
expertise and frequency of meetings are not significantly associated with earnings management, 
whereas larger audit committee size and outside directorship is positively related to lower levels of 
earnings management. 
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Abbott et al. (2000) report that audit committees which are comprised of solely independent non-
executive directors and which meet at least twice a year encounter fewer fraudulent financial 
statements. Abbott et al. (2004) report that audit committees with independent members that are active 
and have financial expertise reduce the likelihood of prior year earnings’ restatements, but not audit 
committee size. Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) document that an independent and financially 
expert board and audit committee reduces the incidence of financial restatements.  
 
A study by Naiker and Sharma (2009) reported that audit committee member experience as an audit 
firm partner (who is also affiliated with the incumbent audit firm) is negatively related to Kothari et al. 
(2005) performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. Dhaliwal et al. (2010), however, found that 
accruals quality is positively related to accounting expertise on the audit committee (when the 
accounting expert is independent, has fewer other board seats, and has lower tenure), especially when 
accounting expertise and finance expertise are both present. Their accruals quality is measured by the 
modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) discretionary accruals model. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) found that accounting expertise (but not other expertise) on the audit committee is 
associated with greater conservatism, but only when overall corporate governance is strong. In a 
similar vein, using Korean data Choi et al. (2004) report that audit committee members with 
experience as academicians (Professors) or as employees in financial institutions reduces the 
occurrence of earnings management, but not audit committee independence. 
 
Davidson et al. (2005) find that an independent board and audit committee are significantly negatively 
related to lower levels of earnings management. All these studies use the modified Jones (1991) 
discretionary accrual model. Benkel et al. (2006) also report a positive significant relationship 
between audit committee independence and earnings management using the discretionary accruals 
model developed by DeAngelo (1986). Piot and Janin (2007) document that the presence of an 
independent audit committee constrains earnings management practices in the French listed 
companies, using discretionary current accruals measured by Jeter and Shivakumar, (1999) and the 
Jones (1991) model.  
 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) found that earnings management tends to be smaller in companies with 
smaller board sizes but no significant association is found between audit committee size and 
independence with earnings management in Malaysia, using discretionary working capital accruals 
measured by the cross-sectional modified version of the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. 
(1995). However, in Indonesia, Siregar and Utama (2008) do not find any significant relationship 
between audit committee independence and earnings management using the discretionary accruals 
measured by the Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), and Kasznik (1999) and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) models. These three findings suggest that board and audit committee independence does not 
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seem to be an effective mechanism in constraining earnings management practices in the developing 
countries, possibly due to the greater presence of controlling shareholders and cultural effects in those 
countries where the board members are less likely to question the management practices or decisions 
(García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009).     
 
In the U.K., Peasnell et al. (2000a) reports that more outside directors on the board and larger board 
size are positively associated with lesser income-increasing accruals when the company earnings fall 
below the threshold. They based their analysis on the comparison between pre-managed earnings with 
earnings threshold (either zero earnings or reported earnings from last year) in both the pre and post 
Cadbury period. Peasnell et al. (2000b) extend the study and document evidence suggesting that the 
application of income-increasing accruals to meet earnings target have reduced in the post-Cadbury 
period due to the increased proportion of non-executive directors in the U.K. boards. However, they 
do not find any significant relationship between board size and earnings management in the U.K., 
during the pre-and post-Cadbury periods. Subsequently, in 2005, Peasnell et al. (2005) extended the 
previous U.K. studies using 1993 to 1996 data and found no significant evidence to suggest that board 
size, audit committee establishment, directors’ stock ownership, blockholder (more than 10 percent 
shareholdings) and institutional ownership constrain discretionary accrual. 
 
Based on past studies, it can be observed that very limited studies have been conducted in the U.K. 
examining the role of board and audits in constraining earnings management activities. Studies that 
have been conducted by Peasnell et al. (2000a, 2000b, 2005), Beekes et al. (2004), Ferguson et al. 
(2004) and Iqbal and Strong (2010) were carried out using data prior to the year 2000. Since then, 
many regulatory changes have been made to the U.K. corporate governance framework such as the 
continued revision to the U.K. Combined Code (2003; 2006; 2009) and the most recent issuance of the 
new U.K. Corporate Governance Code by the FRC in 2010 (subsequently improved in 2012 and 
2014), taking into account lessons learned from the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This raises the 
question whether the prior U.K. findings are still valid and calls for research using more recent data 
given the impact of the new governance reforms on the role played by boards and audit committees in 
enhancing the quality of financial reporting in U.K. public listed companies.  
 
In addition, research on the effect of board diversity on earnings management is very limited. This is 
because board diversity is still a new phenomenon, and its contribution towards corporate governance 
effectiveness in the financial reporting process has yet to be extensively examined and proven. Hence, 
the PhD study fills the gap in the literature by examining the effect of female directors and foreign 
directors on boards simultaneously, in relation to the audit quality and earnings quality of the U.K. 
public listed companies.  
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While there are quite a few studies on the effect of internal audit function on audit quality, studies on 
the effect of internal audits on earnings quality are relatively scarce. Almost all of the past studies have 
been carried out in a U.S. setting. This begs an interesting question as to whether similar findings also 
apply to the U.K. given the different regulatory environment between the two countries.   
 
Also, the majority of the corporate governance and earnings management studies mentioned above 
rely on the Jones (1991) and modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) to measure discretionary 
accruals as the proxy for earnings management. This is due to the high explanatory power of these 
models despite their limitation. While most corporate governance studies tend to focus on a single 
proxy to measure earnings management (e.g. Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004), more 
recent studies by Wang (2006) and Ye et al., (2010) adopt multiple approaches to measure earnings 
management in their analysis including discretionary accruals, cash flow predictions, earnings 
persistence, earnings informativeness, and persistence of transitory loss components.  
 
Besides this, some studies have examined the function of board and audit committees separately 
(Abbott et al., 2000; Bedard et al., 2004), while some studies have combined the function of both 
board and audit committees together when examining their effect on financial reporting quality 
(Rahman and Ali, 2006; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005).  It is argued that consideration of the audit 
committee in isolation is questionable, as audit committee effectiveness is associated with board 
composition and “a company’s corporate governance can only be strengthened through joint efforts 
between these two parties” (Cohen et al., 2002). Furthermore, the empowerment and selection of audit 
committee members are made by the board, suggesting that without strong support from the board, the 
audit committee cannot effectively fulfil its oversight functions (Cohen et al., 2004). Hence, this study 
suggests that the analysis of audit committee characteristics should not be segregated from the board 
of director characteristics by presenting them in different models, as this may not provide a complete 
analysis of the effectiveness of corporate governance in constraining earnings management.  
 
2.6 Summary 
Overall, the corporate governance and earnings management literature suggests that corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, the audit committee and the company’s 
internal audit function influence the credibility of financial statements by constraining earnings 
management practices. Similarly, industry specialist auditors, given their in depth industry knowledge 
and experience, are able to produce high quality audits, which limits the management manipulation of 
earnings. Research also shows that the product differentiation strategy adopted by the industry 
specialist auditor is valued by shareholders and investors as signalling high quality audits as they are 
able to command an audit fee premium relative to non-industry specialist auditors. The study views 
earnings management activities as an opportunistic behaviour by management, which is carried out in 
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a legitimate way within the violation of GAAP for the purpose of concealing the true economic value 
of the company.  
  
Overall, it can be seen that there is a very limited body of research examining the effectiveness of 
industry specialist auditors in constraining earnings management, particularly in light of the 
development of the various identified sources of auditor industry specialisation (e.g. using the national 
and city-level industry leadership framework, and the audit partner expertise as proxies for industry 
specialist auditors). Specifically, this issue still remains as an empirical question in the U.K. as it is yet 
to be tested. The only two studies in the U.K. that have employed the national and city-level industry 
leadership framework in their measures of auditor industry specialisation are by McMeeking et al. 
(2006) and Basioudis and Francis (2007). However, these two studies only examine the effect of 
auditor industry specialisation (using the national and city-level industry leadership framework) on 
audit fee premium, but not on audit quality and earnings management. Furthermore, there is a paucity 
of research with regards to the use of the individual audit partner as the unit of analysis, particularly in 
the U.K. The disclosure of the name of the senior statutory auditor (or engagement partner) signing off 
the auditor’s report for and on behalf of the audit firm was only made mandatory in the U.K. for 
financial years beginning on or after 6 April 2008 (Section 503 of Companies Act 2006). This new 
rule makes it interesting to examine the effect of the individual audit partner within the context of the 
study. Thus, this study fills the gap in the literature and responds to the recent call from academics 
(DeFond and Francis, 2005; Carcello, 2005) and policy makers for more scrutiny and understanding of 
audit quality at the individual audit partner level. 
 
A review of the governance literature reveals a scarcity of research in relation to board diversity. The 
effect of female directorship, foreign directorship and internal audit function on various measures of 
audit quality and earnings quality have yet to be thoroughly investigated, particularly in the U.K. 
Although the issues might have been examined in a different country, such findings may not apply to 
the U.K. given the different size of the capital markets, the cultural differences, the unique regulatory 
and economic environments, as well as the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms and investor 
protection.  
 
Research on financial crises (e.g. the Asian crisis and the 2007/2008 financial crisis) has shown that 
the motivation for earnings management is higher during financial crisis periods due to the unstable 
economic and financial conditions (e.g. Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2008; Lang and Maffett, 2011; 
Habib et al., 2013). Consequently, various governance reforms have taken place following the 
2007/2008 financial crisis (e.g. the implementation of the U.K. Stewardship Code and the Audit Firm 
Governance Code in 2010) with the aim to improve the quality of governance and auditing in the 
public listed companies, given that directors and auditors have been heavily criticised and blamed for a 
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lack of necessary diligence, and so contributing to the crisis. Thus, the financial crisis setting makes it 
interesting to analyse the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit 
quality and earnings quality to see whether the findings would turn out differently as compared to 
prior studies carried out during the non-crisis period.  Also, corporate governance research using more 
recent data is important, considering the changing financial reporting landscape and regulatory 
environment in the U.K. which has impacted the role played by corporate governance and external 
auditors recently. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The subject matter of this PhD thesis, which focuses on the issues related to auditor industry 
specialisation, corporate governance, audit quality and earnings quality, has been thoroughly discussed 
in the previous literature review chapter, where the gaps in the research literature have also been 
identified. This chapter describes the theoretical framework underpinning the current study from 
which the research questions and hypotheses are developed. As mentioned earlier, this PhD thesis 
examines two empirical research questions. The first empirical question is concerned with the effect of 
auditor industry specialisation and corporate governance structure on audit quality. The audit is taken 
in this study as a proxy capturing the variation in the level of audit effort as reflected in audit fees. The 
second empirical question examines the effectiveness of industry specialist auditors and firms’ 
corporate governance structures in promoting earnings quality through constraining earnings 
management activities.  
 
Before the empirical analysis is carried out, it is crucial to understand how a company’s corporate 
governance characteristics and auditor competencies and specialisation could affect the quality of an 
audit and the company’s quality of financial reporting. The first section below provides an explanation 
of the role of corporate governance and external auditing in financial reporting. The second section 
demonstrates theories of corporate governance. The third section specifically discusses the theories 
relating to auditor industry specialisation. The penultimate section provides the theoretical framework 
of this thesis which binds all the relevant aspects discussed in the earlier sections into a unique and 
coherent framework. The final section concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2 The monitoring role of the board and audit committees 
According to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2014, p.1), the board of directors’ 
responsibilities include “setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them 
into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their 
stewardship”. This suggests that the board of directors plays a very strategic and tactical role in 
determining business success. Thus, it follows that it is very important that the board members have 
the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable 
them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities effectively (U.K. Corporate Governance 
Code (2010, 2014). The U.K. Companies Act (2006) also outlines the board duties in ensuring 
transparency and fairness in a firm’s financial reporting, where all accounts of the public listed 
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companies that have been prepared and approved by the directors have to be independently audited by 
an external auditor to verify their credibility, objectivity and reliability. 
 
In order to carry out its responsibility effectively, the board may, however, delegate its authority to 
sub-committees, such as the audit committee, nomination committee and remunerations committee. 
However, this delegation of authority does not make the board less accountable for the sub 
committees’ actions. The audit committee is of particular interest in this study. This is because the 
audit committee has a direct link with the financial reporting process of a firm and represents a firm’s 
liaison with the external auditors. The formation of the audit committee aims to enhance the integrity 
of the reported numbers, thus maintaining investors’ confidence in the financial market (The Blue 
Ribbon Committee, 1999: p. 19). According to Wolnizer (1995), the audit committee responsibilities 
can be categorised into 1) accounting and financial reporting, 2) auditors and auditing, and 3) 
corporate governance. The successful implementation of these tasks also helps reduce management 
opportunistic behaviour, improve staff accountability, increase internal control effectiveness, enhance 
audit quality and strengthen the function of the board of directors while helping them to meet their 
legal responsibilities (Wolnizer, 1995).  
 
Many researchers, particularly in Anglo-American settings, have examined the relationship between 
corporate governance and accounting or auditing outcomes. Amongst the studies are by Turley and 
Zaman (2004), Gramling et al. (2004), DeFond and Francis (2005), Cohen et al. (2007), Schneider et 
al. (2009), Garcýa-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009), Bedard and Gendron (2010), and Lin and 
Hwang (2010). Consistently, most of these meta-analyses studies have generally found evidence 
which supports the notion that an effective board and audit committee are associated with “good” 
accounting and auditing outcomes and more effective internal controls within the business 
environment (Carcello et al., 2011). The most popular characteristics of the board and audit committee 
that have been examined are their independence and expertise (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley 1996; 
Abbott et al. 2004), whereas accounting outcomes are measured in terms of lower earnings 
management (e.g., Klein 2002), lower restatements (e.g., Abbott et al., 2004), or fraudulent financial 
reporting (e.g., Beasley 1996; Beasley et al., 2000). Auditing outcomes that have been examined 
include going concern reporting (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000, 2003a), auditor type (e.g., Beasley and 
Petroni, 2001), and auditor fees (audit and non-audit fees) (e.g., Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 
2002). The strength of internal controls have been measured by reference to SOX Section 404 internal 
control in the U.S., audit opinions, or management disclosures of internal control effectiveness under 
SOX section 302 in the U.S. (e.g., Zhang et al., 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007; Hoitash et al., 
2009). Overall, research has demonstrated that the two roles of the board and audit committee are 
integral in the company financial reporting process in order to protect shareholders’ interests and 
maintain investors’ confidence in the financial markets.  
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3.2.1 The external auditor competencies through industry specialisation 
In addition to the important role of a company’s board of directors and audit committee, the external 
auditor also plays a crucial role in promoting financial reporting quality. Under the U.K. Companies 
Act (2006), the external auditors are appointed by the shareholders to form and express an opinion on 
whether the company’s financial statements give a true and fair view of its financial position and 
comply with the applicable financial reporting framework. The external audit adds value and 
credibility to the financial reports prepared by the management (Power, 1996), through the auditor 
competencies and independent verification (DeAngelo, 1981). Regulators have also emphasised the 
importance of an auditor being able to understand the client’s industry setting before proceeding with 
auditing work (Knechel et al., 2007). For example, ISA 315: Understanding the Entity and its 
Environment and Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement states that an auditor needs to establish 
an understanding of the client’s industry setting before planning their audit strategies. Consistently, 
empirical research provides evidence that independent and competent auditors provide higher audit 
quality. 
 
DeAngelo (1981, p.186) defines audit quality as the “market-assessed joint probability that a given 
auditor will both detect a breach in the client’s accounting system, and report the breach”. DeFond 
and Zhang (2014) assert that audit quality is a component of financial reporting quality, because high 
audit quality increases the credibility of the financial reports. According to Watts and Zimmerman 
(1981), the supply of audit quality is affected by both the auditor’s competency and incentives for 
independence. Auditor competency refers to the ability of the auditor to deliver high audit quality, 
which includes training, skills, and expertise (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). On the other hand, auditor 
independence is driven by market-based incentives such as litigation risk and concerns over 
reputational capital (Dye, 1993). Auditor competencies and auditor incentives are somehow 
interdependent. Greater incentives to supply high audit quality also motivate auditors to develop 
competencies that facilitate the delivery of high quality audits. Similarly, greater competency in 
delivering high quality audits is expected to increase the auditor’s reputation capital, which 
consequently provides greater incentives to supply high audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).  
 
Auditors are likely to specialise if they perceive benefits such as increased fees or market share from 
higher quality audits and/or economies of scale. Industry specialists are expected to provide higher 
audit quality due to having superior knowledge of the industry’s business and accounting practices 
than non-specialists (Dopuch and Simunic, 1982). This suggests that specialists have greater 
competencies to deliver high quality audits. In addition to that, industry specialists have higher 
reputational capital at stake which continuously motivates them to deliver high audit quality.  
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Industry specialisation can arise at different organisational levels for different reasons. Global and 
national-level specialisation provides greater opportunities for knowledge sharing, while office-level 
specialisation leverages client-specific knowledge or local business conditions. On the other hand, 
partner-level specialisation may capture knowledge that is difficult to transfer while also providing 
stronger individual incentives. Prior literature measured specialisation based on the auditor with the 
largest industry market share or based on a certain arbitrary percentage of the market (usually 10 to 30 
percent), which is calculated based on either sales, size, fees or number of clients (Ferguson et al., 
2003; Neal and Riley, 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt and Wang, 2010). The Big N
4
  auditors are 
usually the national-level specialists because they dominate most (if not all) industries. In addition, 
many studies control for brand name by restricting their analysis to Big N auditors only (Basioudis and 
Francis, 2007; Francis et al., 2005). Thus, industry specialisation often refers to specialisation among 
the Big N auditors.  
 
The literature takes several approaches to test whether industry specialists provide higher quality 
audits. A large number of studies find that national-level specialists are associated with high audit 
quality proxies including discretionary accruals, ERC, going concern reporting, benchmark beating, 
disclosure quality, and analyst forecast accuracy (e.g. Balsam et al., 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; 
Behn et al., 2008; Lim and Tan, 2008; Payne, 2008), with relatively limited evidence that city level 
specialists provide higher quality (Reichelt and Wang, 2010, Sun and Liu, 2013). Prior studies in 
Taiwan documented that clients of partner industry specialists have lower financial restatements (Chin 
and Chi, 2009) and have a higher likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions (Chi and Chin, 
2011). Another approach examines the market reaction to auditor switches and finds a positive 
reaction for switching to a specialist, which is consistent with the perception that specialists offer 
higher audit quality (Knechel et al., 2007).  
 
While early studies find a fee premium charged only to larger clients, recent studies conclude that 
national-level industry leaders earn a fee premium, but only when they are also city-level industry 
leaders; global-level industry leaders earn fee premiums irrespective of whether they are also national-
level specialists; and partner-level industry leaders earn a fee premium, but only when they also work 
for an audit firm specialist (for early studies, see Palmrose, 1986; Ettredge and Greenberg, 1990; 
O’Keefe et al., 1994; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Craswell et al., 1995; Deis and Giroux, 1996; 
Menon and Williams, 2001; for more recent studies, see Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; 
                                                     
4 The Big N audit firms started with the Big 8 comprised of Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney, 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse, Touche Ross and Arthur Young. But then the Big 8 
became the Big 6 following the merger of Peat Marwick with the Klynveld Main Goerdeler (KMG) group in 1987 to become 
what was later known as KPMG, the merger of Ernst & Whinney with Arthur Young in 1989 to form Ernst & Young, and the 
merger of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells with Touche Ross to form Deloitte & Touche in August 1989. The Big 6 became the Big 
5 in July 1998 with the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers & Lybrand to form PricewaterhouseCoopers, and finally 
after the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 following the Enron financial scandal, the Big 5 became the Big 4. 
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Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Carson, 2009; Zerni, 2011; Goodwin and Wu, 2014;  Nagy, 2014). 
Furthermore, another dimension is brought into the literature, namely the degree of audit market 
competition, and some recent evidence suggests that the degree of audit market competition impacts 
the specialisation premium. Numan and Willekens (2012) found that the specialisation premium 
increases with the distance between the auditor’s market share and the market share of the next closest 
competitor, and Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) find similar results in the IPO market. This suggests that 
the fee premiums may accrue to auditors with superior bargaining power. But, in contrast, the fee 
premium declines when it is the clients that have the strong bargaining power (see Casterella et al., 
2004; Huang et al., 2007; Fung et al., 2012). Additionally, auditors may alternatively grant fee 
discounts when specialisation produces economies of scale (DeFond et al., 2000). This last evidence 
was reported in Hong Kong and has not been replicated or found in another country so far. 
 
The economic analysis of audit outcomes is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that 
auditing in general is valuable and has material economic consequences for the financial statement 
users. Second, outcomes provide evidence of the effects of differential audit quality. Audits are 
perceived to be of higher quality by debt and equity markets when companies are audited by large 
accounting firms or firms with industry expertise (Francis et al., 2011). 
 
3.2.2 The interdependencies between a firm’s internal corporate governance structure and 
external audit function 
The board of directors, the audit committee and the internal audit function represent the internal 
monitoring mechanism within a company, whereas the external auditors serve as an external 
monitoring mechanism providing independent verification on the quality of a company’s financial 
reporting. Interdependencies exist between a firm’s internal corporate governance structure and the 
external audit function, and this is discussed in more detail below.  
 
Looking at the accounting fraud landscape where 89 percent of the perpetrators are mainly the 
company’s CEO or Chief Financial Officer (CFO) from top management (Beasley et al. 2010), the 
effectiveness of the board monitoring role needs to be carefully assessed by the external auditor to 
determine the strength of the control environment and to assess the audit risk (Carcello et al., 2011). 
Consistently, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) suggest that auditors take into consideration clients’ 
strength of internal control, risk of earnings manipulation and effectiveness of corporate governance in 
making audit planning and pricing decisions, then adjust their audit effort and billing rates 
accordingly. Cohen et al. (2007) reported that auditors’ control risk assessments and audit planning 
decisions are affected by the client’s board characteristics and effectiveness. Stewart and Munro 
(2007) documented that the auditor risk assessment is lower in the presence of an active audit 
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committee. This means that the auditor assesses risk to be higher and plans more audit hours for 
companies with weak governance (Carcello et al., 2011). 
 
The relationship between the audit committee and the external auditor is manifested in its 
responsibility for overseeing the audit process and liaising between the external auditor and 
management. This includes making recommendations to the board on the appointment of the external 
auditor, discussing the level of audit fees, reviewing the audit engagement scope and activities, and 
protecting the auditor’s independence (U.K. Corporate Governance Code, 2010; 2014). Auditor 
independence is protected by the audit committee controlling the type and amount of non-audit 
services purchased from the incumbent auditor, while ensuring that the proposed audit fees do not 
potentially jeopardise the quality of audit work (U.K. Corporate Governance Code, 2010; 2014).  This 
is due to auditors trying to balance their audit costs with expected future losses as a consequence of 
legal liability arising from audit failure (Carcello et al., 2002).  
 
The relationship between corporate governance and external audit can be explained using two 
competing theories, namely, the substitution theory and the signalling theory (Wu, 2012). The 
substitution theory posits that firms with effective corporate governance have lower agency costs, 
which contribute to lower audit risk and lower audit effort, thus lowering the audit fees charged by the 
auditor. In other words, effective corporate governance, to some degree, represents a substitute to the 
audit external auditor function. Studies by Tsui et al. (2001) provide support for this argument by 
showing that a corporate board independent of the CEO enhances financial reporting quality, and is 
positively associated with lower audit fees. In addition, Felix et al. (2001) and Prawitt et al. (2009) 
found evidence which indicated that external audit fees are lower in companies which employ higher-
quality internal audit functions. On the other hand, the signalling theory argues that companies with an 
effective board and audit committee may signal to management and the auditor that they exercise a 
more effective monitoring role, and they are thus likely to be more demanding and to insist on having 
a higher quality audit (Carcello et al. 2002; Carcello et al. 2011). Consistent with this a study by 
Carcello et al. (2000) reported that a higher proportion of non-executive directors increase the demand 
for assurance and audit quality, leading to higher fees. Lee et al. (2004) document that companies with 
more independent audit committees prefer higher quality successor auditors. Bronson et al. (2009) 
reported that an external auditor is seldom likely to be dismissed following a going-concern report 
when the audit committee is fully independent. Wu (2012) asserts that the inconclusive results 
reported in prior studies make it difficult to ascertain which theory actually better explains the 
relationship between corporate governance and auditing. 
 
To summarise, effective corporate governance and high quality audits are important and beneficial for 
investors and to the financial statement users in order to minimise the potential for damage to 
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reputation and legal exposure while, at the same time, raising the support from shareholders. The next 
section reviews a number of theoretical perspectives for corporate governance research that are 
considered in this PhD thesis. 
 
3.3 Theories on corporate governance 
Although there is no agreed theoretical base for research in corporate governance (Parum, 2005), the 
study identified four main corporate governance theories that are relevant to the study in explaining 
the association between corporate governance, external audit function and audit (or earnings) quality. 
These are agency theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory and managerial hegemony theory. 
This chapter reviews these four theories and their relevance to the research questions of this study. 
These corporate governance theories either provide competing or complementary explanations to each 
other, as further discussed in the respective sections below.  
 
3.3.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory is a predominant theory in accounting and auditing literature underpinning the role of 
corporate governance and external auditing in improving financial reporting processes. Modern 
companies with widely dispersed ownership are characterised by their separation of ownership and 
control, where the shareholders (the principal) appoint managers (the agent) to run the daily operations 
of the business on their behalf. The distinction between ownership and control creates potential 
conflicts of interest between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory posits that 
managers are likely to act opportunistically by pursuing their personal gains (e.g. luxury company 
cars, lavish offices, excessive entertainment expenses) at the expense of maximising the shareholders’ 
wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, the shareholders’ inability 
to monitor management closely due to separation of ownership and control gives rise to information 
asymmetry which results in moral hazard (hidden actions by agents) and adverse selection problems 
(hidden information by agents), where both are being incurred at the expense of the shareholders’ 
wealth (Fama, 1980). Earnings management can be referred to as a form of adverse selection problem, 
as it represents a misreporting of information by management (Singh and Davidson, 2003). 
 
In order to reduce the conflict of interests, the shareholders incur some forms of agency costs which 
include a monitoring cost, a bonding cost and a residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring 
cost relates to the appointment of internal as well as external monitoring mechanisms to constrain 
management opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Bonding cost relates to 
management compensation contracts, whereas the residual loss refers to the reduction in shareholders’ 
wealth caused by any disparity between monitoring and bonding costs (i.e., in other words, when there 
is an imperfect alignment between the principal and agent interest) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a 
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form of monitoring cost, the corporate governance system reduces the agency costs through a number 
of mechanisms such as with the presence of the board of directors and the audit committee (Lin and 
Hwang, 2010; Gracia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009). Empirical research provides evidence that 
an effective board of directors and audit committee contributes to higher audit quality and “good” 
financial reporting outcomes (Carcello et al., 2011). 
 
Another form of monitoring cost incurred by the shareholders is by engaging an independent external 
auditor to perform verification on the financial reports prepared by the management in respect of its 
truth and fairness in accordance with the applicable financial reporting standards (Lin and Hwang, 
2010). Hence, an external audit enhances the credibility of the financial information provided to 
shareholders, reduces information asymmetry between the two parties and, therefore, limits 
management opportunistic behaviour such as earnings management (Lin and Hwang, 2010; Piot, 
2001; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). In order to signal to the market that they exercise a more 
effective monitoring role, companies with effective corporate governance characteristics are more 
likely to hire auditors that are perceived to deliver a high quality audit (Carcello et al., 2000; 2002; 
2011). As noted earlier, high audit quality is defined by DeAngelo (1981) as the market assessed joint 
probability that an auditor will detect material misstatements and report them in the audit opinion. 
Thus, high audit quality refers to the auditors’ competency and amount of effort devoted to the audit, 
as well as their objectivity and independence in reporting any identified breach in the client’s 
accounting system (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The auditing literature shows positive association 
between the Big 4 industry leadership with various proxies of audit quality such as audit fees (e.g. 
Palmrose, 1986; Craswell and Taylor, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2003; Basioudis and Francis, 2007), 
auditor opinion reporting (e.g. Lim and Tan, 2008; Reichelt and Wang, 2010) and earnings 
management (e.g. Balsam et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2010).   
 
In reality, the internal corporate governance mechanism (e.g. the board of directors, an audit 
committee, internal audit) and external corporate governance mechanism (external auditing) do not 
operate independently but interact with each other (Sharma et al., 2011) to have an impact on the 
quality of the financial reporting outcome. Furthermore, the auditor’s monitoring role varies 
depending on the strength of the company’s corporate governance structure (Larcker and Richardson, 
2004). This argument is supported by evidence from auditor choice studies that the auditor 
differentiation strategy (industry specialisation) is valued by the board of directors, audit committee 
and shareholders as signalling a higher quality audit, as they are more likely to choose high quality 
auditors, either based on their brand name reputation or industry specialisation (Abbott and Parker, 
2000; Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Velury et al., 2003; Kane and Velury, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Chen 
et al., 2005). 
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Finally, agency theory is relevant to this study as it explains the opportunistic behaviour of 
management which is important for explaining the motives of earnings management. Besides this, 
agency theory also recognises the importance of the role of the board, the audit committee as internal 
monitoring mechanism, and the external auditors as external monitoring mechanism, in reducing the 
agency cost and promoting financial reporting quality.  Thus, agency theory is supported if the study 
finding indicates that audit quality and earnings quality are higher when the company employs a Big 4 
industry specialist auditor (either a firm, partner or combination of a firm and partner industry 
specialist) and has an effective board, audit committee and internal audit function. 
 
3.3.2 Stewardship theory 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory proposes that the interests of the company 
management and the shareholders are in alignment (Albrecht et al. 2004). Management is assumed to 
be trustworthy and that their interests are properly aligned with the organisation and its owners. Thus, 
opportunistic behaviour such as earnings management would be unlikely to happen and there is no 
need for monitoring cost to be incurred.  
 
Under the stewardship theory, management and executive directors represent the best people to 
enhance shareholders’ wealth given their familiarity with the business environment and expertise in 
business operational activities. Thus, the role of the board is more seen as a support tool for the 
trustworthy executive directors, particularly the CEO, rather than as a control tool over management 
undertakings (Albrecht et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the shareholders’ assumption that management is 
trustworthy might also open doors of opportunities for management to commit fraud or other 
misrepresentations (Albrecht et al. 2004). This may be due to the lack of management experience of 
board members (Choo and Tan, 2007) and may give ample space for management to exercise their 
desires and pursue their self-serving endeavour, as there might be times where management may not 
find their interests coincide with the shareholders.  
 
Clark (2004) asserts that both agency theory and stewardship theory are important in explaining the 
behaviour of management, despite their opposing views (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Ignoring the 
stewardship theory in the explanation of agency theory or one over the other does not sufficiently 
justify the cause of effect of board duality and performance. This is because management has to be 
controlled but at the same time enabled/empowered in order to perform effectively. Despite their 
contradiction, there are similarities between agency theory and stewardship theory in terms of 
motivation, identification, and use of power (Clark, 2004). 
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The stewardship theory is relevant to this thesis as it provides an alternative explanation for the 
positive effect of corporate governance in financial reporting. Thus, this theory is supported if the 
findings of the study indicate that the presence of a board, audit committee and internal audit function 
within the company contributes to higher audit quality and earnings quality. 
 
3.3.3 Institutional theory 
The institutional theory suggests that companies operate in an environment which pressures them to 
conform to certain rules and regulations to ensure their survival and legitimacy, as well as to allow 
access to the resources needed for their survival and sustainability (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Thus, companies shape themselves into appropriate structures following other companies in the same 
environment (Judge and Zeithaml, 1999), so as to avoid any disputes or investigations of their function 
by external parties (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Such conformity and compliance to rules and 
regulations as well as the socially acceptable factors do not necessarily confirm that the company is 
indeed operating effectively in substance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
Under the institutional theory, corporate governance is viewed as a ritualistic role which the company 
needs to fulfil in order to legitimise its interactions with other players within the corporate governance 
mosaic (Cohen et al., 2007). In other words, the institutional theory suggests that board and 
management of companies tend to adopt best practices (such as the Code of Corporate Governance) 
and employ high quality auditors (e.g. Big 4 auditors and industry specialist auditors) in order to align 
the perception of their practices and characteristics with regulatory requirements and social 
expectations which, in turn, enhance their legitimacy. However, the adoption of such best practices 
does not necessarily mean that they are effectively functioning (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 and Meyer 
and Scott, 1983), as it could simply be ceremonial in nature to mimic other successful companies in 
their environment or in order to avoid regulatory sanctions or political pressures (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
 
This mimicking process is known as isomorphism, which could be further classified into coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Coercive isomorphism refers to compliance to political pressure and regulatory requirements to 
enhance the legitimacy of the corporations. In this study, coercive isomorphism could be related to a 
company’s initiatives to comply with the stock exchange requirements and the recommended 
corporate governance best practices issued by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council. Mimetic 
isomorphism, on the other hand, is driven by internal motivation by the management from within the 
company itself (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For instance, the management decision to imitate 
another company’s strategy that is foreseen to be successful and legitimised by society. In respect of 
financial reporting, mimetic isomorphism takes place when management decide to adopt the corporate 
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governance structure or accounting practices of the successful or leading companies within their field, 
in order to become more competitive in the market. Over time, this will eventually lead to an increase 
in the overall compliance with the accounting standards and corporate governance best practices 
recommendations issued by the regulatory bodies. Finally, normative isomorphism is a mimicking 
process influenced by professionalism of involved individuals, or the professionals working in the 
organisation. The professionalism here refers to the practices or actions advocated by the professional 
bodies to their members (Burns, 2000). For example, the chartered accountants and the auditors are 
respectively governed by their professional bodies which continuously push for increased compliance 
with listing rules, accounting and auditing standards as well as corporate governance best practices.  
 
In other words, the institutional theory asserts that a company’s corporate governance processes will 
turn out to be closely comparable over time (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) through their compliance with regulation and mimicking rival best practices, in order  to 
enhance their legitimacy (Cohen et al. 2007). Kalbers and Fogarty (1998, p.131) describe this 
ceremonial effort as a symbolic display of organisational structures to demonstrate their conformity 
and social accountability. Institutional theory is able to explain the reason why there is a gap between 
the symbolic display of the organisation and its actual accomplishment. Fogarty and Roger (2005) 
assert that institutional theory explains the gap between a firm’s actual accomplishments and its 
external structure on display. 
 
This theory is relevant to this thesis as it provides explanation for why the adoption of the corporate 
governance best practices by companies does not have any significant effect on their financial 
reporting quality. This theory is supported if an insignificant relationship is reported between the 
corporate governance characteristics examined in this study with the proxy of audit quality and 
earnings quality. 
 
3.3.4 Managerial hegemony theory 
Managerial hegemony theory suggests that the board of directors play a passive role in decision 
making within the company as they are dominated by management. Moreover, their internal position 
as top management gives managers the advantage of obtaining strategic and confidential information 
about the business, which might not come to the non-executive director’s attention. Thus, the board 
would be dependent on the management for information and insights about the firm and its industry 
for decision making purposes (Wolfson, 1984). In other words, the board only plays a “rubber-stamp” 
function within the company (Herman, 1981).  
 
Managerial hegemony theory and institutional theory are similar in that the role of the board of 
directors is more ceremonial in nature in order to meet regulatory requirements. This is in contrast to 
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agency theory and stewardship theory where the board is a substantive and effective monitoring 
mechanism over the opportunistic actions of management. The board’s functions, according to 
managerial hegemony theory, are limited to ratifying management’s actions, satisfying regulatory 
requirements, and enhancing senior management compensation (Molz, 1995; Core et al., 1999). As 
found by Nowak and McCabe (2003), outside non-executive directors have the perception that the 
CEO has control over the flow of information which influences the decisions and effectiveness of 
directors. The adverse implication of managerial hegemony is that independent directors within the 
board and audit committee will be dysfunctional as they are under management influence and will be 
unlikely to question management actions (e.g. during disputes with the external auditor).  
 
Criticisms of this theory primarily highlight the lack of empirical support (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). 
Furthermore, the board has become more empowered since the 1980’s (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003) 
through the separation of CEO and Chairman roles within a company and the increased composition 
of independent non-executive directors on the board. Thus, the board is no longer under the definitive 
control of management as they have the power to terminate the CEO whenever the duty of trust is 
breached (Mizruchi, 1983). 
 
This theory is relevant to the thesis as it help explains the possible reason for an ineffective board or 
audit committee governance role. Insignificant results for the corporate governance effect on audit fees 
and earnings quality lend support to this theoretical justification. 
 
3.4 Theories on auditor industry specialisation 
An industry specialist auditor is expected to produce a higher quality audit due to their competency 
and in-depth knowledge of the client’s business environment. Positioning themselves as a market 
leader in a particular industry (either at the firm-wide level, office level or audit partner level) allows 
the auditors to command a higher audit fee premium above and beyond the brand name premium alone 
enjoyed by the audit firms who are not industry leaders (Ferguson et al., 2003 in Australia; Basioudis 
and Francis, 2007 in the U.K.; Francis et al., 2005 in the U.S.). There are a number of theories in the 
literature that have been used to explain the demand and supply of industry specialist auditors in the 
audit market, and how the industry specialist auditor contributes to higher audit quality. In particular, 
the product differentiation theory, production efficiency theory, reputation theory and spatial 
competition theory are discussed in greater detail below. It is important to highlight that these theories 
may appear to be related to one another in explaining auditor industry specialisation. 
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3.4.1 Product differentiation theory 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) and Casterella et al. (2004) applied the Porter (1985) five forces model to 
explain product differentiation from the supply perspective. Using the Porter (1985) model, they 
suggested that industry specialist auditors strive to obtain a competitive advantage over their rivals by 
offering differentiated products or services through channels such as economies of scale, brand name 
reputation, product differentiation, or combinations of these. Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) and Cahan 
et al. (2008) assert that the payoff for the investment is at its highest through servicing a homogenous 
group of clients within the same industry and is based on how successful the audit firm has 
differentiated itself from competitors. The degree of differentiation between the audit firm and its 
competitor plays an important role in determining the level of audit fees that the audit firm can charge 
as well as the bargaining power that the audit firm may have with its clients relative to its competitors. 
  
An audit firm that possess significantly higher market shares than its industry competitors earns fee 
premiums, suggesting that audit firms that have successfully differentiated themselves retain a 
stronger bargaining position over their clients. Clients are also unlikely to switch to other audit firms 
because they cannot obtain similar quality services from competing audit firms (Mayhew and Wilkins, 
2003).  When the degree of differentiation is not obvious, the auditor loses its bargaining power with 
its clients, and the clients may also bargain for part of the cost savings by threatening to switch to 
another auditor which they perceive to be offering a similar quality of services. This would then result 
in market share driven price competition between audit firms with similar market shares in their effort 
to chase and obtain clients.  
  
The market share dominance of an audit firm within a particular industry offers it two competitive 
advantages. Firstly, the high industry specific training costs could be spread over a larger client base, 
resulting in economies of scale which are not easily possible to be achieved by audit firms with a 
smaller market share. The benefit of economies of scale could be passed as savings to the clients either 
through an absence of a fee premium or as fee discounts charged by the industry specialist auditor (see 
Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Danos and Eichenseher, 1982; Ettredge and Greenberg, 1990; Cairney 
and Young, 2006; Giroux and Jones, 2007). Secondly, audit firms with a large market share develop 
more industry-specific knowledge and expertise by focusing their resources and technologies in a 
particular industry, thus allowing them to deliver services of a higher quality relative to what can be 
offered by an audit firm with smaller market shares in the industry.  Evidence of fee premium attached 
to successful differentiation strategy is widely available in the literature based on findings from 
different countries (Defond et al., 2000; Ferguson et al., 2003; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Francis et 
al., 2005; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Carson, 2009; Cahan et al., 2011; Fung et al., 2012). 
According to Willenborg (2002), these competing effects make it difficult to predict how audit fees 
will be related to industry specialisation.  
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The Porter’s (1985) analysis of competitive forces is important and relevant for this study, as it helps 
to explain how an industry specialist is able to differentiate itself from competitors through market 
share, and predict the conditions under which the audit firm will earn fee premiums or offer fee 
discounts.  
 
3.4.2 Production efficiency theory 
Assuming perfect competition, studies generally deduce a positive association between industry 
specialisation and audit fees as the client is willing to pay for the auditor’s expertise and reputation 
(e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson et al., 2003; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Francis et al., 2005; 
Numan and Willekens, 2012). This premium is further evidenced when higher audit quality is 
associated with industry specialisation (e.g., Balsam et al., 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Reichelt 
and Wang, 2010). However, there is not always a direct relationship between fees and auditor 
specialisation because auditors in certain industries may experience economies of scale. When there 
are legitimate increases in efficiencies due to specialisation, firms benefit from technical economies of 
scale (Yardley et al., 1992). Differences and similarities in the auditor’s client characteristics can 
affect audit production costs (e.g. on both labour and audit technology) (Brown, 2012). Several 
experimental studies found that industry specialisation is related to auditor efficiency; specialist 
auditors are found able to understand incomplete patterns that are descriptive of misstatements 
(Hammersley, 2006), have greater non-error knowledge (Solomon et al., 1999), identify more 
conceptual errors (Owhoso et al., 2002) and have better risk assessments (Low, 2004). 
 
Since cost data for audit firms are not publicly available to analyse efficiency in an archival setting, 
prior archival studies investigated possible scale economies in the audit market by employing the 
survivorship approach and by examining audit fee behaviour
5
 (Danos and Eichenseher, 1982; Yardley 
et al., 1992). Studies using the survivorship approach provide evidence that high concentration allows 
audit market leaders to develop expertise-related economies of scale which over time allow the firm to 
gain a larger market share in certain industries (e.g., Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Danos and 
Eichenseher, 1982, 1986; Hogan and Jeter, 1999). These empirical findings are in line with Doogar 
and Easley’s (1998) model which predicted that auditors with smaller market shares have production 
constraints which make it difficult for them to compete with the large market share auditors. On the 
other hand, studies have examined audit fees based on Simunic’s (1980) widely-used model in which 
fees are a function of direct production costs (“effort”) and expected future losses that might arise as a 
consequence of an audit (“risk”). Previous literature has confirmed significant positive relationships 
between effort and risk factors with audit fees (Hay et al. 2006; Causholli et al. 2010). If a specialist 
                                                     
5 The survivorship approach assumes that only cost-effective auditors will gain market share over time (Danos and 
Eichenseher, 1982; Yardley et al., 1992) 
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audit firm achieves economies of scale in the production of its services, then such production 
efficiencies could reasonably be expected to manifest as fee discounts.  
 
A few archival studies find evidence of audit fee discounts for specialists in regulated industries that 
the authors attribute to economies of scale resulting from focused knowledge in these industries (e.g., 
Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Fields et al., 2004). Using proprietary data in a Belgian setting, Fung et 
al. (2012) assert that economies of scale also benefit the audit firm in terms of more efficient resource 
allocation, knowledge sharing and intra-firm networking.  
 
In general, client homogeneity within the same industry facilitates the transfer of industry-specific 
knowledge across clients, making it easier for auditors to spread the costs of acquiring industry 
expertise across their client base in a given industry, leading to potential economies of scale. 
Furthermore, less planning and oversight is required from the auditors and the auditor can benefit from 
the knowledge overlap from doing repetitive tasks, leading to more efficiency in terms of time and 
staffing and efficiencies from shared audit technology. Cairney and Young (2006) expand on previous 
studies by introducing a more general definition of industry homogeneity by using the operational cost 
structures of the industry in which the clients operate. Based on this premise, they report evidence that 
auditor industry specialisation and clients’ industry homogeneity is positively related, as auditors 
prefer to audit new clients in similar industries. This demonstrates that industry specialist auditors 
compete on economies of scale as competitive advantage in a homogenous industry where they can 
effectively spread their cost and expertise through such homogeneity.  
 
When auditors choose to specialise in homogenous industries due to economies of scale, it is 
reasonable to expect that industry specialists will be able to pass along cost savings in the form of 
lower audit fees to clients in these industries (Cahan et al., 2008). Even more cost efficiencies can be 
achieved when the industry specialist auditor operates in a homogenous industry with complex 
accounting practices. The high risk of material misstatements in the accounts leads to higher audit risk, 
which has to be compensated by the auditor by exerting more audit effort. Such response from the 
auditor would normally result in greater resource investment by the audit firm (e.g. longer working 
hours, more senior auditors, investment in audit technologies). This would then lead to higher audit 
fees and greater demand for industry specialist auditors for their expertise in handling industry specific 
accounting complexities (Bills et al., 2015). Given that the industry specialist auditor serves a larger 
proportion of the industry market, they could realize some cost savings with more homogenous 
operations and capitalise on their resource investments to address the high audit risk due to the specific 
industry accounting complexities of their clients. Consistently, results from studies by Bills et al. 
(2015) demonstrate that clients of industry specialists are being charged lower audit fees in industries 
with both complex accounting practices and homogenous operations. This finding is important as it 
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indicates that a fee discount does not necessarily mean compromised audit quality, as it could simply 
be a manifestation of economies of scale that the auditor is passing on to clients, particularly to those 
clients with high bargaining power (Bills et al., 2015)  
 
The production efficiency theory is relevant to this study as it provides an explanation for industry 
specialist auditors when there is an inconsistency between the effect on fee premium and audit quality. 
The theory explains the reason why an industry specialist auditor is still able to deliver a high quality 
audit despite the fee discount charged.  
 
3.4.3 Reputation theory 
Certain accounting firms willingly invest in higher levels of resources and expertise beyond the 
professional standards’ minimum requirements, as an incentive to maintain their reputations as the 
producer of higher-quality audits. The costly investment by the Big 4 audit firms in building reputation 
through brand name recognition and industry expertise is worthwhile given the higher audit fees return 
(Craswell et al., 1995). Studies by Green (2008) offer evidence that an industry specialist auditor is 
more efficient and effective in performing analytical procedures whereas Moroney (2007) reports that 
the industry expertise of the auditor improves their efficiency in making audit judgments. 
 
According to Scitovsky (1945) and Ferguson et al. (2003), market leadership is a mean to signal 
product quality which enables market leaders to charge higher prices or premiums to further signal 
their differentiated product quality. When product quality is uncertain, consumers infer product quality 
based on the supplier market share (Smallwood and Conlisk, 1979; Caminal and Vines, 1996). This is 
the case in auditing, where clients can only assess the service quality through experience (Craswell 
and Francis, 1999).  
 
Lucrative prices charged for high quality experience goods symbolise market returns on sellers’ 
reputations, and also can be seen as a control mechanism so that suppliers do not shirk on product 
quality (Shapiro, 1983). In the audit market, given that the Big 4 industry specialist auditors are able to 
extract a fee premium, this shows that their reputation as industry experts is valued and priced in the 
audit market above the Big 4 brand name reputation (Francis et al, 1999). From the demand side, 
clients’ willingness to pay a fee premium to industry specialists indicates their commitment to higher 
quality financial reporting given that they are willing to hire expensive specialists to conduct the audit 
with superior reputations in the industry (Titman and Trueman, 1986). Furthermore, firms are more 
likely to choose industry specialist auditors to portray to public investors their concerns over agency 
issues (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). Studies on auditor industry specialisation infer industry 
leadership based on the audit firm’s market share of clients’ sales, total assets, audit fees or number of 
clients, as these measures represent an auditor’s depth and breadth of knowledge, expertise, experience 
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and investment in that particular industry (Neal and Riley, 2004; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Francis 
et al., 2005).   
 
This theory is relevant to this study. From the supply side, this theory provides explanation as to why 
auditors make reputation investments in certain industries while, on the demand side, this theory 
explains why clients are willing to pay higher audit fees (fee premium) to industry specialist auditors 
for their services. 
 
3.4.4 Spatial competition theory 
The theory of spatial competition found in the economics literature (Hotelling, 1929; Shapiro, 1989), 
which focuses on oligopoly market competition, suggests that price competition among suppliers only 
takes place in the market once firms have established their product entry and space decisions. Only 
those suppliers that have successfully differentiated their products may earn a price above the marginal 
cost in equilibrium without losing market share. The theory suggests that the product-space locations 
of the competitors also have an effect on the supplier’s price elasticities. In other words, whether the 
supplier could charge a higher (lower) price would depend on how huge (small) is the distance of the 
competitor’s product-space location in the market. 
 
Prior studies on auditor industry specialisation (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Basioudis and Francis, 2007) have mostly relied upon the application of neoclassical theory by 
Simunic (1980). Simunic’s theoretical work assumes that the audit market is perfectly competitive, 
and it shows how the fee premium earned by the industry specialist auditor is merely derived from a 
client’s willingness to pay for a superior and differentiated service quality. However, Numan and 
Willekens (2012) assert that competition in the concentrated audit market is more accurately 
characterised as an oligopoly in nature, thus a more suitable theory is needed to recognise the supplier 
payoff interdependency. Numan and Willekens (2012) study is the first  to apply the spatial 
competition theory of oligopoly to the audit market and propose an empirical method of analysis that 
could separate between the effects of competition and auditor industry specialisation on audit fees.  
 
Applying the spatial competition theory by Hotelling (1929) to the audit market, Numan and 
Willekens (2012) assert that the industry specialisation strategy pursued by the audit firm contributes 
to greater market power relative to other rivals within the audit market. This will eventually put  
pressure on the specialist pricing, with the closest rival being the one who exerts the greatest pressure 
on price (Hotelling, 1929; Chan et al., 2004). However, this price competition can be softened by 
differentiation in terms of service quality provided by the industry specialist to the market. Whether 
the fee premium remains with the industry specialist auditor depends on how successfully they have 
managed to differentiate their services from their competitors, as clients will no longer be willing to 
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pay a fee premium where substitute suppliers of similar service quality are available in the market.  
Nevertheless, the increased competition among the audit firms may offer the incumbent auditor 
incentives to distinguish him/herself from their closest competitor on other factors - it is then 
anticipated that this may result in higher quality audits (Numan and Willekens, 2012).  
 
In their research, Numan and Willekens (2012) distinguish between two sources of market power: 
power arising from auditor-client alignment (measured by the close-fit between the auditor preference 
and the client’s industry preference), and power arising from a firm's differentiation from its closest 
competitors (termed as competitive pressure from the closest competitor and measured based on the 
distance between the market share of the industry specialist auditor and their closest competitor in the 
audit market), in which both are assumed to have an effect on the fee premium charged by the auditor. 
 
According to Numan and Willekens (2012), each of these sources of market power represents the 
effect of differentiation and competition, respectively, on audit fees. Consistently, the study of Numan 
and Willekens (2012) in the U.S. audit market documented that audit fees increase in both auditor-
client industry alignment and industry market share distance to the closest competitor. They also found 
that the fee premium of the industry specialist auditor drops as the distance with the closest competitor 
becomes smaller. Consequently, the auditor effort might be reduced following the drop in the fee 
premium, and this, thus, may affect audit quality in a negative way. As the audit quality drops due to 
competition, clients’ tendency to switch to similar quality auditor increases.  
 
Subsequently, Numan and Willekens (2014) examined the effect of competitive pressure from close 
competitors on audit quality provided by the industry specialist auditor. They found that audit quality 
diminishes with increased competitive pressure from close competitors within the city-industry audit 
market. This is evidenced by lower likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion to a financially 
distressed company, higher discretionary accruals and higher likelihood of financial restatements as 
the market share distance with the close competitor becomes smaller. They also found that the market 
share dominance that an industry specialist auditor has over their closest competitor is the primary 
driver of audit quality, instead of industry leadership per se.  
 
This theory is relevant to this study. This is because the spatial competition theory provides an 
explanation for how differentiation and competition can both have an effect on the fee premium and 
audit quality of the industry specialist. The application of this theory will be tested in the sensitivity 
analysis to justify whether the fee premium and earnings quality of the industry specialist is affected 
by competitive pressure from the closest competitor.   
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the relevance of various theories in corporate governance research and 
auditor industry specialisation in explaining the role of corporate governance and the industry 
specialist auditor in promoting financial reporting quality. As described by DeFond and Zhang (2014), 
financial reporting quality is affected by a company’s earnings quality and audit quality. 
 
For corporate governance, agency theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory and managerial 
hegemony theory have been discussed. These theories provide significant insights on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of corporate governance monitoring and control functions from various perspectives 
(Hung, 1998). While agency theory focuses on conflicting interests between principals and agents, 
stewardship theory neglects the power of interest-based behaviour, which is important for explaining 
the motives of earnings management. However, there is a similarity between agency theory and 
stewardship theory where corporate governance is viewed as an effective monitoring mechanism to 
control management self-serving actions. Managerial hegemony theory, however, asserts that the 
board is dysfunctional and consistently supportive of management, and, hence, offers virtually no 
monitoring at all (Cohen et al., 2007; Beasley et al., 2009). To some extent, the managerial hegemony 
theory agrees with institutional theory in that the role of the board of directors is perceived only as 
ceremonial in nature. Nevertheless, the influence of agency theory in the literature has been 
instrumental in the development of corporate governance standards, principles and codes.  
 
Mallin (2010) provided a comprehensive discussion of corporate governance theories and argued that 
the agency approach is the most suitable approach because it provides a more comprehensive 
explanation for corporate governance roles in the U.K. context which considers the complexity of the 
legal system, ownership, culture and other structural differences. Furthermore, the agency theory 
framework has the capacity to illustrate the drivers for earnings management as well as the expected 
relationship between corporate governance and external auditor monitoring mechanisms and earnings 
management. Researchers often find that audit committee members interviewed about governance 
processes provide responses that are consistent with a mix of governance theories (e.g., Beasley et al., 
2009), as directors are balancing their monitoring roles under agency theory with other considerations, 
such as promoting legitimacy under institutional theory or being dominated by management under 
managerial hegemony theory (Carcello et al, 2011). Thus, all these four theories will be considered in 
the explanation of the findings of this study on the effect on corporate governance on audit fees (as a 
proxy of audit quality) and earnings quality. 
 
With regards to auditor industry specialisation, the theories discussed have been product 
differentiation theory, production efficiency theory, reputation theory and spatial competition theory. 
These theories are able to provide distinct explanations of the demand and supply of industry specialist 
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auditors, and how industry specialisation strategies could have differential effects on the auditor’s fees 
and quality of services offered. Product differentiation theory explains the motivation for industry 
specialist auditors to meet client demands for a quality-differentiated audit in certain market segments 
of the audit market, by competing on the service rather than price alone. Production efficiency theory 
explains how the investment of resources and technology in a particular industry could result in 
economies of scale as auditors are able to spread their costs over huge client bases, while at the same 
time improve their knowledge and expertise in the domain industry. The reputation theory suggests 
that suppliers who hold a large market share are able to generate positive reputation effects and 
perceived value among buyers as market leadership signals product quality, which enables market 
leaders to charge higher prices. Firms with effective corporate governance which are concerned about 
agency issues normally select auditors that are costly, in order to signal to the public their financial 
reporting quality, given the auditor superior reputation. Finally, the spatial competition theory asserts 
that auditors derive some market power from industry specialisation. The two sources of market power 
arise from auditor-client alignment and from the market share distance with its closest competitors. 
These two sources of market power have an effect on the fee premium and audit quality offered by the 
industry specialist auditor. 
 
Figure 3.1 below which summarises the theoretical framework used for the study, depicts the 
relationship between industry specialist auditors and a firm’s internal corporate governance 
mechanism and financial reporting quality (which includes both earnings quality and audit quality). 
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Figure  3.1: Theoretical framework of the thesis 
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of the research hypotheses examined in the current study. The 
research hypotheses are developed based on the literature review and theoretical framework discussed 
in the previous two chapters. These hypotheses will then be used to examine the two main research 
questions underlying the two empirical analyses of the thesis. The first research question concerns the 
effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit quality, where audit quality is 
measured by the variation in the level of audit fees; the second research question is concerned with the 
effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on earnings quality. Earnings quality in 
this study is measured by the level of discretionary accruals, accrual estimation error and the 
likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss. The industry specialist auditor will be examined 
using various measurements under the firm national-city framework, partner national-city framework 
and joint firm-partner national-city framework analyses. The corporate governance characteristics that 
are of particular interest in this study are female directors, foreign directors, internal audit function, 
audit committee, audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise and audit 
committee activity. 
 
In order to investigate the abovementioned research questions, these two research questions are split 
into smaller hypotheses as discussed and presented below. The first section below describes the 
hypotheses development regarding the relationship between a firm’s corporate governance 
characteristics with audit quality and earnings quality. Hypotheses will be developed for each of these 
corporate governance characteristics respectively in relation to audit quality and earnings quality. The 
second section further discusses the hypotheses development regarding the relationship between 
industry specialist auditors under the three different national-city frameworks with audit quality and 
earnings quality. 
 
4.2 Female directors, audit quality and earnings quality 
Female directorship is one of the core characteristics of corporate governance in the U.K., and it is 
believed that it contributes to better overall financial reporting quality. Thus, this section develops the 
arguments surrounding the first two hypotheses of the study which relate to female directorship, audit 
quality and earnings quality. 
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The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2014) recommends that board members be appointed 
“on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, 
including gender” (Principle B.2, p.11). Also, in 2010, the U.K. government commissioned Lord 
Davies to carry out an investigation identifying the reasons which precluded women from holding top 
executive positions in U.K. public listed companies.  
 
Prior research pertaining to gender differences identified a few factors which differentiate the 
effectiveness of male and female workers in their board representations – these can be observed in 
terms of leadership style (Nielsen and Huse, 2010), behaviour and skills (Yukl, 2002) and greater 
demand for effective monitoring in order to protect their reputation in the capital markets (Gilson, 
1990). 
 
Thomas and Ely (1996) assert that the representation of female directors on boards brings more 
synergy to the board functionality, and the effect of such synergy is doubled as compared to when a 
new male board member is recruited, given the same level of qualification and capabilities. Several 
studies (Clarke, 2005; Huse and Solberg, 2006) have stressed that boards with female directors are 
more deliberate and thorough in their discussion and decision making, and are more likely to give due 
consideration to difficult issues that are normally taken for granted by all male boards.  Joy (2008) 
highlighted that female directors’ communication skills help facilitate more effective communication 
between the board and investors. Improvements in the board deliberation and communication are 
expected to contribute to better monitoring ability (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
 
Female directors are reported to exercise greater diligence in their monitoring role, as evidenced by 
their higher participation in committees charged with governance and auditing and their ability to 
improve board attendance rate and CEO accountability (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In terms of 
financial reporting outcome, prior studies have reported that the presence of female directors on board 
and audit committees reduces earnings management activities through accruals manipulation (Srinidhi 
et al., 2011). Gul et al. (2008) have documented that auditors exert higher levels of effort in auditing 
companies with female directors as compared to male directors given their high concern for audit and 
risk oversight and controls (Rosener, 2003). Female directors also contribute to increased disclosure 
and decreases in the cost of capital (Gul et al., 2010). Taken together, female participation on board 
and audit committees is viewed as contributing to better financial reporting quality and improved 
investor confidence in the quality of the reported earnings. 
  
Nevertheless, there are also studies suggesting the negative effect of having female directors on 
boards, such as increased firm costs due to higher turnover and absenteeism (Cox and Blake, 1991), 
the notion that women are more risk-averse than men (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998), and the 
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increased likelihood of conflict when women are the minority gender representative (Richard et al., 
2004). In other words, more gender diversity may not necessarily contribute to more effective 
monitoring as they are discriminated against and not given fair and equal say in their role relative to 
men (Carter et al., 2003). 
  
On the other hand, prior research on other countries besides the U.S. has failed to find a significant 
relationship between the percentage of female members of U.S. boards and several accounting 
measures of financial performance. This includes studies from Sweden (Du Rietz and Henrekson, 
2000),  Denmark (Smith et al., 2006; Rose, 2007) as well as cross-country studies on over 500 of the 
largest firms from three Scandinavian countries, namely Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Randøy et 
al., 2006). These findings indicate that the effect of gender diversity between countries varies.  Given 
the mixed findings from prior studies, the following hypotheses are proposed (stated in the null form): 
 
H1: There is no significant relationship between the female directors on boards and audit quality. 
H2: There is no significant relationship between female directors on boards and earnings quality. 
 
4.3 Foreign directors, audit quality and earnings quality 
The presence of foreign directors on boards improves board diversity, which is believed to contribute 
to better management quality and, thus, the quality of financial reporting. This section discusses the 
development of the next two hypotheses concerning the relationship between foreign directors, audit 
quality and earnings quality. 
 
Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Samaha et al. (2012) assert that the diversity of board nationalities 
within a company board bring together a multiplicity of ideas, experiences and perspectives. This may 
help to reduce the information asymmetry and the associated agency costs, expand cross-border flows 
of knowledge and technology, and improve financing prospects through the increasing pool of 
international investors (Fogel et al., 2013). Two studies by Carter et al. (2003) and Choi et al. (2007) 
have reported that a higher proportion of ethnic minority directors on boards contributes to better firm 
performance.  
 
However, studies from diversity research (Konrad and Kramer, 2006; Ruigrok et al., 2007) have 
argued that diversity could also create problems in communication, such as conflict and 
misunderstandings, leading to slow decision making. A study by Masulis et al. (2012) has found that 
foreign directors are facing difficulties in challenging managerial decisions and evaluating managerial 
performance due to their unfamiliarity with national accounting rules, laws and regulations, 
governance standards, and management methods. They also found that foreign independent directors 
have higher rates of meeting absenteeism and poor performance and are associated with a greater 
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likelihood of intentional financial misreporting, higher CEO compensation, and a lower sensitivity of 
CEO’s turnover to performance. From the above discussion, the following null hypotheses are 
proposed:  
 
H3: There is no significant relationship between foreign directors on boards and audit quality. 
H4: There is no significant relationship between foreign directors on boards and earnings quality. 
 
4.4 Internal audit function, audit quality and earnings quality 
The internal auditing standards (International Auditing Standard ISA 610) explicitly recognise the 
potential relevance of internal auditing to the financial reporting process, which makes the internal 
audit an important function in promoting the quality of financial reporting. Thus, in this section, two 
hypotheses will be developed pertaining to the relationship between internal audit function, audit 
quality and earnings quality. 
 
ISA 610 provides guidance on how the external auditor’s reliance on the work of internal auditors 
could affect the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures performed by the external auditor. 
According to the Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA) definition of internal audit, the internal audit’s 
role encompasses both assurance activity as well as consulting activity, playing a key role in corporate 
governance and risk management, instead of narrowly focusing on evaluating and strengthening 
internal controls per se. Given the increased capability and scope of internal audits today, the presence 
of the internal audit function within a company facilitates the external audit process (Schneider, 2009) 
by reducing the risk of material misstatements (Prawitt et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2011) as well as 
improves internal governance processes (Munro and Stewart, 2010), particularly when agency costs 
are high (Adams, 1994). 
 
The relationship between internal audit and audit fees could be explained using either the substitutive 
or complementary perspectives (Zain et al., 2015). Under the substitution perspective, it is argued that 
the external auditor can benefit from their reliance on internal auditor work, and thus pass some 
portion of the cost savings from reduced audit effort to the clients, resulting in lower audit fees 
(Prawitt et al., 2011). Findings from audit fee studies by Anderson et al. (1993), Felix et al. (2001), 
Prawitt et al. (2009), Prawitt et al. (2011), Abbott et al. (2012), Mohamed et al. (2012) and Zain et al. 
(2015) support this argument, as they report negative association between internal audit and audit fees. 
From a complementary perspective, it is argued that companies with strong corporate governance are 
committed to the establishment of an internal audit function within their companies and are willing to 
pay for higher audit fees to ensure that their demand for higher audit quality is met (Hay et al., 2008). 
Consistent with this argument, studies by Walker and Casterella (2000) and Goodwin-Stewart and 
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Kent (2006) and Hay et al. (2008) have found a positive relationship between presence of internal 
audit function and external audit fees.  
 
A meta-analysis study by Bame-Aldred et al. (2013) reports that reliance on internal audit function 
can influence factors such as litigation risk, audit fees, audit efficiency, as well as the quality of the 
financial statement. Abbott et al. (2012) and Pizzini et al. (2011) have reported that internal audit 
function quality and its coordination with external auditors increases the external audit efficiency by 
reducing external audit delay, whereas Lin et al. (2011) find the coordination between the external 
auditor and the internal audit function improves audit quality as it increases material weakness 
disclosures. Prawitt et al. (2009b) document that internal audit function quality reduces the level of 
earnings management as measured by lower abnormal accruals and a higher propensity to meet or 
barely beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. In light of the above discussion, the following hypotheses are 
proposed (in the null form): 
  
H5: There is no significant relationship between the internal audit function and audit quality. 
H6: There is no significant relationship between the internal audit function and earnings quality. 
 
4.5 Audit committee size, audit quality and earnings quality 
Audit committee size is an important attribute of good corporate governance as it contributes to the 
effectiveness of the committee’s function, which affects the company’s financial reporting quality. 
This section will discuss the two hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between audit committee 
size, audit quality and earnings quality. 
 
The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2014) requires the board to establish an audit committee 
comprised of at least three members. The suggestion of a minimum number of members on the audit 
committee, without an upper limit, expresses the regulatory bodies’ view in the U.K. that they place 
great emphasis in ensuring the audit committees are sufficiently staffed.  
 
A larger sized audit committee represents greater resources, talents, skills and knowledge to rely on in 
overseeing the financial reporting process (Vafeas, 2000; Bedard et al., 2004; Norman et al., 2007; 
Lin and Hwang, 2010), and thus it is argued a more effective monitoring is accomplished. Larger audit 
committees are more likely to withstand pressures of management collusion (Dezoort and Salterio, 
2001) and are able to pay more attention to the overall financial accounting process (Anderson et al., 
2004); other studies, however, conceive larger audit committees as increasing the risk of material 
misstatement (Boo and Sharma, 2008). 
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Results of studies on the effect of audit committee size on financial reporting outcomes are 
inconclusive. Prior studies (such as Abbott et al., 2003a; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007; Hoitash and 
Hoitash, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011) have found a positive association between the audit committee size 
and audit fees. Few other studies report negative association between audit committee size and auditor 
independence (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009), auditor switches (Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001), 
adverse ruling by the FRRP
6
 (Song and Windram, 2004) and financial restatements (Lin et al., 2006), 
and lower accrual estimation error (Kent et al., 2010). 
 
On the contrary, Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004) report no significant relationship 
between audit committee size and earnings management. There are also studies which show no 
significant association between audit committee size and financial reporting measures such as audit 
fees (O’Sullivan, 1999), restatements (Abbott et al., 2004) and accruals (Baxter and Cotter, 2009).  
Given the mixed results from previous studies, the study makes no directional prediction, and the 
hypotheses are stated below in the null form, as follows:  
 
H7: There is no significant relationship between the size of audit committees and audit quality. 
H8: There is no significant relationship between the size of audit committees and earnings quality. 
 
4.6 Audit committee independence, audit quality and earnings quality 
The independence of the audit committee is another key characteristic for effective monitoring of the 
financial reporting process. In this section, two hypotheses pertaining to the effect of audit committee 
independence in relation to audit quality and earnings quality are developed. 
 
It is assumed that independent directors within the audit committee are better at monitoring than their 
insider counterparts (DeFond and Francis, 2005) and are more likely to report questionable managerial 
financial reporting practices to appropriate authorities (Baxter and Cotter, 2009). The independence of 
the audit committee is also a subject of increasing regulatory interest. The U.K. Corporate Governance 
Code (2010, 2012, 2014) recommends, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires all listed 
companies to establish and maintain a fully independent audit committee.  
 
Based on prior literature, an audit committee that is independent preserves the objectivity of the 
internal and external auditors (Vicknair et al., 1993; Deli and Gillan, 2000; Abbott et al. 2003a), is 
more questionable of management actions (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), is more conservative and 
supportive of the proposed audit adjustment and auditor’s effort (Dezoort et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 
2003), and reduces management threat to replace or dismiss the existing auditor when modified 
                                                     
6 In the U.K., action against companies by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) for defective financial statements 
has been used as an equivalent signal to SEC Enforcement Actions in the U.S. 
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opinion is being issued (Knapp, 1985; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2003a; Abbott et 
al., 2003; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009).  
 
Studies in the U.S. by Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003), and Mitra et al. (2007) report a 
positive association between audit committee independence and audit fees. On the contrary, Zaman et 
al. (2011) have reported negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees in 
the U.K. Koh et al. (2007) and Kent et al. (2010) have suggested that higher audit committee 
independence is associated with higher accruals quality. Nevertheless, Osma and Noguer (2007) and 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) have failed to find any significant association between audit committee 
independence and absolute accruals. In light of the above discussion, the following null hypotheses are 
proposed: 
 
H9: There is no significant relationship between audit committee independence and audit quality. 
H10: There is no significant relationship between audit committee independence and earnings quality. 
 
4.7 Audit committee financial expertise, audit quality and earnings quality 
Audit committee financial expertise is a very important aspect of corporate governance, given the 
complex nature of financial reporting. This section will discuss the development of the next two 
hypotheses in respect of the relationship between audit committee financial expertise, audit quality 
and earnings quality. 
 
In the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates audit committees to include at least one financial 
expert and requires the rest of the members to be financially literate. In the U.K., the U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code (2010, 2014) recommends that “at least one member of the audit committee should 
have significant, recent and relevant financial experience”. The SOX Act (2002) avoids a requirement 
for a qualification but demands an extensive list of accounting knowledge and skills.  
 
Previous studies have measured audit committee financial expertise in several ways, such as 
accounting financial experts (directors with experience as a chief finance officer, a certified public 
accountant or a chartered accountant), non-accounting financial experts (directors with experience as 
Chairman or CEO) and non-financial experts (directors who are neither accounting nor non-
accounting financial experts) (DeFond et al., 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). Other studies 
have measured audit committee financial expertise using the various U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) definition of a financial expert such as audit partner experience (Naiker and 
Sharma, 2009), industry expertise (Cohen et al., 2010) and auditing expertise (Barua et al., 2010). 
Farber (2005), using SEC’s broad definition of financial expertise, has reported that fraudulent firms 
have fewer financial experts on their audit committees. Similarly, Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. 
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(2003a), Bedard et al. (2004), Abbott et al. (2004), and Lo et al. (2010) note that the presence of 
financial expertise on the audit committee has a significant positive association with financial 
reporting quality measures. However, Carcello and Neal (2003a) and Zaman et al. (2011) do not 
report any benefit of such expertise. Krishnan (2005) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010) show that accounting 
financial expertise is associated with less earnings management. Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008) provide evidence of a strong positive association between accounting financial expertise and 
earnings quality. Baxter and Cotter (2009) document a significant negative association between the 
audit committee accounting expertise variable (members with accounting qualification) and earnings 
management, hence improving financial reporting quality.  
 
Audit committee members with auditing experience are reported to be more likely to communicate the 
detected material misstatements and make corrections in a timely manner (DeZoort and Salterio, 
2001), while audit committee members with accounting expertise are more effective in assessing the 
nature and appropriateness of accounting choices and constrain aggressive accounting policies 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) argue that governance expertise is 
important in maintaining audit quality and have documented a positive and significant association 
between governance expertise and audit fee. They define audit committee governance expertise 
broadly as the audit committee members' experience of serving on another audit committee. It has also 
been argued that audit committee members with financial expertise can better handle financial 
reporting complexities relative to members without such expertise (Dezoort and Salterio, 2001; 
Davidson et al., 2004) and demand better monitoring of the financial reporting process (Engel et al., 
2010). From the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed (in the null form): 
 
H11: There is no significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and audit 
quality. 
H12: There is no significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and earnings 
quality. 
 
4.8 Audit committee activity, audit quality and earnings quality 
Audit committee activity is an important corporate governance characteristic which contributes to 
effective financial reporting. Thus, this section develops the arguments for the two hypotheses of the 
study which relate to audit committee activity, audit quality and earnings quality. 
 
Active audit committees that frequently meet are more attentive and have better understanding of their 
roles and responsibilities (Abbott et al., 2003a). During the meetings, audit committee members have 
the opportunity to put an emphasis on financial statement accuracy, control effectiveness and audit 
quality discussions, financial report wording, and questioning management and auditors on their 
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actions/decisions (Gendron et al., 2004). Thus, how effective the audit committee is in discharging its 
roles and responsibilities can be measured based on its meeting activities (Song and Windram, 2004), 
as the frequency of audit committee meetings indicates its level of diligence and activity (Peasnell et 
al., 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005).  
 
McMullen (1996) has found that incidence of errors, irregularities and illegal acts are lower in 
companies with active audit committees. Abbott et al. (2000) and Beasley et al. (2000) document that 
there is lower likelihood for companies to be sanctioned for fraud and aggressive accounting when the 
audit committee frequently meets. However, Abbott et al. (2004) have reported that financial 
restatements are unlikely to happen to companies that meet at least four times a year. Other prior 
studies (Vafeas, 2005; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006: Stewart and Munro, 2007; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009; Engel et al., 2010; Kent et al., 
2010; Zaman et al., 2011) lend support to the importance currently attached to audit committee 
activity levels and highlight the benefits associated with higher levels of audit committee diligence. 
These studies have found support for higher audit committee meetings frequency in relation to audit 
fee, non-audit fee ratio and earnings quality. However, empirical studies such as Abbott et al. (2003a), 
Bedard et al. (2004) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) have found an insignificant association between a 
few financial reporting quality measures and audit committee meeting frequency. The results of a 
recent meta-analysis study by Lin and Hwang (2010) also support these findings by documenting a 
significant negative relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and earnings 
management. Given the mixed findings, the hypotheses below are stated in the null form as follows: 
 
H13: There is no relationship between audit committee activity and audit quality. 
H14: There is no relationship between audit committee activity and earnings quality. 
 
4.9 Industry specialist auditors, audit quality and earnings quality 
An industry specialist auditor is an important quality of a Big 4 auditor, given their depth of industry 
knowledge and expertise. This knowledge and industry expertise will help the auditor to perform 
better audit works and contribute to the quality of reported earnings. Thus, this section develops the 
arguments surrounding the first two hypotheses of the study which relate to industry specialist 
auditors, audit quality and earnings quality.     
 
Auditor industry specialisation is a product differentiation strategy adopted by the audit firms to 
differentiate themselves from competitors in fulfilling clients’ demands for better financial reporting 
quality (Krishnan, 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) and to compete on other than cost-price strategy 
alone (Habib, 2011; Gramling and Stone, 2001; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). By concentrating 
resource and technology investments in a particular focus industry or a number of industries, audit 
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firms are able to gain efficiency through economies of scale (Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Cairney 
and Young, 2006) and build reputation as an industry expert, which will then provide them with 
competitive advantage and greater market power (bargaining power) over their rivals, and the ability 
to charge a differentially high audit fee premium (Hay and Jeter, 2011), both over existing or potential 
clients (Causholli et al., 2010; Simony, 1980; Francis, 1984). The merger of the Big N accounting 
firms into the current Big 4 firms was partly driven by their intention to focus on industry 
specialisation (GAO, 2003), and the establishment of industry specialist status is seen as an important 
strategy in order for the audit firm to signal their ability to provide higher audit quality (FRC, 2009).  
Many studies have reported a positive relationship between auditor industry (national) specialisation 
and audit fees (e.g., Defond et al., 2000; Ferguson et al., 2003; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Francis et 
al., 2005; Carson, 2009; Cahan et al., 2011; Fung et al., 2012), and many others provide somewhat 
different conclusions. For example, Craswell et al. (1995) and Carson and Fargher (2007) find the fee 
premium to occur only in the large client segment, whilst Casterella et al. (2004) have reported the fee 
premium in the small client market. Other studies provide weak results or insignificant findings (e.g., 
Palmrose, 1986; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2006; 
Basioudis and Francis, 2007), inconclusive evidence (Minutti-Meza, 2013), or a fee discount (e.g., 
Ettredge and Greenberg, 1990; Hay and Jeter, 2011). The mixed results obtained are due to the 
different industry specialisation measures used, and to the country and the period analysed (Craswell 
et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Huang et al., 2007; Causholli et al., 2010; Hay and Jeter, 
2011). 
Relatively recent studies on auditor industry specialisation examine the effect of the Big 4 industry 
leadership on audit pricing using the national-city framework developed by Ferguson et al. (2003) to 
determine whether national (firm-level) reputations or city reputations (office-level) for industry 
expertise are more valued and more highly priced in the audit market (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et 
al., 2005; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Hay and Jeter, 2011). Whether the audit pricing is dominated 
by firm-level or office-level industry expertise might explain the strength of knowledge sharing and 
transfer of industry expertise between the city-offices of the audit firms. The results of this line of 
research are so far inconclusive. In the U.S. and Australia, auditors’ industry expertise based on joint 
national and city reputation matters more in the Big 4 audit market, as they are priced at a higher rate 
as compared to national industry leadership alone or city-specific industry leadership alone (Ferguson 
et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005). On the contrary, the industry specialisation premium for city-
industry leadership alone in New Zealand appears to be higher than joint national and city-specific 
industry leadership (Hay and Jeter, 2011). The prior U.K. evidence based on 2002 data (Basioudis and 
Francis, 2007) stands in contras to the U.S. and Australia, but is similar to New Zealand by showing 
that the Big 4 city-specific industry leadership alone matters more than joint national and city-specific 
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industry leadership, as it is able to earn higher fee premiums. Also, no significant fee premium is 
reported for Big 4 national industry leaders in the U.K. relative to other Big 4 auditors that are not 
national industry leaders. The prior U.K. results imply that knowledge sharing and transfer in respect 
of industry expertise does not occur across the city-offices of the Big 4 firms. These findings of fee 
premiums are further supported by evidence showing that industry specialisation is associated with 
higher audit quality (e.g. Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Sun and Liu, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, more recently researchers have started focusing on partner industry expertise. This is 
based on the argument that audit partner depth of knowledge, experience and expertise dealing with 
clients within a specific industry is a somewhat unique “private human capital”’ to the partner and 
cannot be easily shared
7
 with other partners or staff residing within the same audit firm (Chi and Chin, 
2011). Thus, this would mean that audit quality is not only attributed to the brand name of the audit 
firm, but is also affected by the individual partner’s characteristics and reputation (Goodwin and Wu, 
2014).  
 
In their study in Australia, Goodwin and Wu (2014) have reported evidence of a premium only for 
companies audited by partners who are industry leaders at the city level, suggesting that partner level 
expertise is the driver of the audit fee premium for industry expertise. Their results are consistent 
when they control for either the first, second or third ranked city partner. On the other hand, Nagy 
(2014) has found evidence using U.S. data suggesting that there are fee premiums attached to both the 
city-industry leading audit partner and the audit firm who is a city-specific industry leader, and that the 
fee premium between the two aforementioned are not significantly different from one another. Zerni et 
al. (2011) also report a fee premium for partner industry specialisation in Sweden. Consistent with 
this, a study in Taiwan by Chin and Chi (2009) documented that the partner industry specialist reduces 
restatements. Chi and Chin (2011) document evidence of a combination of audit firm national industry 
leadership  and  partner  city  industry  expertise contributing to higher earnings quality, resulting  in 
lower discretionary accruals. As this study intends to examine the effect of industry specialist auditors 
on audit fees and earnings quality using the national-city framework at the firm and partner level, the 
following hypotheses are proposed (in the null form): 
 
H15: There is no significant relationship between auditor industry leadership and audit quality. 
H16: There is no significant relationship between auditor industry leadership and earnings quality. 
                                                     
7 This is due to the difficulty in documentation or transfer of data/information (e.g. papers, databases), the involvement of 
professional judgment in various considerations, and the gap in knowledge-sharing through the use of IT-based expert 
knowledge systems (Vera-Munoz et al., 2006). 
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4.10 Summary 
The table below summarises all the hypotheses that have been developed and are to be tested in the 
study. 
 
H1 There is no significant relationship between female directors on boards and audit quality. 
H2 There is no significant relationship between female directors on boards and earnings 
quality. 
H3 There is no significant relationship between foreign directors on boards and audit 
quality. 
H4 There is no significant relationship between foreign directors on boards and earnings 
quality. 
H5 There is no significant relationship between the internal audit function and audit quality. 
H6 There is no significant relationship between the internal audit function and earnings 
quality. 
H7 There is no significant relationship between the size of audit committees and audit 
quality. 
H8 There is no significant relationship between the size of audit committees and earnings 
quality. 
H9 There is no significant relationship between audit committee independence and audit 
quality. 
H10 There is no significant relationship between audit committee independence and earnings 
quality. 
H11 There is no significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and 
audit quality. 
H12 There is no significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and 
earnings quality. 
H13 There is no relationship between audit committee activity and audit quality. 
H14 There is no relationship between audit committee activity and earnings quality. 
H15 There is no significant relationship between auditor industry leadership and audit quality. 
H16 There is no significant relationship between auditor industry leadership and earnings 
quality. 
  
  
 
88 
CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodology adopted to test the hypotheses developed. The first 
section provides justification on the research design adopted for the studies, while the second section 
provides explanation on the data collection process including the sample selection process. Next, the 
chapter outlines the definitions and measurements of the hypothesised variables (i.e. the industry 
specialist auditor and selected corporate governance variables examined in the study). The model 
specifications and related control variables are also discussed, followed by the data diagnostic test. 
The final section concludes.  
 
5.2 Research methodology justification 
The study adopts the positivism paradigm in examining its research problem. The positivism paradigm 
views the world as having a single reality and that the phenomenon being examined is context 
independent. Using the deductive approach to theory, the study relies on a number of corporate 
governance theories as well as a few theories on auditor industry specialisation to develop its research 
hypotheses. The corporate governance theories tested in the study are agency theory, stewardship 
theory, institutional theory and managerial hegemony theory. These theories are used to explain the 
relationship between firm’s corporate governance characteristics, external audit and earnings quality. 
Whereas the auditor industry specialisation phenomenon is explained by product differentiation 
theory, production efficiency theory, reputation theory and spatial competition theory. These theories 
help explained the reasons why industry specialist auditors are able to earn either a fee premium or a 
fee discount, and provides differential audit quality due to their specialisation strategy.  
 
The deductive approach to theory allows the test of theory against a large sample of observations, 
which increases the reliability and external validity of the research findings. The quantitative research 
design allows the researcher to make inferences and predictions of possible relationships among the 
variables analysed using mathematical modelling and statistical techniques, with strict variable 
definitions and measurements. Therefore, the research findings can be generalised and replicated 
across time and context. This quantitative research design fits well with the philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings chosen for the research, which is the positivism paradigm. This decision is 
made after taking into consideration factors such as the resources availability in terms of time, data, 
funding, and the skill sets of the PhD student carrying out this research. 
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5.3 Data collection and sample selection 
The research sample comprise of all the companies listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). It is a 
cross-sectional study over four-year period from 2008 to 2011. As mentioned earlier, there are two 
empirical studies being carried out in this thesis. The first study examines the relationships between 
industry specialist auditor and corporate governance on audit fees. The second empirical analysis 
examines the relationship between industry specialist auditor, corporate governance and earnings 
quality. The investigation for both empirical studies is performed under three different level of 
analysis for auditor industry specialisation: 1) firm national-city framework, 2) partner national-city 
framework, and 3) joint firm-partner national-city framework. Thus, each of this empirical study is 
carried out using different sample size based on data availability for each level of analysis. While the 
firm national-city framework analysis is based on 2008 to 2011 sample of observations, the partner 
national-city framework and the joint firm-partner national-city framework sample are limited to only 
three years 2009-2011 data. This is because the disclosure of the name of the senior statutory auditor 
(or engagement partner) signing the auditor’s report for and on behalf of the audit firm was only made 
mandatory for financial years beginning or after 6 April 2008 (Section 503 of the Companies Act 
2006) and, therefore, the first full disclosure of this requirement has happened in the 2009 year. 
Without such disclosure, it would not be possible to carry out the partner level of analysis. 
 
The initial sample of companies listed on the LSE between year 2008 to 2011 comprises of 
approximately 9,946 observations. This sample is then reduced further to exclude listed companies 
from the financial services sector, governmental institutions, as well as companies with missing data 
for the audit pricing and earnings quality analyses. Following Basioudis and Francis (2007), sample 
with less than two observations per city-industry combination are also eliminated, as to allow for the 
application of the national-city framework for the auditor industry specialisation analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the calculation of market share in determining auditor 
industry leadership at the national level is based on the sample of all companies (N=1,747) with 
available audit fees data. The sampling procedure is shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 below, for the 
audit pricing and earnings quality analyses separately. The industry classification used in this study is 
based on the FAME categorisation of major industry sectors, where the numerous LSE industry codes 
(SIC codes) of similar industry nature are being categorised into only 13 major industry sectors.  This 
is the first study on auditor industry leadership and corporate governance in the U.K. that employ data 
from the period affected by the 2007/2008 financial crisis, and, therefore, any conclusions need to be 
reached with this consideration in mind. 
 
For the audit pricing analysis, the study only used the Big 4 sample to mitigate the problem of self-
selection bias and to control for the Big 4 brand name reputation (Craswell et al., 1995; Chung and 
Kallapur, 2003). This is because the study is interested to determine whether there is any differential 
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fee premium gain by the Big 4 industry specialists relative to Big 4 non-industry specialists. Similar 
approach has been used in prior studies by Basioudis and Francis (2007) and Francis et al. (2005). 
Nevertheless, robustness analysis using the full sample including both the Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients 
are also performed in Chapter 8. Table 5.1 summarises the selection procedure for the first empirical 
study examining the relationships between industry specialist auditor, corporate governance and audit 
fees. 
 
Table  5.1: Sample selection procedures for the first empirical study: The relationship between 
industry specialist auditors, corporate governance and audit quality 
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled 
All LSE listed firms 2,724 2,414 2,289 2,519 9,946 
Less: Firms not followed by FAME database (1,706) (1,380) (1,229) (1,456) (5,771) 
Less: Financial firms (112) (117) (121) (120) (470) 
Less: Public administration and defence, health and 
education, other services firms 
(401) (415) (437) (441) (1,694) 
Less: Firms with incomplete financial data (27) (7) (10) (10) (54) 
Less: Firms audited by other than U.K. audit offices (10) (7) (8) (8) (33) 
Less: Firms with unavailable annual reports (56) (66) (35) (20) (177) 
Full sample with complete data on audit fees  
This sample is used to calculate the industry specialist 
auditor market share in Table 6.4  
412 422 449 464 1,747 
Less: Sample with less than two observations per city-
industry combination 
(67) (71) (75) (70) (283) 
Less: Firms with missing corporate governance data (15) (22) (13) (38) (88) 
Less: Non-Big 4 sample (118) (114) (130) (124) (486) 
Final sample for firm national-city framework 212 212 232 236 892 
Less: Sample with missing audit partner data (212) - - - 212 
Final sample for partner and joint firm-partner        
national-city framework 
- 212 232 236 680 
 
The second empirical analysis examines the relationship between industry specialist auditor, corporate 
governance and earnings quality. There are three earnings quality proxies examined in this study; 1) 
the discretionary accruals which controls for firm’s performance based on Kothari et al. (2005) model 
(DAC_PERF), 2) the accrual estimation error (AEE) based on the Dechow and Dichev’s modified 
accrual quality model of McNichols (2002), and 3) the likelihood of reporting a profit (avoiding a 
loss) model adopted from Francis et al. (2013) (PROFIT). Similar to the audit pricing analyses, the 
earnings quality analyses is also performed under the three different level of analysis for auditor 
industry specialisation: 1) the firm national-city framework, 2) the partner national-city framework, 
and 3) the joint firm-partner national-city framework. Thus the sample size varies. Table 5.2 
summarises the selection procedure for the second empirical study examining the relationships 
between industry specialist auditor, corporate governance and earnings quality. For the DAC_PERF 
and AEE analysis, consistent with the arguments set forth by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and 
Subramanyam (1996), the sample for each industry within a year comprised of at least six 
observations, in order to provide an unbiased estimation of discretionary accruals.  
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Table 5.2 below summarises the selection procedure and data attrition for the second empirical study 
examining the relationships between industry specialist auditor, corporate governance and earnings 
quality. Based on the Table 5.2 below, the final sample using the firm national-city framework is 
1,347 observations for the DAC_PERF and PROFIT models and 1,083 observations for the AEE 
model for the 2008-2011 period. Similarly, the final sample using the partner national-city framework 
and the joint firm-partner national-city framework is 1,019 observations for both the DAC_PERF and 
PROFIT models and 824 observations for the AEE model for the same period as above. These 
different size samples will be used consistently in all the earnings quality empirical analyses and 
robustness tests performed. The analysis of earnings quality is based on the full sample instead of the 
Big 4 sample only, while controlling for the Big 4 effect using a dummy variable. 
 
Table 5.3 presents the distribution of sample based on the 13 major sectors for the first empirical 
study. While Table 5.4 presents distribution of sample based on the 13 major sectors for the second 
empirical study.  
 
Table  5.2: Sample selection procedures for the second empirical study: The relationship between 
industry specialist auditors, corporate governance and earnings quality 
Panel A: Discretionary accruals and likelihood to report a profit (avoid a loss) analyses  
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled 
All LSE listed firms 2,724 2,414 2,289 2,519 9,946 
Less: Firms not followed by FAME database (1,706) (1,380) (1,229) (1,456) (5,771) 
Less: Financial firms (112) (117) (121) (120) (470) 
Less: Public administration and defence, health and 
education, other services firms 
(401) (415) (437) (441) (1,694) 
Less: Firms with incomplete financial data (27) (7) (10) (10) (54) 
Less: Firms audited by other than U.K. audit offices (10) (7) (8) (8) (33) 
Less: Firms with unavailable annual reports (53) (66) (35) (20) (174) 
Less: Firms with missing corporate governance data (15) (22) (13) (38) (88) 
Less: Sample with less than two observations per city-
industry combination 
(67) (71) (75) (70) (283) 
Less: Firms with incomplete data to calculate DAC_PERF (5) (8) (9) (10) (32) 
Final sample for firm national-city framework 328 321 352 346 1,347 
Less: Sample with missing audit partner data (328) - - - (328) 
Final sample for partner and joint firm-partner national-
city framework  
- 321 352 346 1,019 
Panel B: Accrual estimation error analysis  
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled 
Final sample for firm national-city framework from 
Panel A 
328 321 352 346 1,347 
Less: Firms with incomplete data to calculate AEE (69) (56) (54) (85) (264) 
Final sample for firm national-city framework  259 265 298 261 1,083 
Less: Sample with missing audit partner data (259) - - - (259) 
Final sample for partner and joint firm-partner national-
city framework analyses 
- 265 298 261 824 
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Table  5.3: Sample size and industry distribution for the first empirical study: The relationship 
between industry specialist auditors, corporate governance and audit quality using the final 
sample under the firm national-city framework 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year  
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled 
Sample size 
N % N % N % N % N % 
212 23.77 212 23.77 232 26.00 236 26.46 892 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry 
Major Industry Sectors 2 Digit SIC Codes 
Pooled 
N % 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 1,10-14,23 85 9.53 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 24-26 125 14.01 
Construction 45 46 5.16 
Food, beverages, tobacco 15-16 48 5.38 
Gas, water, electricity 40-41 17 1.91 
Hotels and restaurants 55 51 5.72 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 30,33-37 133 14.91 
Metals and metal products 27-29 68 7.62 
Post and telecommunications 64 47 5.27 
Publishing, printing wood, cork, paper, 20-22 34 3.81 
Textiles, wearing apparel, Leather 17-19 17 1.91 
Transport 60-63 58 6.50 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-52 163 18.27 
Total  892 100.00 
 
Table  5.4: Sample size and industry distribution for the second empirical study: The 
relationship between industry specialist auditors, corporate governance and earnings quality 
using the final sample under the firm national-city framework 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year  
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled 
Sample size 
N % N % N % N % N % 
328 24.4 321 23.8 352 26.1 346 25.7 1,347 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry 
Major Industry Sectors 2 Digit SIC Codes 
Pooled 
N % 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 1,10-14,23 151 11.22 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 24-26 191 14.18 
Construction 45 52 3.86 
Food, beverages, tobacco 15-16 65 4.82 
Gas, water, electricity 40-41 32 2.37 
Hotels and restaurants 55 66 4.90 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 30,33-37 234 17.38 
Metals and metal products 27-29 148 10.99 
Post and telecommunications 64 72 5.34 
Publishing, printing wood, cork, paper, 20-22 43 3.19 
Textiles, wearing apparel, Leather 17-19 23 1.71 
Transport 60-63 69 5.12 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-52 201 14.92 
Total  1,347 100.00 
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5.4 Sources of data 
This study employs a quantitative research design through analysis of publicly available secondary 
data. There are four main sources of data relevant to the study, namely Datastream, FAME, Thomson 
One Banker and the firms’ annual reports. Financial data for the audit pricing and earnings quality 
analysis are downloaded from Datastream, FAME and Thomson OneBanker databases. Data on the 
audit partners, audit engagement office, the board of directors, the audit committee characteristics, and 
the internal audit function are hand collected manually from the annual report of each company in the 
sample from year 2008 to 2011, as they are not available in any database. The annual reports are either 
downloaded from the individual company’s website or Northcote database8. Substantial amount of 
time and effort have been devoted to the manual data collection process. The individual director 
bibliography is checked to identify the director’s nationality and gender, which are later cross-checked 
to the Directors information in the FAME database for verification and completeness. The audit 
committee characteristics (such as audit committee size, independence, frequency of meetings and 
type of expertise possessed (accounting, finance and supervisory expertise based on their education 
background, professional qualification held as well as working experience), are extracted manually 
from the corporate governance section With regards to the industry specialist auditor analysis, the 
information on the auditor city offices and the name of the individual audit partner are extracted 
manually from the individual auditor report from the company’s annual report. The various financial 
statement data items used to calculate the audit quality and earnings quality variables are explained in 
the next section. Before that, the empirical models used in the analyses are explained below. 
 
5.5 Definition and measurement of hypothesised variables 
The variables of interest examined in this study are explained in this section. There are main variables 
to be examined are the different specification for industry specialist auditor, the characteristics of the 
board and audit committee, and the presence of internal audit function.  
 
5.5.1 Industry specialist auditor 
Prior auditor industry specialisation studies (Neal and Riley, 2004; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; 
Francis et al., 2005), consider industry specialist to be those auditors with the largest market share (or 
based on certain arbitrary percentage of market share) within a particular industry. This is based on the 
contention that audit firm with the largest market share has developed the largest knowledge base 
within that particular industry, which later may benefit them in terms of increased economies of scale 
and improved audit quality (Neal and Riley, 2004).  Various different approach has been used to 
measure auditor industry specialist, either based on the number of clients audited, the fees that clients 
                                                     
8 Northcote is a free online research tool which provides links you listed company information. The website URL is 
http://www.northcote.co.uk/.ze  
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pay to the auditor for statutory audit, the assets of clients, or the sales of clients. Following prior study 
by Basioudis and Francis (2007), this study measures the auditor industry market share based on audit 
fees, based on the notion that it is the most popular and appropriate measure of industry leadership as 
audit fees “measure the value of the auditing industry’s economic output” (Basioudis and Francis, 
2007)
9
. Furthermore, the use of other measures could create potential problem and inconsistency in the 
analyses. Prior U.K. study by Basioudis and Francis (2007) report that designating an audit firm as an 
industry specialist based on the largest number of clients turns out to be a problematic measure at the 
city level because there are ‘‘ties’’ in many of the unique city-industry combinations, i.e., two or more 
audit firms have the same number of audit clients and this, in turn, causes difficulty in picking one top 
leader. This effect is exacerbated given that the large audit fee market share differential between the 
first and second ranked auditors across all city-specific industries (68 percent versus 27 percent) find 
in the study. Thus, treating the top two firms or more as co-leaders could potentially induce large 
measurement error.  
 
In addition, Basioudis and Francis (2007) report no evidence of a fee premium for industry leadership 
when the number of clients is used to measure industry leadership and firms with ‘‘ties’’ are coded as 
co-industry leaders. Besides that, they also document insignificant fee premium when industry 
specialist audit firm is determined based on clients assets and clients sales, and argued that client 
assets and sales are noisy proxies for audit fees.  
 
In addition, Neal and Riley (2004) have described two approaches on how industry specialist auditor 
is measured using the industry market share; 1) the market share approach - either using dummy and 
continuous, the 2) portfolio approach. While the market share approach consider industry specialist to 
be those auditors with the largest market share within a particular industry, the portfolio approach 
determines industry specialist auditor based on the relative distribution of audit services and related 
fees across the various industries for each audit firm considered individually”. However, Neal and 
Riley (2004) also concluded that the use of these two approaches may not give the same results 
because many research papers suggests that the market and portfolio share measures do not act as 
substitutes, given that they are unlikely to be measuring the same attributes.  
 
Thus, based on the arguments mentioned above, this study measures auditor industry specialisation 
using the market share approach based on the clients audit fees to designate industry specialist 
auditor
10
. The industry specialist auditor (firm and partner) market share in this study are measured at 
                                                     
9 Nevertheless, Francis et al. (2005, 130, footnote 11) point out that audit fees include the effect of an industry premium and, 
therefore, could potentially bias the measure of industry leadership. 
10 Thus, the results reported in the study would not be robust to various alternative measure of auditor industry specialist 
based  on market share determined using the number of clients, clients assets and clients sales, and also using the portfolio 
approach to measure the auditor industry leadership. 
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both the national level and city (or office) level, following the national and-city framework adapted 
from the work of Ferguson et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2005), Basioudis and Francis (2007) and 
Goodwin and Wu (2014).  
 
Thus, the market share of the audit firm and the audit partner are calculated for each particular 
industry by year, at the national and city level based on the following formulas as used by Goodwin 
and Wu (2014). 
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Following Goodwin and Wu (2014), where i, j, and, k represents audit firms, clients, and industries, 
respectively; ik and ikc are number of audit firms in industry k and industry k in city c, respectively; 
jik, jikc, jikp and jikcp are number of clients served by audit firm i in industry k, audit firm i in 
industry k in city c, and partner p in industry k in city c, respectively; AFijk, AFijkc, AFijkp and 
AFijkcp are total audit fees for audit firm i from client j in industry k, audit firm i from client j in 
industry k in city c, partner p from client j in industry k, and partner p from client j in industry k in city 
c, respectively. If partner expertise is an important variable in explaining the audit fee premium 
(earnings management), the coefficient on audit partner national or city-industry market share should 
be positive and significant (Goodwin and Wu, 2014).  
 
As most of the industry specialist auditor studies (Basioudis and Francis, 2007, Francis et al., 2005, 
Ferguson et al., 2003), this study uses indicator variables to define industry specialist auditor. This is 
because the use of continuous market share variables to represent industry specialist auditors may not 
be descriptive of the auditing industry, where evidence from prior studies have indicated that there are 
cases where the second-ranked industry leader may not earn any fee premium as relative to the lower 
Audit firm national 
market share  = 
Audit firm city-industry 
market share  = 
Audit partner national 
market share  = 
Audit partner city-industry 
market share  = 
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ranked industry leaders (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al,. 2005; Basioudis and Francis 2007). This, 
thus suggest that the first-ranked auditors have a more credible reputation for industry expertise, 
relative to other auditors with large market shares in the industry. As shown in Table 6.4, the means 
for the top (second) ranked audit firms are about 58 percent (25 percent) and 68 percent (27 percent) 
for audit firm who are national leaders and city-specific industry leaders, respectively. On the other 
hand, the means for the top (second) ranked partners are about 40 percent (19 percent) and 60 percent 
(27 percent) for audit partner who are national leaders and city-specific industry leaders, respectively. 
These findings suggest that the top-ranked auditors dominate the second-ranked market shares at all 
the levels examined.  
 
Thus, in order to cater for such a non-linear relationship between the auditor (firm or partner) industry 
leadership, the indicator variables are used in this study. The specifications vary depending on analysis 
used, either at the firm national-city framework, partner national-city framework or joint firm-partner 
national-city framework as describe in Table 5.5 and 5.6 as follows:  
 
Table  5.5: Variables definition for industry specialist auditor under the firm national-city 
framework and partner national-city framework 
Variable  Variable definition 
Firm national-city framework  
NAT#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), 0 if otherwise 
CITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit office is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), and the office is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
CITY#1_ONLY Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally, and the office is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
NAT#1_ONLY Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), and the office is not the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share, 0 if otherwise 
Partner national-city framework  
PARNAT#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), 0 if otherwise 
PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (PARCITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), 0 if 
otherwise 
PARCITY#1_ONLY Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally, and the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
PARNAT#1_ONLY Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share, 0 if otherwise 
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Following Francis et al. (2005), the determination of the audit firm or partner national industry leader 
(in Model 1) and city-specific industry leader (in Model 2), respectively, is based on an iterative 
process using the regression model in each analysis in Chapter 6 to Chapter 11, under the respective 
firm, partner and joint firm-partner framework. The iterative process starts with only one indicator 
variable for the top-ranked leader (either national or city-specific) in the first estimation, and then 
adding a second indicator variable for the second-ranked leader in the second estimation, and so on 
until the introduction of an additional ranking variable is not statistically significant, or in other words, 
does not have an effect on audit fees. This iterative process determines the top-ranked Big 4 industry 
leaders (firm or partner) which have a significant coefficient relative to the remaining Big 4 non-
industry leaders. For example, NAT#1 represents as indicator variable coded 1 if the audit firm is the 
top-ranked industry leader nationally (coded zero if otherwise), given that, based on the iterative 
process in Model 1 of the firm national-city framework analysis, only the top-ranked audit firms 
nationally are only able to extract fee premiums.  However, if the iterative process indicates that the 
second-ranked audit firm industry leader nationally is also able to extract a fee premium, then the 
indicator variable would be NAT#2 which is coded 1 if the audit firm ranked as the top-two industry 
leader nationally (coded zero if otherwise). The same iterative process applies in determining city-
specific industry leader. Consequently, the determination of the joint national-city industry leader in 
Model 3 would be derived from the combination of the top-ranked leaders identified in Model 1 and 
Model 2 respectively. This iterative process applies under both, the firm national-city framework and 
the partner national-city framework, in which the designation of industry specialist will eventually 
flow to the joint firm-partner national-city framework analysis in the respective audit quality and 
earnings quality chapters.  
 
There is a possibility that the reported premiums under the firm national-city framework and partner 
national-city framework may be overstated due to the confounding effect of failure to control for the 
effect of partner industry leadership or firm industry leadership in the respective models. To correct 
for this effect, this study extends the analysis further, by adopting the joint firm-partner national-city 
industry framework. This study contributes to the auditor industry specialisation literature, as it is the 
first study that explores the effect of the joint firm-partner national-city framework in its analyses on 
audit pricing and earnings quality. This joint firm-partner national-city framework represents another 
approach to testing whether within-office knowledge sharing exists. The following analysis combines 
both the effect of audit firm and audit partner industry leadership at the national and city industry 
level, and tests them simultaneously to determine which type of industry leadership is more important 
(audit firm versus audit partner), and which yields the highest fee premium and earnings quality.  
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The combinations of the firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework results in 
the creation of 15 new variables to be examined under the joint firm-partner national-city framework 
analysis. These variables are described in detail in Table 5.6 below. The default comparison group is 
the remaining auditors who are neither the national nor city industry leaders at both the audit firm 
level and audit partner level. 
 
Table  5.6: Variables definition for industry specialist auditor under the joint firm-partner 
national-city framework 
Variable  Variable definition 
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the 
top-ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the 
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top-ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-two ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top- ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the top-ranked by city-
industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top- ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the 
top-ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not the top-ranked by 
city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
 
5.5.2 Corporate governance 
Next, this section presents the variable definition and measurement for the corporate governance 
variables selected for the study, which are female directors, foreign directors, internal audit, and audit 
committee characteristics of effectiveness including size, independence, financial expertise and 
activity. These corporate governance variables represents the independent variables that are examined 
in both, the audit quality and earnings quality chapters. The definition of the corporate governance 
variables is summarised in Table 5.7 below: 
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Table  5.7: Variables definition for corporate governance characteristics 
Variables Definition 
BODFEM proportion of female directors on board 
BODFOREIGN proportion of foreign directors on board 
INTAUD indicator variable, 1 = presence of internet audit function; 0 = otherwise 
ACSIZE number of directors on audit committee 
ACINDP proportion of non-executive directors on audit committee 
ACFINEXP proportion of directors with financial expertise on audit committee 
ACMEET number of audit committee meetings 
 
5.5.2.1 Female directors (BODFEM) 
The female directors on board is measured based on the number of female director, in proportion to 
the total board members. This definition follows Gul et al. (2008) and Garcia-Meca et al. (2015). 
 
5.5.2.2 Foreign directors (BODFOREIGN) 
The foreign directors on board is measured based on the number of foreign nationality director on 
board, in proportion to the total board members. This definition follows Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) in 
their study of board diversity and performance.  
 
5.5.2.3 Internal audit (INTAUD) 
Following Davidson et al. (2005), the internal audit is an indicator variable representing the presence of 
an internal audit function in the company, and 0 if otherwise. 
 
5.5.2.4 Audit committee size (ACSIZE) 
The audit committee size is measured based on the total number of audit committee members 
presented at the end of the financial year; this definition is consistent with Yang and Krishnan (2005). 
 
5.5.2.5 Audit committee independence (ACINDP) 
Consistent with DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Beasley (1996) and Bradbury et al. (2006), the audit 
committee independence is measured based on the total number of non-executive directors in the audit 
committee members, in proportion to the total members.  
 
5.5.2.6 Audit committee financial expertise (ACFINEXP) 
The audit committee financial expertise, in this study, is measured by the number of audit committee 
members who possess either accounting or financial qualification or experience, in proportion to the 
total number of audit committee members. This includes any academic background or qualifications in 
accounting and finance, as well as experience as a Chief Finance Officer, Finance Manager, 
  
 
101 
accountants, auditor or working in the banking industry. This definition is similar the ones used in 
prior studies by DeFond et al. (2005) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008). The accounting or 
financial knowledge of the audit committee should enable them to better understand, discuss and 
resolve the financial reporting issues. 
 
5.5.2.7 Audit committee activity (ACMEET) 
The audit committee level of activity is measured based on number of meetings held by the committee 
during the year. This definition is consistent with the one used by Krishnan and Visvanathan, (2009) 
and Zaman et al. (2011) in their studies.  
 
5.6 Model specification 
This section presents and discusses the models used to examine the two empirical studies; 1) the effect 
of industry specialist auditor and corporate governance on audit quality and 2) the effect of industry 
specialist auditor and corporate governance on earnings quality. For the first empirical study, the 
independent variables are industry specialist auditor variables, the corporate governance variables and 
the control variables, which are regressed on audit fees (LAF), as the dependent variable.  For the 
second empirical study, the independent variables are industry specialist auditor variables, the 
corporate governance variables and the control variables, which are then regressed on three different 
measures of earnings quality. The dependent variables for the earnings quality models are; 1) the 
discretionary accruals which controls for firm’s performance (DAC_PERF) based on Kothari et al., 
(2005) model, 2) the accrual estimation error (AEE) based on the Dechow and Dichev’s modified 
accrual quality model by McNichols (2002), and 3) the likelihood of reporting a profit or avoiding a 
loss (PROFIT) model adopted from Francis et al. (2013).  
 
There are two empirical models that will be used to address the research objectives, namely: 1) the 
audit fee model and 2) the earnings management models. The first empirical model analyse the effect 
of corporate governance and industry specialist auditor on audit fee, while the second empirical model 
examines the effectiveness of corporate governance and industry specialist auditor in promoting 
earnings quality. The variables definitions and measurements included in the models are clearly 
defined in their respective model below. 
 
5.6.1 Audit fee model (LAF Model) 
For the analysis of audit premium, the study adopts the internationally well-established audit fee 
determinants model introduced by Simunic (1980) and modified by Craswell et al. (1995). This model 
has been robust across different samples, time periods, countries, and sensitivity analyses for model 
misspecification (Francis and Simon 1987; Chan et al., 1993; Basioudis and Francis, 2007). Besides 
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the hypothesised variables (auditor industry specialisation, board and audit committee characteristics 
and internal audit function), the model controls for the effect of other core determinants’ of audit fees, 
namely the client’s size, complexity, risk, profitability, leverage, non-audit fees and auditor’s 
production costs and institutional ownership (Cobbin, 2002; Hay et al., 2006; Basioudis and Francis, 
2007). The audit fee model is estimated as the industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects model to 
control for systematic differences in fees across the 13 industries and four years period examined in 
the sample. An industry fixed-effects model controls for potential omitted variables in case there are 
any systematic differences across industries and years with respect to client’s company size, risk or 
audit complexity that are associated to audit fees (Basioudis and Francis, 2007). The ordinary least-
squares (OLS) regression model
11
 is specified as follows: 
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(Equation 1) 
 
where: 
LAF   = natural log of audit fees in GBP’000 
LNAF   = natural log of non-audit fees in GBP’000 paid to the incumbent auditor 
LTA   = natural log of total assets in GBP’000 
SQRTSUBS  = square root of total subsidiaries 
ROI   = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets 
DE   = ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
FOREIGN  = proportion of total sales from foreign operations; 
QUICK   = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities 
CATA   = ratio of current assets to total assets  
OPINION  = indicator variable, 1 = qualified or going concern audit report; 0 = otherwise 
LONDON  = indicator variable, 1 = London-based company, 0 = otherwise 
BUSY   = indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st year-end, 0 = otherwise 
LOSS   = indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three years, 0 = otherwise 
INITIAL  = indicator variable, 1 = new auditor in the current or prior year, 0 = otherwise  
INSOWN  = proportion of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders who individually  
    own 5 percent or more of outstanding ordinary shares  
ISA = indicator variable, 1 = industry specialist auditor (specification varies as described  
    in Section 5.4.1 earlier), 0 = otherwise 
BODFEM  = proportion of female directors on board 
BODFOREIGN = proportion of foreign directors on board 
INTAUD = indicator variable, 1 = presence of internet audit function; 0 = otherwise 
                                                     
11 According to Chaney et al. (2004), the estimations of models with both Big 4 and no-Big 4 clients lead to the problem of 
selection bias, as clients selected their own auditor, instead of being randomly. Although some studies use the Heckman two-
stage procedure to correct for this selection bias (e.g. Sun and Liu, 2013). However, as Francis and Lennox (2007) and 
Clatworthy et al. (2009, p. 139) highlighted that there is no confirmatory evidence in the econometrics literature on the 
reliability of the Heckman two-stage procedure to rectify the selection bias problem.  
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ACSIZE  = number of directors on audit committee  
ACINDP  = proportion of non-executive directors on audit committee  
ACFINEXP  = proportion of directors with financial expertise on audit committee 
ACMEET  = number of audit committee meetings 
   = error term 
 
The 15 control variables used in the model above are the standard audit fee control variables used in 
the audit fee models in previous studies. the model controls for the effect of other core determinants’ 
of audit fees, namely the client’s size, complexity, risk, profitability, leverage, non-audit fees and 
auditor’s production costs and institutional ownership (Cobbin, 2002; Hay et al., 2006). These 
variables are relatively similar to those adopted in studies examining the effect of industry specialist 
auditors and corporate governance characteristics on audit fees (Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Francis 
et al., 2005; Zaman et al., 2011). 
 
Following Whisenant et al., (2003) and Basioudis and Francis (2007), positive association is expected 
between audit fees and non-audit fees (LNAF). LTA is a measure of firm size and is defined as the 
natural log of the total assets (Simunic, 1980; Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002). As the firm 
size increased, the auditors extend the audit scope and audit test accordingly. Such extensive efforts 
increase audit hours and fees, and thus the present study predicts a positive relationship between total 
assets and audit fees. SQRTSUBS and FOREIGN represents the measure of complexity of clients 
operation. Positive association is expected between audit fees and SQRTSUBS and FOREIGN, given 
that the auditor needs to exert more effort and time to deal with client’s complex operational issues, 
leading to higher audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Craswell and Francis, 1999; Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello 
et al., 2002).  
 
According to Hay et al (2006), ROI and LOSS measure clients risk of failing, as the  auditor will lose a 
client if they are not financially viable (Hay et al., 2006). On the other hand, a dummy variable for the 
presence of loss (Hay et al., 2006) is also a proxy of client risk. The association between the client’s 
loss and fee charged by the auditor is expected to be positive. This is because company’s poor 
performance will lead to greater risk for the auditor, which results in higher fees. According to 
Basioudis and Francis (2007), clients with a larger QUICK ratio are less risky. Thus negative 
relationship is expected between audit fees and Quick ratio. According to Rubin (1988) during the 
busy season between 31
st
 March and 31
st
 December, companies having their financial year end during 
this period would have to pay higher audit fees. Thus, positive association is expected between busy 
season (BUSY) and audit fees. According to Chan et al., (1993) and Basioudis and Francis (2007), 
client companies that are located in London (LONDON) pays higher audit fees due to their higher 
living cost. Following Basioudis and Francis (2007), higher audit fees are expected from companies 
with greater inherent risk (higher DE and CATA ratios), given their higher audit risk and greater 
likelihood of business failing (Hay et al., 2006). In addition, prior studies (Simunic and Stein, 1996; 
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Menon and Williams, 2001, Pratt and Stice, 1994) assert that clients with high leverage (DE) face 
higher perceived litigation risk, and the auditor would need to increase its audit effort to reduce their 
audit risk. 
 
Following prior studies (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987; Davis et al., 1993 
Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Basioudis et al., 2008), positive association is expected between 
qualified and going concern audit opinion (OPINION) and audit fees, as the companies receiving such 
opinions are likely to be subject to more thorough examinations by the auditors. These thorough 
examinations include additional audit work in terms of more substantive testing and documentation, as 
well as engaging in lengthy discussions and negotiations with the client in order to arrive at their final 
opinion. Following Basioudis and Francis (2007), negative relationship is expected between initial 
engagement (INITIAL) and audit fees, as evidence from prior literature suggests that there are lower 
fees due to lowballing effects in the first or second year of engagement.  
Mitra et al. (2007) and Zaman (2011) argued that large and sophisticated shareholders (INSOWN) 
actively monitor management. This active monitoring is expected to lower the inherent risk that the 
financial statement would be materially misstated, thus, auditors would be likely to reduce their 
assessment of audit risk for the client, leading to lower audit effort and consequently, lower audit fees. 
Following Chung et al. (1995), institutional ownership is measured as proportion of ordinary shares 
held by institutional shareholders who individually own 5 percent or more of outstanding ordinary 
shares in the company. Thus, consistent with these prior studies, negative relationship is expected 
between institutional ownership and audit fees. 
 
5.6.2 Earnings quality models 
There are three earnings quality models that are used for the second empirical analyses on the 
relationship between industry specialist auditor, corporate governance and earnings quality. the three 
earnings quality proxies that will be examined in this study are; 1) the discretionary accruals which 
controls for firm’s performance based on Kothari et al., (2005) model (DAC_PERF), 2) the accrual 
estimation error (AEE) based on the Dechow and Dichev’s modified accrual quality model by 
McNichols (2002), and 3) the likelihood of reporting a profit (avoiding a loss) model adopted from 
Francis et al. (2013) (PROFIT). For the DAC_PERF and AEE models, the model specification is 
similar to those used by Klein (2002) and Bédard et al. (2004) in their study examining the 
relationship between board characteristics, audit committee characteristics, auditor quality and 
earnings management. Whereas the control variables included in the model are found in prior studies 
to be significantly related to company’s level of discretionary accruals (Reichelt and Wang, 2010; 
Choi et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2013). The earnings management models are estimated as the industry 
fixed-effects and year fixed-effects model to control for systematic differences in fees across the 13 
  
 
105 
industries and four years period examined in the sample. The earnings quality model for discretionary 
accruals and accrual estimation error are as follow: 
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(Equation 2) 
where: 
DAC_PERF = magnitude and direction of discretionary accruals based on the model by             
    Kothari et al., (2005) which controls for firm’s performance 
AEE  = accrual estimation error (AEE) based on the Dechow and Dichev’s modified  
   accrual quality model by McNichols (2002) 
LTA   = natural log of total assets in GBP’000 
DE   = ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
PYTAC  = net income from continuing operations minus operating cash flow in year t-1 scaled  
        by total assets at year t-2 
GROWTH  = one-year growth rate in sales 
MB   = the market value of equity divided by book value of equity 
CFO   = operating cash flow in year t scaled by total assets at year t-1 
LOSS   = indicator variable, 1 = loss in any past three years, 0 = otherwise 
ALTMAN  = Altman’s (1983) scores 
BLOCKOWN  = proportion of ordinary shares held by institutional blockholders who individually  
        owns 3 percent or more of outstanding ordinary shares 
BIG4   = indicator variable, 1 = client Big 4 audit firms, 0 = otherwise 
SECOND  = indicator variable, 1 = client of Second-tier audit firms, 0 = otherwise 
ISA   = indicator variable, 1 = industry specialist auditor (specification varies),  
                   0 = otherwise 
BODFEM  = proportion of female directors on board 
BODFOREIGN = proportion of foreign directors on board 
INTAUD = indicator variable, 1 = presence of internet audit function; 0 = otherwise 
ACSIZE  = number of directors on audit committee  
ACINDP  = proportion of non-executive directors on audit committee  
ACFINEXP  = proportion of directors with accounting or financial expertise on audit committee 
ACMEET  = number of audit committee meetings  
   = error term 
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Whereas the earnings quality model for the likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss is as 
follow: 
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(Equation 3) 
where:  
PROFIT  = indicator variable, 1 = reported positive net income before extraordinary item,  
                   0 = otherwise 
TAC  = net income from continuing operations minus operating cash flow in year t scaled  
        by total assets at year t-1 
LAG_LOSS  = indicator variable, 1 = loss in the prior year, 0 = otherwise 
ε                       = error term 
 
LTA, DE, GROWTH, MB, CFO, ALTMAN, BLOCKOWN, BIG4, SECOND, ISA, BODFEM, 
BODFOREIGN, INTAUD, ACSZIE, ACINDP, ACFINEXP and ACMEET are defined as before in 
Equation (2). 
 
Following Ashbaugh et al. (2003) lagged total accruals (PYTAC) are included in the model so that 
reversal of accruals overtime could be controlled for. Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) assert that 
management of larger firms are more pressurised to manage earnings to achieve the target. Following 
Douma Prawit (2009) and Dechow and Dichev (2002), firm size is measured using natural logarithm 
of company’s total assets (LTA), and is expected to be positively related to earnings management. 
Following Becker et al. (1998) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), companies with higher leverage 
have higher likelihood to manage earnings in order to meet debt covenants, thus positive association is 
expected between DE and earnings management (Prawit et. al, 2009). Consistent with Reichelt and 
Wang (2010), negative association is expected between ALTMAN and earnings management. This is 
because Altman score measures the likelihood of company survival, thus higher Altman score 
represents lower bankruptcy risk attached to the company.  
 
Following Prawit et al. (2009), companies experiencing loss (LOSS) or facing financial difficulties 
have greater incentives to manage earnings. Therefore, either LOSS or LAG_LOSS is included in the 
model to capture this effect, and positive relationship is expected between loss and earnings 
management. Also, consistent with Reichelt and Wang (2010), companies audited by the Big 4 firms 
and the second tier audit firms have lower accruals, thus negative relationship should be expected.  
 
Wang (2006) find that larger size of blockholder is positively associated with management propensity 
to commit and detect fraud using three proxies for earnings quality: abnormal accruals, earnings  
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informativeness, and persistence of transitory loss components. Bushee (2001) documents that the 
presence of long-term institutional holdings increases the likelihood of earnings management, while 
short-term institutional holdings reduce earnings management. Consistent with prior studies, positive 
relationship is expected between BLOCKOWN and earnings management. Consistent with Prawit et 
al. (2009), Reichelt and Wang (2010) and Francis et al. (2013), firms with more growth opportunities 
are associated with higher earnings management activities. Thus, positive association is expected 
between sales growth (GROWTH) and market to book ratio (MB) with earnings management. 
Following Kasznik (1999), Kothari et al. (2005) and Choi et al. (2010), cash flow from operation is 
included in the model to control for the potential correlation between accruals and cash flows (CFO).  
 
5.6.3 Earnings quality measures 
Accrual is found to be the most popular method of earnings management amongst managers 
(Goncharov, 2005). Thus, in this study, the earnings management is estimated using a cross-sectional 
variation in the performance-adjusted model by Kothari et al. (2005), the McNichols (2002) model, 
and the likelihood of reporting a loss rather than a profit model. 
 
5.6.3.1 Performance-matched discretionary accruals (DAC_PERF) 
Kothari et al. (2005) introduced the performance-matched discretionary accruals model, which is 
considered to be more superior and more reliable than the Jones and modified Jones (1991) model, 
which was introduced earlier by Dechow et al. (1995). This is because the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals model controls for firm performance effects through inclusion of the lagged 
return on assets (LROA) variable in its model, besides including an intercept term to reduce the noise 
and increases the accuracy of the discretionary accrual measure.  
 
In the second empirical study in the PhD thesis, the performance-matched discretionary accruals 
model introduced by Kothari et al. (2005) will be used as the first measure of earnings quality. The 
accruals variable is referred to as DAC_PERF, which represents a continuous measure of the absolute 
value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals. In addition, the sign of the discretionary 
accruals will also be examined. To calculate the non-discretionary accrual (NDA), the following 
equation is estimated by year and industry: 
 
NDA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV- ΔREC /LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) + α4 (LROA) 
Where: 
NDA  = non-discretionary accruals  
LTA  = total assets in year t-1 
ΔREV  = change in revenues 
ΔREC  = change in receivables 
PPE  = property, plant and equipment (gross) in year t 
LROA  = return on assets in year t-1  
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Before the NDA can be calculated, the coefficients parameters α1, α2 and α3 need to be estimated 
using an OLS regression for all the firms with available data within the same industry and year. For 
this purpose, the study adopts the methodology used in another U.K. study by Athanasakou et al. 
(2009), which sets at least minimum of six firms in each industry per year. 
 
TA/LTA = α1 (1/LTA) + α2 (ΔREV- ΔREC /LTA) + α3 (PPE/LTA) + α4 (LROA) + ε 
Where: 
TA  = total accruals in year t 
LTA  = total assets in year t-1 
ΔREV  = change in revenues 
PPE  = property, plant and equipment (gross) in year t 
LROA  = return on asset in year t-1  
 
Finally, the discretionary accruals can be calculated by employing the equation below: 
 
DA = (TA/ LTA)-NDA 
Where: 
DA  = discretionary accruals 
TA  = total accruals in year t 
LTA  = total assets in year t-1 
NDA = non-discretionary accruals 
ε           = error term,  
 
 
5.6.3.2 Accrual estimation error (AEE) 
Quality of accruals could be measured based on how the accruals are related to the current, preceding 
year and future year cashflows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Earnings in the financial statements 
represents the current year operating cashflow which have been modified by using accruals so show a 
better firm’s performance in the future years. Thus, a “good” accrual should estimation should reverse 
itself as operating cashflows either in the current or future financial periods. 
 
While the Jones (1991) variants of discretionary accruals models used an indirect measure of accruals 
quality, the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model of accruals quality that has been modified by 
McNichols (2002) provides a more direct measure of accruals quality. This is because the calculation 
of accruals quality is itself derived from the fundamental accounting data available in the company’s 
financial statements. Using the McNichols (2002) accruals quality model allow the prediction of 
accrual estimation error which is determined by regressing the previous, current, and future cashflows 
on current accruals using industry level pooled cross-sectional regressions, estimating them by 
industry and year. McNichols (2002) has demonstrated that the inclusion of two additional variables, 
namely the changes in revenue and PPE to the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev (2002) regression, 
contribute to significant increase in the model explanatory power (R
2
), which thus reduces 
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measurement error. Accruals quality is measured by estimating the following regression by industry 
and year; 
 
ΔWCt = α0 + α1 CFOt-1 + α2 CFOt + α3 CFOt+1 + α4 ΔRevt + α5 PPEt + εt  
 
Where: 
ΔWCt  = (ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent Liabilities – ΔCash) / total assets in year t 
CFOt-1  = (Cash flows from operations in year t – 1) / total assets in year t-1 
CFOt  = Cash flows from operations in year t / total assets in year t 
CFOt+1  =(Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1) / total assets in year t+1 
ΔRevt  = (Sales in yeart – Sales in yeart – 1) / total assets in year t 
PPEt  = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t / total asset in year t 
 
Operationally, this model measures accrual quality for each firm by using the absolute value of the 
residual as the measure of accrual quality (Srindhi and Gul, 2011; Baxter and Cotter, 2009). The high 
value of absolute residual for each sample company signifies the low quality of earnings. The 
residuals from the modified regression represent the accrual estimation error, which is an inverse 
measure of accruals quality. According to Francis et al. (2005), discretionary accruals quality is 
attributable to managers’ estimates and accounting implementation decisions and is priced by 
investors’ more than discretionary accruals and other proxies for accruals quality. The accrual 
estimation error model is unsigned. 
 
5.6.3.3 Likelihood to report a profit (avoid a loss) (PROFIT) 
The third measure of earnings quality is the likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss, as 
adapted from Francis et al. (2003). According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Graham et al., 
(2005), companies with high earnings quality do not avoid reporting losses. Consistently, Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) assert that earnings that are of high-quality are conservative, whereas earnings that 
are of low-quality are earnings that are managed upward such as through income-increasing accruals. 
According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), “earnings are managed to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses”. They have found evidence that incentives for earnings management to avoid the reporting of 
earnings decreases is stronger and became increasingly prevalent in the period where there are 
preceding string of earnings increases (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Managers have incentives to 
avoid reporting losses as they prefer to report positive earnings to attract investors through media 
coverage, annual report, websites and news. Most earnings manipulation takes place through 
manipulation of cash flow from operations and changes in working capital. Prospect theory suggests 
that incentive to manage earning is high when moving from relative or absolute loss to a gain 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, managers opportunistically avoid reporting earnings 
decreases and losses to decrease the costs imposed in transactions with stakeholders, assuming that 
stakeholder decisions are often based on heuristic cut-offs at zero changes or levels of earnings 
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(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Following Francis et al. (2013), PROFIT is coded as 1 to be 
consistent with the directional prediction for accruals, as a higher-quality audit is expected to result in 
a lower likelihood of managers reporting a profit (i.e., reporting a loss), just as high-quality audits are 
expected to result in smaller accruals. 
 
5.7 Summary of variables definition for the study 
Table  5.8: Summary of variables definition  
Variable  Variable definition 
Industry specialist auditor variables: 
Firm national-city framework 
NAT#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), 0 if otherwise 
CITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), 0 if 
otherwise 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), and the audit 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
CITY#1_ONLY 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally, and the audit office 
is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
NAT#1_ONLY 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), and the audit 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share, 0 if otherwise 
Partner national-city framework 
PARNAT#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), 0 if 
otherwise 
PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), 0 
if otherwise 
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), the 
audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
PARCITY#1_ONLY 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is not the 
top-ranked by market share nationally, and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), 0 if otherwise 
PARNAT#1_ONLY 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit partner is the top-
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and 
the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry 
market share, 0 if otherwise 
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Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), 
the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), 
the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#0), the audit  partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
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partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-two 
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit 
office is the top- ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), 
the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked 
by market share nationally (NAT#1), the audit office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top- 
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 
Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-
ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the audit 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by 
market share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit 
partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share (PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
Note:
 
The rankings designation for the industry leader depends on the iterative process performed for 
each analysis, as explained in Section 5.5.1 earlier. 
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Corporate governance variables 
BODFEM proportion of female directors on board 
BODFOREIGN proportion of foreign directors on board 
INTAUD 
indicator variable, 1 = presence of internet audit 
function; 0 = otherwise 
ACSIZE number of directors on audit committee 
ACINDP 
proportion of non-executive directors on audit 
committee 
ACFINEXP 
proportion of directors with financial expertise on audit 
committee 
ACMEET number of audit committee meetings 
Dependent variables for audit quality analysis 
LAF  natural log of audit fees in GBP’000 
Control variables for audit fee model 
LNAF 
natural log of non-audit fees in GBP’000 paid to the 
incumbent auditor 
LTA natural log of total assets in GBP’000 
SQRTSUBS square root of total subsidiaries 
ROI ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets 
DE ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
FOREIGN proportion of total sales from foreign operations 
QUICK  
ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current 
liabilities 
CATA ratio of current assets to total assets 
OPINION 
indicator variable, 1 = qualified or going concern audit 
report; 0 = otherwise 
LONDON 
indicator variable, 1 = London-based company, 0 = 
otherwise 
BUSY 
indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st 
year-end, 0 = otherwise 
LOSS 
indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three 
years, 0 = otherwise 
INITIAL 
indicator variable, 1 = new auditor in the current or 
prior year, 0 = otherwise;  
INSOWN 
proportion of ordinary shares held by institutional 
shareholders who individually owns 5 percent or more 
of outstanding ordinary shares 
Dependent variables for earnings quality analysis 
DAC_PERF 
magnitude and direction of discretionary accruals 
model by  Kothari et al., (2005) which controls for 
firm’s performance 
AEE 
accrual estimation error (AEE) based on the Dechow 
and Dichev’s modified accrual quality model by 
McNichols (2002) 
PROFIT 
indicator variable, 1 = reported positive net income 
before extraordinary item, 0 = otherwise 
Control variables for earnings quality model 
LTA natural log of total assets in GBP’000 
DE ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
PYTAC  
net income from continuing operations minus 
operating cash flow in year t-1 scaled by total assets at 
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year t-2 
GROWTH one-year growth rate in sales 
MB 
the market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity 
CFO 
operating cash flow in year t scaled by total assets at 
year t-1 
ALTMAN Altman’s (1983) scores 
BLOCKOWN 
proportion of ordinary shares held by institutional 
blockholders who individually owns 3 percent or more 
of outstanding ordinary shares 
BIG4 
indicator variable, 1 = client Big 4 audit firms, 0 = 
otherwise 
SECOND 
indicator variable, 1 = client of Second-tier audit firms,  
0=otherwise 
TAC 
net income from continuing operations minus 
operating cash flow in year t scaled by total assets at 
year t-1 
LAG_LOSS 
indicator variable, 1 = loss in the prior year,                 
0=otherwise 
Ɛ error term 
 
5.8 Data diagnostic test 
In this section, the data diagnostic test is employed on the data examined in the study. This is to ensure 
that the data passed the criteria of the parametric test, which are the normality, linearity, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation assumptions. Any violation of the 
assumptions will caused the inferences made on the estimates from the OLS to be statistically 
inefficient or invalid (Gujarati, 2003; Greene, 2008). 
 
Gujarati (2003) and Hair et al. (2010) list down the five fundamental assumptions underlying a valid 
OLS. The assumptions that are needed to be fulfilled by the data in order for the OLS results to be 
valid  are; 1) normality (where the errors or residuals should follow a normal distribution; 2) linearity 
(where the dependent and independent variables have a linear relationship), 3) homoscedasticity 
(where there is constant errors variance), 4) independent error term (error of one observation could not 
be correlated with error of another observation), and 5) multicollinearity (no exact collinearity 
between predictors) .  
 
Next, few statistical analysis will be employed on the data to test the all the five assumptions 
mentioned above. Each of these assumptions is tested using various statistical analyses available in the 
STATA statistical tool, and the next five sub-sections outline the results and discussions. The same 
data diagnostic test is performed for each of the model specifications that are used in the study; which 
is the audit fees model (hereafter referred to as the LAF model) and the three earnings quality models 
(hereafter referred to as (the DAC_PERF model, the AEE model and the PROFIT model). The results 
are discussed below in the respective sections. 
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5.8.1 Assumption of normality  
As discussed above, the first assumption underlying the OLS regression is that the data from the 
population is normally distributed. As shown in the skewness and kurtosis columns in Table 5.9 for 
the variables examined in this study, most of the variables are not normally distributed. The normal 
distribution takes a value of 0, and values above and below 0 denote departures from normality. To 
reach the normal distribution, following prior audit fees studies, variables AF, NAF, SUBS and TA 
have been transformed using the natural log and the square root (e.g. LAF, LNAF, SQRTSUBS, LTA). 
Whereas all the corporate governance variables including the institutional ownership variable has been 
transform to normal scores using the Van der Waerden's Formula. This transformation technique was 
used in previously published studies on corporate governance (Cooke, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Al-Baluchi, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). 
 
Besides that, the residuals of the regression model should be normally and randomly distributed with a 
mean of zero. According to Chen et al. (2003), the normality assumption could be examined using 
graphic test or numerical tests, in which both will be used in this section. For the graphic tests, the 
study shall employ the normal probability plot and the Kernel density estimate. Whereas for the 
numerical test, the study employs the Shapiro-Wilk test (Swilk test), which is claimed by Chen et al., 
(2003), as a very highly reliable numerical test to detect a small departure from normality.  
 
The graphs for the Kernel density estimate for the LAF model, DAC_PERF model, AEE model and 
PROFIT model are presented in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 respectively. For the 
residuals for each these models to be considered normal, the kernel density estimate line of the 
respective residuals should be overlaid on the normal density line in the graph. Except for the LAF 
model in Figure 5.1, all the results for the DAC_PERF model, AEE model and PROFIT model 
indicated that the residuals in the model are not normally distributed as demonstrated by their 
departure from the normal density line. Only the kernel density estimate line for the LAF model is   
nicely overlaid on the kernel plot. Next, the standardized normal probability plot test the sensitivity to 
non-normality in the middle range of the residuals data. Except for the LAF model in Figure 5.5, the 
results of the standardized normal probability plot test (P-P plot) in Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 and Figure 
5.8 for the DAC_PERF model, AEE model and PROFIT model respectively, seems to deviate 
significantly from the normal plot.  
 
Next, the normality of the residuals is further tested using a numerical test, which is the Swilk Test. 
The null hypothesis of the Swilk Test is that the residuals are normally distributed. Thus, if the p-value 
is significant, then the null hypothesis would be rejected, as the results suggest the residuals are not 
normally distributed. Table 5.10 presents the results of the Swilk Test for all the four models 
examined in this study. It can be seen from the last right column of Table 5.10 that all the p-values are 
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significant for all of the four models, suggesting that the normality of residuals are not fulfilled at one 
percent significant level since the p-value is less than 0.01. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected, and it 
can be concluded that the data in the study is not normally distributed. Taken together, both the results 
of the graphic test and the numerical test suggest that the data used in the study is not normally 
distributed. 
 
Table  5.9: Kurtosis and skewness for the variables in the LAF model 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Min Max 
AF (‘000) 1,163 279 3,281 64.222 7.279 9 37,234 
NAF (‘000) 645 155 1,473 35.658 5.241 0 15,859 
BODFEM 0.067 0.000 0.093 0.957 1.257 0.000 0.429 
BODFOREIGN 0.149 0.000 0.219 2.649 1.753 0.000 1.000 
ACSIZE 3.269 3.000 0.926 0.295 0.633 2.000 7.000 
ACINDP 0.961 1.000 0.134 15.538 -3.824 0.000 1.000 
ACFINEXP 0.351 0.330 0.194 -0.034 0.589 0.000 1.000 
ACMEET 3.448 3.000 1.456 9.607 1.848 1.000 15.000 
INTAUD 0.689 1.000 0.463 -1.330 -0.820 0.000 1.000 
INSOWN 2.919 3.000 1.626 -0.424 0.211 0.000 8.000 
TA (‘000) 4,400,433 367,423 18,397,799 79.530 8.437 1,227 214,818,000 
SUBS 15.870 10.000 19.361 32.594 4.457 0.000 210.000 
FOREIGN 0.344 0.089 0.402 -1.410 0.592 0.000 1.000 
OPINION 0.058 0.000 0.234 12.291 3.777 0.000 1.000 
ROI  0.028 0.045 0.232 35.061 1.825 -1.126 2.609 
DE 0.152 0.112 0.171 6.221 1.794 0.000 1.427 
QUICK 1.829 0.938 3.831 60.437 6.872 0.014 49.078 
CATA 0.430 0.411 0.232 -0.521 0.373 0.004 1.000 
LONDON 0.400 0.000 0.490 -1.838 0.408 0.000 1.000 
BUSY 0.655 1.000 0.476 -1.579 -0.652 0.000 1.000 
LOSS 0.187 0.000 0.390 0.582 1.606 0.000 1.000 
INITIAL 0.140 0.000 0.347 2.319 2.077 0.000 1.000 
(Note: All continuous variables have been winsorised at top and bottom 1%) 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Figure  5.1: Kernel density test for the LAF model 
 
 
 
Figure  5.2: Kernel density test for the DAC_PERF model 
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Figure  5.3: Kernel density test for the AEE model 
 
 
 
Figure  5.4: Kernel density test for the PROFIT model 
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Figure  5.5: Standardized normal probability plot (P-P plot) test for the LAF model 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.6: Standardized normal probability plot (P-P plot) test for the DAC_PERF model 
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Figure  5.7: Standardized normal probability plot (P-P plot) test for the AEE model 
 
 
 
Figure  5.8: Standardized normal probability plot (P-P plot) test for the PROFIT model 
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Table  5.10: Shapiro-wilk (Swilk) test of the residuals 
Models                      |    Observation  |    W        |      V        |       z       |     Prob>z 
LAF Model                |          892           | 0.99109  |    5.062    |   3.997    | 0.00003 
DAC_PERF Model    |         1,038        |  0.92840  |   59.279  |   10.231  |  0.00000 
AEE Model                |         1,347         | 0.83896  |  133.332  |   12.262 |   0.00000 
PROFIT Model         |         1,347         | 0.90376  |   79.686    |  10.972  |  0.00000 
 
5.8.2 Assumption of linearity  
Under this assumption, the OLS model is expected to have linear parameters where the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables follows a straight line. Augmented component plus 
residual plot for non-dummy independent variables is used to check on the linearity assumption, where 
the standardised residuals are plotted against each of the independent variables in the regression model 
and the graph will indicate whether a linear pattern exists between the variables. Figure 5.9 to Figure 
5.11 presents the augmented component plus residual plot for LNAF, PYTAC and MB from the 
respective models, which demonstrated that the data points are asymmetrically scattered from the 
ordinary regression line in the plot with serious outliers. Thus, it can be concluded that the linearity 
assumption in the relationship between the response variables and predictors is not fulfilled. 
 
Figure  5.9: The augmented component plus residual plot for LNAF from the LAF model 
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Figure  5.10 : The augmented component plus residual plot for PYTAC from the DAC_PERF 
model 
 
 
 
Figure  5.11: The augmented component plus residual plot for MB from the DAC_PERF model 
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heteroscedasticity. Meanwhile, in Breusch-Pagan/ Cook Weisberg test, a large chi-square value plus 
significant p-value of chi-square would indicate the present of heteroscedasticity. Results of the 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook Weisberg test for each of the LAF model, DAC_PERF model, AEE model and 
the PROFIT model are presented in Table 5.11 below. Results indicate that only the p-value for the 
LAF model is insignificant (p>0.10), suggesting that the variance of the error terms for the model is 
constant or homogeneous. However, the p-values for the DAC_PERF and AEE are significant 
(p<0.01), suggesting that the models’ error term suffer from heteroscedasticity problem.  
 
Table  5.11: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Model Results 
LAF Model chi2(1)      =  0.01, Prob > chi2  =   0.9264 
DAC_PERF Model chi2(1)      =  2306.00, Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 AEE Model chi2(1)      =  1487.36, Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
  
 
5.8.4 Assumption of no autocorrelation (independent error terms)  
Next, this section test for the assumption of no correlation in OLS is met. While the OLS assumes that 
the error terms are independent, autocorrelation (serial correlation) happens when the error term of one 
period done is correlated with the error term of the previous period. This non-independent error term 
biases the standard errors and causes the results of the OLS to be less efficient (Drukker, 2003). The 
Wooldridge (2002) is a new and attractive test for serial correlation for panel data (Drukker, 2003). 
 
If the p-value is significant, then the null hypothesis is rejected, suggesting the error term is not 
independent. Results of the Wooldridge test for each of the LAF model, DAC_PERF model, AEE 
model and the PROFIT model are presented in Table 5.12 below. Except for the AEE model, the 
results indicate that the p-values for the LAF model, DAC_PERF model and AEE model are 
significant. 0.010, suggesting that the assumption of no autocorrelation is not fulfilled. 
 
Table  5.12: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Model Results 
LAF Model F(  1,     197) =     30.468, Prob > F =      0.0000 
DAC_PERF Model F(  1,     303) =      5.528,  Prob > F =      0.0194 
AEE Model F(  1,     238) =      0.002,  Prob > F =      0.9680 
PROFIT Model F(  1,     304) =     48.062,  Prob > F =      0.0000 
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5.8.5 Assumption of no multicollinearity  
Finally, in this section, the study further investigate whether the models fulfils the assumptions of no 
multicollinearity. This is done by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) and conducting a 
tolerance value test. As a rule of thumb, VIF value for a variable exceeding 10 or tolerance value 
(1/VIF) below 0.10, indicates high collinearity (Gujarati, 2003). The results are presented in Table 
5.13 below for the LAF model, and Table 5.14 for the two earnings quality models; DAC_PERF 
model and the AEE model. Since all the variables have VIF values that are just between 1 and 2, 
whereas tolerance values that are higher than 0.10 this suggests that no multicollinearity problem 
exists. 
 
Table  5.13: VIF and tolerance value for LAF model 
Variable VIF Tolerance value 
LNAF 1.4 0.712 
LTA 4.0 0.250 
SQRTSUBS 1.43 0.699 
ROI 1.63 0.614 
DE 1.72 0.580 
FOREIGN 1.32 0.760 
QUICK 1.32 0.756 
CATA 1.84 0.542 
OPINION 1.33 0.751 
LONDON 1.26 0.791 
BUSY 1.21 0.825 
LOSS 1.80 0.554 
INITIAL 1.13 0.883 
INSOWN 1.16 0.862 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 2.02 0.496 
CITY#1_ONLY 1.91 0.522 
NAT#1_ONLY 1.11 0.899 
BODFEM 1.34 0.747 
BODFOREIGN 1.52 0.659 
INTAUD 2.12 0.471 
ACSIZE 1.64 0.610 
ACINDP 1.16 0.860 
ACFINEXP 1.19 0.842 
ACMEET 1.66 0.601 
MEAN VIF 1.59  
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Table  5.14: VIF and tolerance value for DAC_PERF model and AEE model  
 DAC_PERF Model  AEE Model 
Variable VIF Tolerance value  VIF Tolerance 
value 
LTA 4.360 0.230  4.170 0.240 
PYTAC 1.290 0.774  1.330 0.749 
DE 1.490 0.672  1.470 0.682 
GROWTH 1.060 0.940  1.110 0.904 
MB 1.060 0.941  1.100 0.910 
CFO 1.620 0.616  1.490 0.673 
LOSS 1.730 0.577  1.610 0.620 
ALTMAN 1.440 0.695  1.460 0.686 
BLOCKOWN 1.220 0.821  1.280 0.780 
BIG4 3.870 0.258  3.640 0.275 
SECOND 1.940 0.515  2.430 0.411 
BODFEM 1.270 0.785  1.280 0.781 
BODFOREIGN 1.300 0.768  1.290 0.773 
INTAUD 2.310 0.434  2.160 0.463 
ACSIZE 1.660 0.603  1.660 0.604 
ACINDP 1.130 0.888  1.140 0.878 
ACFINEXP 1.130 0.885  1.170 0.858 
ACMEET 1.680 0.594  1.750 0.572 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 1.970 0.508  1.470 0.682 
CITY#1_ONLY 1.250 0.798  1.280 0.780 
NAT#1_ONLY 1.700 0.587  1.130 0.882 
Mean VIF 1.610   1.580  
 
5.9 Mitigating outliers  
Following Cornett et al. (2008) and Dhaliwal et al. (2009), all the continuous variables are winsorised 
at the top 1 percent and bottom 1 percent, as to mitigate the effect of extreme outliers in the dataset. In 
addition, a numerical test called the inter-quartile range (IQR) test is also performed to determine the 
presence of extreme outliers. The results of the IQR are presented in Table 5.15, Table 5.16, Table 
5.17 and Table 5.18 for the LAF model, the DAC_PERF model, the AEE model and the PROFIT 
model respectively. Any points which are either 3 inter-quartile-ranges below the first quartile or 3 
inter-quartile-ranges above the third quartile, indicates severe outliers. Based on the results in Table 
5.15 to Table 5.18, no evidence of severe outliers has been documented. 
 
  
  
 
126 
Table  5.15: Inter-quartile range test for LAF model 
mean= 5.513 std.dev.=  .5782 (n= 892) 
median= 5.473 pseudo std.dev.=   .607 (IQR=0.8188) 
10 trim= 5.5    
   low high 
  inner fences 3.882 7.157 
  # mild outliers 0 0 
  % mild outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
     
  outer fences 2.653 8.385 
  # severe outliers 0 0 
  % severe outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Table  5.16: Inter-quartile range test for DAC_PERF model 
 
 
Table  5.17: Inter-quartile range test for AEE model 
mean=  0.1023 std.dev.=  .0551 (n=1,083) 
median=   0 .09 pseudo std.dev.=  .0481 (IQR=0.0649) 
10 trim=   .096   
   low high 
  inner fences -0.0346 0.2252 
  # mild outliers 0 49 
  % mild outliers 0.00% 3.64% 
     
  outer fences -0.132 0.3226 
  # severe outliers 0 1 
  % severe outliers 0.00% 0.07% 
 
  
mean=0.672 std.dev.=  .2987 (n=1347) 
median=0.8212 pseudo std.dev.=  .3371 (IQR=.4547) 
10 trim=0.7114    
    low high 
   inner fences -0.2319 1.587 
   # mild outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
   % mild outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
      
   outer fences -0.914 2.269 
   # severe outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
   % severe outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table  5.18: Inter-quartile range test for PROFIT model 
mean= 0.672 std.dev.= 0.2987 (n=1,347) 
median= 0.8212 pseudo std.dev.= 0.3371 (IQR=0.4547) 
10 trim= 0.7114     
    low High 
  inner fences -0.2319 1.587 
  # mild outliers 0 0 
  % mild outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
      
  outer fences -0.914 2.269 
  # severe outliers 0 0 
  % severe outliers 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 
5.10 Alternative regression estimators to the OLS regression  
Given that the data diagnostic test above indicates that most of the standard OLS regression 
assumptions have been violated, it is important that the study employs alternative methods of 
regression. This is because violation of the parametric assumptions of the OLS regression leads to 
incorrect estimates of coefficients and standard errors (Baltagi, 2005; Greene, 2008; Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). Hamilton (1992) suggested the use of robust regression as an alternative to OLS in case 
of the assumptions are violated, and that it has a more efficient statistical properties and more accurate 
confidence intervals and tests then the OLS. 
 
Thus, in the main analysis, the study employs the Huber White (1980) robust standard errors to correct 
for heteroscedasticity, non-normality and outliers (Chen et al., 2003). In addition, as the study uses a 
panel data (repeated observations on the same, or a substantially overlapping, set of firms over time) 
(Gow et al., 2010), there is a possibility that cross sectional and time-series dependence are present 
given that the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time (Petersen, 2009). While the OLS 
regression estimator with Huber White (1980) robust standard errors are consistent in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, it has been argued that it could be biased or produces mis-specified test-statistics 
(either over or underestimate the true variability of the coefficient estimates) when either form of 
dependence is present, such as in panel dataset (Gow et al., 2010, p.487). According to Petersen 
(2009) and Gow et al. (2010), the use of White (1980) robust standard error fail to correct for both 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence in panel data, thus produces mis-specified test-statistics 
and invalid inferences about the relationship of the variables examined. In other words, the audit 
quality and earnings quality of the companies could be correlated within a client over time, within a 
period across clients, or in both ways.  
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Thus, a sensitivity analysis is performed in Chapter 8.2 and Chapter 11.2 for the audit quality and 
earnings quality analysis respectively, where all the regressions performed in the main analysis are re-
estimated using i) one-way cluster robust standard error, clustering for the firm dimension, and ii) two-
way cluster robust standard error, clustering for both the firm and time dimensions. 
 
5.11 Summary 
This chapter describes the study. The model specification and the sampling and data collection 
process, and the sources of data used for the study. The independent and dependent variables have also 
been clarified, with a clear demonstration of the empirical models to examine the research questions. 
There are four models altogether, namely the LAF model, DAC_PERF model, AEE model and 
PROFIT model. Diagnostic test is performed at the final part of the chapter to check whether the OLS 
assumptions have been violated. Given the results of the diagnostic test indicates that the five OLS 
assumptions were not fulfilled, alternative regression estimates have been considered, which includes 
the used of Huber White (1980) robust standard error in the main analysis. In addition, one-way and 
two-cluster robust standard error as recommended by Gow et al. (2010) and Petersen (2009) will be 
used in the sensitivity analysis to confirm the robustness of the study findings. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY 
SPECIALIST AUDITORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
AUDIT QUALITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by outlining the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the first 
empirical analysis investigating the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on 
audit quality, as proxy by the variation in the level of audit fees. The next section in this chapter 
presents the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study. The sample selection process has 
been discussed in detail earlier in Chapter 5, together with the empirical models and variables that are 
to be examined in the study.  This is followed by a pairwise correlation matrix which identifies the 
significant associations among the independent variables examined in this study. 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 contains descriptive statistics for the variables used in first empirical analysis investigating 
the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit fees. The descriptive 
statistics in the table below refer to the period 2008-2011 and only for the Big 4 sample. There are 892 
listed companies in this period that are audited by the Big 4 audit firms. The sample selection process 
on how the Big 4 sample is derived is presented in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter. Only the Big 4 
sample is used for this first empirical study as the study intends to examine the effect of the Big 4 
industry specialist auditor’s differential fee premium relative to other Big 4 audit firms who are non-
industry leaders.  
 
The mean audit fee (AF) and natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF) in this period is £1.163 million and 
5.519 respectively. These means, respectively, is lower as compared to prior audit fees studies in the 
U.K. by Adelopo et al. (2012) of £1.6 million. However, this figure is higher relative to Zaman et al. 
(2011) which reported mean of £202,489 and Basioudis and Francis (2007) who documented the 
natural logarithm of audit fees in their study to be 4.540. The difference is primarily driven by the 
larger sample size used in this study. The sample size for studies by Adelopo et al. (2012) is 209 
observations, Zaman et al. (2011) is 155 observations, whereas Basioudis and Francis (2007) 
examined only 631 observations of Big 4 companies during their sample period.  
 
In relation to the board diversity variables, there is on average 6.7 percent female directors 
(BODFEM) sitting on the corporate board of the public listed companies in the sample. This figure 
shows a great progress in the woman participation in the U.K. board given that it was only 0.5 percent 
in 2002 (Brammer et al., 2007). The improvement in the female directors composition in the U.K. 
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corporate boards indicates the success of the U.K. government’s effort to promote gender diversity on 
board through the establishment of Lord Davies of Abersoch Steering Committee’s to review on the 
issue and make recommendations regarding what government and business could do to increase the 
proportion of women on corporate boards (Davies Review Annual Report, 2011). The average foreign 
directors (BODFOREIGN) on the U.K. corporate board during the sample period is 14.9 percent. The 
average female directors and foreign directors on board reported in this study (6.7 percent and 14.9 
percent respectively) are slightly are lower as compared 10 percent (average female directorship) and 
18 percent (average foreign directorship) reported by Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) in their study covering 
nine countries including the U.K. The average female directors on board reported in this study (6.7 
percent) is also lower as compared to the U.S. which is reported at the average of 9.4 percent (Srinidhi 
et al., 2011). 
 
Audit committees on the U.K. boards (ACSIZE) have, on average, 3 members. 96.1 percent of audit 
committee members are comprised only of independent non-executive directors (ACINDP). This 
finding suggest vast improvement in the audit committee independence level as a prior U.K. study by 
Zaman et al. (2011) has only reported the average audit committee independence to be 53 percent 
between 2001 and 2005. On average, 35.1 percent of the audit committee composition is represented 
by directors having accounting or financial expertise (ACFINEXP). Audit committees in this study 
meet on average 3 times during the year. The average meeting frequency of audit committees 
(ACMEET) is 3 times, which is comparable to Zaman et al. (2011), but slightly lower as compared to 
Adelopo et al. (2012) who have documented their average meeting frequency to be 4 times a year. 
Finally, 68.9 percent of the U.K. public listed companies have their own internal audit function 
(INTAUD), comparable with 60 percent reported by Hay et al. (2008) in Australia.  
 
Of the other audit fee determinants, the average company size based on total assets (TA) is £4,400 
billion; firms have on average 16 subsidiaries (SUBS) with an average 34.4 percent foreign sales 
(FOREIGN); only 5.8 percent of the companies in the sample on average over the period 2008 to 2011 
have received either a qualified or going concern audit opinion (OPINION); the mean ROI of firms is 
2.8 per cent and the gearing levels (DE) are on average 15.2 per cent. The mean for the quick ratio 
(QUICK) is 1.829, the mean for ratio of current asset to total assets (CATA) is 0.43; 18.7 percent of the 
companies experienced loss in the preceding three years and 14 percent of companies have just 
changed their auditor within the preceding two years. 40 per cent of the listed companies in the sample 
are located in London (LONDON) and 65.5 per cent of the companies’ year end falls on December 
31st or March 31st year-end (BUSY), which is also regarded as the audit peak period. The average 
number of institutional shareholders with more than 5 percent shareholdings  in the company 
(INSOWN) is 2.919, which is lower as compared to 5.81 reported in Zaman et al. (2011).  
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Table  6.1: Descriptive statistics for the LAF model (N=892) 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
AF (‘000) 1,163 279 3,281 9 37,234 
LAF  5.519 5.446 0.632 3.954 7.571 
NAF (‘000) 645 155 1,473 0 15,859 
LNAF 4.907 5.192 1.541 0.000 7.200 
BODFEM 0.067 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.429 
BODFOREIGN 0.149 0.000 0.219 0.000 1.000 
ACSIZE 3.269 3.000 0.926 2.000 7.000 
ACINDP 0.961 1.000 0.134 0.000 1.000 
ACFINEXP 0.351 0.330 0.194 0.000 1.000 
ACMEET 3.448 3.000 1.456 1.000 15.000 
INTAUD 0.689 1.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 
INSOWN 2.919 3.000 1.626 0.000 8.000 
TA (‘000) 4,400,433 367,423 18,397,799 1,227 214,818,000 
LTA 8.627 8.565 0.937 6.089 11.332 
SUBS 15.870 10.000 19.361 0.000 210.000 
SQSUBS 3.471 3.160 1.957 0.000 14.490 
FOREIGN 0.344 0.089 0.402 0.000 1.000 
OPINION 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 1.000 
ROI  0.028 0.045 0.232 -1.126 2.609 
DE 0.152 0.112 0.171 0.000 1.427 
QUICK 1.829 0.938 3.831 0.014 49.078 
CATA 0.430 0.411 0.232 0.004 1.000 
LONDON 0.400 0.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 
BUSY 0.655 1.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 
LOSS 0.187 0.000 0.390 0.000 1.000 
INITIAL 0.140 0.000 0.347 0.000 1.000 
(Note: All continuous variables have been winsorised at top and bottom 1 percent) 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables 
 
Next, the study presents the descriptive statistics for the Big 4 audit firms and the industry specialist 
auditors’ market share respectively. For completeness, the market share of the Big 4 audit firms and 
the industry specialist auditors are calculated on all the observations in the sample with available audit 
fees data (N=1,747), as indicated in sample selection process in Table 5.1 earlier.  
 
Panel A of Table 6.2 presents the sample distribution of the audit firms based on number of clients, 
while Panel B presents the sample distribution of the audit firms based on audit fees. The findings 
below reports that Big 4 auditors have performed, on average, over the period 2008 to 2011, 64 
percent of audits in the sample (first line in Panel A) and received about 96 percent of audit fees (first 
line in Panel B). Further in Panel B of Table 6.2, it can be seen that PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is 
the leading firm auditing about 20 percent of clients and earning on average 48 percent of audit fees in 
the sample. KPMG (KP) ranked second in term of number of audit clients (approximately 18 percent) 
whereas Ernst & Young (EY) ranked the second in term of market share of audit fees (about 20 
percent). The three mid-tier auditors, BDO International (BDO), Grant Thornton (GT) and Baker Tilly 
(BA) together have conducted 19 percent of audits in the sample and received approximately 3 percent 
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of audit fees. Whereas about 43 third-tier firms have audited about 17 percent of the sample firms and 
received about 1 percent of audit fees.  
 
Table  6.2: Sample distribution of audit firms  
Panel A: Sample distribution of the audit firms based on number of clients (N=1,747) 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
 N  %  N  %  N  %  N  %  N  % 
                    
Big4 261  63  274  65  285  63  295  64  279  64 
Second Tier 83  20  81  19  85  19  88  19  84  19 
Third Tier 68  17  67  16  79  18  81  17  74  17 
TOTAL 412  100  422  100  449  100  464  100  437  100 
                    
PWC 76  19  87  20  94  21  95  21  88  20 
KP 71  17  73  18  81  18  84  18  77  18 
DE 68  16  70  17  66  14  72  16  69  16 
EY 46  11  44  10  44  10  44  9  45  10 
GT 43  10  40  10  39  9  40  8  41  9 
BDO 26  7  29  7  34  7  36  8  31  7 
BA 14  3  12  2  12  3  12  3  13  3 
Panel B: Sample distribution of the audit firms based on percentage of audit fees in GBP’000 (N=1,747) 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
  %    %    %    %    % 
                    
Big4   96    96    96    97    96 
Second Tier  3    3    3    2    3 
Third Tier   1    1    1    1    1 
TOTAL   100    100    100    100    100 
                  
PWC   45    50    48    48    48 
EY   22    18    21    19    20 
DE   15    14    13    14    14 
KP   14    14    15    15    15 
GT   2    2    1    1    2 
BDO   0.7    0.7    0.8 
 
   0.7    0.7 
BA   0.3    0.3    0.2    0.3    0.3 
                 
a 
Second-tier firms are GT, BDO and BA. 
b
 There are 43 small third-tier firms in the sample. 
C
 Definition of Big 4 and Second-Tier Accounting Firms: 
PWC = PricewaterhouseCoopers   
EY = Ernst & Young     
DE = Deloitte & Touche      
KP = KPMG     
GT = Grant Thornton 
BDO = BDO International     
BA= Baker Tilly 
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Table 6.3 below reports the sample distribution based on the 13 industry codes used in the study. The 
industry codes used are based on the FAME categorisation of major industry sectors, where the 
numerous LSE industry codes (SIC codes) of similar industry nature are being categorised into only 
13 major industry sectors. The industry sector that seems to be paying the most fees as an average 
figure are the primary sector (22.95 percent), followed by the wholesale (13.07 percent) and the 
chemicals industry (11.84 percent). Subtle differences in the market share of audit fees can be 
observed for the food sector and also the publishing sector during the four years period examined in 
the study where their industry market have increased 7 times subsequent to 2008.  
 
Table  6.3: Industry distribution based on audit fees in GBP’000 (N=1,747)  
Major industry sectors 2 Digit SIC 
Codes 
2008  
(%)  
2009 
 (%)  
2010 
 (%)  
2011 
 (%)  
Average 
(%) 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 1,10-14,23 23.13 23.35 25.06 20.27 22.95 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic 
products 
24-26 12.92 11.82 11.52 11.09 11.84 
Construction 45 4.97 4.76 4.43 4.13 4.57 
Food, beverages, tobacco 15-16 1.03 7.03 6.43 6.19 5.18 
Gas, water, electricity 40-41 2.02 3.10 2.52 2.64 2.57 
Hotels and restaurants 55 2.74 2.83 2.66 2.84 2.77 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 30,33-37 6.97 7.59 7.59 7.59 7.43 
Metals and metal products 27-29 7.35 6.99 7.28 12.24 8.46 
Post and telecommunications 64 5.46 5.35 5.06 4.96 5.21 
Publishing, printing wood, cork, paper, 20-22 1.30 7.28 7.30 7.54 5.86 
Textiles, wearing apparel,  leather 17-19 1.54 1.48 1.41 1.54 1.49 
Transport 60-63 6.08 5.81 5.48 5.05 5.60 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-52 12.49 12.61 13.26 13.92 13.07 
Auditor industry expertise is measured at a national and a city level in this study. For completeness, 
the industry market share is calculated for all companies listed in the LSE with available audit fees 
data (N=1747), based on the 13 FAME major industry sectors classification (excluding the companies 
within the financial and insurance service industries). National auditor industry expertise is based on 
the auditor’s annual market share of audit fees within each of the 13 FAME major industry sector. City 
level auditor industry expertise is calculated based on the auditor’s annual market share of audit fees 
within each of the 13 FAME major industry sector for a particular city, after eliminating 296 
observations located in cities having only one observation. Thus, there are 1,451 observations located 
in cities having two or more audits, which are used to calculate the city-specific industry leaders. 
Following Basioudis and Francis (2007), the data on the location of the accounting firm’s lead 
engagement office is obtained from the office-specific letterhead of the audit report in order to analyse 
the city-specific industry leadership. However, the study acknowledges that this definition of industry 
specialist is arbitrary and may have errors in classifying auditors into the specialist and non-specialist 
groups (Habib, 2011). Therefore, in Chapter 8, sensitivity tests are conducted using several cut-off 
points to define industry specialist auditors. 
Next, the following Table 6.4 reports the Big 4 audit firm market shares of audit fees for the industry 
leaders at the national and city levels, whereas Panel B reports the same for the audit partner. The top-
ranked national industry leader has an annual average 58 percent of industry fees over the period 
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2008-2011 while the second ranked auditor has an annual average of 25 percent of industry fees. This 
reported market share is comparatively higher as compared to prior U.K. findings by Basioudis and 
Francis (2007) which documented a lower average market share for the Big 4 audit firm who is the 
top-ranked national industry leader and second-ranked national industry leader (at 45 percent and 22 
percent respectively). The finding of 58 percent market share for the top-ranked national industry 
leader in this study is also higher as compared to the U.S. which is reported at 50 percent (Francis et 
al., 2005). Further analyses (untabulated) indicate that PWC is the top-ranked firm nationally in 9 out 
of 13 industries, while Deloitte is the second-ranked firm in 7 out of 13 industries (not tabulated).  
 
For the audit firm city industry leadership reported in Panel A of Table 6.4, it can be seen that there 
are annual average of 64 unique city-industry combinations over the four years period, where the top-
ranked auditor per industry has an average market share of 68 percent of the fees, and the second-
ranked auditor has 27 percent. This is comparable to the earlier findings by Basioudis and Francis 
(2007) of 68 percent and 26 percent respectively. These city-level percentages are also comparable to 
the U.S. where the top-ranked auditor has an average market share of 69 percent and the second-
ranked firm has 22 percent (Francis et al., 2005). 
 
Panel B of Table 6.4 above also presents the audit partner industry leadership which is also measured 
at the national and city levels. The average market share for the top-ranked and the second-ranked 
audit partner at the industry level over the period 2008-2011 is at 40 percent and 19 percent 
respectively. Whereas the third, fourth, fifth and sixth audit partner have a lower market share of audit 
fees of 10 percent, 6 percent, 4 percent and 3 percent respectively. At the city level, the market share 
of the top-ranked partner is 60 percent on average over the four year period of the sample, followed by 
27 percent for the second-ranked and 14 percent for the third-ranked audit partner.  
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Table  6.4: Descriptive statistics of auditor industry expertise  
Panel A: Big 4 Audit firm market shares of audit fees (N=1,747)
a
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Top-ranked national industry leader 92 51.95 96 56.99 105 61.24 109 64.35 402 58 
Second-ranked national industry leader 71 19.35 80 19.28 82 20.12 83 19.24 316 25 
           
Top-ranked city industry leader 98 65 101 70 109 68 115 69 423 68 
Second-ranked city industry leader 67 28 73 26 71 26 69 27 280 27 
           
No. of industries  13  13  13  13   
No. of cities   16  19  18  19   
No. of city-industry combinations*   58  62  66  68 254 63.5 
* based on two minimum observations per combination as per Basioudis and Francis (2007) 
Panel B: Big 4 Audit partner market shares of audit fees (N=1,335)
b
  
  2009 2010 2011 Average 
   No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Top-ranked national industry leader   13 40 13 39 13 39 39 40 
Second-ranked national industry leader   13 47 13 44 13 48 39 19 
Third-ranked national industry leader   12 10 13 9 13 10 38 10 
Fourth-ranked national industry leader   14 5 14 5 14 7 42 6 
Fifth-ranked 2006).national industry leader   12 4 12 4 12 4 36 4 
Sixth-ranked national industry leader    14 3 12 3 12 3 38         3 
Top-ranked city industry leader   57 60 66 61 67 63 190 60 
Second-ranked city industry leader   45 25 47 26 53 28 145 27 
Third-ranked city industry leader   26 13 29 14 29 19 84 14 
a The sample size (N=1,747) is based on all observation in the sample between 2008-2011 with complete audit fees data, after excluding financial companies as described in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter. 
b The sample size (N=1,335) is based on the sample presented in Panel A (N=1,747) after excluding the missing data on audit partner for year 2008 (N=412). This missing audit partner data is because the disclosure of the name of the 
senior statutory auditor (or engagement partner) signing off the auditor’s report for and on behalf of the audit firm was only made mandatory in the U.K. for financial years beginning on or after 6 April 2008 (Section 503 of Companies 
Act 
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Additional analysis of audit market concentration (not tabulated) reveals that on average, 48 percent of 
companies from our sample are audited by London offices of the Big 4 firms, and paid an annual 
average of 84 percent of the sample audit fees. The three largest cities after London are Birmingham 
(8 percent), Manchester and Leeds (both at 6 percent). Similarly, 42 percent of the companies in the 
sample are headquartered in London, with only 33 percent of them being audited in London itself, 
while the remaining London-based companies are audited by audit offices based outside of London. 
58 percent of the sample companies are located in 51 cities outside of London and are audited by non-
London offices of the audit firms. This analysis of concentration shows that the audit market in the 
U.K. is dominated by London. This is not surprising given its role as the largest U.K. commercial 
centre where the large multinational companies are mainly headquartered. Given the smaller 
geographical size of U.K. relative to countries like U.S. and Australia, and the position of London as 
the primary commercial centre, it makes the role of city-offices less crucial in administering audit 
engagements, rather acting more as a shop front for the audit firms (Basioudis and Francis, 2007). 
Thus, it is logical to assume that industry expertise in the U.K. is more likely to be driven by the firm’s 
total client base (national clientele) rather than city-specific expertise based on office-specific 
clienteles (Basioudis and Francis, 2007).   
 
The evidence presented so far shows that the average market shares of the national industry auditors 
has increased in the period 2008-2011 in comparison to the ones in the period 2002-2003 (Basioudis 
and Francis, 2007). Given the financial crisis that started in 2007/2008 and the various changes in the 
corporate governance regulations, it may have seemed appropriate for the audit firms to shift their 
strategies and focus to their expertise at the national level rather than at the city level. The city-level 
expertise is not diminished at all from the Basioudis and Francis (2007) study but the national industry 
expertise has gained its prominence as compared to finding from earlier study.  
 
6.3 Correlation matrix 
The Table 6.5 below contains a correlation matrix showing the two-way Pearson correlations between 
all variables included in this study. The correlations are interesting as they highlight the associations 
between audit fees and the explanatory variables, and also identify the significant correlations among 
the independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). According to Hair et al. (2010), any 
correlation above 0.9 indicates the presence of multicollinearity problem, which may substantially 
affect the predictive ability of the regression model as well as the estimation of the regression 
coefficients. The single asterisks in the Table 6.5 below signify statistically significant correlations at 
10 percent level (p<0.10). In general, the overall correlation matrix shows that audit fees and the 
independent variables (i.e. board diversity, internal audit, audit committee and related control 
variables) are moderately inter-correlated with one and another, with the exceptions of LAF and LTA 
(correlation coefficient of 88.5 percent), JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 and NAT#1 (correlation coefficient of 
89.53 percent), CITY#1_ONLY and PARCITY#1 (correlation coefficient of 85.4 percent), and 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 and CITY#1 (correlation coefficient 72.96 percent), which have the correlation 
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coefficients above 70 percent. Consistent with previous studies, LTA has always been highly 
correlated to LAF, as client’s size represents the main determinant of audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). 
Other than LTA and LAF, the other highly correlated variables above should not represent any 
multicollinearity problem as these variables are never analysed concurrently in a single model within 
this study. Diagnostics on the multicollinearity that is associated with each empirical model, using the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are provided earlier in Section 5.8.5. 
 
The correlations in column A show how each of the explanatory variables are associated with the 
dependent variable, the natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF). Consistent with previous audit fees 
studies (e.g. Hay et al., 2006, Zaman et al., 2011, Basioudis and Francis, 2007), LAF is significantly 
and positively correlated to LNAF, LTA, SQSUBS, FOREIGN, LONDON, BUSY , ROI and DE. 
However, the negative and significant correlation between LAF and OPINION, LOSS, QUICK, CATA, 
INITIAL and INSOWN is somewhat counter-intuitive. In respect to the corporate governance variables, 
the coefficients in Table 6.5 indicate that board diversity (BODFEM, BODFOREIGN), internal audit 
(IA), and audit committee characteristics (ACSIZE, ACINDP, ACFINEXP and ACMEET) are all 
significantly positively correlated with LAF. For the industry specialist variables, NAT#1, CITY#1, 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1, PARNAT#1, PARCITY#1, PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1, NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#1PARCITY#1, NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1, NAT#0-CITY#0-
PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0, NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-
PARCITY#0 are significantly positively correlated with LAF, except for CITY#1_ONLY, 
NAT#1_ONLY, PARCITY#1_ONLY, NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1, NAT#1-
CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1,  NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1, NAT#0-
CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1, NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0, NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  which are significantly negatively correlated with LAF. Because 
these correlations are pair-wise, the coefficient sign may differ in the multivariate analysis (Reichelt 
and Wang, 2010). 
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Table  6.5: Pairwise correlation matrix for the LAF model 
Variables A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
A LAF 1.000             
B LNAF 0.518* 1.000            
C LTA 0.885* 0.444* 1.000           
D SQSUBS 0.551* 0.241* 0.440* 1.000          
E OPINION -0.147* -0.129* -0.193* -0.114* 1.000         
F ROI 0.213* 0.130* 0.268* 0.140* -0.184* 1.000        
G DE 0.280* 0.121* 0.388* 0.062* -0.136* 0.041 1.000       
H LONDON 0.205* 0.098* 0.128* 0.024 0.099* -0.021 0.016 1.000      
I BUSY 0.183* 0.121* 0.097* 0.100* 0.080* -0.004 -0.067* 0.092* 1.000     
J LOSS -0.256* -0.107* -0.305* -0.173* 0.211* -0.421* -0.112* 0.054 0.010 1.000    
K FOREIGN 0.194* 0.141* 0.050 0.098* 0.025 0.050 -0.008 0.158* 0.171* -0.005 1.000   
L QUICK -0.247* -0.142* -0.228* -0.163* 0.122* -0.081* -0.205* -0.006 0.032 0.258* 0.032 1.000  
M CATA -0.271* -0.064* -0.380* -0.037 -0.047 -0.073* -0.395* -0.145* -0.021 0.096* -0.055* 0.264* 1.00  
N INITIAL -0.199* -0.184* -0.158* -0.073* 0.065* -0.082* -0.069* -0.020 0.062* 0.129* -0.046 0.087* - 0.020 
O BODFEM 0.308* 0.164* 0.361* 0.086* -0.110* 0.099* 0.079* 0.082* 0.018 -0.091* 0.010 -0.125* -0.103*  
P BODFOREIGN 0.302* 0.116* 0.210* 0.067* 0.206* 0.015 -0.030 0.359* 0.205* 0.057* 0.245* 0.040  -0.185*  
Q ACSIZE 0.455* 0.261* 0.495* 0.223* -0.139* 0.074* 0.183* 0.098* 0.068* -0.155* 0.080* -0.133*  -0.160*  
R ACINDP 0.086* 0.052 0.089* 0.030 -0.093* 0.108* -0.012 -0.033 0.022 -0.140* -0.009 0.011 - 0.020  
S ACFINEXP 0.331* 0.135* 0.317* 0.201* -0.015 0.025 0.126* 0.067* 0.064* -0.023 -0.026 -0.058*  -0.201*  
T ACMEET 0.507* 0.256* 0.522* 0.254* -0.056* 0.099* 0.149* 0.075* 0.125* -0.132* 0.081* -0.117*  -0.199*  
U ACE 0.372* 0.169* 0.387* 0.255* -0.147* 0.115* 0.137* 0.005 0.058* -0.201* 0.069* -0.145*  -0.144*  
V INTAUD 0.570* 0.331* 0.628* 0.291* -0.267* 0.251* 0.250* -0.040 0.038 -0.299* 0.004 -0.285*  -0.214*  
W INSOWN -0.227* -0.059* -0.249* -0.136* 0.030 -0.104* -0.108* -0.097* 0.016 0.036 -0.053 -0.016  0.097*  
X NAT#1 0.175* 0.059* 0.158* 0.080* 0.012 0.092* 0.017 -0.047 0.025 -0.061* -0.018 -0.073*  -0.078*  
Y CITY#1 0.115* 0.028 0.106* 0.058* 0.020 0.018 0.075* -0.106* 0.059* -0.027 -0.038 -0.085* - 0.050  
Z JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 0.243* 0.080* 0.229* 0.086* 0.008 0.092* 0.041 -0.006 0.041 -0.068* 0.016 -0.071*  -0.107*  
Variables N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
N INITIAL 1.000                          
O BODFEM -0.094* 1.000                        
P BODFOREIGN -0.047  0.046  1.000                      
Q ACSIZE -0.065* 0.321* 0.113* 1.000                    
R ACINDP -0.080* 0.054  -0.014  -0.087* 1.000          
S ACFINEXP 0.031  0.024  0.129* 0.043  0.135* 1.000         
T ACMEET -0.053  0.154* 0.204* 0.342* 0.113* 0.255* 1.000        
U ACE -0.083* 0.168* 0.023  0.321* 0.427* 0.154* 0.513* 1.000       
  
* is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table 6.5: Pairwise correlation matric for the LAF model (continued) 
Variables N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
V INTAUD -0.161* 0.290* -0.045  0.320* 0.159* 0.262* 0.383* 0.397* 1.000      
W INSOWN 0.018  -0.105* -0.176* -0.159* 0.026  -0.018  -0.133* -0.016  -0.082* 1.000     
X NAT#1 -0.088* 0.044  0.046  0.066* 0.024  0.044  -0.022  0.079* 0.055* -0.039  1.000    
Y CITY#1 -0.113* 0.028  -0.020  0.038  0.030  0.014  -0.012  0.067* 0.031  -0.019  0.608* 1.000   
Z JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 -0.111* 0.096* 0.075* 0.107* 0.067* 0.086* 0.029  0.102* 0.116* -0.057* 0.895* 0.729* 1.000  
Variables A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
AA CITY#1_ONLY -0.156* -0.065* -0.149* -0.031 0.018 -0.095* 0.052 -0.140* 0.030 0.051 -0.074* -0.027 0.072*  
BB NAT#1_ONLY -0.133* -0.040 -0.139* -0.008 0.010 0.008 -0.051 -0.091* -0.031 0.010 -0.074* -0.010 0.057*  
CC PARNAT#1 0.504* 0.251* 0.412* 0.225* 0.028 0.033 0.123* 0.145* 0.127* -0.050 0.134* -0.061 -0.153*  
DD PARCITY#1 0.119* 0.053 0.087* 0.092* 0.009 0.031 0.067* -0.180* 0.068* -0.039 -0.019 -0.072* 0.01  
EE PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.504* 0.251* 0.412* 0.225* 0.028 0.033 0.123* 0.145* 0.127* -0.050 0.134* -0.061 -0.153*  
FF PARCITY#1_ONLY -0.158* -0.085* -0.140* -0.028 -0.007 0.015 0.002 -0.279* 0.001 -0.013 -0.097* -0.044 0.102*  
GG PARNAT#1_ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  
HH NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  0.525* 0.261* 0.446* 0.298* 0.000 0.050 0.115* 0.099* 0.108* -0.051 0.133* -0.083* -0.148*  
II NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.209* -0.063* -0.221* -0.089* -0.013 0.026 -0.127* -0.199* -0.039 0.029 -0.030 -0.066* 0.108*  
JJ NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  
KK NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1   -0.094* -0.034 -0.031 -0.068* -0.024 -0.007 0.049 -0.054 -0.017 -0.053 -0.057 0.059 - 0.01  
LL NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.315* 0.109* 0.274* 0.204* 0.036 0.044 0.135* 0.033 0.087* -0.077* 0.135* -0.030 -0.136*  
MM NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.311* -0.143* -0.301* -0.134* -0.038 -0.057 0.048 -0.163* -0.095* 0.017 -0.093* -0.035 0.066*  
NN NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.143* 0.093* 0.116* 0.037 -0.035 0.016 0.012 0.040 0.067* -0.029 0.053 -0.023 0.00  
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.130* -0.049 -0.073* -0.065* 0.048 -0.075* 0.057 -0.055 -0.080* 0.101* 0.021 0.139* 0.112*  
PP NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  0.090* 0.029 0.088* 0.076* -0.031 0.052 0.067* 0.027 0.028 -0.042 0.020 0.002 - 0.04  
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.055 -0.138* -0.014 -0.110* 0.055 0.032 -0.023 0.058 -0.048 -0.019 -0.087* 0.059 -0.065*  
RR NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  0.036 0.022 0.002 0.028 -0.009 0.001 0.026 -0.032 0.028 -0.020 -0.034 -0.010 - 0.01  
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.009 0.009 -0.023 0.056 -0.013 0.013 -0.047 0.066* -0.017 -0.028 -0.030 -0.005 0.063*  
TT NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   0.088* 0.052 0.102* 0.092* -0.010 0.020 0.089* -0.001 -0.070* 0.014 -0.008 -0.049 -0.084*  
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.134* -0.065* -0.101* -0.107* -0.032 -0.096* -0.122* 0.060 -0.017 0.082* 0.012 0.063* 0.05  
VV NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0.120* 0.069* 0.097* 0.020 -0.046 0.046 -0.045 -0.023 0.017 -0.065* 0.054 -0.021 0.04  
  
* is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. PARNAT#1_ONLY (GG) and NAT#1-CIT#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (JJ) are empty due to missing observations Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
140 
 
  
Table 6.5: Pairwise correlation matric for the LAF model (continued) 
Variables N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
AA CITY#1_ONLY -0.014  -0.087* -0.126* -0.087* -0.046  -0.093* -0.055  -0.039  -0.109* 0.048  -0.313* 0.451* -0.280* 
BB NAT#1_ONLY 0.042  -0.109* -0.059* -0.083* -0.091* -0.088* -0.109* -0.044  -0.126* 0.037  0.303* -0.210*  
CC PARNAT#1 -0.095* 0.159* 0.241* 0.280* 0.006  0.260* 0.174* 0.084* 0.130* -0.191* 0.315* 0.267* 0.356* 
DD PARCITY#1 -0.059  -0.017  -0.011  0.064* 0.027  -0.003  0.028  0.015  0.060  -0.064* 0.207* 0.597* 0.285* 
EE PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.095* 0.159* 0.241* 0.280* 0.006  0.260* 0.174* 0.084* 0.130* -0.191* 0.315* 0.267* 0.356* 
FF PARCITY#1_ONLY -0.009  -0.108* -0.149* -0.089* 0.026  -0.151* -0.069* -0.032  -0.009  0.039  0.046  0.496* 0.107* 
GG PARNAT#1_ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
HH NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  -0.126* 0.179* 0.161* 0.269* 0.020  0.248* 0.129* 0.112* 0.220* -0.167* 0.479* 0.371* 0.520* 
II NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.012  -0.098* -0.079* -0.122* -0.044  -0.137* -0.130* -0.053  -0.151* 0.079* 0.523* 0.243* 0.393* 
JJ NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
KK NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1   0.047  -0.036  -0.038  -0.015  -0.059  -0.019  -0.022  0.006  -0.023  0.072* 0.135* -0.094* -0.067* 
LL NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.043  0.088* 0.151* 0.091* 0.059  0.122* 0.204* 0.128* 0.147* -0.137* -0.211* -0.079* -0.187* 
MM NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.026  -0.112* -0.199* -0.142* -0.020  -0.101* -0.098* -0.060  -0.137* 0.135* -0.385* 0.084* -0.342* 
NN NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.001  0.030  -0.000  0.052  0.041  0.037  0.034  0.015  0.104* 0.024  -0.112* -0.138* -0.100* 
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.077* -0.081* -0.050  -0.007  -0.030  -0.030  -0.057  -0.136* -0.050  -0.006  -0.120* -0.147* -0.106* 
PP NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  -0.019  -0.045  0.050  0.068* 0.037  0.009  0.026  0.090* 0.093* -0.019  0.178* 0.145* 0.201* 
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.017  0.060  -0.010  -0.035  0.012  -0.016  -0.034  -0.002  -0.029  0.005  0.391* 0.285* 0.405* 
RR NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  -0.015  -0.028  -0.026  -0.053  0.011  -0.067* -0.012  -0.057  0.027  0.027  0.051  -0.035  -0.026  
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  0.059  -0.040  -0.037  -0.016  0.015  0.024  -0.017  0.037  -0.020  -0.031  0.072* -0.050  -0.036  
TT NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   -0.030  0.071* 0.006  0.051  -0.029  0.026  0.028  0.030  0.085* -0.065* -0.146* -0.164* -0.130* 
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   0.047  -0.053  -0.079* -0.051  0.031  -0.001  -0.061  -0.044  -0.023  0.131* -0.248* -0.206* -0.220* 
VV NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 -0.032  0.107* 0.059  0.072* 0.005  0.013  0.082* 0.051  0.122* 0.015  -0.149* -0.184* -0.132* 
Variables AA BB CC DD EE FF GG HH II JJ KK LL MM 
AA CITY#1_ONLY 1.000             
BB NAT#1_ONLY -0.094* 1.000            
CC PARNAT#1 -0.087* -0.058 1.000           
DD PARCITY#1 0.460* -0.143* 0.406* 1.000          
EE PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.087* -0.058 1.000* 0.406* 1.000         
FF PARCITY#1_ONLY 0.549* -0.122* -0.127* 0.854* -0.127* 1.000        
GG PARNAT#1_ONLY . . . . . . .       
HH NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  -0.153* -0.044 0.665* 0.291* 0.665* -0.062 . 1.000      
II NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.167* 0.312* -0.097* 0.219* -0.097* 0.293* . -0.141* 1.000     
 
              
*is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. PARNAT#1_ONLY (GG) and NAT#1-CIT#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (JJ) are empty due to missing observations. Refer Table 5.8 for 
definition of variables. 
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Table 6.5: Pairwise correlation matric for the LAF model (continued) 
Variables AA BB CC DD EE FF GG HH II JJ KK LL MM 
JJ NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  . . . . . . . . . .    
KK NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1   -0.043 0.431* -0.025 -0.062 -0.025 -0.053 . -0.037 -0.040 . 1.000   
LL NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.130* -0.066* -0.045 0.020 -0.045 0.047 . -0.101* -0.110* . -0.029 1.000  
MM NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.555* -0.121* -0.126* 0.251* -0.126* 0.344* . -0.184* -0.201* . -0.052 -0.144* 1.000 
NN NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.063* -0.036 -0.037 -0.046 -0.037 -0.029 . -0.054 -0.059 . -0.015 -0.042 -0.077* 
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.068* -0.038 -0.040 -0.075* -0.040 -0.060 . -0.058 -0.063 . -0.016 -0.045 -0.082* 
PP NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  -0.057 -0.032 -0.033 -0.081* -0.033 -0.069* . -0.048 -0.053 . -0.014 -0.038 -0.068* 
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.124* 0.003 -0.072* -0.178* -0.072* -0.152* . -0.105* -0.115* . -0.030 -0.082* -0.150* 
RR NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  -0.016 0.1623* -0.010 -0.023 -0.010 -0.020 . -0.014 -0.015 . -0.004 -0.011 -0.020 
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.023 0.2297* -0.013 -0.033 -0.013 -0.028 . -0.020 -0.021 . -0.006 -0.015 -0.028 
TT NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   -0.061 -0.046 -0.048 -0.118* -0.048 -0.101* . -0.070* -0.076* . -0.020 -0.055 -0.100* 
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.003 -0.078* -0.081* -0.200* -0.081* -0.171* . -0.119* -0.129* . -0.034 -0.093* -0.169* 
VV NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 -0.084* -0.047 -0.049 -0.121* -0.049 -0.103* . -0.071* -0.078* . -0.020 -0.056 -0.102* 
Variables NN OO PP QQ RR SS TT UU VV     
NN NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 1.000             
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.024 1.000            
PP NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  -0.020 -0.022 1.000           
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.044 -0.047 -0.039 1.000          
RR NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 1.000         
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.016 -0.002 1.000        
TT NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   -0.029 -0.031 -0.026 -0.057 -0.008 -0.011 1.000       
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.050 -0.053 -0.044 -0.097* -0.013 -0.018 -0.064* 1.000      
VV NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 -0.030 -0.032 -0.027 -0.059 -0.008 -0.011 -0.039 -0.065* 1.000     
*is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. PARNAT#1_ONLY (GG) and NAT#1-CIT#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (JJ) are empty due to missing observations. Refer Table 5.8 for 
definition of variables. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY 
SPECIALIST AUDITORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
AUDIT QUALITY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Having analysed and explained the descriptive statistics of the data used to study the effect of industry 
specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit quality (proxy by the variation in the level of 
audit fees) in Chapter 6, the multivariate analysis which follows in Chapter 7 examines the 
relationship between industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit fees. This analysis 
extends the analysis in Basioudis and Francis (2007) and provides a comparison to the results obtained 
in Basioudis and Francis (2007) in the period 2002-2003. This analysis is also the starting point, as the 
main focus of the PhD is the effect of the industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on 
earnings quality in the U.K. As a first step, the effect of the industry specialist auditors and corporate 
governance on audit fees is examined in this chapter. Then, to extend this line of research, the second 
empirical study investigates the effect of the industry specialist auditors in conjunction with corporate 
governance on earnings quality in Chapter 9 to Chapter 11.  
 
7.2 Multivariate analysis 
The audit pricing analyses are performed under three different levels of analysis for auditor industry 
specialisation: 1) firm national-city framework, 2) partner national-city framework, and 3) joint firm-
partner national-city framework. As in prior studies using the national and city framework (Francis et 
al., 2005; Basioudis and Francis, 2007), three models are reported for comparative purposes under the 
firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework analyses. In this study, the same 
frameworks are adopted and the three models in each analysis are described as follows: Model 1 tests 
the effect of firm (partner) national industry leadership and corporate governance on audit fees. Model 
2 tests the effect of firm (partner) city-specific industry leadership and corporate governance on audit 
fees. Model 1 and Model 2 are provided for completeness, while Model 3 represents the model of 
interest as it controls for the joint effect of firm (partner) national and city industry leadership and 
corporate governance on audit fees.  
 
Following Francis et al. (2005), the determination of the national industry leader in Model 1 and the 
city-specific industry leader in Model 2, respectively, is based on an iterative process. The iterative 
process starts with only one indicator variable for the top-ranked leader (either national or city-
specific) in the first estimation, and then adds a second indicator variable for the second-ranked leader 
in the second estimation, and so on until the introduction of an additional ranking variable is not 
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statistically significant or, in other words, does not have an effect on audit fees. This iterative process 
determines the top-ranked Big 4 industry leaders (firm or partner) which have a significant coefficient 
relative to the remaining Big 4 non-industry leaders. For example, NAT#1 represents an indicator 
variable coded 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked industry leader nationally (coded zero if otherwise), 
given that, based on the iterative process in Model 1, only the top-ranked audit firms nationally are 
able to extract fee premiums.  However, if the iterative process indicates that the second-ranked audit 
firm industry leader nationally is also able to extract a fee premium, then the indicator variable would 
be NAT#2, which is coded 1 if the audit firm ranked as being in the top-two industry leaders nationally 
(coded zero if otherwise). Consequently, the determination of the joint national-city industry leader in 
Model 3 would be derived from the combination of the top-ranked leaders identified in Model 1 and 
Model 2, respectively. This iterative process applies under both the firm national-city framework 
(Section 7.2.1) and the partner national-city framework (Section 7.2.2).  
 
Under the joint firm-partner national-city framework (Section 7.2.3), the industry specialist auditor 
variables (e.g. NAT#-CITY#_PARNAT#-PARCITY#) are derived from the combination of firm and 
partner industry leadership. The ranking for the firm and partner either nationally or at the city-
specific level is determined from the firm national-city framework (Section 7.2.1) and partner 
national-city framework (Section 7.2.2), respectively. For instance, NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-
PARCITY#3 (in Table 7.5) is a variable which represents the combined industry leadership of both the 
audit firm and the partner, where the audit firm is the first ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), 
the office is in the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the partner is in the top six 
ranked by market share nationally (PARNAT#6), and the partner is in the top three ranked by city-
industry market share (PARCITY#3).  
 
The significance levels for model coefficients are reported as one-tailed p-values, except for the 
industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are reported as two-
tailed p-values. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-
statistics and p-values are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity
12
. 
 
7.2.1 Firm national-city framework  
Results in Table 7.1 below are derived based on 892 observations. The sample selection process for 
this empirical analysis is explained in Table 5.1 earlier. In short, this final sample is derived after 
                                                     
12 According to Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010), the use of OLS or White (1980) standard error fails to correct for both 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence in panel data, thus producing mis-specified test-statistics and invalid inferences 
about the relationship of the variables examined. Instead, the econometric literature shows that two-way cluster robust 
standard errors have both time-series and cross-sectional correlation (Thompson, 2006; Petersen, 2009). Thus, a sensitivity 
analysis is performed in the next chapter in Section 8.2., where all the regressions are re-estimated using 1) robust standard 
error clustered by firm, and 2) two-way cluster robust standard error clustered by firm and year. Interestingly, qualitatively 
similar results are reported as per the main findings in Section 7.2.1, indicating that the results are not sensitive to specific 
types of regression estimators used in the study. 
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excluding sample with less than two city-specific observations per industry (N=283), 88 observations 
with missing corporate governance variables and 486 non-Big 4 observations from the full sample 
with complete audit fees data (N=1,747).  This screening is performed so as to ensure that the audit 
market for all the cities in specific industries analysed is competitive where more than one audit client 
exists; moreover, using only the Big 4 sample allows us to test directly whether Big 4 industry leaders 
have a fee premium relative to other Big 4 auditors who are non-leaders. There is an average of four 
observations per city-industry combination, which is similar to what has been documented in a prior 
U.K. study by Basioudis and Francis (2007), and also is comparable to the six observations per city-
industry combination in the U.S. reported in Francis et al. (2005).  
 
Following Ferguson et al. (2003), under the national-city framework analysis, the fee premium for 
industry leadership is estimated using three model specifications: Model 1 tests the effect of national 
level industry leadership per se on differential Big 4 audit pricing relative to other Big 4 who are non-
leaders; Model 2 tests the effect of city-specific industry leadership per se relative to companies 
audited by Big 4 who are non-leaders (note that while Models 1 and 2 are provided for completeness, 
they are not the primary models of interest because they do not control for the joint effect of national 
and city-specific industry leadership on audit pricing); Model 3 is the primary model of interest 
because it controls explicitly for the joint effect of national and city-specific industry leadership 
through the use of three auditor indicator variables. In order to perform Model 3, the final sample of 
Big 4 audited companies (N=892) is partitioned into the following three groups: 1) companies audited 
by auditors that are jointly the national industry leader and the city-specific industry leader; 2) 
companies audited by the city-specific industry leader without also being the national industry leader; 
and 3) companies audited by the national industry leader without also being the city-specific industry 
leader. The purpose of these three partitions is to test for the separate effects of national and city-
specific industry leadership on audit pricing, as well as to isolate the joint effect of national and city-
specific industry leadership on pricing. The default comparison group is companies whose Big 4 
auditors that are neither national nor city-specific industry leaders.  
 
Panel A of Table 7.1 represents the audit fee regression excluding the corporate governance variables, 
whereas Panel B of Table 7.1 represents the final results of interest, where corporate governance is 
being tested simultaneously in the model alongside the industry specialist auditors. The purpose of 
these tests of exclusion and then inclusion of corporate governance variables in the models is to 
examine whether the omission of those monitoring mechanisms has any effect on the models’ 
explanatory power (R-square), and whether there is a change in the effect of the industry specialist 
auditors (based on any changes observed on the fee premium or fee discount (if any) reported by the 
industry specialist auditors). Previous studies on auditor industry specialisation (e.g. Basioudis and 
Francis, 2007; Francis et al., 2005; Hay and Jeter, 2011) have failed to control for the effect of 
corporate governance in their models despite these numerous variables having been previously shown 
to explain the variation in audit fees (e.g. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Krishnan and 
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Visvanathan, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011). Furthermore, as earlier demonstrated in the correlation 
analysis in Table 6.3, the industry specialist auditor variables to some extent are correlated with the 
various corporate governance variables, which means that exclusion of corporate governance in the 
regression models could have significant implications for the study's internal validity. Previous studies 
have also shown that companies with effective corporate governance are likely to recruit industry 
specialist auditors (e.g. Abbott and Parker, 2000; Chen et al., 2005), and industry specialist auditors 
are likely to charge audit fee premiums in the presence of a strong corporate governance function. 
Thus, it is possible that the measure of industry specialist auditors in previous studies is capturing the 
impact of corporate governance characteristics of the firm.  
 
Table 7.1 below reports the results of the three model estimations for the audit firm national-city 
framework, as described above
13
. Results in Panel A present the regression results before the inclusion 
of corporate governance variables, whereas in Panel B, the regression results are tabulated with the 
inclusion of the corporate governance variables to determine the effect of corporate governance on the 
industry specialist premium. As mentioned before, as compared to Model 1 and Model 2, Model 3 is 
the model of interest as it controls for the joint effect of national and city-specific industry leadership 
of the Big 4 audit firms on audit pricing. Once the corporate governance variables are controlled for in 
the model, the models explanatory power (
R2
) increases from 87.3 percent (R
2
 for Model 3 in Panel A) 
to 88.1 percent (R
2
 for Model 3 in Panel B), and the coefficient for the Big 4 joint national and city-
specific industry leader (JOINT) reduces slightly from 0.081 to 0.068, which indicates that the 
corporate governance characteristics of a firm do explain a considerable portion (1.3 percent  or 0.013 
difference between the coefficient 0.081 and 0.068) of the auditor industry specialist effect on audit 
fees. The significance of the results for the control variables and industry specialist auditor variables in 
Panel A and Panel B is qualitatively the same, except that OPINION has lost its significance in Panel 
B, as the industry specialist auditors may rely more on the corporate governance function as an 
internal monitoring mechanism. The final results are interpreted based on the outcome of Panel B. All 
control variables LNAF, LTA, SQRTSUBS, ROI, FOREIGN, QUICK, CATA,  LONDON, BUSY and 
INITIAL are significant at the conventional levels and in the expected direction, except for DE which 
is significant at p<0.01 but in the opposite direction, while LOSS and INSOWN are insignificant. The 
significant negative relationship reported between DE and audit fees in this study is consistent with a 
prior U.K. study by Zaman et al. (2011) which included corporate governance and Big 4 variables in 
their audit fee models. The variable LOSS is also insignificant. The insignificant findings for INSOWN 
is consistent with findings from prior U.K. study by O’Sullivan (2000) but inconsistent with a later 
U.K. study by Zaman et al. (2011). Nevertheless, overall, results of the control variables support the 
notion that client characteristics such as size (LTA), complexity (SQRTSUBS, FOREIGN), profitability 
(ROI), inherent risk (CATA, QUICK) and the auditor production costs (BUSY, LNAF, LONDON, 
                                                     
13 The significance levels for model coefficients are reported as one-tailed p-values, except for the industry specialist auditor 
variables and corporate governance variables which are reported as two-tailed p-values. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-
effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and p-values are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors 
to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
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INITIAL) affect audit risk and audit effort, contributing to the variation in the level of audit fees (Hay 
et al., 2006). 
 
Next, results for the industry specialist auditor experimental variable under the firm national-city 
framework are discussed. Model 1 tests the effect of national industry leadership on audit pricing, 
without controlling for the effect of joint national and city-specific industry leadership. The estimation 
of Model 1 is an iterative process, as explained earlier at the beginning of Section 7.2, starting with 
only one indicator variable for the nationally top-ranked firm in the first estimation, and then adding a 
second indicator variable for the second-ranked firm in the second estimation, and so on until the 
introduction of an additional ranking variable is not statistically significant. This iterative process 
results in only the nationally top-ranked Big 4 firm having a significant fee premium relative to the 
remaining Big 4 firms. Only the auditor indicator variable for the top-ranked firm is found to be 
significant, as when the second specification (not tabulated) is estimated with an additional auditor 
indicator variable for the second-ranked auditor in the industry, the result is insignificant. Thus, the 
results for Model 1 reported in Panel B Table 7.1 below use a single auditor indicator variable that 
takes on the value of 1 if an audit firm is the nationally top-ranked firm in an industry (NAT#1) and 
tests the effect of national level industry leadership per se on differential Big 4 audit pricing for N=322 
observations in which the Big 4 auditor is the national industry leader, and the default comparison 
group is all of the remaining 570 observations not having Big 4 national industry leaders. The NAT#1 
coefficient value is 0.059 (p<0.01), which equates to an average audit fee premium of 6.07 percent for 
the nationally top-ranked firm in the industry.
14
 This finding of fee premium for audit firm industry 
leadership is consistent with prior studies in the U.S. (Francis et al., 2005; Mayhew and Wilkins, 
2003; Cahan et al., 2011, 2015), Australia (Ferguson et al., 2003; Craswell et al., 1995), Hong Kong 
(Defond et al. 2000), and New Zealand (Hay and Jeter, 2011), and also is consistent with a cross-
country study by Carson (2009) that provides evidence of a national industry specialist premium. 
 
However, the finding of fee premium for national industry leaders in this study is inconsistent with a 
few studies in the U.S. (Palmrose, 1986; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Francis et al., 2005: Francis 
and Yu, 2009), Australia (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002), and New Zealand (Hay and Jeter, 2011). More 
importantly, it is inconsistent with the only prior U.K. evidence provided in Basioudis and Francis 
(2007) study which reported insignificant evidence of fee premium using the national market share 
measures of auditor industry expertise.  
 
Model 2 tests the effect of city-specific industry leadership on audit pricing, without controlling for 
the joint national and city-specific industry leadership effect. The estimation of Model 2 follows the 
same iterative process, as described earlier, starting with the top-ranked firm at the city level in the 
first estimation, and adding a second and third indicator variable for the second-ranked firm and third-
                                                     
14 Following Berndt (1991, p. 164), the percentage magnitude of the positive intercept shift on the dependent variable (natural 
log of audit fees) is defined as ez-1, where z is the auditor coefficient value in the regression model. 
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ranked firm in the following estimations. The results indicate that only the top-ranked firm has a 
significant fee premium relative to other Big 4 firms, but not for the second or third-ranked leader. 
This finding is consistent with the only prior study from the U.K. (Basioudis and Francis, 2007) as 
well as other studies from Australia (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2003) and the U.S. (e.g. Francis et al., 2005) 
which fail to report any evidence of fee premiums for second-ranked city-specific industry leaders.  
 
Thus, the results for Model 2 reported in Table 7.1 below use a single auditor indicator variable coded 
1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked city-specific industry leader (CITY#1), and tests the effect of city-
specific leadership per se for N=410 observations in which the Big 4 auditors are the top-ranked city-
specific industry leaders, and the default comparison group is the remaining 482 observations not 
audited by city-specific industry leaders. The coefficient value for CITY#1 is 0.043 and is significant 
(p<0.01), which equates to an average audit fee premium of 4.39 percent for the top-ranked city-
specific industry leaders. Note that the city-specific industry leadership premium in Model 2 (4.39 
percent) is less than the national leadership premium in Model 1 (6.07 percent). This finding on the 
city-industry level specialist premium is consistent with previous studies in Australia (Ferguson et al., 
2003), in the U.S. (Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2010), in New Zealand (Hay and 
Jeter, 2011) and the only prior U.K. study by Basioudis and Francis (2007). Interestingly, in their 
study, Basioudis and Francis (2007) reported a fee premium of 16 percent for the Big 4 city-specific 
industry leader, which is about 5.08 percent higher when compared to 4.39 percent reported in this 
study. A possible explanation for this is that there has been a shift in the Big 4 audit firm focus in 
terms of its industry specialisation strategy, from city-specific to national level industry leadership. It 
is suggested that this effort is aimed at improving the transferability of industry expertise and 
knowledge sharing between the audit offices across the country, in order to achieve more standardised 
audit quality within the audit firm. This is plausible given the increased scrutiny over the audit quality 
of the Big 4 auditors during the period of the financial crisis.  
 
While Models 1 and 2 provide evidence that both national industry leadership per se and city-specific 
industry leadership per se have positive effects on the pricing of Big 4 industry expertise in the U.K, 
they are not the primary models of interest. While Models 1 and Model 2 are provided for 
completeness, Model 3 is the primary model of interest because it controls explicitly for the joint 
effect of national and city-specific industry leadership through the use of three auditor indicator 
variables. The first auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 278 observations (31 percent of the 
sample) in which the audit firm is both the top-ranked national leader and the top-ranked city-industry 
leader; the second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 132 observations (15 percent of the sample) 
in which the audit firm is the top-ranked city-industry leader but not the top national leader; and the 
third auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 44 observations (5 percent of the sample) in which the 
auditor is the top national industry leader but not the top-ranked city-industry leader.  
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In other words, and following on from the presentation of the specialist auditor data in the previous 
paragraphs, companies with auditors that are national industry leaders (N=322) can be decomposed 
into those audited by national leaders alone (N=44), plus those whose auditors are joint national and 
city-specific industry leaders (N=278). Similarly, companies with auditors that are city-specific 
industry leaders (N=410) can be decomposed into those audited by city-specific industry leaders alone 
(N=132), plus those auditors that are jointly national and city-specific industry leaders (N=278). The 
purpose of these three partitions is to test for the separate effects of national and city-specific industry 
leadership on audit pricing, as well as to isolate the joint effect of national and city-specific industry 
leadership on pricing. The default comparison group is the 438 observations (49 percent of the 
sample) in which the auditor is neither a national nor city industry leader. 
 
Results of Model 3 in Table 7.1 show that neither national industry leadership alone nor city-specific 
industry leadership alone results in a fee premium, as coefficients for CITY#1_ONLY and 
NAT#1_ONLY are not significant at conventional levels (p >0.10). Instead, the fee premium for 
industry leadership is only earned by the city-specific industry leaders if and when they are also 
national industry leaders. The coefficient JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 for joint national and city-specific 
industry leadership is 0.081 (p < 0.01), which represents a fee premium of 8.44 percent. The above 
findings differ from Basioudis and Francis (2007), who have reported significant industry specialist 
premiums for both the joint leaders (12 percent) as well as the city-specific industry leader alone (19 
percent). The results of this study also indicate that the premium for industry leadership in the more 
recent period in the U.K. is not driven by the office-level industry expertise as shown previously in 
Basioudis and Francis (2007).  
 
This new U.K. evidence of fee premium for industry leadership is also in contrast to the U.S. and New 
Zealand where joint industry leadership as well as city industry leadership alone have a differential 
effect on the Big 4 pricing (Francis et al., 2005; Hay and Jeter, 2011), whereas the city industry 
leadership plays a prominent role. Instead, this current finding is more similar to Australia where fee 
premium is only reported by the joint industry leader, although the fee premium rate (24 percent) 
reported in Australia is much higher (Ferguson et al., 2003). Nevertheless, a more recent Australian 
study by Goodwin and Wu (2014) has reported that the fee premium averages between 10.80 to 12.80 
percent, depending on the model specification used in their study. Overall, the premium for joint 
national and city industry leadership in the U.K. reported in Table 7.1 is still lower when compared to 
other countries like Australia (between 10.80 percent to 24 percent), the U.S. (18.53 percent) and prior 
U.K. evidence (12 percent).  
 
In addition, this finding is also in contrast to a study by Choi et al. (2010) which uses a continuous 
measure of industry specialist auditors (instead of indicator variables capturing industry 
specialisation), and they have found the coefficient of the city-industry specialist to be significant even 
after controlling for the Big 4 brand name premium and the office size measure, but they report 
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insignificant results for the national measure of industry expertise. Based on Choi et al. (2010), this 
suggests that the city specialist has a more dominant effect than the national specialist on audit pricing 
in the U.S., even after controlling for the size of the local practice office within an audit firm. 
Goodwin and Wu (2014) also have reported recently that the city level industry specialist is more 
important in Australia than national level industry specialist either after having used a continuous 
market share measure or a dummy variable for designated industry leaders
15
. Numan and Willekens 
(2012) have also reported that an audit firm which is a city-industry specialist is more dominant than 
national specialists, as there is evidence of fee premium documented for city-industry specialists even 
after controlling for the effect of national specialists and the effect of competitive pressure from the 
closest competitor. Their results are consistent using either the market share or portfolio approach to 
designate industry specialist auditors
16
.  
 
In support of the product differentiation and reputation theory, the results above imply that only the 
Big 4 audit firms that possess industry leadership at both the national and city level are able to 
differentiate themselves successfully in the Big 4 audit market, as the market priced their service 
quality at a higher rate above the Big 4 brand name reputation. In terms of knowledge sharing, the 
findings reported in Table 7.1, particularly in Model 3, suggest that there is strong knowledge sharing 
and transferability of industry expertise between the audit offices in the U.K., as being an industry 
leader at the city level alone or national level alone is not a sufficient condition for the Big 4 firm 
industry specialists to earn a fee premium. 
 
For the corporate governance variables, in respect of board diversity, the variable BODFOREIGN is 
positive and significant at p<0.01 across all the three models, suggesting that companies that have 
more foreign directors in their board composition pay higher audit fees. This finding supports the 
argument by Masulis et al. (2012) that foreign directors are likely to be less familiar with the U.K. 
national accounting rules, laws and regulations, governance standards, and management methods, 
making it more difficult for them to evaluate managerial performance or challenge managerial 
decisions. The poor monitoring role and poor governance quality of the foreign directors, as described 
above, might necessitate the auditor to perform extra work to verify the quality of the financial reports 
prepared by the management, resulting in the charging of higher audit fees. There is no empirical 
evidence to suggest that the proportion of female directors on boards affects audit fees, as BODFEM is 
not significant at any conventional level. This finding is in contrast to a study by Gul et al. (2008) 
which documented negative association between female directorship and audit fees. The insignificant 
results could also be attributed to the low percentage of female directors participating in the corporate 
boards within the sample; as shown in Table 6.1, the average percentage is only 6.7 percent.  
 
                                                     
15 Sensitivity analysis is performed later in this study in Section 8.5 to test the robustness of the findings using alternative 
measures of auditor industry expertise found in the literature (e.g. Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Neal and Riley, 2004). 
16 Sensitivity analysis is also performed in Section 8.6 to test the effect of spatial competition on the industry specialisation 
premium as examined in a prior study by Numan and Willekens (2012). 
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Although the coefficient for INTAUD is positive, it is not significant at any conventional level either. 
This is in contrast to prior studies which report a significant positive relationship (e.g. Singh and 
Newby, 2010; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006) and also a negative relationship (Prawit et al., 2009, 
Felix et al., 2001) between internal audit function and audit fees. A possible explanation for this 
insignificant finding is that there may be a positive relationship between internal audit and audit fees 
which is not evident because the audit firm absorbs some of the costs of the audit to keep the client 
while attempting to recover the cost by providing other assurance services to the client in the same 
year or subsequent years (Singh and Newby, 2010). For the audit committee variables, the coefficients 
for ACSIZE, ACINDP and ACFINEXP are statistically insignificant at conventional levels in all 
models in Table 7.1. These insignificant finding could be explained by lack of variation between the 
sample companies in terms of their audit committee size, independence and financial expertise, given 
that the authoritative guidance (e.g. Combined Code, 2008; U.K. Corporate Governance Code, 2010) 
has clearly set the minimum requirement that companies need to meet in respect of these audit 
committee characteristics. This finding is consistent with the institutional theory, which suggests that 
the companies’ compliance with the regulation is merely ceremonial in nature in order to maintain its 
legitimacy, without pure intention to exercise their monitoring role effectively. The insignificant 
finding ACINDP is consistent with Carcello et al. (2002) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), 
whereas the insignificant finding for ACFINEXP is consistent with Carcello and Neal (2003a) and 
Zaman et al. (2011), who did not report any benefit of such expertise. On the other hand, ACMEET is 
positive and significant at p<0.10 (except in Model 2), consistent with the notion that diligence of the 
audit committee members is associated with more intensive and expensive audits (Carcello et al., 
2002; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Zaman et al., 2011). 
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Table  7.1: Audit fee regression under firm national-city framework 
Panel A: Exclude corporate governance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.571 5.330 0.000 *** 0.513 4.680 0.000 *** 0.558 5.110 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.038 5.610 0.000 *** 0.038 5.630 0.000 *** 0.038 5.700 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.512 37.310 0.000 *** 0.518 37.830 0.000 *** 0.512 37.330 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.057 10.210 0.000 *** 0.057 10.260 0.000 *** 0.057 10.170 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.115 -2.510 0.006 *** -0.106 -2.290 0.011 ** -0.116 -2.570 0.005 *** 
DE + -0.165 -2.600 0.005 *** -0.187 -2.960 0.002 *** -0.166 -2.630 0.005 *** 
FOREIGN + 0.158 7.020 0.000 *** 0.153 6.740 0.000 *** 0.155 6.930 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.009 -4.070 0.000 *** -0.009 -3.880 0.000 *** -0.009 -3.960 0.000 *** 
CATA + 0.124 2.650 0.004 *** 0.126 2.660 0.004 *** 0.127 2.700 0.004 *** 
OPINION + 0.071 1.480 0.070 * 0.083 1.750 0.040 ** 0.073 1.500 0.067 * 
LONDON + 0.082 5.000 0.000 *** 0.084 5.010 0.000 *** 0.084 5.070 0.000 *** 
BUSY + 0.082 4.910 0.000 *** 0.085 5.110 0.000 *** 0.083 4.950 0.000 *** 
LOSS + 0.016 0.600 0.274  0.016 0.610 0.271  0.012 0.440 0.330  
INITIAL - -0.086 -3.650 0.000 *** -0.086 -3.590 0.000 *** -0.081 -3.390 0.001 *** 
INSOWN - -0.006 -0.600 0.273  -0.007 -0.740 0.230  -0.005 -0.550 0.291  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT #1(n=322)  0.063 3.970 0.000 ***         
CITY#1 (n=410)      0.048 2.420 0.016 **     
JOINT_NAT# 1-CITY#1 (n=278)          0.081 3.650 0.000 *** 
CITY#1_ONLY (n=132)          0.018 0.820 0.411  
NAT#1_ONLY (n=44)          -0.062 -0.850 0.397  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.873 0.872 0.873 
N  892 892 892 
Panel B: Include corporate governance 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.867 5.980 0.000 *** 0.803 5.440 0.000 *** 0.890 6.110 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.037 5.600 0.000 *** 0.037 5.650 0.000 *** 0.037 5.690 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.476 25.910 0.000 *** 0.482 26.340 0.000 *** 0.473 25.620 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.058 10.740 0.000 *** 0.058 10.780 0.000 *** 0.058 10.840 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.116 -2.550 0.006 *** -0.105 -2.280 0.012 ** -0.115 -2.510 0.006 *** 
DE + -0.086 -1.460 0.073 * -0.108 -1.820 0.034 ** -0.084 -1.390 0.082 * 
FOREIGN + 0.140 6.420 0.000 *** 0.134 6.130 0.000 *** 0.137 6.290 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.010 -3.920 0.000 *** -0.009 -3.750 0.000 *** -0.010 -3.990 0.000 *** 
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Table 7.1: Audit fee regression under firm national-city framework (continued) 
Panel B: Include corporate governance 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
CATA + 0.162 3.650 0.000 *** 0.165 3.660 0.000 *** 0.162 3.650 0.000 *** 
OPINION + 0.049 1.050 0.147  0.059 1.270 0.102  0.048 1.020 0.155  
LONDON + 0.059 3.570 0.000 *** 0.060 3.530 0.000 *** 0.058 3.480 0.001 *** 
BUSY + 0.066 3.970 0.000 *** 0.069 4.160 0.000 *** 0.065 3.890 0.000 *** 
LOSS + 0.007 0.250 0.401  0.007 0.250 0.403  0.006 0.210 0.418  
INITIAL - -0.078 -3.380 0.001 *** -0.077 -3.310 0.001 *** -0.077 -3.300 0.001 *** 
INSOWN - -0.003 -0.360 0.360  -0.004 -0.450 0.327  -0.003 -0.350 0.365  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT #1(n=322)  0.059 3.700 0.000 ***         
CITY#1 (n=410)      0.043 2.800 0.005 ***     
JOINT_NAT# 1-CITY#1 (n=278)          0.068 3.860 0.000 *** 
CITY#1_ONLY (n=132)          -0.002 -0.070 0.945  
NAT#1_ONLY (n=44)          0.008 0.200 0.839  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.010 -0.870 0.386  -0.011 -1.020 0.310  -0.010 -0.930 0.353  
BODFOREIGN  0.081 6.530 0.000 *** 0.084 6.820 0.000 *** 0.081 6.550 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.037 1.560 0.120  0.032 1.360 0.175  0.035 1.470 0.141  
ACSIZE  -0.004 -0.370 0.713  -0.002 -0.140 0.886  -0.004 -0.380 0.701  
ACINDP  0.012 0.790 0.428  0.013 0.830 0.404  0.010 0.640 0.521  
ACFINEXP  0.014 1.440 0.151  0.014 1.440 0.150  0.014 1.430 0.154  
ACMEET  0.019 1.770 0.076 * 0.017 1.550 0.123  0.019 1.770 0.078 * 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.881 0.880 0.881 
N  892 892 892 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year 
fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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7.2.2 Partner national-city framework 
Analysing the effect of audit partner industry specialisation in this section provides empirical results 
for an issue that has not been explored in the U.K.. Audit partner data has recently become available in 
the U.K., and this is the first study to explore this important issue in the U.K. in relation to audit fees 
and auditor industry specialisation using the national-city framework. 
 
Table 7.3 below presents the results of the analysis on the effect of audit partner industry 
specialisation and corporate governance on audit fees. The approach used for the analysis is similar to 
the national-city framework, discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, where Model 1 and 
Model 2 test the effect of national audit partner industry leadership per se and city audit partner 
industry leadership per se on audit pricing respectively, without controlling for joint national and city-
specific audit partner industry leadership. Model 3, on the other hand, tests the pricing of national and 
city-specific industry leadership while controlling for the joint effect of national and city-specific 
industry leadership of the audit partners. 
 
The results in Table 7.3 below are derived from 680 observations, where the sample size is 
accomplished after excluding 212 observations with missing audit partner data from the audit firm 
national city framework sample used in previous analysis (N=892) in Table 7.1 below. This missing 
audit partner data is because the requirement for disclosure of the name of the senior statutory auditor 
(or engagement partner) signing off the auditor’s report for and on behalf of the audit firm was only 
made mandatory in the U.K. for financial years beginning on or after 6 April 2008 (Section 503 of 
Companies Act 2006). The starting point for the construction of the sample in this study is the year 
2008, and, therefore, some listed companies would not have adopted the new regulation early enough. 
This has led to 212 company observations being dropped from the original sample. Table 7.2 reports 
the distribution of market shares among the audit partners at the national and city level. 
 
The results in Panel A of Table 7.3 present the regression results before the inclusion of corporate 
governance variables, whereas in Panel B, the regression results are tabulated with the inclusion of the 
corporate governance variables to determine the effect of corporate governance on the industry 
specialist premium. Once they are controlled for in the model, the models explanatory power (R
2
) has 
increased from 90.3 percent (R
2
 for Model 3 in Panel A) to 90.9 percent R
2
 for Model 3 in Panel B). 
However, the coefficient of the fee premium for the partner who is a joint national and city industry 
specialist remained the same at 0.353 at p<0.01, suggesting that corporate governance characteristics 
of the firm do not have any effect on the monitoring role of the industry specialist auditor at the 
partner level. The significance of the results for the control variables and industry specialist auditor 
variables in Panel A and Panel B is qualitatively the same, except that DE has lost its significance in 
Panel B. The final results are interpreted based on the outcome of Panel B.  
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In respect of the control variables, LNAF, LTA, SQRTSUBS, FOREIGN, QUICK, CATA, LONDON, 
BUSY, INITIAL are significant at the conventional levels and in the expected direction, except for DE 
which is significant but in the opposite direction than predicted. The variables LOSS, OPINION and 
INSOWN are insignificant at p=0.10. The results reported for the control variables are consistent with 
what has been reported in Table 7.1 earlier under the firm national-city framework analysis. Overall, 
the results of the control variables support the notion that clients’ characteristics such as client size 
(LTA), complexity (SQRTSUBS, FOREIGN), inherent risk (CATA, QUICK), and the auditor 
production costs (BUSY, LNAF, LONDON, INITIAL) affect audit risk and audit effort, contributing to 
the variation in the level of audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). 
 
As before, the estimation of Model 1 is an iterative process, starting with only one indicator variable 
for the nationally top-ranked partner in the first estimation, and then adding a second indicator 
variable for the second-ranked partner in the second estimation, and so on until the introduction of an 
additional ranking partner is not statistically significant. This iterative process has resulted in only the 
nationally top six partners having a significant fee premium relative to the remaining Big 4 partners. 
Based on the estimations performed (not tabulated), the auditor indicator variable for the six top 
ranked partners nationally are found to be significant as when the specification is estimated with an 
additional auditor indicator variable for the seventh-ranked partner in the industry, the result then 
becomes insignificant. Table 7.2 Panel A presents the coefficients, p-values, average fee premiums 
and average market shares of audit fees for the top-six audit partner national industry leadership. The 
fee premium for the top, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth-ranked audit partner averages at 88.32 
percent, 57.93 percent, 52.20 percent, 22.38 percent, 17.12 percent, and 13.97 percent, respectively. A 
series of F-tests indicates there are only significant differences in the average fee premium between 
the top-ranked partner and second-ranked partner (F-statistic=38.39, p=0.000) as well as between the 
third ranked partner and fourth ranked partner (F-statistic=29.07, p=0.000). 
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 7.2, the huge gap reported between the fee premium of the top-ranked 
and second-ranked partner as well as between the third ranked and the fourth ranked partner is 
consistent with the distance in the market share based on audit fees between these leaders. Thus, the 
results for Model 1 reported in Table 7.3 below use a single auditor indicator variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if the audit partners are ranked in the top six nationally (PARNAT#6) and tests the effect of 
their national-level industry leadership per se on differential Big 4 audit pricing for N=207 
observations in which the Big 4 partner is the national industry leader, and the default comparison 
group is all of the remaining 473 observations not having Big 4 audit partners who are the top six 
industry leaders nationally. As shown in Panel B of Table 7.3, the PARNAT#6 coefficient value is 
0.263 and significant at p<0.01, which equates to an average audit fee premium of 31.26 percent. This 
premium is higher than the one reported by Zerni (2011) in Sweden, where the audit partners who are 
industry specialists (measured using either the aggregate amount of audited total assets or the 
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aggregate number of engagements, but not using audit fees) earns an average of 15.40 percent higher 
fees than their non-specialist counterparts.  
 
Table  7.2: Data on partner industry leadership 
Panel A: National industry leadership 
 Coefficient p-value Average fee premium 
(%) 
Average market share  
based on audit fees  
(%) 
Top-ranked 0.633 0.000 88.32 40 
Second-ranked 0.457 0.000 57.93 19 
Third-ranked 0.420 0.000 52.20 10 
Fourth-ranked 0.202 0.000 22.38 6 
Fifth-ranked 0.158 0.000 17.12 4 
Sixth-ranked 0.131 0.002 13.97 3 
     
Panel B: City industry leadership 
 Coefficient p-value Average fee premium 
(%) 
Average market share  
based on audit fees  
(%) 
Top-ranked 0.096 0.000 10.07 60 
Second-ranked 0.047 0.015 4.81 27 
Third-ranked 0.052 0.031 5.34 14 
 
Model 2 in Panel B of Table 7.3 below tests the effect of city-specific partner industry leadership on 
audit pricing, without controlling for the joint national and city partner industry leadership effect. The 
estimation of Model 2 follows the same iterative process, starting with the top-ranked partner at the 
city-industry level in the first estimation, and adding a second, third and fourth-ranked city-industry 
partner in the following estimations step by step. The results (not tabulated) indicate that only the top, 
second, and third-ranked partner have significant fee premiums relative to other Big 4 partners who 
are not city level industry leaders, but this is not so for the fourth-ranked partner. As shown in Panel B 
of Table 7.2 above, the fee premium for the top-ranked, second-ranked and third-ranked city-industry 
specialist partners averages at 10.07 percent, 4.81 percent, and 5.34 percent, respectively. An F-test 
indicates there is only a significant difference between the coefficients for the top-ranked and second-
ranked city-industry partners (F-statistic=4.56, p=0.033), whereas the coefficients for the second-
ranked and third-ranked city-industry partner are not significantly different (F-statistic=0.020, 
p=0.874). This finding seems to be consistent with the huge gap in market shares, based on audit fees, 
between the top-ranked and second-ranked city-industry partner at 60 percent and 27 percent, 
respectively. Thus, the results for Model 2 reported in Panel B of Table 7.3 below use a single auditor 
indicator variable coded 1 if the partner is ranked in the top three for city-level industry leadership 
(PARCITY#3) and tests the effect of partner city-specific leadership per se for N=400 observations in 
which the Big 4 auditor is the top three city-specific industry leader, and the default comparison group 
is the remaining 280 observations not audited by the city-specific partner who is not an industry 
leader. The coefficient value for PARCITY#3 is 0.072 and significant (p<0.01), which equates to an 
average audit fee premium of 7.46 percent for the top three partners. Note that the partner city-
industry leadership premium in Model 2 (7.46 percent) is less than the national leadership premium in 
Model 1 (31.26 percent). 
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Model 3 tests the pricing of national and city-specific audit partner industry leadership while 
controlling for the joint effect of the audit partner industry leadership at the national and city-industry 
level. The first auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 143 observations (21.03 percent of the sample) 
in which the partner is both the six top-ranked national leader and the top three city-industry leader; 
the second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 257 observations (37.79 percent of the sample) in 
which the partner is a top three city-industry leader but not a top six national leader, and the third 
auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 64 observations (9.41  percent of the sample) in which the 
partner is a top six national industry leader but not a top three city-industry leader. 
 
In other words, companies audited by partners who are national industry leaders (N=207) can be 
decomposed into those whose partners are joint national and city-specific industry leaders (N=143) 
and those audited by national leaders alone (N=64). Similarly, companies audited by partners who are 
city-specific industry leaders (N=400) can be decomposed into those audited by joint national and 
city-specific industry leaders (N=143) and city-specific industry leaders alone (N=257). The purpose 
of these three partitions is to test for the separate effects of partner national and city-specific industry 
leadership on audit pricing, as well as to isolate the joint effect of partner national and city-specific 
industry leadership on pricing. The default comparison group is the 216 observations (31.77 percent of 
the sample) in which the partner is neither a national nor a city industry leader. 
 
The results of Model 3 in Table 7.3 below show that the partner who is an industry leader at both the 
national and city-industry level, and also the partner leaders at the national level only, are able to 
extract fee premiums from their clients relative to other Big 4 partners who are non-leaders. The 
coefficient for PARJOINT_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 is 0.353 and is significant at p<0.01, which 
equates to an average fee premium of 42.33 percent. The coefficient for PARNAT#6_ONLY is 0.145 
and is significant at p<0.01, which represents a premium of 15.60 percent. An F-test indicates that 
there is a significant difference between the coefficients (F-statistic=41.49, p=0.000) for the joint 
national and city audit partner (PARJOINT_PARNAT#6-PARCITY3) and the national partner alone 
(PARNAT#6_ONLY). While all national leader partners are able to extract a fee premium (15.60 
percent), the fee premium is 26.73 percent higher for the city-industry partners who are also leaders at 
the national level (42.33 percent). This finding indicates that the fee premium for industry 
specialisation is driven by the partner industry leadership at the national level, as it represents an 
important condition for the fee premium to be charged.  This study is the first to represent such an 
empirical finding, considering the joint effect of the partner industry leadership at the national and city 
level. 
 
It is important to note that the magnitude of the fee premium reported for the partner in all of the 
models under the partner national-city framework analysis (Table 7.3) is larger when compared to the 
audit firm industry leadership premium under the firm national-city framework analysis (Table 7.1). 
This is because the fee premium for the audit firm who is an industry leader comprised of a portfolio 
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of clients audited by the audit firm within that particular industry, whereas, the fee premium of the 
partner is driven only by his/her individual clienteles. An audit firm (or a local practice office of an 
audit firm) could have more than one engagement partner administering the audits of the firm or 
office. While an audit firm could hold a leadership position in a particular industry either at the 
national or city level, not all of the partners residing within that audit firm (or local audit office) are 
industry leaders. Thus, not all audit engagements and audit reports of the clients of an industry leading 
audit firm (or an industry specialist audit office) are monitored and signed by an industry leading 
partner. For instance, Partner A and Partner B are both from PwC located in Birmingham. PwC, as an 
audit firm, is a city-industry leader in the manufacturing industry in Birmingham. However, Partner A 
has a higher market share of audit fees relative to partner B within that manufacturing industry. Thus, 
Partner A may be designated as the industry leader in Birmingham but not Partner B. Under the 
partner national-city framework analysis, the study only examines the existence and magnitude of fee 
premiums of the industry leading partners. Whereas, under the firm national-city framework, the study 
examined the existence and magnitude of fee premiums of the industry leading audit firms, where any 
fee premium or discount reported in the analysis represents the aggregate fee premium or discount of 
all the partners attached to the audit firm, either at the national or office level. 
 
For the corporate governance variables, the results reported in Panel B of Table 7.3 under the partner 
national-city framework are consistent with the ones reported earlier using the t firm joint national-city 
framework in Table 7.1. Only BODFOREIGN and ACMEET are significant at p<0.05, except for in 
Model 2, where ACMEET is insignificant. Other corporate governance variables (BODFEM, 
INTAUD, ACSIZE, ACINDP, ACFINEXP) are not significant at any conventional levels. 
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Table  7.3: Audit fee regression under partner national-city framework 
Panel A: Exclude corporate governance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  1.191 9.220 0.000 *** 0.546 4.630 0.000 *** 1.349 10.330 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.036 4.680 0.000 *** 0.040 4.610 0.000 *** 0.035 4.690 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.436 27.460 0.000 *** 0.505 33.030 0.000 *** 0.417 26.650 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.056 9.600 0.000 *** 0.066 10.510 0.000 *** 0.057 10.000 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.091 -1.770 0.038 ** -0.120 -2.200 0.014 ** -0.053 -1.030 0.153  
DE + -0.134 -1.980 0.025 ** -0.181 -2.500 0.007 *** -0.115 -1.700 0.045 ** 
FOREIGN + 0.124 5.100 0.000 *** 0.160 6.140 0.000 *** 0.112 4.790 0.000 ** 
QUICK - -0.010 -3.350 0.001 *** -0.009 -2.910 0.002 *** -0.011 -3.440 0.001 *** 
CATA + 0.091 1.860 0.032 ** 0.095 1.830 0.034 ** 0.097 2.040 0.021 ** 
OPINION + 0.049 1.080 0.140  0.079 1.550 0.061 * 0.051 1.120 0.132  
LONDON + 0.093 5.380 0.000 *** 0.102 5.350 0.000 *** 0.087 4.920 0.000 *** 
BUSY + 0.058 3.430 0.001 *** 0.066 3.560 0.000 *** 0.055 3.260 0.001 *** 
LOSS + 0.027 1.030 0.152  0.032 1.140 0.128  0.032 1.240 0.108  
INITIAL - -0.093 -3.730 0.000 *** -0.108 -3.880 0.000 *** -0.089 -3.610 0.000 *** 
INSOWN - 0.005 0.560 0.289  -0.002 -0.160 0.437  0.008 0.840 0.201  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARNAT #6 (n=207)  0.272 10.590 0.000 ***         
PARCITY#3 (n=400)      0.072 3.800 0.000 ***     
PARJOINT_ PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=143)          0.353 11.630 0.000 *** 
PARCITY#3_ONLY (n=257)         -0.013 -0.620 0.532  
PARNAT#6_ONLY (n=64)         0.155 4.840 0.000 *** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.897 0.879 0.903 
N  680 680 680 
Panel B: Include corporate governance 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  1.437 8.840 0.000 *** 0.816 5.280 0.000 *** 1.631 10.030 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.034 4.610 0.000 *** 0.037 4.540 0.000 *** 0.033 4.610 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.408 20.630 0.000 *** 0.474 24.480 0.000 *** 0.384 19.630 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.056 9.590 0.000 *** 0.066 10.680 0.000 *** 0.056 9.930 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.075 -1.420 0.078 * -0.111 -2.000 0.023 ** -0.039 -0.760 0.225  
DE + -0.078 -1.230 0.110  -0.114 -1.670 0.048 ** -0.061 -0.960 0.168  
FOREIGN + 0.107 4.570 0.000 *** 0.139 5.560 0.000 *** 0.092 4.060 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.011 -3.290 0.001 *** -0.009 -2.850 0.002 *** -0.011 -3.390 0.001 *** 
CATA + 0.127 2.680 0.004 *** 0.136 2.710 0.004 *** 0.129 2.800 0.003 *** 
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Table 7.3: Audit fee Regression under partner national-city framework (continued) 
Panel B: Include corporate governance (continued) 
Variables   +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
OPINION + 0.021 0.460 0.322  0.046 0.910 0.181  0.024 0.550 0.292  
LONDON + 0.071 4.070 0.000 *** 0.077 3.990 0.000 *** 0.066 3.730 0.000 *** 
BUSY + 0.045 2.610 0.005 *** 0.051 2.790 0.003 *** 0.039 2.330 0.010 ** 
LOSS + 0.020 0.730 0.232  0.023 0.810 0.210  0.025 0.950 0.172  
 
 
 
INITIAL - -0.086 -3.610 0.000 *** -0.098 -3.630 0.000 *** -0.079 -3.420 0.001 *** 
INSOWN - 0.008 0.870 0.194  0.002 0.230 0.408  0.012 1.250 0.106  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARNAT #6 (n=207)  0.263 10.330 0.000 ***         
PARCITY#3 (n=400)      0.072 3.840 0.000 ***     
PARJOINT_ PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=143)          0.353 11.280 0.000 *** 
PARCITY#3_ONLY (n=257)         -0.011 -0.530 0.594  
PARNAT#6_ONLY (n=64)         0.145 4.700 0.000 *** 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.012 -1.000 0.319  -0.008 -0.600 0.549  -0.013 -1.130 0.260  
BODFOREIGN  0.067 5.320 0.000 *** 0.080 5.790 0.000 *** 0.067 5.470 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.011 0.470 0.636  0.022 0.900 0.369  0.024 1.060 0.290  
ACSIZE  0.008 0.700 0.487  0.004 0.290 0.769  0.007 0.650 0.514  
ACINDP  0.011 0.650 0.515  0.015 0.860 0.389  0.004 0.240 0.810  
ACFINEXP  0.011 1.020 0.309  0.010 0.930 0.353  0.000 -0.040 0.968  
ACMEET  0.022 2.040 0.042 ** 0.015 1.270 0.206  0.028 2.670 0.008 *** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.903 0.887 0.909 
N  680 680 680 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year 
fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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7.2.3 Joint firm-partner national-city framework  
While the results in the audit firm and audit partner national and city framework analyses in the 
preceding two sections of this chapter provide evidence of premiums earned by the industry specialists 
either at the audit firm or the partner level, there is a possibility that those results are distorted due to 
omitted variable bias. For instance, Table 7.1 earlier indicates that there is a premium attributed to the 
audit firm industry leadership at the national and city-industry level. However, the models in Table 7.1 
did not control for the confounding effect of audit partner industry leadership in their analysis. The 
same can be applied to the results in Table 7.3, where the confounding effect of the audit firm industry 
leadership was not controlled for in the audit partner industry leadership analysis.  
 
Thus, there is a possibility that the reported premiums based on merely the audit firm industry 
leadership per se in Table 7.1 and audit partner industry leadership per se in Table 7.3, presented in the 
preceding sections of this chapter, may be overstated due to the confounding effect of failure to 
control for the effect of one another in the respective models. To correct for this effect, this study 
extends the analysis further, by adopting the joint firm-partner national-city industry framework. 
Again, as in the audit partner specialisation analysis in the preceding section, this study contributes to 
the auditor industry specialisation literature, as it is the first study that explores the effect of the joint 
firm-partner national-city framework in its analyses on audit pricing. The following paragraphs 
describe the analysis and the results when specifically the joint firm-partner national-city industry 
specialisation is taken into consideration. This joint firm-partner national-city framework represents 
another approach to testing whether within-office knowledge sharing exists. The following analysis 
combines both the effect of audit firm and audit partner industry leadership at the national and city 
industry level, and tests them simultaneously to determine which type of industry leadership is more 
important (audit firm versus. audit partner), and which yields the highest fee premium.  
 
The combinations of the firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework results in 
the creation of 15 new variables to be examined under the joint firm-partner national-city framework 
analysis. These variables are described in detail in Table 7.4 below. Given that the sample size for the 
joint firm-partner national-city framework is N=680, then the default comparison group is N=150, and 
is comprised of both audit firms and partners who are not leaders either at the national or at the city-
industry level. 
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Table  7.4: Definition of industry specialist auditor variables under the joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variable  N Variable definition 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 
 
76 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), and zero 
otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3  70 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3  2 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 28 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 16 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is in the 
top two ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 77 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 49 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 82 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
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nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#3), 
and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 12 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), and 
zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 51 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 5 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0  1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  10 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 50 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the first-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is in the top six ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is not in the top three ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise 
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Panel A in Table 7.5 presents the regression results before the inclusion of corporate governance 
variables, whereas in Panel B, the regression results are tabulated with the inclusion of the corporate 
governance variables to determine the effect of corporate governance function on the industry 
specialist premium
2
. Once they are controlled for in the model, the models explanatory power (R
2
) has 
increased from 90.7 percent to 91.3 percent, and there is a slight change in the fee premium for the 
industry specialist auditor, which indicates that corporate governance characteristics of a firm may 
explain a considerable portion of the auditor industry specialist premium and variation in audit fees. 
The significance of the results for the control variables and industry specialist auditor variables in 
Panel A and Panel B are qualitatively the same. The final results are interpreted below based on the 
outcomes in Panel B. Variables LNAF, LTA, SQRTSUBS, FOREIGN, QUICK, CATA, LONDON, 
BUSY and INITIAL are significant at conventional levels and in the expected direction, except for ROI, 
DE, OPINION, LOSS and INSOWN, which are insignificant. These findings are consistent with the 
ones reported earlier under the partner national-city framework (see Table 7.3).  
 
In respect of the variables of interest that capture various combinations of auditor industry 
specialisation measures, the coefficient for NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3, NAT#0-
CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3, NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3, NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0, NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0, and NAT#0-
CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 are positive and significant at p<0.01, suggesting evidence of fee 
premiums when the audit partner is an industry leader either at the national or city-industry level
17
. 
The fee premium is the highest when the both the firm and the partner are the industry leader at both 
the national and city level (coefficient for NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 = 0.438) and the 
lowest when the fee premium is driven by partner national industry leadership alone (coefficient for 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0=0.152) Thus, the average fee premium reported in Table 7.5 
ranges between 54.96 percent and 16.42 percent. Interestingly, when a partner is a joint national and 
city-industry leader,  a fee premium is still earned, despite working in an audit firm that is not a leader 
in the industry (coefficient for NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 = 0.347, p<0.01). Besides 
that, there is also evidence of fee premiums for firm joint national and city industry leadership, in the 
absence of partner industry leadership (coefficient for NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-
PARCITY#0=0.090, p<0.01), indicating that firm national industry leadership alone is also a sufficient 
condition to earn a fee premium. However, the fee premium is lower and averages at 9.42 percent. 
Despite the finding that differentiation in fee premium is mainly affected by the level of industry 
expertise possessed by the audit partner, and the fact that non-leading partners (NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0) within these leading firms are still able to charge a fee premium, 
suggest the existence of knowledge sharing and transfer of industry expertise between the partners 
within the Big 4 audit firms.  
 
                                                     
17 Although NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 and NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 are also positively 
significant at p<0.01, the number of observations (N=1) is too small to warrant a conclusion on these observations per se. 
Thus, the results are interpreted with caution.  
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Given that variable NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 is positive and significant at p<0.01, this 
indicates that partner reputation at the national level (PARNAT#6) matters the most in the U.K. audit 
market and it is a necessary condition for a fee premium above and beyond an audit firm industry 
leadership. In addition, all the insignificant variables (NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3, 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3, NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3, NAT#0-
CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3, NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0, NAT#0-
CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0) represent conditions where the partner is not a national industry 
leader, further emphasizing this conclusion.  This empirical finding supports earlier results in Table 
7.3 under the partner national-city framework which indicates that partner industry leadership alone 
(PARNAT#6_ONLY) is a sufficient condition to earn a fee premium.  
 
In a similar vein, a study in Australia by Goodwin and Wu (2014) reported evidence of premiums only 
for companies audited by partners who are industry leaders at the city level, suggesting that partner 
level expertise is the driver of the audit fee premium for industry expertise and that there is no auditor 
industry expertise fee premium at the audit office level when partner level expertise is controlled for. 
Their results are consistent when they control for either the first-ranked, top two or the top three 
ranked city partners. However, Goodwin and Wu (2014) do not control for the partner industry 
leadership at the national level in their analysis. Hence, their results could be biased due to failure to 
control for this confounding effect. This study takes a step further to solve this confounding effect 
issue prevalent in Goodwin and Wu (2014) and contributes to the auditor industry special6isation 
literature by introducing, for the first time, the joint firm-partner national-city framework analysis.  
 
Interestingly, under the joint firm-partner national-city framework analysis, in contrast to Goodwin 
and Wu (2014) findings, the results indicate that there is still evidence of fee premiums at the audit 
office when partner level expertise is controlled for, in conditions where the partner is also an industry 
leader at the national level. As shown in Table 7.5, the coefficients for NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-
PARCITY#3 and NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 are positively significant at p<0.01. 
 
Besides that, another study by Nagy (2014) has found evidence using U.S. data to suggest that auditor 
specialisation at both the partner and office levels are associated with a fee premium (43 percent) and 
that there is no significant difference between partner and office level specialisation effects in regards 
to fee premiums. However, the findings by Nagy (2014) in the U.S. do not apply in the U.K., as there 
is still evidence of fee premiums for clients of audit firms who are city-industry leaders, despite the 
engagements not being administered by city-partners who are industry leaders (as shown in Table 7.5, 
the coefficients for NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 and NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-
PARCITY#0 are positively significant at p<0.01).
18
  
 
                                                     
18 Although NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0  is also positively significant at p<0.01, the number of observations 
(N=1) is too small to warrant a conclusion on this observation per se. Thus, the results are interpreted with caution. 
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In addition, results in Table 7.5 also indicate that there is evidence of fee premiums when the partner 
is a city-industry leader, but who is not residing in an audit firm which is a city-specific industry 
leader (as shown in Table 7.5, the coefficients for NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 and 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 are positively significant at p<0.01). Finally, there is also 
evidence that a fee premium still exists when the clients are not audited by the Big 4 local office and 
the city-industry leading partner, as long as they are audited by a national leading audit firm in that 
industry (NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0).
19
  
 
For the corporate governance variables, the results reported in Table 7.5 below are similar from the 
one reported earlier, using the firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework in 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.3. BODFOREIGN and ACMEET remain positive and significant at p<0.01. 
However, BODFEM, INTAUD, ACSIZE, ACINDP and ACFINEXP are all insignificant at the 
conventional levels in this analysis, too. Overall, these findings suggest that foreign directorship on the 
companies’ boards and active audit committees contribute to higher audit quality, as demonstrated by 
the higher level of audit fees paid by these companies, indicating their demand for more extensive and 
expensive audits.  
 
7.3 Summary 
Overall, the results from the multivariate regressions in this chapter are consistent with the proposition 
of product differentiation theory for industry specialist auditor and reputation theory for corporate 
governance, which suggests that industry specialist auditors and effective corporate governance are 
associated with effective monitoring. They complement their monitoring function by contributing to a 
higher quality audit in terms of a more extensive audit effort, resulting in higher audit fees and a 
higher perceived audit quality. Audit partner industry leadership at the national level seems to drive 
the fee premium for auditor industry specialisation in the U.K. above and beyond the audit firm 
industry leadership. This supports the argument that industry expertise is uniquely attributable to the 
individual audit partner human capital in terms of their knowledge and experience from leading audit 
engagements in a particular industry.  
 
                                                     
19 There is also evidence of a fee premium when the clients are not audited by the Big 4 local office and the city-industry 
leading partner, as long as they are audited by a national leading partner in that industry (NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-
PARCITY#0). However, the number of observations (N=1) is too small to warrant a conclusion based on this observation per 
se. Thus, the result is interpreted with caution. 
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Table  7.5: Audit fee regression under a joint firm-partner national-city framework 
  Panel A: 
Exclude corporate governance 
Panel B: 
Include corporate governance 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  1.394 10.630 0.000 *** 1.682 10.570 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.036 4.750 0.000 *** 0.034 4.700 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.410 25.990 0.000 *** 0.375 19.330 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.057 9.780 0.000 *** 0.056 9.830 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.063 -1.230 0.110  -0.047 -0.910 0.182  
DE + -0.096 -1.430 0.077 * -0.046 -0.720 0.236  
FOREIGN + 0.113 4.860 0.000 *** 0.091 4.110 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.011 -3.750 0.000 *** -0.012 -3.800 0.000 *** 
CATA + 0.103 2.150 0.016 ** 0.138 3.000 0.002 *** 
OPINION + 0.043 0.900 0.186  0.019 0.400 0.345  
LONDON + 0.080 4.400 0.000 *** 0.062 3.400 0.001 *** 
BUSY + 0.054 3.210 0.001 *** 0.039 2.320 0.010 ** 
LOSS + 0.030 1.150 0.125  0.024 0.900 0.184  
INITIAL - -0.078 -3.140 0.001 *** -0.069 -2.900 0.002 *** 
INSOWN - 0.007 0.720 0.236  0.011 1.150 0.126  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=76)  0.428 10.410 0.000 *** 0.438 10.440 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=70)  0.024 0.740 0.459  0.020 0.650 0.518  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=2)  0.357 1.690 0.092 * 0.347 1.480 0.139  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=28)  -0.042 -1.000 0.316  -0.039 -0.860 0.389  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=16)  0.255 4.140 0.000 *** 0.275 4.700 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=77)  0.001 0.040 0.966  0.006 0.180 0.854  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=49)  0.352 9.660 0.000 *** 0.347 9.490 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=82)  -0.006 -0.210 0.830  0.005 0.180 0.854  
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=12)  0.235 4.570 0.000 *** 0.209 4.430 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=51)  0.084 2.810 0.005 *** 0.090 3.050 0.002 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=1)  0.597 13.750 0.000 *** 0.614 12.710 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=5)  0.044 0.700 0.483  0.058 0.940 0.346  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=1)  0.193 3.990 0.000 *** 0.252 4.800 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=10)  -0.049 -0.930 0.351  -0.059 -1.100 0.273  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=50)  0.158 4.330 0.000 *** 0.152 4.270 0.000 *** 
Corporate Governance     
BODFEM      -0.014 -1.220 0.224  
BODFOREIGN      0.066 5.310 0.000 *** 
INTAUD      0.025 1.080 0.279  
  
167 
Table 7.5: Audit fee regression under joint firm-partner national-city framework (continued)  
  Panel A: 
Exclude corporate governance 
Panel B: 
Include corporate governance 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
          
ACSIZE      0.005 0.480 0.632  
ACINDP      0.003 0.170 0.863  
ACFINEXP      -0.003 -0.260 0.793  
ACMEET      0.033 3.100 0.002 *** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included 
R2  0.907 0.913 
N  680 680 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year 
fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Despite the finding that differentiation in fee premiums is mainly affected by the level of industry 
expertise possessed by the audit partner, and the fact that non-leading partners within these leading 
firms are still able to charge a fee premium suggest the existence of knowledge sharing and transfer of 
industry expertise between the partners within the Big 4 audit firms. For the corporate governance 
variables in particular, the effect of the monitoring role of a foreign directorship and an active audit 
committee consistently outweighs the other effective characteristics of a board and audit committee 
across the analyses. There is no consistent evidence that female directorship, presence of internal audit 
function, and audit committee financial expertise are associated with higher or lower audit fees. 
Whereas, audit committee size and independence have never been significant in any analysis 
performed.  
 
The results of all the control variables are significant in the predicted directions and consistent with 
the prior studies, except for DE, LOSS, OPINION and INSOWN, which show inconsistent results or 
insignificant findings. Various sensitivity and robustness tests are performed in Chapter 8 to determine 
whether the results obtained from the main analyses discussed in this chapter continue to hold in 
various settings and across various model specifications. 
 
Table  7.6: Summary of findings from multivariate analysis for the first empirical study 
Hypotheses Findings 
H1 There is no significant relationship between  
female directors on boards and audit quality. 
Not significant. 
H3 There is no significant relationship between 
foreign directors on boards and audit quality. 
Significant positive relationship. 
H5 There is no significant relationship between the 
internal audit function and audit quality. 
Not significant. 
H7 There is no significant relationship between the 
size of audit committees and audit quality. 
Not significant. 
H9 There is no significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and audit quality. 
Not significant. 
H11 There is no significant relationship between audit 
committee financial expertise and audit quality. 
Not significant. 
H13 There is no relationship between audit committee 
diligence and audit quality. 
Significant positive relationship. 
H15 There is no significant relationship between 
auditor industry leadership and audit quality. 
Significant positive relationship. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FURTHER ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS: THE EFFECT 
OF INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AUDITORS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ON AUDIT QUALITY 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, several additional tests are performed to give reasonable assurance that the main 
findings presented in the last chapter are robust to the various model specifications. The robustness 
tests include different regression estimator, elimination of incompetitive audit market, alternative 
measures of auditor industry leadership, the effect of spatial competition, endogeneity, the effect of 
client size and various different definitions of corporate governance characteristics. All these are 
discussed in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.  
 
8.2 Alternative regression estimator  
This study uses panel data sets, which means typically observations on the same, or a substantially 
overlapping, set of firms are repeated over time (Gow et al., 2010), where cross sectional and time-
series dependence are present as the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time (Petersen, 
2009). While the OLS regression estimator with Huber White (1980) robust standard errors are 
consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity, it has been argued that its standard errors could be 
biased or produce mis-specified test statistics (either over or underestimating the true variability of the 
coefficient estimates) when either form of dependence is present (Gow et al., 2010, p.487). According 
to Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010), the use of OLS or White (1980) robust standard error fails to 
correct for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence in panel data, thus produces mis-specified 
test-statistics and invalid inferences about the relationship of the variables examined. In other words, 
audit quality of the companies could be correlated within a client over time, within a period across 
clients, or in both ways. 
 
The econometric literature shows that two-way cluster robust standard errors is robust to both time 
time-series and cross-sectional correlation (Thompson, 2006; Petersen, 2009), while at the same time, 
robust to heteroscedasticity (Petersen, 2009). Thus, a sensitivity analysis is performed in this section, 
where all the regressions performed in the last chapter are re-estimated using i) one-way cluster robust 
standard error, clustering for the firm dimension, and ii) two-way cluster robust standard error, 
clustering for both the firm and time dimensions. 
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As shown in the Table 8.1 below, the test results provide qualitatively similar findings as reported in 
the main regression analysis in the last chapter. Thus, it can be concluded that the main findings are 
not sensitive to alternative regression estimators.   
 
8.3 Eliminate the effect of monopoly pricing in the market of city-specific industries 
The sample screening process imposed earlier in the main analysis of the last chapter has stipulated a 
minimum of two observations (companies) per unique city-industry combination as to ensure that 
there is some level of competition in the audit market. This process has reduced the final sample used 
in the main analysis of the last chapter to N=892. However, a city-specific industry may still be 
uncompetitive if all the companies in that particular industry in that particular city are audited by the 
same auditor, as this indicates monopoly pricing by a single auditor. Hence, in order to eliminate such 
effect from the results, the dataset is reviewed again in order to make sure that all companies within 
the same city-specific industry are not audited by only one auditor. As a result, the review of the 
dataset has revealed 18 observations from 15 city-industry combinations that fall within this group. 
These 18 observations from 15 city-industry combinations are eliminated, which reduces the sample 
size to 874 observations. The analyses are rerun, and as shown in the Table 8.2 below, the results are 
qualitatively the same when re-estimated on this reduced sample. 
 
8.4 Continuous market share as a measure of industry leadership 
Next, the study tests whether the main results presented in the last chapter are robust to the use of 
continuous market share measures of auditor industry leadership. Results are presented in the Table 
8.3 below. When the audit fee regression is re-estimated using the firm national and city-specific 
industry variables based on continuous market shares (Firm national specialist and Firm city 
specialist) in Model 1, a significant premium is only reported at the national level (coefficient=0.084) 
at p<0.05, whereas the coefficient for Firm city specialist is insignificant at p=0.10. This shows that 
national level industry leadership of the audit firm is more important than office-level expertise in 
explaining fee premiums. On the other hand, when the audit fee regression is estimated using the audit 
partner national and city-specific variables based on continuous market shares (Partner national 
specialist and Partner city specialist ) in Model 2, only the Partner national specialist is significant at 
p<0.01 (coefficient=1.507), whereas the Partner city specialist is insignificant at p=0.10. This indicates 
that partner industry leadership at the national level is more important that city-specific leadership in 
explaining fee premiums. Finally, in Model 3, when the firm and partner industry leadership are 
combined together in one model (Firm national specialist, Firm city specialist, Partner national 
specialist and Partner city specialist) similar to the joint firm-partner industry leadership framework 
dummies used in the analysis of the last chapter, only the coefficient for firm national specialist is  
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Table  8.1: Audit fee fegression using different regression estimators 
  Panel A: One-way cluster robust standard error  Panel B: Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +
/
- 
coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Intercept  0.890 4.070 0.000*** 1.631 7.210 0.000*** 1.682 7.670 0.000***  0.890 4.240 0.000*** 1.610 8.330 0.000*** 1.662 8.380 0.000*** 
LNAF + 0.037 4.270 0.000*** 0.033 3.710 0.000*** 0.034 3.910 0.000***  0.037 4.340 0.000*** 0.033 3.860 0.000*** 0.034 4.410 0.000*** 
LTA + 0.473 17.030 0.000*** 0.384 13.780 0.000*** 0.375 13.870 0.000***  0.473 16.720 0.000*** 0.384 16.200 0.000*** 0.375 14.940 0.000*** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.058 7.310 0.000*** 0.056 7.310 0.000*** 0.056 7.560 0.000***  0.058 5.680 0.000*** 0.056 8.510 0.000*** 0.056 8.290 0.000*** 
ROI - -0.115 -2.200 0.014** -0.039 -0.670 0.252 -0.047 -0.810 0.209  -0.115 -2.070 0.020** -0.039 -0.580 0.281 -0.047 -0.780 0.217 
DE + -0.084 -0.880 0.190 -0.061 -0.680 0.247 -0.046 -0.520 0.301  -0.084 -1.020 0.155 -0.061 -0.890 0.187 -0.046 -0.670 0.253 
FOREIGN + 0.137 4.060 0.000*** 0.092 3.050 0.002*** 0.091 3.140 0.001***  0.137 4.020 0.000*** 0.092 3.350 0.001*** 0.091 3.350 0.001*** 
QUICK - -0.010 -3.310 0.001*** -0.011 -3.110 0.001*** -0.012 -3.460 0.001***  -0.010 -3.130 0.001*** -0.011 -2.470 0.007*** -0.012 -2.690 0.004*** 
CATA + 0.162 2.190 0.015** 0.129 1.930 0.027** 0.138 2.100 0.019**  0.162 2.590 0.005*** 0.129 2.250 0.013** 0.138 2.390 0.009*** 
OPINION + 0.048 0.880 0.190 0.024 0.500 0.309 0.019 0.370 0.358  0.048 1.120 0.132 0.024 0.430 0.333 0.019 0.320 0.373 
LONDON + 0.058 2.030 0.022** 0.066 2.520 0.006*** 0.062 2.350 0.010**  0.058 2.330 0.010** 0.066 3.280 0.001*** 0.062 2.910 0.002*** 
BUSY + 0.065 2.340 0.010** 0.039 1.630 0.053* 0.039 1.660 0.049**  0.065 2.250 0.013** 0.039 2.230 0.013** 0.039 2.240 0.013** 
LOSS + 0.006 0.200 0.422 0.025 0.890 0.187 0.024 0.860 0.195  0.006 0.150 0.439 0.025 0.590 0.277 0.024 0.550 0.290 
INITIAL - -0.077 -2.930 0.002*** -0.079 -3.250 0.001*** -0.069 -2.820 0.003***  -0.077 -3.290 0.001*** -0.079 -3.090 0.001*** -0.069 -2.760 0.003*** 
INSOWN + -0.003 -0.230 0.408 0.012 0.940 0.174 0.011 0.880 0.191  -0.003 -0.270 0.393 0.012 1.190 0.117 0.011 1.110 0.135 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national-city framework 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1  (n=278)  0.068 2.430 0.016**        0.068 2.370 0.018**     
CITY#1 _ONLY (n=132)  -0.002 -0.050 0.961        -0.002 -0.060 0.949     
NAT#1_ONLY (n=44)  0.008 0.170 0.867        0.008 0.260 0.792     
Partner national-city framework           
PARJOINT_PARNAT#6-PARCITY# (n=143)     0.353 8.720 0.000***        0.353 12.830 0.000***  
PARCITY#3_ONLY (n=257)     -0.011 -0.380 0.707        -0.011 -0.530 0.599  
PARNAT#6_ONLY (n=64)     0.145 3.690 0.000***        0.145 4.500 0.000***  
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=76)        0.438 8.030 0.000***        0.438 0.000**
* 
0.000**
* NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=70)        0.020 0.460 0.646        0.020 0.611 0.611 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=2)        0.347 1.520 0.129        0.347 . . 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=28)        -0.039 -0.750 0.456        -0.039 0.363 0.363 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=16)        0.275 4.130 0.000***        0.275 0.000**
* 
0.000**
* NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=77)        0.006 0.130 0.893        0.006 0.854 0.854 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 (n=49)        0.347 7.320 0.000***        0.347 0.000**
* 
0.000**
* NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3 (n=82)        0.005 0.140 0.886        0.005 0.820 0.820 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=12)        0.209 3.240 0.001***        0.209 0.000**
* 
0.000**
* NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=51)        0.090 2.300 0.022**        0.090 0.006 0.006**
* NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=1)        0.614 9.600 0.000***        0.614 0.000**
* 
0.000**
* NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=5)        0.058 0.840 0.403        0.058 0.130 0.130 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=1)        0.252 3.510 0.001***        0.252 0.000**
* 
0.000**
* NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=10)        -0.059 -1.060 0.288        -0.059 0.003**
* 
0.003**
* NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0 (n=50)        0.152 3.430 0.001***        0.152 0.000**
* 
0.000**
*   
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Table 8.1: Audit fee regression using different regression estimators (continued)          
  Panel A: One-way cluster robust standard error  Panel B: Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +
/
- 
coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Corporate Governance                     
BODFEM  -0.010 -0.640 0.522 -0.011 -0.670 0.427 -0.014 -0.860 0.391  -0.010 -0.810 0.420 -0.013 -0.930 0.354 -0.014 0.308 0.308 
BODFOREIGN  0.081 4.610 0.000 0.081 4.640 0.000*** 0.066 4.280 0.000  0.081 5.280 0.000 0.067 6.040 0.000*** 0.066 0.000 0.000**
* INTAUD  0.035 1.030 0.305 0.037 1.090 0.430 0.025 0.810 0.418  0.035 1.100 0.270 0.024 0.950 0.343 0.025 0.303 0.303 
ACSIZE  -0.004 -0.270 0.784 -0.004 -0.240 0.614 0.005 0.380 0.706  -0.004 -0.290 0.774 0.007 0.550 0.580 0.005 0.725 0.725 
ACINDP  0.010 0.600 0.549 0.009 0.560 0.830 0.003 0.160 0.876  0.010 0.960 0.340 0.004 0.310 0.760 0.003 0.823 0.823 
ACFINEXP  0.014 1.050 0.297 0.013 0.970 0.974 -0.003 -0.220 0.826  0.014 1.250 0.211 0.000 -0.030 0.972 -0.003 0.802 0.802 
ACMEET  0.019 1.360 0.176 0.020 1.410 0.024** 0.033 2.620 0.009  0.019 1.270 0.204 0.028 2.410 0.016** 0.033 0.003 0.003**
* Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Cluster by Year  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.881 0.909 0.913  0.881 0.909 0.913 
N  892 680 680  892 680 680 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition 
of variables. 
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Table  8.2: Audit fee regression after eliminating incompetitive audit markets 
  Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framework Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.888 6.000 0.000 *** 1.638 9.840 0.000 *** 1.698 7.590 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.037 5.590 0.000 *** 0.033 4.570 0.000 *** 0.034 3.910 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.474 25.300 0.000 *** 0.384 19.150 0.000 *** 0.374 13.540 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.058 10.590 0.000 *** 0.056 9.800 0.000 *** 0.056 7.470 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.109 -2.350 0.010 ** -0.031 -0.590 0.278  -0.036 -0.610 0.271  
DE + -0.071 -1.180 0.119  -0.048 -0.740 0.229  -0.031 -0.360 0.361  
FOREIGN + 0.134 6.080 0.000 *** 0.088 3.830 0.000 *** 0.088 2.990 0.002 *** 
QUICK - -0.010 -3.990 0.000 *** -0.011 -3.310 0.001 *** -0.011 -3.330 0.001 *** 
CATA + 0.169 3.700 0.000 ** 0.127 2.690 0.004 ** 0.132 1.950 0.026 ** 
OPINION + 0.054 1.130 0.130  0.028 0.620 0.266  0.021 0.410 0.340  
LONDON + 0.062 3.650 0.000 ** 0.073 4.070 0.000 *** 0.070 2.680 0.004 *** 
BUSY + 0.064 3.840 0.000 *** 0.039 2.270 0.012 * 0.038 1.600 0.055 * 
LOSS + -0.001 -0.040 0.486  0.022 0.820 0.205  0.020 0.710 0.239  
INITIAL - -0.080 -3.340 0.001 *** -0.084 -3.500 0.000 *** -0.073 -2.920 0.002 *** 
INSOWN - -0.003 -0.370 0.357  0.014 1.400 0.082  0.013 0.970 0.166  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national-city framework    
JOINT_NAT#1- CITY#1    0.068 3.830 0.000 ***         
CITY#1_ONLY   0.000 -0.020 0.984          
NAT#1_ONLY   0.008 0.210 0.833          
Partner national-city framework    
PARJOINT_PARNAT#6 -PARCITY#3        0.353 11.250 0.000 ***     
PARCITY#3_ONLY       -0.010 -0.470 0.318      
PARNAT#6_ONLY       0.147 4.730 0.000 ***     
Joint firm-partner national-city framework  
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3           0.439 8.070 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3           0.029 0.660 0.508  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3           0.357 1.580 0.116  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3           -0.037 -0.710 0.477 ** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3           0.284 4.220 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3           0.007 0.170 0.864  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3           0.348 7.360 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3           0.008 0.230 0.820 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0           0.213 3.300 0.001 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0           0.088 2.260 0.025 ** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0           0.621 9.590 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0           0.059 0.860 0.390  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0           0.265 3.650 0.000 ** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0           -0.031 -0.530 0.599  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0           0.154 3.460 0.001 *** 
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Table 8.2: Audit Fee Regression after eliminating incompetitive audit markets 
(continued) 
  
  Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framework Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.008 -0.700 0.487  -0.011 -0.890 0.186  -0.011 -0.670 0.505  
BODFOREIGN  0.081 6.550 0.000 *** 0.066 5.340 0.000 *** 0.065 4.190 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.030 1.260 0.207  0.020 0.890 0.188  0.021 0.690 0.493  
ACSIZE  -0.008 -0.700 0.484  0.004 0.360 0.361  0.002 0.130 0.893  
ACINDP  0.009 0.550 0.581  0.002 0.110 0.457  0.000 0.020 0.988  
ACFINEXP  0.015 1.570 0.118  0.002 0.210 0.418  0.000 0.040 0.969  
ACMEET  0.020 1.790 0.074 * 0.030 2.770 0.003 ** 0.034 2.670 0.008 ** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
R2  0.881 0.909 0.913 
N  874 664 664 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-
statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
. 
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Table  8.3: Audit fee regression using continuous market share for industry specialist auditor 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed.  Industry fixed-effects 
and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.858 5.870 0.000 *** 1.759 11.060 0.000 *** 1.763 11.140 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.037 5.610 0.000 *** 0.028 4.110 0.000 *** 0.029 4.150 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.476 25.710 0.000 *** 0.367 19.090 0.000 *** 0.365 18.910 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.058 10.820 0.000 *** 0.060 11.160 0.000 *** 0.060 11.180 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.108 -2.390 0.009 *** -0.023 -0.460 0.322  -0.020 -0.400 0.344  
DE + -0.095 -1.580 0.057 * 0.005 0.090 0.466  0.005 0.080 0.467  
FOREIGN + 0.141 6.490 0.000 *** 0.117 5.340 0.000 *** 0.117 5.390 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.010 -3.850 0.000 *** -0.010 -3.090 0.001 *** -0.010 -3.120 0.001 *** 
CATA + 0.157 3.510 0.000 *** 0.129 2.910 0.002 *** 0.130 2.920 0.002 *** 
OPINION + 0.053 1.130 0.129  0.010 0.230 0.410  0.011 0.240 0.407  
LONDON + 0.059 3.500 0.000 *** 0.049 2.880 0.002 *** 0.049 2.870 0.002 *** 
BUSY + 0.066 3.930 0.000 *** 0.039 2.280 0.012 ** 0.039 2.280 0.012 ** 
LOSS + 0.006 0.230 0.408  0.012 0.470 0.321  0.012 0.480 0.317  
INITIAL - -0.077 -3.310 0.001 *** -0.068 -2.820 0.003 *** -0.067 -2.750 0.003 *** 
INSOWN + -0.004 -0.390 0.349  0.018 1.920 0.028 ** 0.017 1.830 0.034 ** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national specialist   0.084 2.190 0.029 **     0.000 0.000 0.997  
Firm city    0.028 0.860 0.392      0.026 0.610 0.544  
Partner national specialist        1.507 10.700 0.000 *** 1.505 10.700 0.000 *** 
Partner city specialist        -0.033 -1.020 0.308  -0.052 -1.290 0.197  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.012 -1.070 0.287  -0.022 -1.970 0.049 ** -0.022 -1.990 0.047 ** 
BODFOREIGN  0.082 6.730 0.000 *** 0.057 4.790 0.000 *** 0.058 4.880 0.000 *** 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
INTAUD  0.035 1.470 0.141  0.073 3.250 0.001 *** 0.074 3.260 0.001 *** 
ACSIZE  -0.002 -0.200 0.845  0.009 0.860 0.389  0.009 0.870 0.383  
ACINDP  0.014 0.920 0.359  0.012 0.780 0.435  0.013 0.790 0.427  
ACFINEXP  0.013 1.380 0.167  -0.006 -0.580 0.560  -0.006 -0.620 0.535  
ACMEET  0.018 1.680 0.093 * 0.021 1.990 0.047 ** 0.021 1.970 0.049 ** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.881 0.912 0.912 
N  680 680 680 
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significant (coefficient=1.505, p<0.01). Altogether, these results suggest that partner reputation at the 
national level matters the most in the U.K. audit market and is a necessary condition for a fee premium 
above and beyond audit firm industry leadership and partner industry leadership at the city-specific 
level. These results are also consistent with the findings reported in Table 7.5 on the joint firm-partner 
national-city framework analysis in the last chapter. 
 
8.5 Alternative definitions of auditor industry leadership at audit firm level 
The study further tests whether the main results presented in the last chapter are robust across different 
definitions of auditor industry leadership found in prior studies; two alternative definitions are adopted 
and tested in this section: 1) there is at least a 10 percentage points greater market share between the 
top-ranked and second-ranked industry leader in a national (or, city-specific) audit market, and 2) the 
cut-off approach introduced by Neal and Riley (2004) in determining national (or, city-specific) 
industry leadership. The 10 percentage cut-off point for determining national industry leadership is 
introduced by Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), as to ensure that there is an adequate market dominance or 
sufficiently larger market share for the top-ranked industry leader relative to the second-ranked  
industry leader in a particular industry at the national or city-level. Nevertheless, the use of such 
definition restricts the number of designated industry leaders as there might be circumstances where 
the auditor have the largest market share at the national (city) level but it is only less than 10 percent 
lead over its nearest competitor (Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). Based on this 
definition, this study’s dataset reveals that there are on average three industries per year where there 
are no designated national industry specialist and 10 city-industry combinations where there are no 
clear city-specific industry leaders when the 10 percent cut-off is imposed.  This result lowers the 
number of companies audited by an industry specialist at the national and city-specific level. There are 
N=280 companies with auditors that are national industry leaders that can be decomposed into 
companies audited by national leaders alone (N=60), plus those whose auditors are joint national and 
city-specific industry leaders (N=220). Similarly, companies with auditors that are city-specific 
industry leaders (N=362) can be decomposed into those audited by city-specific industry leaders alone 
(N=142), plus those auditors that are jointly national and city-specific industry leaders (N=220). 
 
Next, following Neal and Riley (2004), the minimum market share for industry leader is defined as 1.2 
times the inverse of the number of Big N auditors (1.2 x 1/4) which is 30 percent. In order to apply 
Neal and Riley’s formula to the city-specific level, this study follows the approach used in Reichelt 
and Wang (2010) which applies the average number of auditors per city-industry combination, rather 
than the number of Big N auditors. This is because there are fewer auditors in a city-industry 
combination and non-Big N firms can also be specialists at the city level. On average, the study’s 
dataset reveals that there are 2.5 auditors per city industry market, which computes to 48 percent (1.2 
X 1/2.5), or approximately 50 percent. Thus, national (city) industry specialist is designated to the 
audit firms where the auditor has a market share greater than 30 percent (50 percent) in a particular 
industry, within a particular year and city. As this approach requires a minimum 30 percent market 
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share for national industry specialists, this allows for multiple national industry firms to be ranked as 
specialists. 
 
Table  8.4: Audit fee regression using different market shares cut-off for audit firm industry 
specialisation 
  Panel A Panel B 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.914 6.300 0.000 *** 0.870 5.970 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.037 5.740 0.000 *** 0.037 5.640 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.472 25.460 0.000 *** 0.477 25.830 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.059 11.020 0.000 *** 0.058 10.820 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.109 -2.370 0.009 *** -0.111 -2.430 0.008 *** 
DE + -0.080 -1.350 0.088 * -0.083 -1.390 0.083 * 
FOREIGN + 0.131 5.980 0.000 *** 0.138 6.350 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.011 -4.240 0.000 *** -0.010 -4.010 0.000 *** 
CATA + 0.169 3.770 0.000 *** 0.166 3.690 0.000 *** 
OPINION + 0.049 1.050 0.147  0.051 1.100 0.136  
LONDON + 0.051 3.050 0.001 *** 0.055 3.300 0.001 *** 
BUSY + 0.066 3.990 0.000 *** 0.066 3.940 0.000 *** 
LOSS + 0.008 0.310 0.378  0.007 0.270 0.393  
INITIAL - -0.077 -3.320 0.001 *** -0.079 -3.420 0.001 *** 
INSOWN - -0.002 -0.250 0.400  -0.003 -0.350 0.364  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
10% market share difference          
JOINT (n=220)  0.075 4.050 0.000 **     
CITY (N=142)  -0.015 -0.640 0.260      
NAT (N=60)  -0.036 -1.260 0.104      
30% market share cut-off          
JOINT (n=280)      0.050 2.760 0.003 *** 
CITY (N=160)      -0.021 -0.790 0.215  
NAT (N=75)      0.016 0.670 0.253  
Corporate Governance     
BODFEM  -0.010 -0.920 0.180  -0.012 -1.050 0.146  
BODFOREIGN  0.082 6.760 0.000 *** 0.081 6.520 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.033 1.410 0.079 * 0.033 1.430 0.077 * 
ACSIZE  -0.004 -0.330 0.371  -0.003 -0.240 0.405  
ACINDP  0.008 0.500 0.309  0.012 0.800 0.212  
ACFINEXP  0.013 1.410 0.080 * 0.014 1.440 0.075 * 
ACMEET  0.017 1.520 0.064 * 0.018 1.650 0.050 * 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included 
R2  0.882 0.881 
N  680 680 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist 
auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed.  Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for 
brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
 
On the other hand, it reduces the number of city-specialist only for those with market share exceeding 
50 percent, and this is often the case that there is an absence of industry specialists in larger cities such 
as London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds as there are normally more Big 4 firms competing in 
those markets.  For the four year period from 2008 to 2011 in this study, on average, there are five 
industries with two national industry specialists (16 percent) and on average, 12 city-industry 
combinations where there is no single city-specialist which exceeds the 50 percent cut-off market 
share. Thus, under this definition, there are more companies audited by national industry leaders 
(N=440), that can be decomposed into those audited by national leaders alone (N=75), plus those 
whose auditors are joint national and city-specific industry leaders (N=280). However, there is a 
decrease in the number of companies with auditors that are city-specific industry leaders (N=355) that 
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can be decomposed into those audited by city-specific industry leaders alone (N=160), plus those 
auditors that are jointly national and city-specific industry leaders (N=280). 
 
Results for the 10 percent market share cut-off measure following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) is 
presented in Panel A of the Table 8.4, whereas results for the cut-off measures following Neal and 
Riley (2004) are presented in the Panel B. Both results in Panel A and Panel B are comparable, and 
qualitatively the same from the ones reported in our main analysis in Panel B of Table 7.1 in the last 
chapter, suggesting the findings for the audit firm industry specialisation is robust to alternative 
market share cut-offs for determining an industry specialist.  
 
8.6 Effect of spatial competition on fee premium of the audit firms industry specialists 
Using the spatial competition theory, Numan and Willekens (2012) argue the market distance between 
the industry specialist audit firm and its closest competitor within a city-industry audit market affects 
the ability of the auditor to charge a fee premium. This assertion is based on the argument that the 
smaller (larger) is the market share distance between the industry specialist audit firm and its closest 
competitor within the city-industry audit market, then the higher (lower) would be the pressure on the 
audit fees, as higher degree of differentiation gives an auditor market power over its clients. Their 
study using the U.S. audit market has reported that market share-based measures of industry 
specialisation pick up both auditor–client alignment effects (market power through specialised 
knowledge) as well as market share distance effects (market power through differentiation from the 
closest competitor). 
 
Following Numan and Willekens (2012), this study tests for the spatial competition effect on the fee 
premium earned by the industry specialist auditor. Since the results of the Model 3 in Table 7.1 
indicates that only the audit firm which is a joint national and city industry leader is able to command 
a fee premium, but not the city industry leader alone or the national industry leader alone, then 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 will be the variable of interest, which is the experimental variable in this 
analysis, while CITY#1_ONLY and NAT#1_ONLY will be listed alongside as control variables. The 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 represents the auditor alignment with the client’s industry in the application of 
the spatial competition theory. This is because when the auditor invests a huge amount of resources in 
a particular industry, and hence acquires a large market share and leadership position in that particular 
industry, it is actually pursuing a differentiation strategy in order to meet client’s demand for higher 
audit quality by offering its industry expertise. Thus, positive relationship is expected between 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 and audit fees. 
 
Further, another experimental variable DISTANCE_COMP is also included in the model to measure 
the extent to which the industry specialist audit firm (JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1) is differentiated or 
distanced from its closest competitor, based on the city-industry market share. The 
DISTANCE_COMP variable could also be interpreted as the differentiation gap between the 
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incumbent auditor and its closest competitor. While this gap is, on average, larger for leaders, it is not 
equal for all leaders. Hence some leaders will be more differentiated than others and this may be 
associated with higher fee premiums.  Since a higher degree of differentiation or distance compared to 
the closest competitor gives an auditor higher market power, the current study expects a positive effect 
of DISTANCE_COMP on fees beyond the leader (JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1) effect. 
 
Following Degryse and Ongena (2005) and Numan and Willekens (2012), the Herfindahl 
concentration index per audit market (HERFINDEX) is introduced as an additional control variable in 
the model, to control for potential market power effects due to supplier concentration. The 
HERFINDEX captures alternative explanations for competition between audit offices. Prior studies 
report significant effects of the Herfindahl index on audit fees (for example, Pearson and Trompeter, 
1994; Numan and Willekens, 2012). In the empirical analysis, DISTANCE_COMP and HERFINDEX 
are specified at the city-industry level, based on the assumption that clients consider geographically 
proximate audit offices as potential auditor candidates and local audit offices compete to attract 
clients, which is consistent with the spatial competition theory. In addition, this choice is motivated by 
recent literature that shows that industry specialisation is audit-office specific (i.e., Francis et al., 
2005; Basioudis and Francis, 2007). 
 
In order to test for the effect of the spatial competition on the fee premium charged by the audit firms 
industry specialists in the U.K., a further 122 observations from the full sample under the firm 
national-city framework (N=892) has been dropped to exclude monopolistic markets where the 
DISTANCE_COMP or the HERFINDEX equals to 1. The final sample is 770 companies in this 
analysis. 
 
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 8.5 below.  Three regression models are reported in 
the Table 8.5 below. Model 1 is testing only for the effect of auditor–client alignment (JOINT_NAT#1-
CITY#1); Model 2 is testing for the effects of both auditor–client alignment (JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1) 
and the distance of specialist to the closest competitor (DISTANCE_COMP); and finally, Model 3 is 
testing the interaction between the distance of specialist to the closest competitor and the auditor–
client alignment (DISTANCE_COMP x JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1), thus taking into account the 
interdependence of these measures. 
 
All regression models in Table 8.5 are significant (p<0. 01), with an R
2
 of around 88 percent. 
Consistent with prior audit fee literature, in Model 1, the coefficient for JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 is 
positive (coefficient=0.090) and significant at p<0.01, suggesting that the auditor–client alignment 
positively affects the audit fees that auditors can charge. When DISTANCE_COMP enters the analysis 
in Model 2, the coefficient of JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1, although significant (p<0.10), dropped to 
0.059, while the coefficient for the DISTANCE_COMP is 0.148 and significant at p<0.01. 
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These results indicate that an industry specialist auditor in the U.K. in the period 2008-2011 derives 
the fee premium not only from developing specialised knowledge about a client’s industry per se, but 
also from differentiating or distancing itself from its closest competitor. Given that the coefficient for 
the DISTANCE_COMP is 0.089 larger than coefficient for the JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 (the difference 
between the coefficients of the two variables separately is 0.148 and 0.059 resepctively, as shown in 
Model 2 of the table below), this finding also indicate that the distance in the city-industry market 
share between the audit firm industry specialist with its closest competitor (DISTANCE_COMP) has a 
positive effect on audit fees beyond the audit firm industry leadership at both the national and city 
level (JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1).  
 
Turning to Model 3 in Table 8.5 below, the results show that the interaction term DISTANCE_COMP 
x JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 is not significant at any conventional level, whereas the main effects of  
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 and DISTANCE_COMP are individually significant (coefficient =0.058, 
p<0.10 and coefficient =0.150, p<0.10, respectively) and in the predicted direction. The finding in 
Model 3 suggests that there is no interdependency between auditor-client alignment and distance to 
the closest competitor in influencing the level of audit fees. Nevertheless, given that both variables, 
JOINT _NAT#1-CITY#1 and DISTANCE_COMP are positive and significant, it can be concluded that 
the audit firm’s position as a joint national and city industry leader in the U.K. already gives it a 
sufficient market power to extract a fee premium, without being pressurised by the distance of its 
closest competitor. This is because there is a distinct fee premium attached either to the audit firm 
joint national and city industry leader or to its distance with the closest competitor. This U.K. finding 
therefore indicates that the fee premium earned by the firm joint national and city industry leadership 
reported in Chapter 7 earlier is not merely due to successful differentiation strategy, but also partly 
driven by the fee pressure from its closest competitor in the city-industry audit market. Similar finding 
was reported by Marleen and Willekens (2012) using U.S. data during the period 2005 to 2006. Except 
in Model 1, the HERFINDEX is negatively associated to audit fees (p<0.01), which may suggest that 
audit fees are lower in more concentrated market segments as competition is more intense. This is 
consistent with the theoretical arguments put forward by Stiglitz (1987) using a customer search 
model demonstrating that concentrated markets can be more competitive than atomistic markets, as it 
may be less costly for customers to search for all available prices when there are few suppliers. 
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Table  8.5: Audit fee regression on the effect of competitive pressure on fee premium of industry specialist under the firm national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.981 6.460 0.004 *** 1.082 5.780 0.005 *** 1.082 5.790 0.005 *** 
HERFINDEX  -0.054 -1.510 0.228  -0.219 -8.830 0.003 *** -0.217 -9.680 0.001 *** 
LNAF + 0.037 5.440 0.006 *** 0.037 5.490 0.006 *** 0.037 5.490 0.006 *** 
LTA + 0.467 22.730 0.000 *** 0.464 22.310 0.000 *** 0.464 22.270 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.055 10.320 0.001 *** 0.054 9.850 0.001 *** 0.054 9.790 0.001 *** 
ROI - -0.111 -8.100 0.002 *** -0.106 -5.160 0.007 *** -0.106 -5.110 0.007 *** 
DE + -0.078 -0.710 0.264  -0.096 -0.920 0.212  -0.097 -0.930 0.211  
FOREIGN + 0.138 5.420 0.006 *** 0.136 5.340 0.007 *** 0.136 5.330 0.007 *** 
QUICK - -0.009 -2.760 0.035 ** -0.009 -2.730 0.036 ** -0.009 -2.750 0.036 ** 
CATA + 0.194 3.420 0.021 ** 0.189 3.110 0.027 ** 0.189 3.080 0.027 ** 
OPINION + 0.007 0.140 0.449  -0.002 -0.040 0.487  -0.001 -0.030 0.490  
LONDON + 0.056 1.980 0.072 * 0.056 2.060 0.066 * 0.056 2.060 0.066 * 
BUSY + 0.064 1.890 0.078 * 0.066 2.000 0.070 * 0.066 1.980 0.071 * 
LOSS + 0.012 0.330 0.381  0.009 0.270 0.404  0.010 0.270 0.403  
INITIAL - -0.071 -2.480 0.045 ** -0.070 -2.310 0.052 * -0.070 -2.250 0.055 * 
INSOWN - -0.012 -1.180 0.162  -0.012 -1.160 0.164  -0.012 -1.160 0.164  
CITY#1_ONLY  0.000 0.000 1.000  -0.022 -0.530 0.631  -0.023 -0.540 0.315  
NAT#1_ONLY  0.008 0.290 0.788  -0.004 -0.120 0.913  0.002 0.050 0.481  
Experimental variables: 
JOINT _NAT#1-CITY#1 + 0.090 6.110 0.009 *** 0.059 2.660 0.077 * 0.058 2.700 0.074 * 
DISTANCE_COMP +     0.148 2.440 0.092 * 0.150 2.470 0.090 * 
DISTANCE x JOINT _NAT#1-CITY#1 +         -0.029 -0.430 0.698  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.014 -2.250 0.110  -0.013 -2.230 0.112  -0.013 -2.290 0.106  
BODFOREIGN  0.085 6.270 0.008 *** 0.087 5.540 0.012 ** 0.087 5.550 0.012 ** 
INTAUD  0.045 1.600 0.208  0.041 1.660 0.195  0.041 1.670 0.193  
ACSIZE  -0.010 -0.430 0.697  -0.008 -0.370 0.738  -0.008 -0.360 0.740  
ACINDP  0.011 0.320 0.767  0.011 0.340 0.756  0.011 0.340 0.754  
ACFINEXP  0.022 3.530 0.039 * 0.021 3.450 0.041 * 0.021 3.450 0.041 ** 
ACMEET  0.019 1.460 0.241  0.019 1.340 0.274  0.019 1.320 0.279  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R
2
  0.880 0.881 0.881 
N  770 770 770 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables, the experimental variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-
tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and possible correlation within an audit firm cluster, following the methodology of Rogers (1993). 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Taken together, the results in Table 8.5 above indicate that local audit offices do compete on audit fees 
but that they can soften this competition, and hence earn a fee premium, by specialising in certain 
industries, particularly industries that are distant from the industry expertise of competitors. 
Competition in the audit market is thus in line with spatial competition in a Hotelling-type model. 
Although prior studies document that, ceteris paribus, industry specialist auditors are able to charge 
higher audit fees, it seems that market share-based measures of industry specialisation pick up both 
auditor–client alignment effects (market power through specialised knowledge) as well as market 
share distance effects (market power through differentiation from the closest competitor). 
 
8.7 Endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
Prior literature suggests that there is a significant relationship between auditing services and non-audit 
services when both are jointly provided by the same auditor (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986). There 
are two sets of arguments here that non-audit fees may affect audit fees or vice versa. The first 
argument relates to knowledge spillovers from the joint provision of audits and non-audit services 
could lead to economic rents by the auditors (Simunic, 1984). This suggests that it should be expected 
that there would be a positive relationship between audit and non-audit services fees.  
 
The second argument is that there is a possibility that auditing services may be used as a “loss-leader” 
in order to gain a higher profit margin on non-audit services fees (Hillson and Kennelley, 1988: 33). In 
other words, the auditor discounts auditing services in order to hold on to the lucrative fees of non-
audit services, which in turn suggests that there will be a negative relationship between audit and non-
audit services fees. Evidence from prior literature also suggests that board of director and audit 
committee characteristics may influence an auditors’ risk assessment and audit planning, which in turn 
affects the audit pricing (Tsui et al., 2001; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009).  
 
To address these issues, the present study first identifies whether the non-audit fees or board of 
director and audit committee characteristics may suffer from the endogeneity problem by performing 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on each of these variables. For the non-audit fees, following Whisenant 
et al., (2003), the instrumental variable (IV) for non-audit fees is an indicator variable which is equal 
to 1 if the company experienced new financing; whereas for corporate governance variables, following 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) the instrumental variables (IV) are the lagged values of the endogenous 
variables. The IV must fulfil the following conditions: (1) it should be outside the regression model, 
(2) it should be uncorrelated with the regression errors, and (3) it should be strongly correlated with 
the endogenous variables. To ensure the IV is valid, the present study has estimated the reduced form 
equation on the first stage of 2SLS regression and examined the significance level of the endogenous 
variables. The t-statistic should be at least 3.3 (Adkins and Hill, 2007: 249-250). All the IVs meet the 
suggested criterions. Identifying appropriate instruments is difficult in conducting a two-stage least  
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Table  8.6: Endogeneity test for LAF model 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
H0 = the residual of LNNAF, BODFEM, BODFOREIGN, INTAUD, ACSIZE,ACINDP, ACFINEXP and 
ACMEET are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if F-statistic significant 
Variable  Chi2 (1) 
LNAF 0.276  (p = 0.5990) 
BODFEM 0.030  (p = 0.8619) 
BODFOREIGN 2.823  (p = 0.0929) 
INTAUD 2.122  (p = 0.1451) 
ACSIZE 0.068  (p = 0.7935) 
ACINDP 0.121  (p = 0.7273) 
ACFINEXP 3.201  (p = 0.0736) 
ACMEET 0.902  (p = 0.3421) 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
 
Table  8.7: 2SLS Audit fee regression for endogenous variables 
  BODFOREIGN ACFINEXP 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.836 5.420 0.000 *** 0.814 5.340 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.034 4.810 0.000 *** 0.035 4.880 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.468 23.940 0.000 *** 0.471 24.280 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.064 11.080 0.000 *** 0.063 10.780 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.128 -2.050 0.021 ** -0.117 -1.860 0.032 ** 
DE + -0.057 -0.780 0.219  -0.075 -1.030 0.151  
FOREIGN + 0.158 6.430 0.000 *** 0.167 6.820 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.011 -3.500 0.000 *** -0.010 -3.430 0.001 *** 
CATA + 0.171 3.410 0.001 *** 0.169 3.370 0.001 *** 
OPINION + -0.008 -0.180 0.428  0.001 0.010 0.496  
LONDON + 0.057 2.910 0.002 *** 0.065 3.360 0.001 *** 
BUSY + 0.056 2.880 0.002 *** 0.060 3.110 0.001 *** 
LOSS + -0.001 -0.020 0.491  0.002 0.080 0.469  
INITIAL - -0.069 -2.310 0.011 ** -0.077 -2.570 0.005 *** 
INSOWN - 0.001 0.050 0.480  -0.004 -0.350 0.362  
Industry Specialist Auditor    
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1  0.067 3.150 0.002 **
* 
0.065 3.030 0.002 *** 
CITY#1_ONLY  0.016 0.580 0.561  0.012 0.440 0.663  
NAT#1_ONLY   0.033 0.800 0.425  0.030 0.720 0.472  
Corporate Governance     
BODFEM  -0.015 -1.260 0.209  -0.012 -1.000 0.315  
BODFOREIGN  0.112 5.800 0.000 **
* 
0.090 6.580 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.026 0.980 0.329  0.017 0.630 0.530  
ACSIZE  -0.003 -0.230 0.814  0.000 -0.030 0.976  
ACINDP  0.026 1.390 0.165  0.024 1.240 0.215  
ACFINEXP  0.012 1.160 0.245  0.034 1.990 0.047 ** 
ACMEET  0.007 0.590 0.556  0.005 0.430 0.670  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included 
R2  0.888 0.887 
N  607 607 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist 
auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for 
brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
 
 
184 
squares analysis and finding incorrect instruments can lead to IV estimates that are more biased than 
simple OLS estimates
20
. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests the null hypothesis that the residual values of 
LNAF, BODFEM, BODFOREIGN, INTAUD, ACSIZE, ACINDP, ACMEET and ACFINEXP are 
jointly equal to zero. If the F-statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis would be rejected, 
suggesting that endogeneity is present.  
 
Table 8.6 above presents the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. All of the variables suggest 
insignificant F-statistics except for BODFOREIGN and ACFINEXP, which confirms the presence of 
endogeneity since the F-statistics are significant. To mitigate the bias caused by endogeneity, the 
2SLS regression is performed on BODFOREIGN and ACFINEXP respectively. The results are 
presented in Table 8.7 above. Compared to the main findings, the results of 2SLS regressions for 
BODFOREIGN seem consistent, except for the ACCFINEXP, which is found to be positively related 
to LAF in the 2SLS models, suggesting that the audit committee with more accounting or financially 
expert members contributes to more extensive and expensive audits. The other variables remained 
unchanged. In summary, the main finding on BODFOREIGN is that it continues to have positive 
relationship with LAF, suggesting that the inference made regarding BODFOREIGN in the main 
finding is robust to the presence of endogeneity. 
 
8.8 Audit partner gender and tenure 
Motivated by Ittonen and Vahamaa (2012) finding that female audit engagement partners charge 
higher audit fees, additional analysis is performed in this section by including an indicator variable for 
female audit partners (PART_FEM), and it is expected that its coefficient would be positive. Besides 
that, Gul et al. (2013) and Bedard and Johnstone (2010) also argue that partners are likely to build up 
their reputation and expertise with tenure. Thus, we also include a partner tenure (PART_TEN) 
continuous variable in the regression, which takes the value between 1 and 3, and it is expected that its 
coefficient would be positive. As the study’s sample only has partner data available back to fiscal year 
2011, and the earliest sample year is 2008, this means the maximum tenure of a partner in the sample 
is 3 years only. Therefore, the range of partner tenure variable would fall within 1 to 3 years, so that 
tenure is measured on an equal basis over the sample period. 
 
Model 1 in Table 8.8 below presents the moderating effect of gender of the audit partner industry 
specialist on audit fees. Interestingly, when the gender of the audit partner (PART_FEM) is controlled 
for in the model, the adjusted R
2
 of the regression model increased by 1 percent (from 0.909 to 0.919), 
while the coefficients for PARJOINT_PARNAT#6-CITY#3 and PARNAT#6_ONLY remain significant 
at p<0.01, as reported in the main analysis of the last chapter. This suggest that PART_FEM is an     
                                                     
20 Larcker et al. (2008) provide an excellent discussion of the potential problems and limitations associated with using an 
instrumental variables approach. 
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Table  8.8: Audit fee regression on the effect of audit partner gender and tenure on audit fees under the partner national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. Coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  1.634 10.090 0.000 *** 1.635 10.070 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.032 4.490 0.000 *** 0.033 4.650 0.000 *** 
LTA + 0.383 19.700 0.000 *** 0.385 19.730 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.057 9.960 0.000 *** 0.056 9.940 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.040 -0.780 0.217 *** -0.035 -0.680 0.249 *** 
DE + -0.060 -0.940 0.174  -0.065 -1.020 0.155  
FOREIGN + 0.090 4.000 0.000 *** 0.091 4.030 0.000 *** 
QUICK - -0.011 -3.500 0.001 *** -0.011 -3.440 0.001 *** 
CATA + 0.130 2.830 0.003 *** 0.129 2.800 0.003 *** 
OPINION + 0.021 0.490 0.311  0.026 0.570 0.284  
LONDON + 0.068 3.830 0.000 *** 0.067 3.750 0.000 *** 
BUSY + 0.041 2.440 0.008 *** 0.040 2.350 0.010 ** 
LOSS + 0.026 1.000 0.159  0.026 1.000 0.158  
INITIAL - -0.080 -3.430 0.001 *** -0.081 -3.510 0.000 *** 
INSOWN - 0.011 1.150 0.126  0.012 1.270 0.103  
PART_FEM  0.082 2.530 0.012 **     
PART_TEN      -0.010 -0.680 0.495  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
JOINTPART_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3 0.353 11.340 0.000 ** 0.353 11.280 0.000 *** 
PATCITY#3_ONLY  -0.008 -0.380 0.703  -0.011 -0.540 0.590  
PATNAT#6_ONLY  0.149 4.770 0.000 *** 0.145 4.690 0.000 *** 
Corporate Governance     
BODFEM  -0.014 -1.210 0.228  -0.013 -1.120 0.262  
BODFOREIGN  0.067 5.420 0.000 *** 0.066 5.320 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.023 1.050 0.296  0.023 1.040 0.300  
ACSIZE  0.009 0.820 0.412  0.007 0.650 0.517  
ACINDP  0.002 0.110 0.912  0.004 0.240 0.809  
ACFINEXP  0.002 0.150 0.883  -0.001 -0.060 0.956  
ACMEET  0.029 2.720 0.007 *** 0.028 2.670 0.008 *** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included 
R2  0.919 0.910 
N  680 680 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects 
and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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important omitted variable in the main analysis on partner national-city framework for auditor industry 
specialisation, as it moderates the relationship between partner industry specialist and audit fees. The 
PART_FEM coefficient is 0.082 and is significant at p<0.05. 
 
Model 2 in Table 8.8 above presents the moderating effect of tenure of the audit partner industry 
specialist (PART_TEN) on audit fees. When the PART_TEN is controlled for in the model, the 
adjusted R
2
 of the regression model increased by 0.1 percent (from 0.909 to 0.910), while the 
coefficients for PARJOINT_PARNAT#6-CITY#3 and PARNAT#6_ONLY remain significant at p<0.01, 
as reported in the main analysis of the last chapter too. The PART_TEN coefficient is not significant at 
any conventional levels. This is probably because the partner tenure period measurement is too short 
as data on audit partner is only available since 2009, and the earliest sample year for the dataset is 
2011. Therefore, the maximum value for the PART_TEN variable is capped at 3 years, so that the 
tenure is measured on an equal basis over the sample period. Future research could try to examine 
partner tenure in the U.K. over a longer duration of years, other studies on audit partner tenure in the 
US have reported significant effects (Gul et al., 2013, Bedard and Johnstone, 2010). In comparison to 
prior studies, Goodwin and Wu (2014) found that the fee premium for partner industry specialist in 
their study is not moderated by the gender and tenure of the audit partner, as they failed to find any 
significant result.   
 
8.9 The effect of client size  
To examine the Big 4 industry leadership premium based on the auditee size, we follow Francis et al. 
(2005) by splitting the full sample into two sub-samples; large client segment and small client 
segment. The audit firm sample (N=892) is split into large clients segment and small clients segment 
(N=446 each) based on its median value of total assets (GBP £367.423 million). Whereas the partner 
sample (N=680) is split into large clients segment and small clients segment (N=340 each) based on 
its median value of total assets (GBP £372.123 million). 
 
As shown in Panel A of the Table 8.9 below, under the firm national-city framework and in the large 
client segment, the premium for firm industry leadership is significant for the joint national and city-
specific industry leaders (coefficient=0.090, p<0.01) but not for the city-specific industry leaders alone 
or for the national leaders alone (p>0.10). This indicates that the fee premium for industry leadership 
in the large client segment is driven by the audit firm joint industry leadership at the national and city 
level. This finding in the large client segment is consistent with the one reported in the main analysis 
in Table 7.1 earlier. Interestingly, for the small client segment, as shown in Panel B, neither of the 
leaders results in a fee premium. This indicates that the results of the main analysis are actually driven 
by large clients. This finding is consistent with evidence from New Zealand, Australia and U.S.. Hay 
and Jeter (2011) have documented that the fee premium for industry leadership in the New Zealand is 
driven by the city-industry leadership in the large client segment, whereas Craswell et al. (1995) and 
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Francis et al. (2005) have reported significant fee premiums for national industry leaders in the large 
clients segment only. 
 
Under the partner national-city framework, the empirical results for the large clients segment in Table 
8.9 Panel A below show that the fee premium for the joint leaders and the national partner leaders 
alone are significant (coefficient=0.386, p<0.01 and coefficient=0.174, p<0.01 respectively), but not 
for the city-specific partner leader alone. An F-test indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the fee premium charged by the joint national-city leading partners and the national leading 
partners alone (F-statistic=47.56, p-value=0.000) in the large client segment. Whereas for the small 
client segment, as shown in Panel B, the coefficient for the partner national leadership is larger than 
the joint coefficient (coefficient=0.208, p<0.05 and coefficient=0.171, p<0.05 respectively), 
suggesting that in the small client segment, the partners national industry leadership matter the most. 
An F-test indicates that there is no significant difference between the fee premium charged by the joint 
national-city leading partners and the national leading partners alone (F-statistic=3.18, p-value=0.043) 
in the small clients segment. Taken together, the findings for the partner industry leadership in both 
the large and small clients segments under the partner national-city framework suggest that partner 
national industry leadership drives audit pricing in the U.K. 
 
Under the joint firm partner framework of Table 8.9 Panel A, for the large client sample, it can be seen 
that significant fee premiums are only reported when the partner is a national industry leader despite 
the firm and the city partner non-leadership. This suggests that partner leadership at the national level 
drives fee premium in the large client sample. The only exception is when the national partner is not 
an industry leader, the firm needs to be a joint leader at the national and city level as well as the 
partner need to be a leader at the city level in order to gain a fee premium (NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3). Whereas for the small client sample as presented in Panel B, the 
results are mixed. A fee premium could either be earned when the partner is both a leader at the 
national and the city level in the absence of firm industry leadership (NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-
PARCITY#3), when the audit firm is both a leader at the national and city level in the absence of 
partner industry leadership (NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0), and also when the partner 
alone is the industry leader nationally (NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0). Overall, the 
empirical results from the firm and partner level analyses suggest that the fee premium for industry 
leadership in the U.K. is driven by the partner leadership at the national level in both the large and 
small client segments. 
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Table  8.9: Audit fee regression for sub-samples based on client size 
Panel A: Large clients 
  Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framework 
 
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
 Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.380 1.280 0.100  1.452 4.380 0.000 *** 1.617 4.590 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.055 4.780 0.000 *** 0.048 3.770 0.000 *** 0.044 3.480 0.001 *** 
LTA + 0.500 16.290 0.000 *** 0.387 11.330 0.000 *** 0.368 10.040 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.057 8.090 0.000 *** 0.053 7.340 0.000 *** 0.051 7.100 0.000 *** 
ROI - 0.038 0.270 0.394  0.067 0.410 0.341  0.057 0.360 0.362  
DE + -0.162 -1.700 0.046 ** -0.157 -1.540 0.062 * -0.133 -1.240 0.109  
FOREIGN + 0.211 6.370 0.000 *** 0.110 3.100 0.001 *** 0.109 3.140 0.001 *** 
QUICK - -0.012 -1.780 0.038 ** -0.015 -2.410 0.009 *** -0.014 -2.130 0.017 ** 
CATA + 0.161 1.930 0.027 ** 0.051 0.670 0.253  0.087 1.030 0.151  
OPINION + 0.172 2.370 0.009 *** 0.223 3.320 0.001 *** 0.208 2.890 0.002 *** 
LONDON + 0.082 3.590 0.000 *** 0.100 4.090 0.000 *** 0.099 3.860 0.000 *** 
BUSY + 0.087 2.930 0.002 *** 0.055 1.800 0.037 ** 0.044 1.480 0.070 * 
LOSS + -0.013 -0.310 0.380  -0.003 -0.090 0.465  -0.005 -0.130 0.449  
INITIAL - -0.054 -1.330 0.093  -0.071 -1.910 0.029 ** -0.054 -1.500 0.068 * 
INSOWN  0.010 0.600 0.276  0.026 1.560 0.060 * 0.028 1.520 0.065 * 
Industry specialist auditor 
Firm national-city framework 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1  0.090 3.520 0.000 ***         
CITY#1_ONLY  -0.007 -0.150 0.881          
NAT#1_ONLY  0.115 1.050 0.292          
Partner national-city framework 
JOINT_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3    0.386 9.690 0.000 ***     
PARCITY#3_ONLY     0.044 1.120 0.264      
PARNAT#6_ONLY       0.174 4.840 0.000 ***     
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3         0.465 9.270 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3         0.142 2.780 0.006 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3         0.521 2.570 0.011 ** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3         -0.023 -0.210 0.832  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3         0.410 5.540 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3         -0.038 -0.580 0.566  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3         0.346 7.360 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3         0.075 1.380 0.169  
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0         0.227 4.040 0.000 *** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0         0.043 0.900 0.366  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0         0.721 10.040 0.000 *** 
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Table 8.9: Audit Fee Regression for sub-samples based on clients size (continued) 
Panel A: Large Clients 
  Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framework 
 
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
 Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0               
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0         0.378 4.570 0.000 *** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0         -0.091 -0.870 0.383  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0         0.153 3.840 0.000 *** 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.004 -0.250 0.805  -0.001 -0.080 0.934  0.006 0.370 0.712  
BODFOREIGN  0.082 4.430 0.000 *** 0.071 4.260 0.000 *** 0.074 4.290 0.000 *** 
INTAUD  0.146 1.760 0.080 * 0.087 1.210 0.226  0.066 0.900 0.368  
ACSIZE  -0.021 -1.320 0.188  -0.006 -0.390 0.700  -0.011 -0.710 0.477  
ACINDP  0.025 0.970 0.332  0.011 0.430 0.667  0.012 0.460 0.648  
ACFINEXP  0.025 1.700 0.089 * 0.017 1.050 0.293  0.020 1.290 0.199  
ACMEET  0.005 0.290 0.774  0.011 0.630 0.531  0.024 1.320 0.188  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.811 0.870 0.880 
N  446 340 340 
Panel B: Small clients 
  Firm national-city framework  Partner national-city framework Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
(N=340) Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  1.530 6.220 0.000 *** 1.592 5.660 0.000 *** 1.586 5.810 0.000 *** 
LNAF + 0.019 2.580 0.005 *** 0.018 2.160 0.016 ** 0.019 2.290 0.012 *** 
LTA + 0.414 13.000 0.000 *** 0.399 11.260 0.000 *** 0.400 11.510 0.000 *** 
SQRTSUBS + 0.052 6.530 0.000 *** 0.057 5.890 0.000 *** 0.057 6.030 0.000 *** 
ROI - -0.054 -1.050 0.148  -0.037 -0.630 0.265  -0.056 -0.970 0.168  
DE + 0.062 0.780 0.217  0.168 2.000 0.024 ** 0.148 1.780 0.038 ** 
FOREIGN + 0.020 0.790 0.216  0.040 1.460 0.073 * 0.025 0.920 0.179  
QUICK - -0.010 -4.020 0.000 *** -0.012 -3.400 0.001 *** -0.012 -3.810 0.000 *** 
CATA + 0.172 3.380 0.001 *** 0.166 2.720 0.004 *** 0.186 3.070 0.001 *** 
OPINION + 0.034 0.670 0.252  -0.022 -0.440 0.329  -0.034 -0.690 0.246  
LONDON + 0.022 0.950 0.173  0.033 1.270 0.103  0.031 1.200 0.115  
BUSY + 0.015 0.760 0.224  0.002 0.110 0.455  0.004 0.210 0.419  
LOSS + 0.018 0.560 0.288  0.040 1.220 0.111  0.040 1.200 0.115  
INITIAL - -0.060 -2.230 0.013 ** -0.059 -2.260 0.012 ** -0.053 -2.010 0.023 ** 
INSOWN - 0.011 1.030 0.151  0.008 0.640 0.261  0.004 0.330 0.369  
 
 
 
 
 
190 
Table 8.9: Audit Fee Regression for sub-samples based on clients size (continued) 
Panel B: Small Clients 
  Firm national-city framework  Partner national-city framework Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
(N=340) Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Industry Specialist Auditor              
Firm national-city framework                
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1   0.002 0.090 0.926          
CITY#1_ONLY  -0.025 -1.110 0.268          
NAT#1_ONLY  -0.052 -1.450 0.147          
Partner national-city framework 
JOINT_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3        0.171 2.150 0.033 **     
PARCITY#3_ONLY      -0.030 -1.330 0.184      
PARNAT#6_ONLY       0.208 2.000 0.046 **     
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3          0.037 0.500 0.617  
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3          -0.017 -0.460 0.649  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3              
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3          -0.064 -1.350 0.177  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3          -0.048 -0.420 0.671  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3          -0.022 -0.690 0.493  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#3          0.430 2.300 0.022 ** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#3          -0.027 -0.920 0.358  
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0              
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0          0.076 2.030 0.044 ** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0              
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0          -0.045 -0.690 0.491  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0              
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0          -0.087 -1.540 0.124  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#6-PARCITY#0          0.226 2.130 0.034 ** 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  -0.021 -1.420 0.156  -0.024 -1.320 0.186  -0.024 -1.380 0.169  
BODFOREIGN  0.039 2.440 0.015 ** 0.036 2.070 0.039 ** 0.034 1.880 0.061 * 
INTAUD  0.030 1.220 0.222  0.020 0.770 0.443  0.022 0.830 0.409  
ACSIZE  0.003 0.210 0.830  0.005 0.340 0.732  0.009 0.580 0.565  
ACINDP  -0.002 -0.150 0.878  0.000 -0.010 0.994  -0.003 -0.140 0.889  
ACFINEXP  -0.021 -1.900 0.058 * -0.025 -1.940 0.053 * -0.024 -1.760 0.079 * 
ACMEET  0.029 2.430 0.015 *** 0.028 2.070 0.040 ** 0.028 2.060 0.040 ** 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.732 0.763 0.776 
N  446 340 340 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables, the experimental variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and 
year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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In respect of the corporate governance variables, only BODFOREIGN is consistently significant and 
positive (p<0.10) across all models in both the large and small client sub-samples. This is consistent 
with the main analysis presented in the last chapter and supports the contention that foreign directors 
are likely to be less familiar with national accounting rules, laws and regulations, governance 
standards, and management methods. This is turn makes it more difficult for them to evaluate 
managerial performance or challenge managerial decisions (Masulis et al., 2012), which have an 
adverse effect on audit risk, requiring the external auditor to perform extra audit work to compensate 
for this increased audit risk, thus resulting in the charging of higher audit fees. Whereas in the small 
client sample, there is evidence of negative and significant coefficient for  ACFINEXP (p<0.10), 
suggesting that audit committee financial expertise reduces audit risk and auditor effort, contributing 
to lower fees being charged to small client. In addition, ACMEET is significantly positive, indicating 
that the frequency of audit committee meetings contributes to higher audit fees in the small clients, but 
not in the large clients. 
 
8.10 Alternative definition for corporate governance variables 
This analysis is aimed to examine whether the earlier findings for corporate governance presented in 
the main analysis of the last chapter are robust to alternative measures of board diversity and audit 
committee variables. From the main analysis, in respect of board diversity, the proportion of female 
directors on board is insignificant in all of the models, whereas the proportion of foreign directors on 
board is consistently positive and significant in all models. Here, two different measures of female 
directorship and foreign directorship are further tested; 1) two new dummy variables taking the value 
of 1 for the mere presence of a female director or a foreign director on the board (BODFEM dummy1 
and BODFOREIGN dummy1), and 2) two new dummy variables taking the value of 1 when more than 
a quarter of the board composition is comprised of female directors or foreign directors (BODFEM 
dummy2 and BODFOREIGN dummy2). 
 
The results are presented in the Table 8.10 below. When the regression model is re-estimated using the 
first new dummy variable (BODFEM dummy1), no significant relationship is reported with audit fees. 
However, a significant negative relationship between female directorship and audit fees (p<0.05) is 
evident consistently across all the auditor industry specialist framework models when the variable 
which represents more than a quarter of the board composition is comprised of female directors 
(BODFEM dummy2). Taken together, these findings suggest that female directorship is only effective 
in reducing control risk and audit fees when the proportion represents more than a quarter of the board 
composition. In addition, when the foreign directors on boards are considered, both BODFOREIGN 
dummy1 and BODFOREIGN dummy2 continue to be significant at p<0.01, suggesting that the 
significant positive association between foreign directorship and audit fees reported in the main 
analysis of the last chapter is robust to the alternative definitions used in the study. 
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In respect of audit committee characteristics, while the proportion of audit committee size was never 
significant in the main analysis, the results in the Table 8.10 below indicate that audit committee size 
contributes to higher audit fee when it is comprised of at least three members. However, this only 
occurs in the joint firm-partner national-city framework. Besides that, the relationship between the 
proportion of audit committee financial expertise and audit fees in the firm joint national-city 
framework was never significant before. But when the variable is further tested using a dummy 
variable to represent the presence of at least one audit committee member with accounting or financial 
expertise, significant negative relationship is reported under the firm national-city framework and 
partner national-city framework. This suggest that the presence of at least one audit committee 
member with accounting or financial expertise reduces control risk, thus contribute to less extensive 
and less expensive audit. Also, consistent with the main analysis, the result for ACMEET in Table 8.10 
below continues to be positive and significant (except for the firm national-city framework), 
suggesting that the finding of the ACMEET positively contributes to a more extensive and expensive 
audit based on the number of audit committee meetings or when the audit committee meets at least 
three times per year. 
 
In addition, following Zaman et. al (2011), the four audit committee variables used in this study are 
pulled together into an audit committee effectiveness (ACE) index in this sensitivity test. The 
construction of this index helps examining the effect of the four audit committee variables collectively 
on audit fees. The audit committee effectiveness (ACE) index is considered effective when it meets all 
the four criteria as set by the U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2012) as follows: 1) the audit 
committee is comprised of minimum three members, 2) its members are fully independent, 3) it has 
got at least one member with a recent and relevant financial experience, and 4) it meets at least three 
times a year. When the model is ran, the ACE variable seems to be positive and significant at p<0.05 
(except under the firm national-city framework). This finding suggests that it takes beyond than 
fulfilling this minimum criterion of audit committee effectiveness in order to signal to the auditor the 
company’s corporate governance effectiveness. 
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Table  8.10: Audit fee regression with alternative measures of corporate governance 
  Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framework Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Experimental variable 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM dummy1  -0.005 -0.260 0.329  -0.004 -0.230 0.817  -0.007 -0.390 0.699  
BODFEM dummy2  -0.090 -2.080 0.037 ** -0.103 -2.470 0.014 ** -0.107 -2.670 0.008 *** 
BODFOREIGN dummy1  0.106 5.910 0.000 *** 0.084 4.590 0.000 *** 0.081 4.480 0.000 *** 
BODFOREIGN dummy2  0.129 5.500 0.000 *** 0.106 4.680 0.000 *** 0.108 4.890 0.000 *** 
ACSIZE dummy  0.006 0.280 0.782  0.033 1.460 0.146  0.046 2.060 0.040 ** 
ACINDP dummy  0.019 0.690 0.492  0.009 0.320 0.749  0.008 0.260 0.791  
ACFINEXP dummy  -0.102 -2.350 0.019 ** -0.084 -1.980 0.048 ** -0.062 -1.580 0.116  
ACSVEXP  0.010 0.930 0.354  0.000 -0.010 0.993  0.001 0.120 0.905  
ACMEET dummy  0.016 0.740 0.457  0.049 2.290 0.022 ** 0.043 1.970 0.049 ** 
ACE  0.007 0.370 0.709  0.042 2.170 0.030 ** 0.040 2.100 0.036 ** 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using 
the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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8.11 Summary 
The findings from the various robustness tests performed in this chapter indicate the fee premium for 
auditor industry specialisation in the U.K. earned by the Big 4 audit firms who are the joint national 
and city-specific industry leaders is not merely due to their successful differentiation strategy, but also 
partly driven by the fee pressure from their closest competitor in the city-industry audit market. 
Nevertheless, the audit firm’s position as a joint national and city industry leader in the U.K. already 
gives it a sufficient market power to extract a fee premium. This is because there is a distinct (non-
interdependency) fee premium attached either to the audit firm’s joint national and city industry 
leadership or to its distance to the closest competitor. Also, female partners are found to have the 
ability to charge higher fee premiums as compared to male partners. There is no evidence of fee 
discount reported in the study. Thus, the findings of a fee premium attached to the firm and partner 
industry leadership support the product differentiation theory and reputation theory, which suggest that 
auditors differentiate themselves through industry specialisation to meet clients demands for better 
quality audits and this differentiation strategy is valued in the audit market as it is priced at 
differentially higher rate than the Big 4 brand name reputation premium.   
 
In respect of the effect of corporate governance on audit and earnings quality, the robustness test using 
the alternative definition of corporate governance, this study also find evidence that audit fees are 
higher for companies with 1) more than a quarter of the board composition comprised of female 
directors, 2) when a dummy variable for only one foreign director on the board is used, and 3) when 
more than a quarter of the board composition is comprised of foreign directors. Based on the 
sensitivity and robustness analysis examining the client size effect, the results for the main analysis 
seems to be driven by large clienteles, but is robust to alternative regression estimators, alternative 
definition of industry specialist auditor as well as consistent in the presence of endogeneity. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY 
SPECIALIST AUDITORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
EARNINGS QUALITY 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by outlining the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the second 
empirical analysis of this study investigating the influence of industry specialist auditors and corporate 
governance on earnings quality. The three earnings management proxies that are examined in this 
study are: 1) the discretionary accruals which control for a firm’s performance (based on the model 
(DAC_PERF) developed by Kothari et al., 2005); 2) the accrual estimation error (AEE), which is 
based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) modified accrual quality model modified by McNichols 
(2002); and 3) the likelihood of reporting a profit (avoiding a loss) model (PROFIT) adopted by 
Francis et al. (2013). These earnings management proxies represent the inverse measures of earnings 
quality. Following prior literature, firms are deemed to have higher earnings quality when accruals are 
smaller and firms do not avoid reporting losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Graham et al., 2005; Jones, 1991). Consistent with the last chapter, industry specialist auditor are 
measured using the national-city framework (either at the firm, partner and combination of both); 
while the board and audit committee variables are measured in terms of their effectiveness 
characteristics (e.g. diversity, size, independence, financial expertise and activity). 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section presents the descriptive statistics for each of the 
earnings quality samples: DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT. This is followed by a pairwise correlation 
matrix which identifies the significant associations among the independent variables examined in each 
of the earnings quality models. 
 
9.2 Descriptive statistics  
This section reports the descriptive statistics and the results of the univariate tests. Panel A of Table 
9.1 below presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables for the DAC_PERF model. The 
DAC_PERF sample comprises 1,347 observations for the period 2008-2011. This sample size is 
derived after deleting observations with missing data to calculate the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals based on the Kothari et al. (2005) model. Following Peasnell et al. (2005) and 
Ghosh et al. (2010), there has to be at least a minimum of 10 observations per industry per year in 
order to calculate the DAC_PERF and AEE for each individual company in the sample. Panel B of 
Table 9.1 below presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables for the AEE model. The AEE 
sample comprises 1,083 observations and was derived after further deleting observations with missing 
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data on the lag and future operating cashflows in order to calculate the accrual estimation error based 
on the McNichols (2002) model. This section only highlights the descriptive statistics for the different 
earnings quality proxies, namely DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT, as well as the control variables such 
as PYTAC, GROWTH, MB, CFO, ALTMAN and BLOCKOWN, since the other variables (LTA, DE, 
LOSS, BIG4 and SECOND) have fairly similar means and standard deviations (as described in Chapter 
6.1) in descriptive statistics for the audit fee analysis. Also, all the corporate governance variables for 
the earnings quality analyses have fairly consistent means and standard deviations, as reported in 
Chapter 6.1, and are hence not further discussed here. 
 
The mean (median) value for DAC_PERF in Panel A and AEE in Panel B are 0.104 (0.059) and 0.091 
(0.051), respectively. This indicates that there is a very small difference between the two methods of 
calculating accruals. Other US based studies (e.g. Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Minutti-Meza, 2013) 
reported comparable mean values of 0.104 and 0.068, respectively. 
 
Panel C of Table 9.1 below presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the PROFIT 
model, based on the Francis et al. (2013) model. The sample comprises 1,347 observations, similar to 
the DAC_PERF model. Based on the mean PROFIT, it seems that on average 66.6 percent of the 
companies in the sample are reporting a profit instead of a loss in the current year. As some of the 
variables in the DAC_PERF and PROFIT model may overlap, only the control variables which are not 
included in the DAC_PERF model (LAG_LOSS and TAC) are being tabulated and discussed here. 
 
In respect of the control variables, the PYTAC, GROWTH, MB, CFO, ALTMAN and BLOCKOWN for 
the DAC_PERF model and AEE model in Panel A and Panel B of Table 9.1 below have comparable 
means and standard deviations. For the DAC_PERF model in Panel A, the mean (standard deviation) 
for the PYTAC, GROWTH, MB, CFO, ALTMAN and BLOCKOWN are 0.257 (0.456), 0.185 (0.719), 
2.308 (1.390), 0.029 (0.238), 0.972 (0.840) and 0.487 (0.204). For the AEE model in Panel B, the 
mean (standard deviation) for the PYTAC, GROWTH, MB, CFO, ALTMAN and BLOCKOWN are 
0.241 (0.424), 0.165 (0.613), 2.274 (3.826), 0.070 (0.183), 1.083 (0.764) and 0.475 (0.199).  For the 
PROFIT model in Panel C, the mean (standard deviation) for the LAG_LOSS and TAC are 0.365 
(0.482) and 0.116 (0.301), respectively. In comparison to prior studies, Francis et al. (2013) reported 
comparable MB of 2.049, whereas Minutti-Meza (2013) reported comparable CFO of 0.029. However, 
the PYTAC in Francis et al. (2013) and Minutti-Meza (2013) is slightly lower at 0.126 and 0.145, 
respectively. Also, GROWTH and ALTMAN, as documented in Francis et al. (2013), are slightly 
higher at 0.216 and 1.804, respectively, whereas lower LAG_LOSS is reported at 0.272. 
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Table  9.1: Descriptive statistics of variables for the earnings quality models 
Panel A: DAC_PERF Analysis based on the audit firm sample (N=1,347) 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
DAC_PERF 0.104 0.059 0.164 0.000 2.503 
LTA  8.141 8.030 1.062 5.880 10.640 
PYTAC 0.257 0.080 0.456 0.000 2.420 
DE 0.116 0.050 0.148 0.000 0.600 
GROWTH 0.185 0.050 0.719 -1.000 4.880 
MB 2.308 1.390 4.002 -5.870 28.130 
CFO 0.029 0.070 0.238 -1.150 0.470 
LOSS 0.268 0.000 0.443 0.000 1.000 
ALTMAN 0.972 0.840 0.787 -0.020 4.090 
BLOCKOWN 0.487 0.490 0.204 0.000 0.990 
BIG4 0.649 1.000 0.478 0.000 1.000 
SECOND 0.191 0.000 0.393 0.000 1.000 
BODFEM 0.056 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.500 
BODFOREIGN 0.182 0.091 0.246 0.000 1.000 
INTAUD 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
ACSIZE 3.013 3.000 0.922 2.000 7.000 
ACINDP 0.943 1.000 0.164 0.000 1.000 
ACFINEXP 0.306 0.330 0.258 0.000 1.000 
ACMEET 3.077 3.000 1.448 1.000 15.000 
Panel B: AEE Analysis based on the audit firm sample (N=1,083) 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
AEE 0.091 0.051 0.135 0.000 2.293 
LTA  8.310 8.200 1.003 5.880 10.640 
PYTAC 0.241 0.080 0.424 0.000 2.420 
DE 0.131 0.080 0.151 0.000 0.600 
GROWTH 0.165 0.060 0.613 -1.000 4.880 
MB 2.274 1.405 3.826 -5.870 28.130 
CFO 0.070 0.090 0.183 -1.150 0.470 
LOSS 0.206 0.000 0.404 0.000 1.000 
ALTMAN 1.083 0.950 0.764 -0.020 4.090 
BLOCKOWN 0.475 0.475 0.199 0.000 0.990 
BIG4 0.711 1.000 0.453 0.000 1.000 
SECOND 0.182 0.000 0.386 0.000 1.000 
BODFEM 0.063 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.500 
BODFOREIGN 0.150 0.000 0.222 0.000 1.000 
INTAUD 0.579 1.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
ACSIZE 3.100 3.000 0.930 2.000 7.000 
ACINDP 0.947 1.000 0.161 0.000 1.000 
ACFINEXP 0.304 0.330 0.255 0.000 1.000 
ACMEET 3.191 3.000 1.443 1.000 15.000 
Panel C: PROFIT Analysis based on the audit firm sample (N=1,347) 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
PROFIT 0.666 1.000 0.472 0.000 1.000 
LAG_LOSS 0.365 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
TAC 0.116 0.065 0.301 0.000 6.974 
(Note: All continuous variables have been winsorised at top and bottom 1 percent) 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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9.3 Correlation matrix 
Table  9.2: Pairwise correlation matrix for the earnings quality models 
Variables A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
A DAC_PERF 1.000             
B PROFIT -0.252* 1.000            
C AEE 0.168* -0.118* 1.000           
D LTA -0.256* 0.404* -0.117* 1.000          
E DE -0.173* 0.171* -0.077* 0.476* 1.000         
F MB 0.051* 0.052* -0.038 0.034 -0.004 1.000        
G LOSS 0.206* -0.615* 0.140* -0.404* -0.180* -0.045 1.000       
H GROWTH 0.044 -0.052* 0.088* -0.057* 0.010 -0.024 0.056* 1.000      
I CFO -0.354* 0.496* -0.148* 0.476* 0.202* 0.008 -0.456* -0.019 1.000     
J LAG_LOSS 0.213* -0.533* 0.164* -0.438* -0.173* -0.054* 0.603* 0.121* -0.488* 1.000    
K PPE -0.004 -0.126* 0.017 -0.170* -0.076* 0.021 0.177* 0.006 -0.127* 0.114* 1.000   
L PYTAC 0.126* -0.121* 0.044 -0.132* -0.065* 0.034 0.105* 0.100* -0.111* 0.151* -0.039 1.000  
M TAC 0.649* -0.192* 0.142* -0.189* -0.074* 0.0698 0.126* 0.043 -0.313* 0.136* 0.048* 0.040 1.000 
N ALTMAN -0.143* 0.298* -0.124* 0.078* -0.100* 0.080* -0.277* -0.088* 0.263* -0.312* -0.038 -0.081* -0.102* 
O BIG4 -0.184* 0.268* -0.054* 0.615* 0.295* 0.063* -0.263* -0.076* 0.282* -0.294* -0.098* -0.111* -0.134* 
P SECOND 0.030 -0.084* 0.019 -0.324* -0.161* -0.032 0.073* 0.008 -0.139* 0.095* 0.082* 0.043 0.022 
Q BLOCKOWN 0.044* -0.132* 0.061* -0.338* -0.154* -0.045 0.129* 0.061* -0.089* 0.162* 0.062* 0.061* 0.047* 
R BODFEM -0.088* 0.182* -0.030 0.324* 0.110* 0.080* -0.130* -0.061* 0.175* -0.200* -0.029 -0.074* -0.073* 
S BODFOREIGN 0.131* -0.186 0.049 -0.046* -0.064* 0.009 0.192* 0.105* -0.103* 0.222* 0.043 0.019 0.072* 
T INTAUD -0.234* 0.371* -0.131* 0.707* 0.368* 0.065* -0.346* -0.075* 0.366* -0.430* -0.133* -0.127* -0.149* 
U ACSIZE -0.132* 0.233* -0.051* 0.548* 0.256* 0.095* -0.231* -0.042 0.223* -0.252* -0.100* -0.101* -0.105* 
V AZINDP -0.051* 0.126* -0.007 0.158* 0.058* 0.069* -0.178* -0.015 0.109* -0.151* -0.139* 0.001 -0.035 
W ACFINEXP 0.014 0.051* -0.073* 0.199* 0.113* 0.017 -0.076* -0.031 0.032 -0.043 -0.057* 0.007 -0.013 
X ACMEET -0.122* 0.199* -0.090* 0.554* 0.208* 0.043 -0.217* -0.025 0.217* -0.237* -0.105* -0.085* -0.120* 
Y NAT#1 -0.125* 0.137* -0.093* 0.349* 0.148* 0.057* -0.145* -0.044 0.160* -0.180* -0.036 -0.083* -0.072* 
Z CITY#1 -0.129* 0.134* -0.062* 0.361* 0.207* 0.051* -0.144* -0.050* 0.131* -0.182* -0.047* -0.086* -0.089* 
AA JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 -0.134* 0.126* -0.097* 0.376* 0.158* 0.067* -0.141* -0.037 0.161* -0.178* -0.045* -0.096* -0.079* 
BB CITY#1_ONLY -0.017 0.036 0.038 0.048* 0.105* -0.011 -0.030 -0.029 -0.017 -0.040 -0.012 -0.002 -0.026 
CC NAT#1_ONLY 0.004 0.042 -0.001 -0.016 -0.003 -0.014 -0.026 -0.022 0.018 -0.026 0.016 0.020 -0.001 
DD PARNAT#1 -0.060* 0.105* -0.068* 0.373* 0.166* 0.088* -0.071* -0.035 0.067* -0.080* -0.037 -0.051* -0.037 
EE PARCITY#1 -0.083* 0.099* -0.040 0.272* 0.143* 0.047 -0.118* -0.037 0.113* -0.131* -0.026 -0.047 -0.066* 
FF PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.060* 0.105* -0.068* 0.373* 0.166* 0.088* -0.071* -0.035 0.067* -0.080* -0.037 -0.051* -0.037 
GG PARCITY#1_ONLY -0.057* 0.051 -0.004 0.092* 0.065* 0.003 -0.090* -0.021 0.087* -0.100* -0.009 -0.024 -0.047 
HH PARNAT#1_ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
II NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  -0.059* 0.103* -0.068* 0.370* 0.169* 0.089* -0.069* -0.035 0.067* -0.077* -0.036 -0.050 -0.036 
JJ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.046 -0.013 0.012 0.056* -0.035 0.025 -0.034 -0.013 0.086* -0.055* -0.009 -0.028 -0.028 
KK NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
LL NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
MM NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.016 0.022 -0.008 0.046 -0.005 -0.002 -0.020 -0.004 0.010 -0.024 -0.006 -0.015 -0.007 
NN NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.021 0.055* -0.012 0.049 0.089* -0.007 -0.068* -0.037 0.025 -0.057* 0.002 -0.016 -0.031 
 *is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. Variables PARNAT#1_ONLY (HH), NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (KK) and NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (LL) have empty cells due to missing observations. 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table 9.2: Pairwise correlation matrix for the earnings quality models (continued) 
Variables A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
PP NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.042 0.065* -0.012 0.064* 0.0780* -0.034 -0.060* 0.058* 0.040 -0.072* -0.015 0.027 -0.017 
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
RR NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.095* 0.098* -0.076* 0.217* 0.100* 0.021 -0.109* -0.037 0.116* -0.123* -0.033 -0.078* -0.050 
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TT NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  0.013 0.042 0.001 -0.026 0.010 -0.020 -0.017 -0.014 0.032 -0.016 0.017 0.038 0.002 
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
VV NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.007 -0.033 0.067* -0.008 0.054* -0.030 0.033 -0.013 -0.064* 0.016 -0.028 -0.027 -0.005 
WW NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
              
Variables N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
N ALTMAN 1.000             
O BIG4 0.135* 1.000            
P SECOND -0.025 -0.659* 1.000           
Q BLOCKOWN -0.052* -0.180* 0.152* 1.000          
R BODFEM 0.157* 0.166* -0.082* -0.176* 1.000         
S BODFOREIGN -0.293* -0.176* 0.004 0.110* -0.059* 1.000        
T INTAUD 0.182* 0.518* -0.292* -0.293* 0.280* -0.130* 1.000       
U ACSIZE 0.087* 0.379* -0.215* -0.250* 0.302* -0.021 0.403* 1.000      
V ACINDP 0.031 0.153* -0.040 -0.076* 0.075* -0.114* 0.174* 0.017 1.000     
W ACFINEXP -0.007 0.146* -0.131* -0.045 0.017 -0.055* 0.154* 0.031 0.080* 1.000    
X ACMEET 0.037 0.353* -0.205* -0.219* 0.188* 0.045* 0.455* 0.391* 0.109* 0.168* 1.000   
Y NAT#1 0.113* 0.407* -0.268* -0.146* 0.104* -0.040 0.250* 0.199* 0.075* 0.121* 0.122* 1.000  
Z CITY#1 0.091* 0.478* -0.315* -0.165* 0.102* -0.095* 0.271* 0.207* 0.091* 0.122* 0.153* 0.683* 1.000 
AA JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 0.098* 0.370* -0.244* -0.177* 0.139* -0.013 0.275* 0.217* 0.097* 0.123* 0.147* 0.908* 0.774* 
BB CITY#1_ONLY 0.007 0.238* -0.157* -0.015 -0.032 -0.131* 0.045* 0.026 0.010 0.022 0.037 -0.179* 0.497* 
CC NAT#1_ONLY 0.048* 0.135* -0.089* 0.052* -0.067* -0.066* -0.025 -0.016 -0.040 0.011 -0.042 0.331* -0.119* 
DD PARNAT#1 -0.056* 0.146* -0.095* -0.233* 0.156* 0.157* 0.174* 0.282* 0.025 0.127* 0.191* 0.347* 0.306* 
EE PARCITY#1 0.093* 0.336* -0.220* -0.211* 0.050 -0.058* 0.223* 0.180* 0.070* 0.098* 0.134* 0.323* 0.654* 
FF PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.056* 0.146* -0.095* -0.233* 0.156* 0.157* 0.174* 0.282* 0.025 0.127* 0.191* 0.347* 0.306* 
GG PARCITY#1_ONLY 0.135* 0.291* -0.190* -0.104* -0.033 -0.152* 0.150* 0.042 0.063* 0.037 0.041 0.163* 0.553* 
HH PARNAT#1_ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
II NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  -0.058* 0.144* -0.094* -0.230* 0.156* 0.158* 0.170* 0.274* 0.023 0.127* 0.187* 0.354* 0.302* 
JJ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.176* 0.178* -0.116* -0.080* -0.032 -0.076* 0.096* 0.026 0.056* 0.068* 0.025 0.438* 0.373* 
KK NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
LL NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
MM NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.007 0.023 -0.015 -0.035 0.014 0.002 0.032 0.066* 0.010 0.011 0.041 -0.017 0.048 
NN NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.021 0.203* -0.133* -0.066* -0.019 -0.112* 0.079* 0.017 0.024 -0.001 0.029 -0.153* 0.426* 
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
PP NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.005 0.069* -0.045 -0.001 0.011 -0.060* 0.096* 0.043 0.030 -0.029 0.008 -0.052* -0.061* 
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
RR NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  0.047 0.253* -0.165* -0.025 0.138* -0.037 0.171* 0.114* 0.044 0.043 0.053* 0.623* 0.530* 
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TT NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  0.032 0.140* -0.091* 0.055* -0.071* -0.071* -0.027 -0.028 -0.044 0.011 -0.044 0.344* -0.124* 
*is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. Variables with empty cells are due to missing observations. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table 9.2: Pairwise correlation matrix for the earnings quality models (continued) 
Variables N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
VV NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.023 0.118* -0.077* 0.073* -0.042 -0.064* -0.046 0.002 0.020 0.018 0.020 -0.089* 0.248* 
WW NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
               
Variables AA BB CC DD EE FF GG HH II JJ KK LL MM 
AA JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 1.000             
BB CITY#1_ONLY -0.163* 1.000            
CC NAT#1_ONLY -0.092* -0.059* 1.000           
DD PARNAT#1 0.386* -0.049 -0.038 1.000          
EE PARCITY#1 0.383* 0.491* -0.087* 0.433* 1.000         
FF PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0.386* -0.049 -0.038 1.000* 0.433* 1.000        
GG PARCITY#1_ONLY 0.208* 0.570* -0.075* -0.079* 0.863* -0.079* 1.000       
HH PARNAT#1_ONLY . . . . . . . .      
II NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  0.393* -0.064* -0.038 0.986* 0.427* 0.986* -0.078* . 1.000     
JJ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  0.486* -0.080* -0.047 -0.049 0.529* -0.049 0.612* . -0.048 1.000    
KK NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  . . . . . . . . . . .   
LL NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1   . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MM NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.016 0.095* -0.006 0.157* 0.068* 0.157* -0.012 . -0.006 -0.008 . . 1.000 
NN NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.138* 0.842* -0.053* -0.055* 0.603* -0.055* 0.699* . -0.054* -0.067* . . -0.009 
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
PP NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.047 -0.031 -0.018 -0.019 0.205* -0.019 0.237* . -0.019 -0.023 . . -0.003 
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
RR NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  0.691* -0.113* -0.066* -0.068* -0.158* -0.068* -0.137* . -0.068* -0.084* . . -0.011 
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TT NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.095* -0.063* 1.000* -0.038 -0.087* -0.038 -0.075* . -0.038 -0.047 . . -0.006 
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
VV NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.080* 0.490* -0.031 -0.032 -0.074* -0.032 -0.064* . -0.032 -0.039 . . -0.005 
WW NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
               
Variables NN OO PP QQ RR SS TT UU VV WW    
NN NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  1.000             
OO NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 . .            
PP NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.026 . 1.000           
QQ NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . .          
RR NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.095* . -0.033 . 1.000         
SS NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  . . . . . .        
TT NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.053* . -0.018 . -0.066* . 1.000       
UU NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0   . . . . . . . .      
VV NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0   -0.045 . -0.015 . -0.055* . -0.031 . 1.000     
WW NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 . . . . . . . . . .    
*is significant at p<0.10. All p-values are two-tailed. Variables with empty cells are due to missing observations. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table 9.2 represents the correlation matrix showing two-way Pearson correlations between all 
variables included in the earnings quality analyses of this study. The single asterisks in Table 9.2 
above signify statistically significant correlations at p<0.10. In general, the overall correlation matrix 
shows that the earnings quality measures and the independent variables (i.e. board diversity, internal 
audit, audit committee and related control variables) are moderately inter-correlated with one another 
except for variables LAF and LTA (correlation coefficients of 88.5 percent), JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 
and NAT#1 (correlation coefficients of 89.53 percent), CITY#1_ONLY and PARCITY#1 (correlation 
coefficients of 85.4 percent), and JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 and CITY#1 (correlation coefficients of 
72.96 percent), which have the largest correlation coefficients above 70 percent. 
 
The coefficient for PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 and PARNAT#1 is perfectly correlated at 
1.00. This is because all the partners who are national industry leaders are also leaders at the city level. 
While NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0PARCITY#0 and NAT#1_ONLY are perfectly correlated 
(coefficient= 1.00). These findings of perfect correlation and high correlation (above 0.7) between the 
industry specialist variables do not represent a multicollinearity problem as these identified highly and 
perfectly correlated variables are not tested simultaneously in the same regression model. Diagnostics 
on the multicollinearity associated with each empirical model using the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) are previously provided in Chapter 5. 
 
Besides that, as reported in Table 9.2 above, DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT are significantly 
correlated with the determinants of earnings quality reported in prior literature (Reichelt and Wang, 
2010; Minutti-Meza, 2013; Francis et al., 2013). DAC_PERF and AEE are both positively associated 
with LOSS and BLOCKOWN, but negatively associated with LTA, DE, CFO, ALTMAN and BIG4. 
PROFIT, however, is positively correlated with LTA, DE, MB, CFO, ALTMAN and BIG4, but 
negatively correlated with LOSS, GROWTH, LAG_LOSS, PPE and SECOND. 
 
The corporate governance coefficients in Table 9.2 indicate that internal audit (IA) and audit 
committee characteristics (ACSIZE, ACMEET) are consistently significantly negatively correlated with 
both measures of accruals (DAC_PERF and AEE). This suggests that the presence of a strong internal 
control environment and an active audit committee contributes to better quality of reported earnings.  
However, the relationship between the corporate governance variables and PROFIT seemed to be 
mixed. For the industry specialist variables, audit firms with industry leadership at the NAT#1, 
CITY#1, JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1, PARNAT#1, PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1, NAT#11-
CITY#1_PARN1T#1-PARCITY#1, and NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 are significantly 
negatively correlated with DAC_PERF and AEE, indicating the effectiveness of the industry specialist 
auditors in constraining earnings management. Because these correlations are pair-wise, the 
coefficient sign may differ in the multivariate analysis (Reichelt and Wang, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 10 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY 
SPECIALIST AUDITORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
EARNINGS QUALITY 
 
10.1 Introduction  
The descriptive statistics for the earnings management models have been discussed in the previous 
chapter. Next, multivariate regression will be performed in this chapter to examine the effect of 
industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on earnings quality. 
 
10.2 Multivariate regression 
As explained in Chapter 5 in the model specification section, the three earnings management proxies 
that will be examined in this study are: 1) the discretionary accruals which control for a firm’s 
performance (DAC_PERF) and which are based on a model by Kothari et al. (2005); 2) the accrual 
estimation error (AEE) based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality model which modifies 
the model developed by McNichols (2002);  and 3) the likelihood of reporting a profit or avoiding a 
loss (PROFIT) model adopted from Francis et al. (2013).  
 
Following prior literature, firms are deemed to have higher earnings or audit quality when accruals are 
smaller and firms do not avoid reporting losses (Jones 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Frankel et 
al. 2002; Graham et al., 2005). Similar to the multivariate analyses performed for audit pricing 
analyses in Chapter 7, the earnings management analyses in this chapter will be performed using the 
same three different levels of analysis for auditor industry specialisation: 1) the firm national-city 
framework, 2) the partner national-city framework, and 3) the joint firm-partner national-city 
framework.  
 
Similar to the analysis on the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit 
quality (as proxy by the variation in the level of audit fees) in Chapter 7, three models are reported for 
comparative purposes under the firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework 
analyses. This approach to analysis is consistent with Reichelt and Wang (2010) who, in their study, 
examine the effect of national and office specific measures of auditor industry expertise on audit 
quality at the audit firm level using the firm national-city framework. The three models are explained 
as follows: Model 1 tests the effect of firm (partner) national industry leadership and corporate 
governance on earnings quality. Model 2, on the other hand, tests the effect of firm (partner) city-
specific industry leadership and corporate governance on earnings quality. Model 1 and Model 2 are 
provided for completeness, while Model 3 represents the model of interest as it controls for the joint 
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effect of the audit firm’s national and city industry leadership and corporate governance on the three 
different measures of earnings quality employed in the study. 
 
In addition, as applied under the analysis on the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate 
governance on audit quality (as proxy by the variation in the level of audit fees) in Chapter 7, the 
determination of the national industry leader in Model 1 and the city-specific industry leader in Model 
2, respectively, is based on an iterative process. The iterative process starts with only one indicator 
variable for the nationally top-ranked leader in the first estimation, and then adds a second indicator 
variable for the second-ranked leader in the second estimation, and so on until the introduction of an 
additional ranking variable is not statistically significant, or, in other words, it does not have an effect 
on earnings quality. This iterative process will determine the top-ranked Big 4 industry leaders which 
have a significant coefficient relative to the remaining audit firms who are not Big 4 industry leaders. 
Consequently, the determination of the joint national-city industry leader in Model 3 would be derived 
from the combination of the top-ranked leaders as identified in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. 
Significance levels for model coefficients are reported as one-tailed p-values, except for the industry 
specialist auditors and corporate governance variables which are reported as two-tailed p-values. 
Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and p-values 
are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity
21
. 
 
10.2.1 Firm national-city framework 
In this section, the study will examine the effect of industry specialist auditor and corporate 
governance on earnings quality under the firm national-city framework. Table 10.1 to Table 10.4, 
below present the results based on the three different measures of earnings quality applied in this 
chapter: discretionary accruals models (DAC_PERF), accrual estimation error (AEE) and the 
likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss (PROFIT). 
 
10.2.1.1 Performance-matched discretionary accruals (DAC_PERF) 
Table 10.1 reports the results of the three model estimations for the DAC_PERF using the national and 
city framework for auditor industry specialisation, while controlling for the effects of corporate 
governance in the models. Discretionary accruals represent the amount of a company’s abnormal or 
unexpected accruals and is the amount of earnings that have been potentially distorted through 
managerial discretion (i.e. earnings management) (Reichelt and Wang, 2010). The analysis in this 
section focuses on both the magnitude of the discretionary accruals as well as the direction. Table10. 1 
below presents the results examining the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate 
                                                     
21 According to Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010), the use of OLS or White (1980) standard error fails to correct for both 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence in panel data, and thus produces mis-specified test-statistics and invalid 
inferences about the relationship of the variables examined. Instead, the econometric literature suggests that the two-way 
cluster robust standard errors is to both time-series and cross-sectional correlation (Thompson, 2006; Petersen, 2009). Thus, a 
sensitivity analysis is performed in the next chapter in Section 11.2, where all the regressions are re-estimated using 1) one-
way cluster robust standard error clustered by firm, and 2) two-way cluster robust standard error clustered by firm and year.  
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governance in reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals, whereas Table 10.2 presents the 
results of the analysis examining the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on 
both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
 
All models in Table 10.1 below have an R
2
 value ranging from 21.2 percent to 21.4 percent and are 
significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the models are statistically valid.  These R
2
 values, although 
lower compared to Reichelt and Wang (2010) at about 42 percent, are still higher relative to prior 
studies by Ghosh et al. (2010), Baxter and Cotter (2009) and Kent et al., (2010), who have reported 
their R
2
 values as 8.28 per cent, 9.8 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively. These previous studies have 
used U.S. data prior to 2006 whilst this study is using more recent U.K. data between the period 2008 
to 2011. 
 
Model 1 in Table 10.1 below tests the effect of the firm national industry leadership and corporate 
governance in reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals on the company’s reported profit, 
relative to other audit firms who are not Big 4 industry leaders. The iterative process results indicate 
that the top-ranked and the second-ranked audit firm in the industry nationally, respectively, reduces 
discretionary accruals, but not the third ranked firm in the industry. The coefficient for the top-ranked 
national and the second-ranked national leaders are both negative and significant (coefficient = -0.023, 
p<0.05 and coefficient = -0.025, p<0.05, respectively), whereas when the third-ranked auditor 
indicator variable is tested, it is not significant at any conventional level. An F-test indicates there is 
no significant difference between the coefficients for the top-ranked and second-ranked audit firms 
who are the industry leaders nationally (F-statistic=0.050, p=0.818). Thus, following on from the 
discussion above, the results for Model 1 reported in Table 10.1 use a single auditor indicator variable 
that takes on the value of 1 if an audit firm is either the top-ranked or second-ranked firm in an 
industry (NAT#2) and tests the effect of national-level industry leadership per se on reducing the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals for 571 observations in which the top two Big 4 auditors are the 
national industry leaders, and the default comparison group is all of the remaining 776 observations 
not having Big 4 national industry leaders. The NAT#2 coefficient value is -0.024 and significant at 
p<0.05. This finding is consistent with studies by Krishnan et al. (2003), Balsam et al. (2003), Kwon 
et al. (2007), Prawitt et al. (2009), Reichelt and Wang (2010), Cahan et al. (2011) and Minutti Meza 
(2013) which also have reported that earnings quality is higher when the client is audited by an audit 
firm that is a national industry leader, as then earnings management is constrained effectively by 
having the specialist audit firm reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals on the company’s 
reported profit. Prawitt et al. (2009), Reichelt and Wang (2010), Cahan et al. (2011) and Minutti-Meza 
(2013), as in this study, used the performance-matched discretionary accruals model. Krishnan et al. 
(2003) and Balsam et al. (2003) used the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model, whereas  Kwon et 
al. (2007) used both the modified Jones (1991) discretionary current accruals adapted from Teoh et al. 
(1998) and Guenther (1994).  
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Model 2 in Table 10.1 below tests the effect of the Big 4 firm city-specific industry leadership and 
corporate governance in reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals on the company’s reported 
profit, relative to other non-Big 4 industry leaders. The results of the iterative process indicates that 
only the coefficient for the top-ranked firm is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.016, p<0.10), 
whereas when the second-ranked auditor indicator variable is tested, it is not significant at any 
conventional level. Thus, the results for Model 2 in Table 10.1 use a single auditor indicator variable 
that takes on the value of 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked firm in a city-specific industry (CITY#1), 
and tests the effect of city-level industry leadership per se in constraining discretionary accruals for 
401 observations in which the top-ranked Big 4 auditor is the city industry leader, and the default 
comparison group is all of the remaining 946 observations not having Big 4 city industry leaders. This 
finding is consistent with studies by Sun and Liu (2013), Choi et al. (2010), Reichelt and Wang 
(2010), Cahan et al. (2011) and Minutti-Meza (2013) who have also reported that when an audit firm 
is a city industry leader they promote higher earnings quality by reducing the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals on the company’s reported profit.  
 
While Models 1 and Model 2 above are provided for completeness, Model 3 in Table 10.1 below is the 
primary model of interest because it controls explicitly for the joint effect of national and city-specific 
industry leadership through the use of a combination of three auditor indicator variables. The first 
auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 337 observations (25 percent of sample) in which the audit 
firm is jointly the top-two ranked national leaders and the top-ranked city-specific industry leader; the 
second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 64 observations (5 percent of sample) in which the 
audit firm is the top-ranked city-specific industry leader but is not in the top two for national leaders, 
and the third auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 234 observations (17 percent of sample) in which 
the auditor is in the top two for national industry leaders but is not the top city-specific industry leader. 
In other words, companies with audit firms that are national industry leaders (N=571) can be 
decomposed into those audited by national leaders alone (N=234), plus those audited by audit firms 
who are joint national and city-specific industry leaders (N=337). Similarly, companies with auditors 
that are city-specific industry leaders (N=401) can be decomposed into those audited by city-specific 
industry leaders alone (N=64), plus those auditors that are jointly national and city-specific industry 
leaders (N=337). The purpose of these three partitions is to test for the separate effects of national and 
city-specific industry leadership on the magnitude of discretionary accruals, as well as to isolate the 
joint effect of national and city-specific industry leadership on pricing the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. The default comparison group is the 712 observations (53 percent of sample) in which the 
audit firm is neither the top two national leaders nor top city industry leader. 
 
Results of Model 3 in Table 10. 1 below shows that the coefficients for JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 and 
NAT#1_ONLY are negative and significant (coefficient=-0.030, p<0.01 and coefficient=-0.021, p<0.10 
respectively), while the coefficient for CITY#1_ONLY is not significant at any conventional level. This 
indicates that the Big 4 audit firms which are joint national-city industry leaders and the national 
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industry leaders alone reduce the magnitude of discretionary accruals, but not when they are city 
industry leaders alone. An F-test indicates there is no significant difference between the coefficients 
for the joint national and city-specific industry leaders and the national leader alone (F-statistic=0.990, 
p=0.321). This finding suggests that earnings quality is higher (smaller discretionary accruals) when 
the audit firm is a national industry leader, either alone or in conjunction with city industry leadership. 
In other words, an audit firm’s national industry leadership is an important condition to constrain 
accrual-based earnings management. This finding is in contrast to Choi et al. (2010) who have 
documented in the U.S. in the period 2000 to 2005 that the effect of office-level industry expertise 
dominates the effect of national-level industry expertise in deterring management opportunistic 
earnings manipulation. On the other hand, the study by Reichelt and Wang (2010) in the U.S. during 
the period 2003 to 2007 reported that the joint national and city industry leadership is more important 
than city industry leadership in constraining discretionary accruals.  
 
The coefficients for national industry leaders in Model 3, either alone or in conjunction with city 
industry leadership, are as low as -0.021 and as high as -0.030, respectively. The magnitude of these 
coefficients is to be in the range of 26.25 percent to 37.5 percent of pre-tax earnings, based on mean 
pre-tax earnings (scaled by lagged assets) of 0.08 in the sample
22
. In other words, one U.K. sterling 
pound increase or decrease in company pre-tax earnings due to discretionary accruals is moderated 
significantly by national industry leaders, either alone or in conjunction with city industry leadership, 
by 26.25 pence to 37.5 pence, on average. Clearly the U.K. sterling pound impact of smaller 
discretionary accruals has a material effect on earnings using the standard five percent rule-of-thumb, 
and the earnings per share effect may be even more important where even one pence per share matters.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the impact of national level auditor industry leadership on discretionary 
accruals in the U.K. is both statistically and economically significant during the period 2008-2011.  
 
In relation to board diversity, the coefficients for BODFEM and BODFOREIGN are both insignificant 
(p>0.10). This insignificant finding for BODFEM is in contrast to Srinidhi et al. (2011) who report 
that the proportion of female directors on boards reduces the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
While INTAUD is insignificant across all the three models at p<0.10, this finding is consistent with 
Davidson et al. (2005) but is in contrast to prior studies by Prawitt et al. (2009) which report that an 
internal audit represents a detection and deterrent mechanism that moderates earnings management. In 
respect of the audit committee characteristics, the results in this study contradict earlier findings (for 
example, Abbott et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2005) which 
documented the occurrence of earnings management decreases with independence of the audit 
committee, but they are consistent with Choi et al. (2004), Lin et al. (2006) and Xie et al. (2003) who 
                                                     
22 Coefficients on the auditor indicator variables measure the average change (due to the auditor variable) in the dependent 
variable which is the absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged assets. Following Reichelt and Wang (2010), 
the magnitude is computed by dividing each coefficient on the auditor indicator variables by the absolute value of mean pre-
tax earnings in the sample, also scaled by lagged assets, to derive the percentage effect on pre-tax earnings of the median firm 
in the sample.  
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do not find such a significant relationship. The finding of insignificant effect for audit committee size 
in this study is consistent with Bedard et al. (2004) and Xie et al. (2003), but is in contrast to Yang and 
Krishnan (2005) who report that audit committee size is negatively associated with abnormal accrual. 
With regards to audit committee diligence, the finding of this study is consistent with Bédard et al. 
(2004) and Yang and Krishnan (2005) who also fail to find such an association, as opposed to other 
studies which reported negative association between earnings management and the number of audit 
committee meetings (Lin et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005; Koh et al., 2007; Kent et al., 
2010). The insignificant results for BODFEM, BODFOREIGN, INTAUD, ACSIZE, ACINDP and 
ACMEET imply that the role of corporate governance in the U.K. public listed firms is only 
ceremonial in nature, given that the variation between these characteristics among the companies does 
not contribute to improved quality of financial reporting. This conclusion is consistent with the 
proposition under institutional theory where companies are assumed to conform to its environmental 
pressure (to meet the requirement of the corporate governance best practices (e.g. Combined Code, 
2008; U.K. Corporate Governance Code, 2010) simply to maintain its legitimacy, instead of intended 
to achieve an effective governance and monitoring role, particularly in the financial reporting process. 
 
In addition to that, ACFINEXP is found to be positive and weakly significant (p<0.10) across all of the 
three models, suggesting that a higher proportion of audit committees with accounting or financial 
knowledge and experience contribute to higher discretionary accruals manipulation. This finding 
contradicts prior evidence of the positive impact of accounting financial expertise in deterring earnings 
management (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 
2010). The finding on ACFINEXP is contrary to the agency theory and stewardship theory 
propositions, where the board and audit committee is expected to provide stewardship to shareholders 
to safeguard their interest. Instead, the finding supports the managerial hegemony theory assertion that 
board decision and action is dominated by management pursuit of their self-serving interest. This 
interesting finding in respect of the corporate governance effectiveness during the sample period 2008 
to 2011 could be argued to be partly motivated by the economic and financial conditions during the 
financial crisis when companies were facing a difficult time trying to maintain and improve their 
performance in the public equity market. Consistently, research on financial crises (e.g. the Asian 
financial crisis and the 2007/2008 financial crisis) has shown that there are various factors that 
motivate managers to engage in earnings management during the financial crisis period (e.g. 
Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2008; Lang and Maffett, 2011; Habib et al., 2013), and accruals 
manipulation is one of the tools that could be used by management to stabilise earnings of current and 
consecutive periods. Taken together, it seems that the ineffective monitoring role of corporate 
governance in constraining accruals manipulation has been moderated by the presence of industry 
specialist auditors. 
  
All control variables are significant at p<0.10 in the predicted directions in most of the model 
estimations, except for TA, GROWTH, LOSS, ALTMAN, BLOCKOWN and BIG4 which are not 
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significant at any conventional levels. Consistent with Reichelt and Wang (2010), Minutti-Meza 
(2013), and Francis et al. (2013), discretionary accruals are larger for firms with higher prior year total 
accruals (PYTAC), lower leverage (DE), lower operating cash flow (CFO) and higher growth 
opportunities (MB). Also, consistent with Reichelt and Wang (2010) and Minutti-Meza (2013), 
discretionary accruals are lower for clients audited by second tier audit firms (SECOND). 
Interestingly, in contrast to the U.S., based on this study’s findings, the U.K. evidence suggests that it 
is actually the industry specialists within the Big 4 audit firms that play an important role in 
constraining accrual-based earnings management as compared to the Big 4 non-industry leaders. This 
finding supports the contention that the extensive industry-specific experience of the industry 
specialist auditors (Gramling and Stone, 2001) allows them to identify and address industry specific 
problems and issues more thoroughly than auditors who do not have that domain-specific knowledge 
(Craswell and Taylor, 1991; Eichenseher and Danos, 1981), resulting in differentially higher quality 
audits delivered to their clients.  
 
The insignificant effect of BLOCKOWN contradicts the study’s expectation that concentrated 
ownership should reduce the need of monitoring managerial behaviour, but is consistent with prior 
U.K. study by Peasnell (2005) as well as other studies in the U.S. by Davidson et al. (2005) and 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) who do not find any significant relationship between 
blockholder ownership and earnings management. This insignificant finding could be explained by the 
meta-analysis study by Hamid et al. (2014) on corporate governance and earnings management which 
reported that only ownership before the global financial crisis played a significant role in restricting 
earnings management, whereas ownership after the crisis has shown insignificant results. As this 
current study is based on the financial crisis period, the current findings may thus indicate that the 
financial crisis may have resulted in more vigilance and have brought about a more regulatory 
environment, therefore making ownership structure irrelevant to earnings management practices. 
 
209 
Table  10.1: DAC_PERF Regression under firm national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value  coef. t-stat p-value  coef. t-stat p-value  
Intercept  0.103 1.720 0.043 ** 0.109 1.820 0.034 ** 0.101 1.680 0.047 ** 
TA + 0.001 0.190 0.426  0.001 0.120 0.454  0.002 0.240 0.407  
PYTAC + 0.024 1.490 0.068 * 0.023 1.440 0.075 * 0.023 1.470 0.071 * 
DE - -0.059 -2.140 0.016 ** -0.057 -2.090 0.019 ** -0.058 -2.090 0.019 ** 
GROWTH + 0.003 0.520 0.301  0.003 0.510 0.306  0.003 0.510 0.305  
MB + 0.002 1.460 0.073 * 0.002 1.510 0.066 * 0.002 1.480 0.070 * 
CFO - -0.179 -2.930 0.002 *** -0.179 -2.930 0.002 *** -0.180 -2.940 0.002 *** 
LOSS + 0.005 0.260 0.399  0.004 0.220 0.413  0.005 0.250 0.400  
ALTMAN - -0.003 -0.480 0.316  -0.003 -0.460 0.324  -0.003 -0.450 0.326  
BLOCKOWN + -0.003 -0.490 0.313  -0.003 -0.510 0.305  -0.003 -0.530 0.300  
BIG4 - -0.015 -0.750 0.227  -0.023 -1.220 0.111  -0.013 -0.670 0.251  
SECOND - -0.043 -2.180 0.015 ** -0.043 -2.180 0.015 ** -0.043 -2.180 0.015 ** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#2 (n=571)  -0.024 -2.510 0.012 0.006 **         
CITY#1 (n=401)      -0.016 -1.950 0.052 *     
JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 (n=337)         -0.030 -2.720 0.007 *** 
CITY#1_ONLY (n=64)          -0.008 -0.440 0.658  
NAT#2_ONLY (n=234)          -0.021 -1.740 0.082 * 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.004 0.820 0.414  0.003 0.690 0.492  0.004 0.810 0.419  
BODFOREIGN  0.009 1.360 0.173  0.008 1.310 0.190  0.009 1.370 0.171  
INTAUD  -0.012 -1.100 0.272  -0.012 -1.170 0.243  -0.012 -1.140 0.256  
ACSIZE  -0.005 -1.020 0.307  -0.005 -0.940 0.346  -0.005 -1.020 0.308  
ACINDP  -0.002 -0.170 0.862  -0.001 -0.170 0.869  -0.001 -0.160 0.873  
ACFINEXP  0.008 1.830 0.068 * 0.008 1.720 0.085 * 0.008 1.850 0.065 * 
ACMEET  -0.006 -0.890 0.376  -0.005 -0.820 0.411  -0.006 -0.900 0.369  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.214 0.212 0.214 
N  1347 1347 1347 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and the corporate governance variables, which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects 
and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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For robustness purposes, the study also examines the effect of industry specialist auditors and 
corporate governance on income-increasing (DAC_PERF ≥ 0) and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals (DAC_PERF < 0). Table 10.2 Panel A below reports the estimation results where the 
dependent variable is the income-increasing discretionary accruals, whereas Panel B reports the 
estimation results where the dependent variable is the income-decreasing abnormal accruals. 
Examining Table 10.2 Panel A, all models are significant (p<0.01), and the adjusted R
2
 ranges from 
29.3 percent to 30.2 percent. The results for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 are consistent with those 
reported in Table 10.1. Based on Model 3, which is the model of interest, the coefficients of 
JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 and NAT#2_ONLY are negative and significant (coefficient = -0.050, p<0.05 
and coefficient = -0.050, p<0.05, respectively). However, the coefficient on CITY#1_ONLY is not 
significant at any conventional level. These results indicate that clients of audit firms who are both 
national and city-specific industry specialists as well as an industry leader alone have lower income-
increasing discretionary accruals. An F-test indicates there is no significant difference between the 
coefficients for the joint national and city-specific industry leaders and the national leader alone (F-
statistic=0.000, p=0.986). This finding suggests that earnings quality is higher (smaller income-
increasing discretionary accruals) when the audit firm is a national industry leader, either alone or in 
conjunction with city industry leadership. In other words, audit firm national industry leadership is an 
important condition to reduce income-increasing accrual-based earnings management. 
 
On the other hand, examining Table 10.2, Panel B, all models are significant (p < 0.01) and the 
adjusted R
2
 are around 20.7 percent. Interestingly, none of the industry specialist auditor variables 
across all the three model estimations are significant, indicating industry specialist auditors at the firm 
level do not play an important role in restraining income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Perhaps 
income-decreasing accruals may not be an important issue that needs to cause concern for an audit 
firm, but audit firms are particularly interested in their clients’ practices of income-increasing 
discretionary accruals that can potentially lead to heavily manipulated or distorted earnings. Overall, it 
seems that only the results for the income-increasing discretionary accruals corroborate the earlier 
findings using the magnitude of overall discretionary accruals reported in Table 10.1. Therefore, this 
shows that audit firms with leading industry expertise are more concerned about income-increasing 
earnings management than income-decreasing earnings management. However, this finding is in 
contrast to a previous study by Reichelt and Wang (2010) which found that clients report smaller 
income-increasing abnormal accruals and smaller income-decreasing accruals when the auditor is both 
a national and a city industry specialist.  
 
In addition, when comparing the corporate governance results between Panel A and Panel B in Table 
10.2 below, it can be seen that corporate governance only plays an effective role in reducing income-
increasing discretionary accruals. The coefficients for ACSIZE and ACMEET are significantly negative  
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Table  10.2: Income-increasing and income-decreasing DAC_PERF Regression under firm national-city framework 
  Panel A: Income-increasing discretionary accruals  Panel B: Income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Intercept  -0.057 -0.760 0.225 -0.054 -0.710 0.239 -0.056 -0.740 0.229  0.218 2.450 0.007**
* 
0.220 2.490 0.007**
* 
0.215 2.400 0.009**
* TA + 0.017 1.630 0.052* 0.016 1.580 0.058* 0.016 1.610 0.054*  -0.008 -0.640 0.262 -0.008 -0.660 0.255 -0.007 -0.600 0.275 
PYTAC + 0.045 1.900 0.029** 0.044 1.850 0.033** 0.045 1.890 0.030**  0.000 0.020 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.010 0.496 
DE - -0.060 -1.240 0.108 -0.061 -1.250 0.106 -0.058 -1.220 0.112  -0.068 -2.030 0.022** -0.067 -2.000 0.023** -0.069 -2.010 0.023** 
GROWTH + 0.001 0.090 0.464 0.000 -0.060 0.476 0.001 0.080 0.468  0.008 0.880 0.190 0.008 0.900 0.186 0.008 0.880 0.191 
MB + 0.000 0.170 0.432 0.001 0.320 0.376 0.000 0.150 0.439  0.003 1.640 0.051* 0.003 1.650 0.050* 0.003 1.660 0.049** 
CFO - -0.209 -3.300 0.001*** -0.215 -3.390 0.001**
* 
-0.210 -3.310 0.001**
* 
 -0.183 -1.660 0.049** -0.182 -1.660 0.049** -0.184 -1.660 0.048** 
LOSS + -0.020 -0.820 0.208 -0.020 -0.840 0.202 -0.019 -0.800 0.213  0.011 0.360 0.361 0.011 0.350 0.365 0.011 0.360 0.361 
ALTMAN - 0.002 0.150 0.440 0.002 0.150 0.440 0.002 0.140 0.443  -0.005 -0.610 0.270 -0.005 -0.590 0.278 -0.005 -0.580 0.281 
BLOCKOWN + -0.011 -1.660 0.049** -0.010 -1.530 0.063* -0.011 -1.640 0.051*  0.003 0.300 0.383 0.002 0.260 0.397 0.002 0.270 0.395 
BIG4 - 0.016 0.610 0.272 -0.005 -0.190 0.426 0.020 0.690 0.246  -0.048 -1.630 0.052* -0.051 -1.740 0.042** -0.048 -1.660 0.049** 
SECOND - -0.021 -1.060 0.144 -0.021 -1.080 0.140 -0.021 -1.060 0.146  -0.064 -1.990 0.024** -0.064 -1.990 0.024** -0.064 -1.980 0.024** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#2  -0.047 -2.640 0.009***        -0.011 -0.940 0.350       
CITY#1     -0.021 -1.550 0.121        -0.009 -0.860 0.391    
JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1        -0.050 -2.520 0.012**        -0.015 -1.110 0.269 
CITY#1_ONLY         -0.016 -0.500 0.615        0.002 0.060 0.951 
NAT#2_ONLY         -0.050 -2.150 0.032**        -0.005 -0.390 0.699 
Corporate Governance           
BODFEM  0.007 0.960 0.336 0.005 0.680 0.498 0.007 0.970 0.333  0.001 0.180 0.858 0.001 0.160 0.876 0.001 0.190 0.850 
BODFOREIGN  0.005 0.540 0.590 0.003 0.360 0.722 0.005 0.510 0.610  0.010 1.120 0.262 0.010 1.130 0.258 0.010 1.170 0.244 
INTAUD  -0.015 -1.040 0.297 -0.016 -1.110 0.265 -0.015 -1.050 0.296  -0.003 -0.170 0.864 -0.003 -0.200 0.839 -0.003 -0.190 0.850 
ACSIZE  -0.015 -2.260 0.024** -0.013 -2.040 0.042** -0.015 -2.250 0.025**  0.000 0.060 0.955 0.000 0.050 0.959 0.001 0.060 0.949 
ACINDP  0.009 0.960 0.338 0.010 1.030 0.303 0.009 0.930 0.353  -0.009 -0.670 0.501 -0.009 -0.670 0.502 -0.009 -0.660 0.507 
ACFINEXP  0.014 1.910 0.057* 0.012 1.740 0.083* 0.014 1.890 0.059*  0.002 0.400 0.690 0.002 0.390 0.696 0.003 0.450 0.651 
ACMEET  -0.019 -1.900 0.058* -0.018 -1.810 0.071* -0.019 -1.900 0.058*  0.004 0.430 0.664 0.004 0.450 0.656 0.004 0.420 0.675 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
R
2
  0.301 0.293 0.302  0.207 0.207 0.207 
N  551 551 551  796 796 796 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance 
levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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at p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively, across all of the three model estimations. This finding indicates 
that ACSIZE and ACMEET only focus on restraining income-increasing accruals instead of the 
magnitude of accruals, which explains why these variables are insignificant as outlined in Table 10.1. 
Nevertheless, consistent with earlier findings in Table 10.1 for the DAC_PERF analysis, ACFINEXP 
continues to be positive and significant, supporting the notion that more accounting or financial expert 
members in the audit committee contribute to higher discretionary accruals manipulation activities.  
 
On the other hand, none of the corporate governance variables in Panel B are significant, suggesting 
that corporate governance characteristics of the client do not play an important role in restraining 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals, perhaps again because income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals may not be regarded as of great consequence as income-increasing discretionary accruals to 
the efficient operation of capital markets. 
 
10.2.1.2 Accruals estimation error (AEE) 
The analysis in this section of the chapter regresses the various industry specialists and corporate 
governance proxies on the accrual quality measure introduced by McNichols (2002). McNichols 
(2002) has modified the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and the Jones (1991) earnings management 
model by including the change in revenue and property, plant, and equipment as additional control 
variables in determining residuals. The residuals from the modified regression represent the accrual 
estimation error, which is an inverse measure of accruals quality. According to Francis et al. (2005), 
discretionary accruals quality is attributable to managers’ estimates and accounting implementation 
decisions and is priced by investors’ more than discretionary accruals and other proxies for accruals 
quality. Thus, this measure as developed by McNichols (2002) is included in the analysis of this 
section. 
 
The adjusted R
2
 for all models in Table 10.3 below is between 11.4 percent and 11.6 per cent and is 
significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the models are statistically valid. These values, although low, are 
comparable with the prior research conducted by Srinidhi et al. (2011) in this area using the same 
measure of accruals, which reported an R
2
 of 11.5 percent. 
 
Model 1 tests the effect of the Big 4 firm national industry leadership and corporate governance in 
reducing accruals estimation error (AEE). The same iterative process used in previous analyses results 
in only the nationally top-ranked Big 4 firm having a significant coefficient, but not for the second-
ranked leader as, when the second ranked auditor indicator variable is tested, it is not significant at any 
conventional level. Thus, the results for Model 1 reported in Table 10.3 use a single auditor indicator 
variable that takes on the value of 1 if a Big 4 audit firm is the top-ranked nationally (NAT#1) and tests 
the effect of national-level industry leadership per se in reducing AEE for 289 observations in which 
the Big 4 auditor is the national industry leader, and the default comparison group is all of the 
remaining 794 observations not having Big 4 national industry leaders. The NAT#1 coefficient value is 
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-0.018 and is significant at p<0.10. This finding is consistent with the earlier finding using the Kothari 
et al. (2005) performance-matched discretionary accruals models presented in Table 10.1 and Table 
10.2, suggesting that audit firm national industry leadership contributes to higher accruals quality by 
reducing accrual estimation error.  
 
Model 2 tests the effect of the firm city industry leadership and corporate governance in reducing the 
magnitude of AEE on the company’s reported profit. Interestingly, the results from the iterative 
process indicate that even the coefficient for the top-ranked firm is not significant at any conventional 
level. Thus, the regression for Model 2 reported in Table 10.3 below uses a single auditor indicator 
variable that takes on the value of 1 if an audit firm is the top-ranked firm in a city-specific industry 
(CITY#1), and tests the effect of city-level industry leadership on the Big 4 ability to reduce AEE for 
363 observations in which the Big 4 auditor is the city industry leader, and the default comparison 
group is all of the remaining 720 observations not having Big 4 city industry leaders. The coefficient 
for CITY#1 is not significant at any conventional level. This finding under AEE analysis for firm city 
industry leadership is inconsistent with the DAC_PERF results reported in Table 10.1 earlier, as well 
as with findings from prior studies (Sun and Liu, 2013; Choi et al., 2010; Reichelt and Wang, 2010; 
Cahan et al., 2011; Minutti-Meza, 2013) which have documented that lower discretionary accruals are 
reported by clients of audit firms which are city industry leaders. This suggests that unlike the audit 
firm national industry leadership, the finding for audit firm city industry leadership is not robust to 
alternative measures of accrual-based earnings management. 
 
Model 3 is the primary model of interest because it controls explicitly for the joint effect of national 
and city-specific industry leadership through the use of three auditor indicator variables. The first 
auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 251 observations (23 percent of sample) in which the audit 
firm is both the top-ranked national leader and top-ranked city-specific industry leader 
(JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1); the second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 112 observations (10 
percent of sample) in which the audit firm is the top-ranked city-specific industry leader but not the 
top-ranked national leader (CITY#1_ONLY); and the third auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 38 
observations (4 percent of sample) in which the auditor is the top-ranked national industry leader but 
not the top-ranked city-specific industry leader (NAT#1_ONLY).  In other words, companies with 
auditors that are national industry leaders (N=289) can be decomposed into those audited by national 
leaders alone (N=38), plus those whose auditors are joint national and city-specific industry leaders 
(N=251). Similarly, companies with auditors that are city-specific industry leaders (N=363) can be 
decomposed into those audited by city-specific industry leaders alone (N=112), plus those auditors 
that are jointly national and city-specific industry leaders (N=251). The purpose of these three 
partitions is to test for the separate effects of national and city-specific industry leadership, as well as 
to isolate the joint effect of national and city-specific industry leadership on the magnitude of the AEE. 
The default comparison group is the 682 observations (63 percent of sample) in which the auditor is 
neither the top-ranked national nor top-ranked city-industry leader. 
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Results of Model 3 in Table 10.3 below show that neither national industry leadership alone or city-
specific industry leadership alone reduces the magnitude of the accrual estimation error (AEE), as 
coefficients for CITY#1_ONLY and NAT#1_ONLY are not significant at any conventional level. 
Instead, only the coefficient JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 for joint national and city-specific industry 
leadership is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.020, p<.0.10). This finding suggests smaller 
AEE and higher earnings quality are achieved when the audit firm is an industry leader at both the 
national and city level concurrently. This finding is consistent with Minutti-Meza (2013), but is in 
contrast to Choi et al. (2010) who have documented that the effect of office-level industry expertise 
dominates the effect of national-level industry expertise in deterring management opportunistic 
earnings manipulation. On the other hand, the study by Reichelt and Wang (2010) has reported 
significant effect for both the joint national-city specialist as well as for firms which are city specialists 
only. 
 
The coefficient for the joint national-city industry leaders in Model 3 is -0.020, as noted in the 
preceding paragraph. The magnitude of this coefficient is 200 percent of pre-tax earnings, based on 
mean pre-tax earnings (scaled by lagged assets) of 0.01 in the sample
23
. In other words, a client of an 
audit firm which is a joint national and city industry leaders enjoy the benefit of two times lesser AEE 
relative to companies not audited by an audit firm which is a joint national and city industry specialist.  
This evidence strongly suggests that the U.K. sterling pound impact of smaller AEE has a material 
effect on earnings using the standard five percent rule-of-thumb, and the earnings per share effect may 
be even more important where even one pence per share matters. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
impact of joint national-city audit firm industry leadership in reducing AEE is statistically and 
economically significant. 
 
Interestingly, none of the corporate governance variables examined are significant at any conventional 
level, except ACINDP which is weakly significant in Model 3 (coefficient=0.012. p<0.10). Consistent 
with the results in Table 10.1, all control variables are significant at p<0.10 in the predicted directions 
in most of the model estimations, except for TA, PYTAC, DE, GROWTH, MB, BLOCKOWN and BIG4 
which are not significant. In addition, LOSS and ALTMAN are also insignificant. This supports prior
                                                     
23 Coefficients on the auditor indicator variables measure the average change (due to the auditor variable) in the dependent 
variable which is the absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged assets. Following Reichelt and Wang (2010), 
the magnitude is computed by dividing each coefficient on the auditor indicator variables by the absolute value of mean pre-
tax earnings in the sample, also scaled by lagged assets, to derive the percentage effect on pre-tax earnings of the median firm 
in the sample.  
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Table  10.3: AEE Regression under firm national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.138 2.050 0.020 ** 0.146 2.220 0.014 ** 0.135 2.020 0.022 ** 
TA + 0.002 0.220 0.414  0.001 0.100 0.459  0.002 0.250 0.400  
PYTAC + -0.003 -0.270 0.393  -0.003 -0.250 0.400  -0.003 -0.290 0.388  
DE - -0.039 -1.050 0.147  -0.035 -0.980 0.165  -0.040 -1.070 0.142  
GROWTH + 0.008 0.810 0.209  0.008 0.800 0.213  0.008 0.810 0.209  
MB + 0.000 0.420 0.339  0.000 0.400 0.346  0.000 0.430 0.335  
CFO - -0.048 -1.680 0.047 ** -0.050 -1.700 0.045 ** -0.048 -1.640 0.051 * 
LOSS + 0.023 1.810 0.035 ** 0.023 1.800 0.036 ** 0.024 1.850 0.033 ** 
ALTMAN - -0.013 -2.750 0.003 *** -0.013 -2.810 0.003 *** -0.013 -2.770 0.003 *** 
BLOCKOWN + 0.003 0.770 0.221  0.003 0.790 0.214  0.003 0.710 0.238  
BIG4 - 0.001 0.060 0.477  0.001 0.040 0.485  -0.001 -0.030 0.487  
SECOND - -0.024 -1.570 0.059 * -0.024 -1.560 0.059 * -0.024 -1.580 0.058 * 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#1 (n=289)  -0.018 -1.860 0.063 *         
CITY#1  (n=363)      -0.012 -1.140 0.253      
JOINT_NAT#1-
CITY#1  
(n=251) 
 
          -0.020 -1.810 0.070 * 
_ONLY (n=112)          0.003 0.170 0.865  
NAT# _ONLY (n=38)          -0.004 -0.300 0.763  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.007 1.290 0.198  0.007 1.320 0.188  0.007 1.330 0.185  
BODFOREIGN  0.003 0.500 0.619  0.002 0.380 0.705  0.003 0.540 0.587  
INTAUD  -0.014 -1.220 0.223  -0.013 -1.210 0.226  -0.013 -1.180 0.240  
ACSIZE  0.003 0.430 0.664  0.003 0.390 0.698  0.003 0.450 0.652  
ACINDP  0.012 1.610 0.108  0.012 1.590 0.112  0.012 1.670 0.095 * 
ACFINEXP  -0.003 -0.650 0.516  -0.003 -0.670 0.506  -0.003 -0.630 0.528  
ACMEET  -0.008 -0.760 0.446  -0.007 -0.700 0.484  -0.008 -0.760 0.447  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.115 0.114 0.116 
N  1,083 1,083 1,083 
 *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects 
and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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findings (Reichelt and Wang, 2010) which report that AEE are larger for companies with higher 
bankruptcy risk (ALTMAN)
24
 and are smaller for firms which have reported losses in the past three 
years (LOSS). 
 
10.2.1.3 Likelihood to report a profit / (avoid a loss) (PROFIT) 
Next, a probit model is used to examine the likelihood of companies audited by Big 4 industry 
specialist auditors and with effective corporate governance in reporting a loss rather than a profit. 
Managers of firms prefer to avoid losses (Graham et al. 2005), and for this model the dependent 
variable PROFIT is coded 1 for firms that report a bottom-line positive net income and zero for loss 
firms. Following Francis et al. (2013), PROFIT is coded as 1 to be consistent with the directional 
prediction for accruals, as a higher-quality audit is expected to result in a lower likelihood of managers 
reporting a profit (i.e., reporting more losses), just as high-quality audits are expected to result in 
smaller accruals. The adjusted R
2
 for all models in Table 10.4 below are between 35.8 percent and 
36.2 percent and all are significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the models are statistically valid, though 
slightly lower as compared to the regression model used by Francis et al. (2013) in their cross-country 
study with R
2
 of 45.5 percent. 
 
Model 1 tests the effect of the likelihood of the Big 4 firm national industry leadership and the 
corporate governance function to report a profit instead of a loss relative to other non-Big 4 industry 
leaders. Results of the same iterative process used in previous analyses indicate that the top three audit 
firms are industry leaders at the national level, as the top three Big 4 firms ranked nationally have a 
significant coefficient relative to the remaining Big 4 firms who are non-industry leaders. When the 
fourth-ranked auditor indicator variable is tested, it is not significant at any conventional level. The 
coefficient for the top-ranked is -0.424 (p<0.01), for the second-ranked is -0.390 (p<0.05) and for the 
third-ranked is -0.289 (p<0.10). Thus, the results for Model 1 reported in Table 10.4 below use a 
single auditor indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if an audit firm is among the top three 
ranked firms in an industry (NAT#3) and tests the effect of national-level industry leadership per se on 
differential Big 4 ability to report a profit rather than a loss for 733 observations in which the Big 4 
auditor is the national industry leader, and the default comparison group is all of the remaining 614 
observations not having Big 4 national industry leaders. The NAT#3 coefficient value is -0.378 and 
significant at p<0.05. Model 2 tests the effect of the likelihood of the Big 4 firm city industry 
leadership and the corporate governance function to report a profit instead of a loss, relative to other 
non-Big 4 city-specific industry leaders. Interestingly, the results from the iterative process indicate 
that even the coefficient for the top-ranked firm is not significant at any conventional level. Thus, the 
results for Model 2 reported in Table 10.4 use a single auditor indicator variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if an audit firm is the top-ranked firm in a city-industry level (CITY#1), and tests the effect 
of city-level industry leadership per se on differential Big 4 likelihood to report a profit or avoid a loss 
                                                     
24 The Altman score measures the likelihood of a company survival. Lower (higher) scores measure greater (lesser) 
bankruptcy risk. We expect a negative association between accrual estimation error and the company’s Altman Z-score. 
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for 401 observations in which the Big 4 auditor is the city-specific industry leader, and the default 
comparison group is all of the remaining 946 observations not having Big 4 city industry leaders. The 
coefficient for CITY#1 is -0.150 and is insignificant at p=0.10.  
 
The findings from Model 1 suggest that clients of audit firms which are one of the top three national 
industry leaders have got a higher likelihood of reporting a loss instead of profit, but not for clients of 
the top-ranked Big 4 city industry leaders. However, when the effect of both national and city industry 
leadership is controlled for in Model 3, results indicate that only the audit firm which is the joint 
national and city-specific industry leader JOINT_NAT#3-CITY#1 is more conservative in their clients’ 
profit reporting; however, this is not the case for audit firms which only hold either a national industry 
leadership position (NAT#3_ONLY) or a city industry leadership position (CITY#1_ONLY). The 
coefficient for JOINT_NAT#3-CITY#1 (coefficient = -0384) is significant at p<0.05. 
 
Interestingly, none of the corporate governance variables are significant at any conventional level, 
suggesting that the variation on the company’s corporate governance characteristics do not have a 
significant effect on the company’s likelihood of reporting profit (or loss). Control variables TAC, MB, 
CFO, LAG_LOSS and ALTMAN are significant and in the predicted direction, suggesting that 
companies that have lower accruals, higher growth opportunities, and lower operating cash flows do 
not experience loss in the prior year, have a higher risk of bankruptcy and are more likely to report a 
profit rather than a loss (consistent with Francis et al., 2013). Interestingly, BIG4 and SECOND are 
also positive and significant, suggesting that clients of Big 4 (non-specialist) firms and second-tier 
firms are more likely to report a profit rather than a loss. This suggests that Big 4 audit firms which are 
joint national and city-specific industry leaders are more conservative in the profit reporting relative to 
Big 4 and second-tier audit firms. 
 
Overall, the results of the earnings management analysis under the Big 4 audit firm national-city 
framework for auditor industry specialisation while controlling for the effect of corporate governance 
suggest consistent evidence that only the audit firm which is both a national and city-specific industry 
leader is able to effectively provide higher earnings quality. This is based on the evidence of lower 
discretionary accrual, lower accrual estimation error (AEE) and also lower likelihood of reporting a 
profit (PROFIT). This finding is consistent with the evidence of fee premium documented earlier in 
Chapter 7, which is only earned by the Big 4 audit firms with industry leadership at both the national 
and city level. 
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Table  10.4: PROFIT Regression under firm national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -0.349 -0.530 0.300  -0.323 -0.490 0.314  -0.369 -0.550 0.290  
LTA + 0.097 1.130 0.129  0.095 1.110 0.134  0.102 1.190 0.117  
DE - -0.030 -0.080 0.466  -0.047 -0.130 0.447  -0.028 -0.080 0.469  
TAC - -1.886 -3.900 0.000 *** -1.838 -3.710 0.000 *** -1.900 -3.880 0.000 *** 
GROWTH + 0.071 1.090 0.137  0.065 1.010 0.156  0.071 1.100 0.137  
MB + 0.020 1.650 0.049 ** 0.019 1.610 0.054 * 0.020 1.720 0.043 ** 
CFO - 2.412 4.520 0.000 *** 2.391 4.530 0.000 *** 2.394 4.470 0.000 *** 
LAG_LOSS - -0.775 -7.570 0.000 *** -0.782 -7.620 0.000 *** -0.780 -7.590 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN - 0.176 2.460 0.007 *** 0.175 2.440 0.008 *** 0.175 2.440 0.008 *** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.009 -0.180 0.428  -0.008 -0.160 0.437  -0.012 -0.250 0.403  
BIG4 - 0.332 1.770 0.039 ** 0.086 0.600 0.275  0.261 1.310 0.095 * 
SECOND - 0.194 1.380 0.084 * 0.193 1.370 0.086 * 0.193 1.370 0.085 * 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#3(n=733)  -0.378 -2.420 0.016 **         
CITY#1 (n=401)      -0.150 -1.380 0.167      
JOINT_NAT#3-CITY#1 (n=374) 
 
        -0.384 -2.120 0.034 ** 
CITY#1_ONLY (n=27)          0.486 1.140 0.253  
NAT#3_ONLY (n=359)          -0.234 -1.320 0.187  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.000 0.000 1.000  0.004 0.060 0.950  0.006 0.100 0.921  
BODFOREIGN  -0.065 -1.090 0.275  -0.068 -1.150 0.252  -0.057 -0.950 0.340  
INTAUD  0.176 1.420 0.155  0.170 1.380 0.168  0.172 1.390 0.165  
ACSIZE  0.051 0.820 0.411  0.051 0.830 0.408  0.045 0.730 0.467  
ACINDP  0.001 0.010 0.995  0.004 0.050 0.960  0.013 0.170 0.868  
ACFINEXP  0.013 0.270 0.787  0.010 0.200 0.844  0.013 0.270 0.783  
ACMEET  0.005 0.080 0.939  0.008 0.130 0.893  0.005 0.090 0.929  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R
2
  0.360 0.358 0.362 
N  1,347 1,347 1,347 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not 
reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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10.2.2 Partner national-city framework 
Next, the same earnings management analyses under the previous firm national-city framework are re-
performed using the partner national-city framework. Table 10.5, Table 10.6 and Table 10.7 below 
present the results based on the three different measures of earnings quality as applied in the preceding 
sections of this chapter: discretionary accruals models (DAC_PERF), accrual estimation error (AEE) 
and the likelihood of reporting profit (PROFIT) under the partner national-city framework. 
 
10.2.2.1 Performance-matched discretionary accrual (DAC_PERF) 
This section demonstrates the effect of audit partner industry specialism and corporate governance on 
discretionary accruals, based on the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-matched discretionary accrual 
model. As compared to the firm national-city framework, the size of the model dropped by 328 after 
excluding the year 2008 observations which do not have available data on the audit partners. The 
analysis in this section focuses on both the magnitude of the discretionary accruals as well as the 
direction. Table 10.5 below presents the results examining the effect of industry specialist audit 
partner and corporate governance in reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals, whereas Table 
10.6 presents the results of the analysis examining the effect of industry specialist audit partner and 
corporate governance on both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  
 
All the models in Table 10.5 are significant at p< 0.01, and their adjusted R
2
 is about 22.9 percent. The 
same iterative process as used in prior analysis has been used to determine the partner industry 
specialist auditor ranked at the national and city-industry level. Interestingly, based on the iterative 
process, neither the variable PARNAT#1 (in Model 1) nor PARCITY#1 (in Model 2) is significant at 
any conventional levels in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, suggesting that audit partner industry 
expertise does not play an important role in reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Thus, 
the results for Model 1 reported in Table 10.5 use a single auditor indicator variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if a Big 4 partner is the top-ranked industry leader nationally and tests the effect of partner 
national-level industry leadership per se on reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals for 39 
observations in which the top-ranked partners are the national industry leaders, and the default 
comparison group is all of the remaining 624 observations not having Big 4 national industry leaders. 
In comparison, the results for Model 2 reported in Table 10.5 use a single auditor indicator variable 
that takes on the value of 1 if a Big 4 partner is the top-ranked city industry leader and tests the effect 
of partner city level industry leadership per se on reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals for 
178 observations in which the top-ranked partners are the city industry leaders, and the default 
comparison group is all of the remaining 485 observations not having Big 4 city industry leaders.   
 
Model 3 is the primary model of interest because it controls explicitly for the joint effect of partner 
national and city-specific industry leadership through the use of three audit partner indicator variables. 
The first audit partner indicator variable is coded 1 for 39 observations (4 percent of the sample) in 
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which the partner is both the top-ranked national leader and top-ranked city-specific industry leader; 
the second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 139 observations (14 percent of the sample) in 
which the partner is the top-ranked city-specific industry leader but not the top national leader, 
whereas there is no observation available for the third auditor indicator variable which is coded 1 for 
when the auditor is the top national industry leader but not the top city-specific industry leader. 
 
In other words, companies with partners that are national industry leaders (N=39) are also jointly city-
specific industry leaders (N=39), with none of them being national industry leaders alone (N=0). 
Companies with partners that are city-specific industry leaders (N=401) can be decomposed into those 
audited by city-specific industry leaders alone (N=64), plus those partners that are jointly national and 
city-specific industry leaders (N=337). The purpose of these three partitions is to test for the separate 
effects of national and city-specific industry leadership on the magnitude of discretionary accruals, as 
well as to isolate the joint effect of partners national and city-specific industry leadership of the 
partners on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. The default comparison group is the 841 
observations (82 percent of the sample) in which the audit partner is neither the top national nor top 
city industry leader. Interestingly, none of the audit partner indicator variables in Model 3 are 
significant; suggesting that audit partner industry leadership does not play an important role in 
constraining earnings management through reducing the discretionary accruals. 
 
In respect of the corporate governance characteristics, all the variables are not significant at any 
conventional level, except for ACFINEXP which is significant at p<0.10. As reported in Table 10.2, 
the significant ACFINEXP is consistent under the firm national-city framework, suggesting that there 
is a higher risk of income-increasing accruals manipulation when the clients’ audit committee is 
comprised of more members with accounting or financial expertise. In respect of the control variables, 
except for PYTAC, the coefficients of DE, MB, CFO and SECOND are significant in the expected 
direction, consistent with the earlier DAC_PERF results reported in the analysis in Table 10.1 using 
the audit firm national-city framework.  
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Table  10.5: DAC_PERF Regression under partner national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.125 1.580 0.057 * 0.134 1.780 0.038 ** 0.127 1.620 0.053 * 
TA + -0.003 -0.310 0.378  -0.005 -0.460 0.321  -0.004 -0.340 0.367  
PYTAC + 0.024 1.060 0.144  0.024 1.070 0.143  0.024 1.070 0.144  
DE - -0.048 -1.450 0.073 * -0.047 -1.430 0.077 * -0.047 -1.440 0.076 * 
GROWTH + -0.005 -0.580 0.280  -0.005 -0.570 0.284  -0.005 -0.580 0.281  
MB + 0.002 1.310 0.095 * 0.002 1.280 0.100  0.002 1.310 0.095 * 
CFO - -0.198 -2.680 0.004 *** -0.197 -2.670 0.004 *** -0.197 -2.670 0.004 *** 
LOSS + 0.011 0.500 0.310  0.011 0.490 0.312  0.011 0.490 0.311  
ALTMAN - -0.002 -0.290 0.387  -0.002 -0.230 0.409  -0.002 -0.250 0.400  
BLOCKOWN + -0.002 -0.200 0.422  -0.002 -0.200 0.420  -0.002 -0.220 0.412  
BIG4 - -0.028 -1.250 0.106  -0.025 -1.130 0.130  -0.026 -1.160 0.123  
SECOND - -0.044 -1.880 0.031 ** -0.044 -1.880 0.031 ** -0.044 -1.880 0.031 ** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARNAT#1 (n=39)  -0.018 -1.220 0.224          
PARCITY# (n=178)      -0.009 -0.820 0.414      
PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=39) 
 
        -0.019 -1.270 0.203  
PARCITY_ONLY (n=139) 
 
        -0.006 -0.500 0.615  
PARTNAT#1_ONLY(n=0) 
 
            
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.008 1.300 0.194  0.007 1.240 0.216  0.007 1.260 0.208  
BODFOREIGN  0.008 0.980 0.328  0.007 0.930 0.355  0.007 0.960 0.338  
INTAUD  -0.003 -0.240 0.810  -0.002 -0.160 0.876  -0.003 -0.210 0.835  
ACSIZE  -0.007 -1.090 0.278  -0.007 -1.110 0.265  -0.007 -1.090 0.276  
ACINDP  -0.003 -0.230 0.820  -0.002 -0.220 0.829  -0.003 -0.220 0.826  
ACFINEXP  0.011 1.980 0.048 ** 0.011 1.960 0.050 ** 0.011 1.980 0.048 ** 
ACMEET  -0.002 -0.320 0.747  -0.002 -0.320 0.747  -0.002 -0.330 0.743  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.229 0.229 0.229 
N  1,019 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard 
errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Next, the study also examines the effect of industry specialist audit partner and corporate governance 
on income-increasing (DAC_PERF ≥ 0) and income-decreasing discretionary accruals (DAC_PERF < 
0). Table 10.6, Panel A, below reports the estimation results where the dependent variable is the 
income-increasing discretionary accruals, whereas Panel B reports the estimation results where the 
dependent variable is the income decreasing abnormal accruals. Examining Table 10.6, Panel A, all 
models are significant (p<0.01), and the adjusted R
2
 ranges from 31.7 percent to 31.8 percent. The 
results for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 are consistent with those reported in Table 10.5 where none 
of the industry specialist audit partner variables are significant. This indicates that industry expertise 
of the audit partners does not play an important role in reducing income-increasing discretionary 
accruals. 
 
On the other hand, examining Table 10.6, Panel B, all models are significant (p<0.01) and the adjusted 
R
2
 is 23.6 percent. Interestingly, none of the industry specialist audit partner variables across all the 
three model estimations are significant. Results in Panel A and Panel B taken together corroborate the 
earlier findings using the magnitude of discretionary accruals reported in Table 10.5 above, and 
indicate that industry specialist auditors at the partner level do not play an important role in lowering 
either income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  
 
In addition, when comparing the corporate governance results between Panel A and Panel B in Table 
10.6, it can be seen that only ACFINEXP in Panel A is significant and positive, suggesting that audit 
committees consisting of more members with accounting or financial expertise contributes to higher 
income-increasing accruals manipulation. This finding is consistent with the results for ACFINEXP as 
reported under the firm national-city framework in Table 10.2. In comparison, ACSIZE and ACMEET, 
which were previously negatively significant under the firm national-city framework (Table 10.2), 
have become insignificant under the partner national-city framework analysis, suggesting that their 
monitoring role has been moderated by the partner industry expertise. Other corporate governance 
variables are not significant at any conventional level, suggesting that they do not play an effective 
role in constraining income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  
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Table  10.6: Income-increasing and income-decreasing DAC_PERF regression under partner national-city framework  
  Panel A: Income-increasing discretionary accruals  Panel B: Income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Intercept  -0.173 -1.660 0.049** -0.163 -1.650 0.050* -0.165 -1.600 0.055*  0.294 2.630 0.005*** 0.301 2.820 0.003*** 0.321 2.860 0.002*** 
TA + 0.032 2.180 0.015** 0.030 2.210 0.014** 0.031 2.110 0.018**  -0.020 -1.360 0.088* -0.022 -1.520 0.064* -0.020 -1.340 0.090* 
PYTAC + 0.076 1.920 0.028** 0.076 1.930 0.028** 0.076 1.920 0.028**  -0.020 -0.760 0.224 -0.020 -0.760 0.224 -0.020 -0.760 0.223 
DE - -0.078 -1.150 0.125 -0.075 -1.130 0.130 -0.075 -1.120 0.132  -0.047 -1.260 0.105 -0.047 -1.260 0.105 -0.048 -1.280 0.102 
GROWTH + -0.005 -0.560 0.289 -0.005 -0.530 0.297 -0.005 -0.530 0.298  0.002 0.130 0.447 0.002 0.140 0.444 0.002 0.140 0.446 
MB + 0.001 0.290 0.388 0.000 0.220 0.411 0.000 0.230 0.410  0.003 1.500 0.068* 0.003 1.470 0.072* 0.003 1.490 0.069* 
CFO - -0.236 -2.970 0.002*** -0.235 -2.980 0.002*** -0.236 -2.960 0.002***  -0.210 -1.650 0.050* -0.209 -1.650 0.050* -0.210 -1.650 0.050* 
LOSS + -0.013 -0.420 0.337 -0.013 -0.410 0.341 -0.013 -0.410 0.341  0.017 0.510 0.306 0.017 0.510 0.306 0.017 0.510 0.307 
ALTMAN - -0.003 -0.270 0.392 -0.002 -0.210 0.418 -0.003 -0.220 0.415  0.001 0.110 0.455 0.001 0.080 0.467 0.001 0.080 0.469 
BLOCKOWN + -0.009 -0.970 0.166 -0.009 -1.050 0.147 -0.009 -1.040 0.150  0.005 0.490 0.312 0.006 0.520 0.301 0.006 0.510 0.304 
BIG4 - -0.021 -0.700 0.244 -0.015 -0.480 0.317 -0.015 -0.480 0.316  -0.055 -1.530 0.063* -0.055 -1.550 0.061* -0.056 -1.570 0.059* 
SECOND - -0.021 -0.870 0.192 -0.020 -0.850 0.199 -0.020 -0.840 0.200  -0.070 -1.800 0.036** -0.070 -1.800 0.036** -0.070 -1.800 0.037** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARTNAT#1  -0.020 -0.760 0.447        -0.009 -0.440 0.658       
PARCITY#1     -0.021 -1.190 0.234        0.004 0.310 0.755    
JOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1       -0.025 -0.910 0.361        -0.008 -0.390 0.698 
PARCITY#1_ONLY         -0.021 -1.040 0.298        0.008 0.460 0.646 
PARNAT#1 ONLY                      
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.009 0.930 0.352 0.008 0.900 0.371 0.009 0.890 0.372  0.003 0.450 0.655 0.003 0.460 0.648 0.003 0.460 0.643 
BODFOREIGN  -0.004 -0.340 0.737 -0.005 -0.400 0.689 -0.005 -0.380 0.705  0.012 1.170 0.242 0.012 1.160 0.245 0.012 1.180 0.240 
INTAUD  -0.013 -0.630 0.527 -0.010 -0.530 0.596 -0.011 -0.520 0.600  0.012 0.650 0.517 0.013 0.700 0.486 0.012 0.630 0.529 
ACSIZE  -0.017 -2.110 0.036 -0.017 -2.090 0.038 -0.017 -2.080 0.038  0.001 0.130 0.900 0.001 0.110 0.916 0.001 0.140 0.886 
ACINDP  0.012 1.090 0.277 0.012 1.070 0.284 0.012 1.070 0.285  -0.017 -0.960 0.335 -0.018 -0.970 0.330 -0.018 -0.980 0.329 
ACFINEXP  0.016 1.710 0.088* 0.016 1.720 0.086* 0.016 1.720 0.087*  0.006 0.810 0.418 0.005 0.760 0.447 0.006 0.800 0.423 
ACMEET  -0.026 -2.120 0.035 -0.026 -2.120 0.034 -0.026 -2.120 0.035  0.009 0.990 0.325 0.009 1.010 0.314 0.009 0.990 0.321 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
R2  0.317 0.318 0.318  0.236 0.236 0.236 
N  395 395 395  624 624 624 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-
statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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10.2.2.2 Accruals estimation error (AEE) 
The next analysis regresses the partner industry specialist and corporate governance proxies on the 
accrual quality measure introduced by McNichols (2002). The results in Table 10.7 below demonstrate 
the effect of audit partner industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on accrual estimation 
error (AEE) (based on the McNichols (2002) accrual quality model). All the models are significant at 
p<0.01, and their adjusted R
2
 is about 8.9 percent. These values, although low, are comparable with prior 
research conducted by Srinidhi et al. (2011) in this area using the same measure of accruals, which 
reported an R
2
 of 11.5 percent. 
 
Model 1 tests the effect of the partner national industry leadership per se (N=39) and corporate 
governance in reducing the AEE, relative to other non-Big 4 industry leading partners (N=547), whereas 
Model 2 tests the effect of the partner city industry leadership per se (N=162) and corporate governance 
in reducing the magnitude of AEE, relative to other non-Big 4 industry leading partners (N=662). This 
iterative process indicates that the top-ranked national partner reduces the AEE, but not the second ranked 
partner in the industry. The coefficient for the top-ranked national industry leading partners (PARNAT#1) 
is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.022, p<0.10), whereas the coefficient for the second-ranked 
partner is not significant at any conventional level. In Model 2, an insignificant result is reported for the 
PARCITY#1 variable, suggesting that city leading partners do not play an important role in reducing the 
magnitude of AEE.  
 
While Models 1 and 2 are provided for completeness, Model 3 is the primary model of interest because it 
controls explicitly for the joint effect of partner national and city-specific industry leadership through the 
use of three audit partner indicator variables. The first audit partner indicator variable is coded 1 for 39 
observations (5 percent of the sample) in which the partner is both the top ranked national leader and top-
ranked city-industry leader; the second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 123 observations (15 
percent of the sample) in which the partner is the top city-industry leader but not the top national leader - 
there is no observation available for the third auditor indicator variable which is coded 1 for when the 
partner is the top-ranked national industry leader but not the top-ranked city-industry leader. 
 
In other words, companies which audit using partners that are national industry leaders (N=39) are also 
jointly city-specific industry leaders (N=39), with none of them being national industry leaders alone 
(N=0). Companies audited by partners that are city-specific industry leaders (N=162) can be decomposed 
into those audited by city-specific industry leaders alone (N=123), plus those partners that are jointly 
national and city-specific industry leaders (N=39). The purpose of these three partitions is to test for the 
separate effects of partner national and city-specific industry leadership on the magnitude of AEE, as well 
as to isolate the joint effect of partner national and city-specific industry leadership on the magnitude of 
AEE. The default comparison group is the 423 observations (80 percent of sample) in which the partner is  
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Table  10.7: AEE Regression under partner national-city framework 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.170 2.740 0.003 *** 0.184 3.060 0.001 *** 0.170 2.740 0.003 *** 
TA + -0.005 -0.590 0.277  -0.007 -0.880 0.190  -0.005 -0.600 0.276  
PYTAC + -0.011 -0.830 0.203  -0.011 -0.830 0.205  -0.011 -0.830 0.203  
DE - 0.006 0.180 0.430  0.007 0.190 0.426  0.006 0.180 0.431  
GROWTH + -0.003 -0.300 0.382  -0.002 -0.290 0.386  -0.003 -0.300 0.383  
MB + 0.000 0.240 0.404  0.000 0.160 0.438  0.000 0.240 0.404  
CFO - -0.031 -1.070 0.142  -0.029 -1.010 0.158  -0.031 -1.070 0.143  
LOSS + 0.008 0.830 0.204  0.008 0.840 0.200  0.008 0.830 0.205  
ALTMAN - -0.008 -1.680 0.047 ** -0.008 -1.630 0.052 ** -0.008 -1.690 0.046 ** 
BLOCKOWN + 0.001 0.220 0.412  0.001 0.300 0.383  0.001 0.230 0.410  
BIG4 - -0.004 -0.250 0.401  -0.002 -0.140 0.445  -0.004 -0.250 0.400  
SECOND - -0.009 -0.550 0.291  -0.009 -0.540 0.293  -0.009 -0.550 0.291  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARNAT#1 (n=39)  -0.022 -1.710 0.088 *         
PARCITY#1 n=162)      -0.004 -0.420 0.675      
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY (n=39)         -0.022 -1.670 0.096 * 
PARCITY#1_ONLY (n=123)          0.000 0.020 0.982  
PARNAT#1_ONLY (n=0)              
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.010 1.610 0.107  0.009 1.550 0.120  0.010 1.600 0.110  
BODFOREIGN  0.002 0.370 0.714  0.001 0.240 0.811  0.002 0.370 0.714  
INTAUD  -0.014 -1.210 0.225  -0.013 -1.080 0.279  -0.014 -1.220 0.225  
ACSIZE  -0.004 -0.800 0.423  -0.004 -0.840 0.402  -0.004 -0.800 0.424  
ACINDP  0.015 2.560 0.011 ** 0.015 2.570 0.010 ** 0.015 2.540 0.011 ** 
ACFINEXP  -0.003 -0.490 0.623  -0.003 -0.570 0.572  -0.003 -0.500 0.619  
ACMEET  0.000 -0.090 0.930  0.000 -0.080 0.938  0.000 -0.090 0.930  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.081 0.080 0.081 
N  824 824 824 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not 
reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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neither the top national nor top city industry leader. Interestingly, the PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-
PARCITY#1 variable is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.022, p<0.05), suggesting that the audit 
partner who is a joint national and city-specific industry leader constrains earnings management through 
reducing the AEE, while audit partner national or city industry leadership alone does not.  
 
In respect of the corporate governance variables, interestingly, none of the corporate governance 
examined is significant at any conventional level, except for ACINDP which is significant at p<0.05. This 
finding of ACINDP is consistent with the one reported in Table 10.3 under the firm national-city 
framework.  For the control variables, only ALTMAN is significant at p<0.10 in the predicted directions 
across all of the model estimations, whereas TA, PYTAC, DE, GROWTH, MB, CFO, LOSS and 
BLOCKOWN are not significant.  
 
10.2.2.3 Likelihood to report a profit / (avoid a loss) (PROFIT) 
Next, a probit model is used to examine the likelihood of companies reporting a profit rather than a loss 
when audited by partners who are industry specialists and who have effective corporate governance. The 
adjusted R
2
 for all models in Table 10.8 below ranges between 37.4 percent and 37.6 percent and is 
significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the models are statistically valid, though slightly lower as compared 
to the regression model used by Francis et al. (2011) in their cross-country study with an R
2
 of 45.5 
percent. 
 
Model 1 tests the effect of the partner national industry leadership per se (N=39) and corporate 
governance on their likelihood to report a profit rather than a loss, relative to other non-industry leading 
Big 4 partners (N=980), whereas Model 2 tests the effect of the partner city industry leadership per se 
(N=178) and corporate governance on their likelihood to report a profit rather than a loss, relative to other 
non-industry leading Big 4 partners (N=841). Based on the results of Model 1 and Model 2, neither 
PARNAT#1 nor PARCITY#1 are significant, suggesting that there is no sufficient evidence to indicate that 
partners who are either national or city industry leaders are more conservative in their profit reporting. 
 
While Models 1 and 2 are provided for completeness, Model 3 is the primary model of interest because it 
controls explicitly for the joint effect of partner national and city-specific industry leadership through the 
use of three auditor indicator variables. The first auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 39 observations 
(4 percent of the sample) in which the partner is both the top-ranked national leader and top-ranked city-
specific industry leader; the second auditor indicator variable is coded 1 for 139 observations (14 percent 
of the sample) in which the partner is the top-ranked city-specific industry leader but not the top-ranked 
national leader, whereas there is no observation available for the third auditor indicator variable which is 
coded 1 for when the auditor is the top national industry leader but not the top-ranked city-specific 
industry leader.             
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Table  10.8: PROFIT Regression under partner national-city framework  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -1.119 -1.350 0.088 * -1.185 -1.460 0.072 * -0.982 -1.180 0.119  
TA + 0.190 1.780 0.038 ** 0.204 1.950 0.026 ** 0.173 1.610 0.054 ** 
LEV - 0.048 0.120 0.454  0.069 0.170 0.434  0.086 0.210 0.418  
TAC - -1.743 -2.900 0.002 *** -1.781 -2.950 0.002 *** -1.770 -2.950 0.002 *** 
GROWTH + 0.122 1.450 0.074 * 0.120 1.430 0.077 * 0.122 1.450 0.073 * 
MB + 0.016 1.280 0.101  0.017 1.380 0.083 * 0.015 1.220 0.111  
CFO + 2.496 3.850 0.000 *** 2.485 3.810 0.000 *** 2.508 3.850 0.000 *** 
LAG LOSS - -0.784 -6.610 0.000 *** -0.785 -6.610 0.000 *** -0.788 -6.630 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN + 0.225 2.600 0.005 *** 0.230 2.650 0.004 *** 0.233 2.700 0.004 *** 
BLOCKOWN - 0.008 0.140 0.444  -0.007 -0.130 0.449  -0.002 -0.030 0.487  
BIG4 - -0.078 -0.470 0.320  -0.045 -0.270 0.393  -0.014 -0.080 0.468  
SECOND - 0.081 0.490 0.311  0.075 0.460 0.323  0.082 0.500 0.309  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARNAT#1 (n=39)  0.193 0.630 0.531          
PARCITY#1 (178)      -0.194 -1.350 0.178      
JOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=39)         0.153 0.490 0.624  
PARCITY#1 _ONLY (n=139) 
 
       -0.255 -1.630 0.103  
PARNAT#1_ONLY (n=0) 
 
            
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.003 0.040 0.969  0.002 0.030 0.978  -0.002 -0.020 0.981  
BODFOREIGN  -0.085 -1.280 0.201  -0.077 -1.160 0.244  -0.087 -1.310 0.189  
INTAUD  0.157 1.080 0.279  0.154 1.070 0.284  0.176 1.210 0.226  
ACSIZE  0.021 0.290 0.775  0.024 0.340 0.737  0.018 0.240 0.808  
ACINDP  -0.003 -0.040 0.972  0.002 0.030 0.979  0.003 0.040 0.969  
ACFINEXP  0.013 0.220 0.827  0.019 0.330 0.740  0.014 0.240 0.813  
ACMEET  -0.032 -0.480 0.631  -0.032 -0.480 0.630  -0.031 -0.460 0.643  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.374 0.375 0.376 
N  1,019 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects 
and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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In other words, companies with partners that are national industry leaders (N=39) are also jointly city-
specific industry leaders (N=39), with none of them being national industry leaders alone (N=0). 
Companies with partners that are city-specific industry leaders (N=178) can be decomposed into those 
audited by partners who are city-specific industry leaders alone (N=139), plus those partners that are 
jointly national and city-specific industry leaders (N=39). The purpose of these three partitions is to test 
for the separate effects of partners national and city-specific industry leadership on their likelihood to 
report a profit rather than a loss, relative to other Big 4 partners who are non-leaders. The default 
comparison group is the 841 observations (82 percent of sample) in which the audit partner is neither the 
top-ranked national nor the top-ranked city-industry leader. Results from Model 3 indicate that none of 
the partner indicator variables are significant at p=0.10, suggesting that there is no sufficient evidence to 
suggest that Big 4 partners industry leadership affects its conservatism in profit reporting, relative to other 
non-Big 4 industry leading partners. 
 
Consistent with Table 10.4 earlier under the firm national-city framework, none of the corporate 
governance variables are significant at any conventional level, suggesting that the variation in the 
company’s corporate governance characteristics does not have a significant effect on the company’s 
likelihood of reporting profit (or loss). Control variables TAC, MB, CFO, LAG_LOSS and ALTMAN are 
positive and significant, suggesting that companies which have lower accruals, higher growth, lower 
operating cash flows, experienced loss in the previous year, and have a higher risk of bankruptcy are 
more likely to report a profit rather than a loss. 
 
Overall, the results of the earnings quality analysis under the audit partner national and city framework 
for auditor industry specialisation while controlling for the effect of corporate governance do not show 
consistent evidence that audit partner industry leadership in the U.K. is important in promoting earnings 
quality. This is the first set of audit partner data that is reported in the U.K. and the results may be 
different when more data from other years is incorporated in future research. 
 
10.2.3 Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
So far, the results from the firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework for auditor 
industry specialisation offer conflicting results. While firm national-city industry leadership does have a 
positive effect in promoting higher earnings quality, partner industry leadership does not show an 
important effect. However, it could be argued that the results from the firm level perspective and partner 
level perspective alone suffer from omitted variable bias, due to the failure to control for the confounding 
effect of the audit firm industry leadership either at the national or city level, as similarly argued in the 
audit pricing analysis in Chapter 7. This means that the effect of the audit partner in promoting earnings 
quality is subsumed within the effect of audit firm industry leadership. The same applies to the results of 
earnings management under the audit firm national-city framework, where the confounding effect of the 
partner industry leadership was not controlled for in the firm industry leadership analysis. Thus, there is a 
possibility that the reported significance or insignificance in these two models is understated due to 
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omitted variable bias. To correct for this effect, this study adopts the joint firm-partner national-city 
framework where it examines the importance of partner-level industry expertise and firm level industry 
expertise simultaneously to determine which type of industry leadership is more important and effective 
in improving a firm’s earnings quality (the same approach has been used in the audit quality analysis in 
Chapter 7). The joint firm-partner national-city framework represents the contribution of this study to the 
auditor industry specialisation literature, given that it has not yet been tested before in other countries.  
 
10.2.3.1 Performance-matched discretionary accruals (DAC_PERF) 
For the results in Table 10.10 below, the coding for the joint firm-partner industry leadership is derived 
from the analysis in Table 10.1 and Table 10.5 above. The firm industry leadership is based on the 
combination of the top two national industry leaders and the top-ranked city industry leader, whereas the 
partner industry leadership is based on the combination of the top-ranked national industry leader and the 
top-ranked city industry leader.  
 
The combinations of the firm national-city framework and partner national-city framework results in the 
creation of 15 new variables to be examined under the joint firm-partner national-city framework 
analysis. These variables are described in detail in Table 10.9 below. The R
2
 is 23.2 percent and is 
significant at p<0.01. Given that the sample size for the joint firm-partner national-city framework is 
N=680, then the default group is N=173 and is comprised of both audit firms and partners who are not 
leaders either at the national or the city-industry level. 
 
From the joint firm-partner national-city framework tests, as shown in Table 10.10 below, evidence 
indicates that audit firms that are both national and city-specific industry leaders seem to constrain 
discretionary accruals either when the partner is both joint national and city-specific industry leaders 
(NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1) or when the partner is only leader at the city-specific industry 
level but not nationally (NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1), where the coefficients are -0.036 
(p<0.10) and -0.032 (p<0.10), respectively. Firm joint national and city-specific industry leadership 
proves to be important beyond partner industry leadership as the variable representing joint firm national 
and city-specific industry leadership without partner industry leadership NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-
PARCITY#0 is negatively significant (coefficient=-0.030, p<0.10). However, NAT#0-
CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 is also negative and significant (coefficient=-0.074, p<0.05), 
suggesting that in certain cities the firm industry leadership position is more crucial than other industry 
leadership positions. Nevertheless, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution due to the small 
number of observations (less than 10), although the result is significant. 
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Table  10.9: Definition of industry specialist auditor variables under the joint firm-partner national-city framework for DAC_PERF analysis 
Variable  N Variable definition 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
 
39 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  93 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 2 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 42 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 7 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
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nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the 
top- ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 131 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 185 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#2), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  8 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
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Table  10.10: DAC_PERF Regression under joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.120 1.520 0.065 ** 
TA + -0.002 -0.230 0.410  
PYTAC + 0.024 1.030 0.152  
DE - -0.048 -1.450 0.074 * 
GROWTH + -0.005 -0.600 0.276  
MB + 0.002 1.220 0.112  
CFO - -0.204 -2.730 0.004 *** 
LOSS + 0.012 0.520 0.303  
ALTMAN - -0.002 -0.200 0.422  
BLOCKOWN + -0.002 -0.180 0.429  
BIG4 - -0.011 -0.450 0.327  
SECOND - -0.045 -1.890 0.030 ** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=39)  -0.036 -1.840 0.066 * 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=93)  -0.032 -1.920 0.055 * 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)      
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=2)  -0.022 -0.360 0.720  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)      
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=42)  -0.001 -0.050 0.961  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)      
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=7)  -0.037 -1.430 0.152  
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=131)  -0.030 -1.890 0.059 * 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=185)  -0.020 -1.300 0.195  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=8)  -0.074 -2.400 0.017 ** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.008 1.330 0.182  
BODFOREIGN  0.007 0.940 0.345  
INTAUD  -0.002 -0.140 0.886  
ACSIZE  -0.007 -1.050 0.294  
ACINDP  -0.002 -0.200 0.840  
ACFINEXP  0.012 2.100 0.036 ** 
ACMEET  -0.003 -0.460 0.645  
Year fixed-effects Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included 
R2  0.232 
N  1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist 
auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported 
for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
 
Interestingly, none of the corporate governance variables are significant at any conventional level, 
except for ACFINEXP, which is positive and significant (coefficient=0.012, p<0.05). This finding for 
ACFINEXP is consistent with previous DAC_PERF using the firm national-city framework (Table 
10.1) and partner national-city framework (Table 10.5). For the control variables, DE, CFO and 
SECOND are negative and significant at p<0.10, which is consistent with Reichelt and Wang (2010), 
Minutti-Meza (2013), and Francis et al. (2013), suggesting that abnormal accruals are larger for firms 
that have lower leverage (DE) and lower operating cash flow (CFO) and are audited by the second-tier 
audit firm (SECOND). Other control variables, TA, PYTAC, GROWTH, MB and BLOCKOWN, are not 
significant at any conventional level. 
 
Next, the study examines the effect of joint firm-partner national-city industry leadership and 
corporate governance on income-increasing (DAC_PERF ≥ 0) and income-decreasing discretionary 
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accruals (DAC_PERF < 0). Table 10.11, Panel A below reports the estimation results where the 
dependent variable is the income increasing discretionary accruals; Panel B reports the estimation 
results where the dependent variable is the income decreasing abnormal accruals. The model in Table 
10.11, Panel A, is significant (p<0.01), and the adjusted R
2
 is 33.7 percent. The reported results in 
Panel A are consistent with those reported in Table 10.11. Evidence indicates that audit firms which 
are both national and city-specific industry leaders constrain discretionary accruals either when the 
partner is both joint national and city-specific industry leaders (NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-
PARCITY#1) or when the partner is only leader at the city-specific industry level but not nationally 
(NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1), where the coefficients are -0.077 (p<0.10) and -0.067 
(p<0.10), respectively. Firm joint national industry leadership proves to be important beyond partner 
industry leadership as the coefficient for NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 is significant and 
negative (coefficient = -0.085, p<0.05). The firm industry leadership is driven by the firm leadership 
position at the national level as NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 is also negatively 
significant (coefficient = -0.064, p<0.10). Taken together, this result indicates that audit firm industry 
leadership at the national level drives earnings quality in the U.K. public listed companies market. 
However, NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 is also negative and significant (coefficient = -
0.085, p<0.05), suggesting that in certain cities the partner industry leadership position is more crucial 
than other industry leadership positions. Nevertheless, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution 
due to its small number of observations (less than 10), although the result is significant.  
 
In respect of the corporate governance variables, ACSIZE and ACMEET are negative and significant 
(coefficient = -0.018, p<0.05 and coefficient= -0.030, p<0.05, respectively), suggesting that a larger 
size and active audit committee constrain income-increasing discretionary accruals. On the other hand, 
ACFINEXP is positive and significant (coefficient= 0.016, p<0.10), which indicates that the more 
financially expert members there are in the audit committee actually increases the risk of earning 
manipulation through income-increasing accruals. Other corporate governance variables BODFEM, 
BODFOREIGN, INTAUD and ACINDP are not significant at any conventional level. 
 
Examining Table 10.11, Panel B, the model is significant (p<0.01) and the adjusted R
2
 is 24 percent. 
Interestingly, none of the industry specialist auditor variables across the model estimations are 
significant, except for NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 and NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-
PARCITY#0 which are negatively significant (coefficient= -0.075, p<0.10 and coefficient= -0.099, 
p<0.05, respectively). Nevertheless, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution due to its small 
number of observations (less than 10), although the result is significant. Comparing the results of 
industry specialist auditors in Panel A and Panel B, it seems that only the results for the income-
increasing discretionary accruals corroborate the earlier findings using the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals reported in Table 10.10 above. This shows that audit firms with leading industry expertise are 
more concerned about income-increasing earnings management than income-decreasing earnings 
management. 
234 
 
Table  10.11: Income-increasing and income-decreasing DAC_PERF Regression under joint firm 
partner national-city framework 
  
Panel A: Income-increasing 
discretionary accruals 
 Panel B: Income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig.  coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -0.191 -1.790 0.037 **  0.315 2.770 0.003 *** 
TA + 0.034 2.300 0.011   -0.019 -1.260 0.104  
PYTAC + 0.081 1.960 0.026 **  -0.020 -0.760 0.224  
DE - -0.072 -1.090 0.138   -0.057 -1.400 0.082 * 
GROWTH + -0.001 -0.130 0.450   0.002 0.160 0.438  
MB + 0.000 -0.110 0.458   0.003 1.460 0.072 * 
CFO - -0.237 -3.020 0.002 ***  -0.218 -1.670 0.048 ** 
LOSS + -0.013 -0.420 0.339   0.018 0.530 0.298  
ALTMAN - -0.003 -0.210 0.416   0.002 0.210 0.418  
BLOCKOWN + -0.009 -0.970 0.168   0.006 0.530 0.299  
BIG4 - 0.030 0.700 0.242   -0.056 -1.610 0.055 * 
SECOND - -0.020 -0.840 0.202   -0.070 -1.790 0.037 ** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  -0.077 -1.870 0.062 *  -0.010 -0.400 0.693  
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.067 -1.970 0.050 *  -0.007 -0.410 0.684  
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1           
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.261 -2.710 0.007 ***  0.075 1.900 0.058 * 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1           
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.045 -0.960 0.340   0.033 0.950 0.341  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1           
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  -0.085 -2.160 0.031 **  0.034 1.100 0.272  
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0           
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.085 -2.590 0.010 **  -0.003 -0.160 0.873  
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0           
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.064 -1.840 0.066 *  0.005 0.300 0.765  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0           
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  -0.037 -1.050 0.296   -0.099 -2.120 0.034 ** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0           
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.012 1.320 0.186   0.003 0.440 0.663  
BODFOREIGN  -0.005 -0.360 0.717   0.013 1.250 0.213  
INTAUD  -0.009 -0.460 0.647   0.012 0.640 0.521  
ACSIZE  -0.018 -2.140 0.033 **  0.002 0.210 0.831  
ACINDP  0.012 1.110 0.269   -0.017 -0.960 0.337  
ACFINEXP  0.016 1.730 0.084 *  0.006 0.840 0.399  
ACMEET  -0.030 -2.350 0.019 **  0.009 1.030 0.304  
Year fixed-effects  Included  Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included  Included 
R2  0.337  0.240 
N  395  624 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except the industry specialist auditor 
variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for 
brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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In addition, when comparing the corporate governance results between Panel A and Panel B in Table 
10.11, it can be seen from Panel A that ACSIZE and ACMEET are negative and significant, whereas 
ACFINEXP is positive and significant. On the other hand, none of the corporate governance variables 
in Panel B are significant. These findings are consistent with the corporate governance results reported 
earlier under the firm national-city framework analysis (Panel A and Panel B of Table 10.2) for 
income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. This suggests that corporate 
governance only plays an effective role in reducing income-increasing discretionary accruals, but not 
for constraining income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  
 
10.2.3.2 Accrual estimation error (AEE) 
For the results in Table 10.13, the coding for the joint firm-partner industry leadership is derived from 
analysis in Table 10.3 and Table 10.6 above, where the firm industry leadership is based on the 
combination of the top-ranked national industry leader and the top-ranked city industry leader; the 
partner industry leadership is also based on the combination of the top-ranked national industry leader 
and the top-ranked city industry leader. The R
2
 is 8.7 percent and is significant at p<0.01. The 
definition for the industry specialist auditor variables under the joint firm-partner national-city 
framework is given in Table 10.12. Given that the sample size for the joint firm-partner national-city 
framework is N=680, then the default group is N=322 and is comprised of both audit firms and 
partners who are not leaders either at the national or city-industry level. 
 
For the joint firm-partner national-city framework tests, only two variables are significant. NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 is negative and significant (coefficient= -0.028, p<0.10), suggesting 
that combined leadership of the firm and the partner at the national and city level is associated with a 
lower level of AEE. However, NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 is also negative and 
significant (coefficient= -0.020, p<0.05), which indicates that firm joint industry leadership is more 
important above and beyond the audit partner industry leadership in their ability to reduce AEE. An F-
test indicates that there are no significant differences between the coefficients for NAT#1-
CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 and NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (F-statistic=0.000, 
p=0.986), which indicates that firm joint industry leadership either alone or in conjunction with 
partner industry leadership is equally effective in constraining accrual estimation error. This shows 
that there is no incremental value provided by the partner leadership in reducing AEE.  
 
In respect of the audit committee characteristics, BODFEM and ACINDP are significant and positive 
(coefficient = 0.011, p<0.10 and coefficient = 0.015, p<.05, respectively), suggesting that the more 
female directors there are on the board and the more independent members there are on the audit 
committee, the higher is the risk of earnings manipulation as evidenced by the higher level of AEE. 
This finding contradicts a prior study by Srinidhi et al. (2011) which reports negative association 
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Table  10.12: Definition of industry specialist auditor variables under the joint firm-partner national-city framework for AEE analysis 
Variable  N Variable definition 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
 
38 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  58 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 1 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 77 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 9 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
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nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top two ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is 
the top ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 113 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is the top-
ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 36 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#1), the office is not the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share nationally 
(PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), and zero 
otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  26 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is the 
top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the office is not 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
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Table  10.13: AEE regression under joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.166 2.630 0.005 *** 
TA + -0.004 -0.510 0.305  
PYTAC + -0.011 -0.860 0.194  
DE - 0.008 0.210 0.419  
GROWTH + -0.003 -0.360 0.358  
MB + 0.000 0.260 0.396  
CFO - -0.028 -0.960 0.168  
LOSS + 0.007 0.650 0.259  
ALTMAN - -0.009 -1.890 0.030 ** 
BLOCKOWN + 0.001 0.250 0.400  
BIG4 - -0.004 -0.220 0.414  
SECOND - -0.009 -0.570 0.284  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=38) -0.028 -1.860 0.063 * 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=58) 0.011 0.510 0.607  
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=0)     
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=0)     
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=1) 0.024 1.480 0.139  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=77) -0.010 -0.710 0.476  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)     
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=9) -0.022 -0.700 0.482  
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)     
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=113) -0.020 -2.090 0.037 ** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)     
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=36) 0.002 0.170 0.868  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  (n=0)     
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  (n=26) 0.029 0.480 0.634  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)     
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.011 1.750 0.080 * 
BODFOREIGN  0.002 0.350 0.726  
INTAUD  -0.013 -1.150 0.252  
ACSIZE  -0.004 -0.780 0.433  
ACINDP  0.015 2.460 0.014 ** 
ACFINEXP  -0.003 -0.520 0.606  
ACMEET  -0.001 -0.240 0.810  
Year fixed-effects Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included 
R2  0.087 
N  824 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist 
auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported 
for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
 
between female directorship and accruals quality. Other corporate governance variables 
BODFOREIGN, INTAUD, ACSIZE, ACFINEXP and ACMEET are not significant at any conventional 
level. 
 
For the control variables, only ALTMAN is negative and significant at p<0.01, similar to Reichelt and 
Wang (2010) and Minutti-Meza (2013), which shows that accrual estimation error is larger for firms 
with higher bankruptcy risk (ALTMAN)
25
. Other control variables, TA, PYTAC, DE, GROWTH, MB, 
CFO, LOSS, BLOCKOWN, BIG4 and SECOND, are not significant at any conventional level. 
 
                                                     
25 The Altman score measures the likelihood of a company survival. Lower (higher) scores measure greater (lesser) 
bankruptcy risk. Thus, negative association is expected between accrual estimation error and Altman. 
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10.2.3.3 Likelihood to report a profit / (avoid a loss) (PROFIT) 
For the results in Table 10.15 below, the coding for the joint firm-partner industry leadership is 
derived based on analysis from Table 10.4 and Table 10.8, where the firm industry leadership is based 
on the combination of the top three ranked national industry leaders and the top-ranked city industry 
leader, whereas the partner industry leadership is based on the combination of the top-ranked national 
industry leader and the top-ranked city industry leader. The R
2
 is 38 percent and is significant at 
p<0.01. The definition for the industry specialist auditor variables under the joint firm-partner 
national-city framework is provided in Table 10.14 below. Given that the sample size for the joint 
firm-partner national-city framework is N=680, then the default group is N=77 and is comprised of 
both audit firms and partners who are not leaders either at the national or city-industry level. 
 
For the joint firm-partner national-city framework tests in Table 10.14, only one industry specialist 
auditor variable is significant. NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 is negative and significant 
(coefficient= -0.022, p<0.10), suggesting that combined joint leadership of the firm and the city 
partner is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a loss rather than a profit. 
 
In respect of the corporate governance variables in Table 10.15, none of the variables are significant at 
any conventional level, consistent with the earlier reported results under the firm national-city 
framework (Table 10.4) and partner national-city framework (Table 10.8) analyses. Control variables 
TA, TAC, GROWTH, MB, CFO, LAG_LOSS and ALTMAN are significant, suggesting that companies 
that are larger in size, have lower accruals, higher growth, lower operating cash flows, have 
experienced loss in the prior year and have a higher risk of bankruptcy are more likely to report a 
profit rather than a loss (Francis et al., 2013). 
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Table  10.14: Definition of industry specialist auditor variables under the joint firm-partner national-city framework for PROFIT analysis 
Variable  N Variable definition 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 
 
39 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  119 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#1), and 
zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 4 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 16 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 5 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by 
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market share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#1), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#6), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 134 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (PARCITY#0), 
and zero otherwise; 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 276 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#3), the office is 
not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  5 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#1), the audit partner is not the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#0), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 0 Indicator variable = 1 if the audit firm is not in the top three ranked by market share nationally (NAT#0), the 
office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share (CITY#0), the audit partner is the top-ranked by market 
share nationally (PARNAT#1), and the audit partner is not the top-ranked by city-industry market share 
(PARCITY#0), and zero otherwise; 
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Table  10.15: PROFIT Regression under joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -1.026 -1.220 0.112  
TA + 0.180 1.650 0.050 * 
LEV + 0.077 0.180 0.429  
TAC - -1.867 -3.140 0.001 *** 
GROWTH + 0.129 1.520 0.065 * 
MB + 0.018 1.440 0.075 * 
CFO - 2.533 3.770 0.000 *** 
LAG LOSS + -0.787 -6.590 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN - 0.240 2.790 0.003 *** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.009 -0.150 0.441  
BIG4 - 0.245 0.990 0.160  
SECOND - 0.083 0.510 0.307  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=39)  -0.116 -0.320 0.752  
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  (n=119)  -0.675 -2.580 0.010 ** 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=0)      
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=4)      
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)      
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=16)  0.702 1.490 0.137  
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)      
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=5)      
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=139)  -0.398 -1.640 0.100  
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=276)  -0.271 -1.220 0.222  
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  (n=0)      
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  (n=5)      
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)      
Corporate Governance      
BODFEM  -0.007 -0.090 0.926  
BODFOREIGN  -0.075 -1.120 0.264  
INTAUD  0.168 1.160 0.248  
ACSIZE  -0.001 -0.020 0.985  
ACINDP  0.002 0.020 0.983  
ACFINEXP  0.020 0.340 0.731  
ACMEET  -0.030 -0.440 0.659  
Year fixed-effects Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included 
R2 0.380 
N 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist 
auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported 
for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
 
 
10.3 Summary 
The findings from the second empirical study suggest that audit firm industry leadership plays a more 
important role than audit partner industry leadership in promoting higher earnings quality, as 
evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, lower accrual estimation error and higher likelihood of 
reporting a loss rather than a profit. The finding on auditor industry specialisation seems to support the 
product differentiation theory and reputation theory, given the consistent evidence between fee 
premium and higher earnings quality offered by industry specialist auditors. In addition, the study also 
finds that the audit committee’s financial expertise and independence contribute to accruals 
manipulation through larger magnitude of discretionary accruals and higher accrual estimation error. 
This finding is interesting given the data is tested in the period following the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis, suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms is not effective in constraining earnings 
management, but somehow the effect is moderated by the role of industry specialist auditor. In 
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addition, the study also finds that the female directors, audit committee independence, and audit 
committee’s accounting or financial expertise contribute to accruals manipulation.  Findings for the 
corporate governance analyses are consistent with institutional theory or managerial hegemony theory, 
where the role of board is viewed to be passive and more of ceremonial in nature during the sample 
period investigated, as there is no evidence to suggest that they effectively constrain the earnings 
management practices in the U.K. public listed companies. 
 
The results from the multivariate analyses are summarised in Table 10.16 below. 
 
Table  10.16: Summary of findings from multivariate analysis for the second empirical study 
Hypotheses DAC_PERF 
Findings 
AEE Findings PROFIT 
Findings 
H2 There is no significant 
relationship between the female 
directors on boards and earnings 
quality. 
Not significant. Significant 
negative 
relationship. 
Not significant. 
H4 There is no significant 
relationship between foreign 
directors on boards and earnings 
quality. 
Not significant. Not significant. Not significant. 
H6 There is no significant 
relationship between the 
internal audit function and 
earnings quality. 
Not significant Not significant. Not significant. 
H8 There is no significant 
relationship between the size of 
audit committees and earnings 
quality. 
Not significant. Not significant. Not significant. 
H10 There is no significant 
relationship between audit 
committee independence and 
earnings quality. 
Not significant. Significant 
negative 
relationship. 
Not significant. 
H12 There is no significant 
relationship between audit 
committee financial expertise 
and earnings quality. 
Significant 
negative 
relationship. 
Not significant. Not significant. 
H14 There is no relationship between 
audit committee diligence and 
earnings quality. 
Not significant. Not significant. Not significant. 
H16 There is no significant 
relationship between auditor 
industry leadership and earnings 
quality. 
Significant 
positive 
relationship. 
Significant 
positive 
relationship. 
Significant 
positive 
relationship. 
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CHAPTER 11 
FURTHER ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS: THE EFFECT 
OF INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AUDITORS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ON EARNINGS QUALITY 
 
11.1 Introduction 
Several tests are performed after the multivariate regression analysis in Chapter 10. The purpose of 
these additional tests is to provide reasonable assurance that the main findings in Chapter 10 are robust 
to the various models and variables specifications. The robustness tests include tests using different 
regression estimators, alternative measures for audit firm industry specialist, moderating effect of 
competitive pressure on audit firm industry specialist ability in constraining earnings management, 
continuous measure of industry specialist, moderating effect of gender and tenure on audit partner 
industry expertise ability in constraining earnings management, endogenous relationship between 
industry specialist auditor and corporate governance and earnings quality,  various alternative fixed-
effects models, and alternative definitions of corporate governance characteristics. Overall, these 
robustness tests presented in the following sections of this chapter provide additional empirical 
evidence on the main conclusions reached in the last chapter.  
 
11.2 Alternative regression estimator 
In this section, the various earnings quality regressions that have been carried out using the OLS in the 
main analysis are being re-estimated using alternative regression estimators; i) one-way cluster robust 
standard error clustering for the firm dimension, and ii) two-way cluster robust standard error, 
clustering for both the firm and time dimensions. This sensitivity analysis is the same as the one that 
have been carried out for the audit fees analysis in Section 8.2 earlier. 
 
For the DAC_PERF model, the test results for the industry specialist auditor variables in Table 11.1 
below are consistent with the results reported in the main analysis using OLS in Chapter 10 earlier, 
where the audit firm industry leadership matters more than the partner industry leadership in reducing 
the AEE. Whereas for the corporate governance variables, findings are consistent throughout all the 
models as per the main analyses, where only ACFINEXP is significant and positive, suggesting that 
the accruals manipulation is higher when the audit committee comprised of more members with 
accounting or financial background or qualification. Other corporate governance variables are not 
significant at any conventional levels.  
 
For the AEE model, the test results for the industry specialist auditor variables in Table 11.2 below are 
consistent with the results reported in the main analysis using OLS in Chapter 10 earlier, where the 
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audit firm industry leadership matters more than the partner industry leadership in reducing the AEE. 
Whereas for the corporate governance variables, findings are consistent throughout all the models as 
per the main analyses, where BODFEM is significant and positive, suggesting that the accruals 
estimation error is higher when the board comprised of more female directors on board. However, 
when two-way robust cluster standard error is used for the analysis, BODFEM is also significant. 
Other corporate governance variables are not significant at any conventional levels. 
 
For the PROFIT model, the test results for the industry specialist auditor variables in Table 11.3 below 
inconsistent with the results reported in the main analysis using OLS in Chapter 10 earlier, as there is 
also evidence that partners who are industry leaders at the city level are more conservative in their 
profit reporting. On the other hand, results from the main analysis indicate that the audit firm firm 
industry leadership matters more than the partner industry leadership in conservative profit reporting. 
Whereas for the corporate governance variables, findings are consistent throughout all the models as 
per the main analyses when one-way cluster robust standard error is used, as none of the corporate 
governance variables seemed to be significant at any conventional level. However, when two-way 
cluster robust standard error is used as the regression estimator,  BODFOREIGN and INTAUD turned 
out to be significant at p<0.01 when the partner industry leadership is controlled for in Model 2 and 
Model 3. Other corporate governance variables remain insignificant at the conventional levels. 
 
Taken together, it seems that the main analyses results from using OLS are only consistent with the 
one-way cluster robust standard error is used, clustering for time dimension. However, when both time 
and firm dimension are being clustered for using the two-way cluster robust standard error, some 
results in the AEE and PROFIT analyses which were insignificant in the main analyses have now 
become significant. 
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Table  11.1: DAC_PERF Regression using different regression estimators 
  Panel A: One-way cluster robust standard error  Panel B: Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/-
/- 
coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Intercept  0.101 1.510 0.066* 0.127 1.600 0.055* 0.120 1.500 0.067*  0.101 2.010 0.023** 0.127 2.230 0.013**** 0.120 1.740 0.041** 
TA + 0.002 0.220 0.414 -0.004 -0.340 0.369 -0.002 -0.230 0.411  0.002 0.250 0.402 -0.004 -0.490 0.313 -0.002 -0.270 0.393 
PYTAC + 0.023 1.360 0.087* 0.024 0.980 0.164 0.024 0.950 0.172  0.023 1.830 0.034** 0.024 1.600 0.055* 0.024 1.480 0.070* 
DE - -0.058 -2.310 0.011** -0.047 -1.650 0.050* -0.048 -1.710 0.045**  -0.058 -2.520 0.006*** -0.047 -1.620 0.053* -0.048 -2.380 0.009*** 
GROWTH + 0.003 0.510 0.305 -0.005 -0.570 0.285 -0.005 -0.580 0.281  0.003 0.320 0.375 -0.005 -0.410 0.343 -0.005 -0.450 0.326 
MB + 0.002 1.580 0.058* 0.002 1.420 0.078* 0.002 1.330 0.092*  0.002 3.380 0.001*** 0.002 3.310 0.001*** 0.002 2.970 0.002*** 
CFO - -0.180 -2.910 0.002*** -0.197 -2.680 0.004*** -0.204 -2.740 0.004***  -0.180 -2.400 0.009*** -0.197 -2.440 0.008*** -0.204 -2.570 0.005*** 
LOSS + 0.005 0.260 0.396 0.011 0.530 0.299 0.012 0.550 0.291  0.005 0.230 0.409 0.011 0.480 0.314 0.012 0.490 0.311 
ALTMAN - -0.003 -0.430 0.335 -0.002 -0.240 0.405 -0.002 -0.190 0.426  -0.003 -0.510 0.306 -0.002 -0.360 0.358 -0.002 -0.280 0.389 
BLOCKOWN + -0.003 -0.550 0.291 -0.002 -0.230 0.408 -0.002 -0.190 0.425  -0.003 -0.410 0.343 -0.002 -0.160 0.437 -0.002 -0.130 0.447 
BIG4 - -0.013 -0.680 0.248 -0.026 -1.220 0.111 -0.011 -0.470 0.321  -0.013 -0.470 0.320 -0.026 -0.930 0.177 -0.011 -0.310 0.378 
SECOND - -0.043 -2.190 0.015** -0.044 -1.980 0.024** -0.045 -2.000 0.024**  -0.043 -1.640 0.050* -0.044 -1.270 0.103 -0.045 -1.300 0.098* 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national-city framework 
JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 (n=337)  -0.030 -2.650 0.008***        -0.030 -2.010 0.045**       
CITY#1_ONLY (n=64)  -0.008 -0.540 0.592        -0.008 -0.370 0.709       
NAT#2_ONLY (n=234)  -0.021 -1.720 0.086*        -0.021 -2.020 0.044**       
Partner national-city framework           
PARJOINT_PARTNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=39)     -0.019 -1.180 0.239        -0.019 -0.960 0.335    
PARCITY_ONLY (n=139)     -0.006 -0.540 0.587        -0.006 -0.740 0.461    
PARTNAT#1_ONLY(n=0) 
 
                   
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=39)       -0.036 -1.740 0.082*        -0.036 -1.460 0.145 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=93)       -0.032 -1.920 0.056*        -0.032 -2.760 0.006*** 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)                    
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=2)       -0.022 -0.350 0.723        -0.022 -0.490 0.621 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)                    
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=42)       -0.001 -0.060 0.953        -0.001 -0.040 0.972 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)                    
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=7)       -0.037 -1.630 0.104        -0.037 -4.000 0.000*** 
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                    
NAT#2-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=131)       -0.030 -1.770 0.077*        -0.030 -1.140 0.256 
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                    
NAT#2-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=185)       -0.020 -1.300 0.196        -0.020 -1.580 0.114 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                    
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=8)       -0.074 -2.310 0.021**        -0.074 -2.970 0.003*** 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                    
Corporate Governance                    
BODFEM 0.004 0.830 0.408 0.007 1.400 0.163 0.008 1.500 0.135  0.004 0.560 0.575 0.007 0.840 0.403 0.008 0.960 0.338 
BODFOREIGN 0.009 1.420 0.156 0.007 1.040 0.300 0.007 1.020 0.307  0.009 1.770 0.077* 0.007 1.580 0.116 0.007 1.390 0.165 
INTAUD -0.012 -1.130 0.257 -0.003 -0.210 0.834 -0.002 -0.140 0.887  -0.012 -1.090 0.277 -0.003 -0.240 0.813 -0.002 -0.150 0.884 
ACSIZE -0.005 -1.000 0.318 -0.007 -1.080 0.280 -0.007 -1.040 0.300  -0.005 -1.330 0.183 -0.007 -1.340 0.179 -0.007 -1.120 0.263 
ACINDP -0.001 -0.150 0.881 -0.003 -0.210 0.831 -0.002 -0.200 0.844  -0.001 -0.330 0.745 -0.003 -0.690 0.491 -0.002 -0.550 0.584 
 
 
 
                   
                    
247 
                    
Table ‎11.1: DAC_PERF Regression using different regression estimators (continued) 
  Panel A: One-way cluster robust standard error  Panel B: Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/-
/- 
coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
ACFINEXP  0.008 2.030 0.043** 0.011 2.270 0.024** 0.012 2.390 0.017**  0.008 2.240 0.025** 0.011 3.540 0.000*** 0.012 3.840 0.000*** 
ACMEET  -0.006 -0.890 0.373 -0.002 -0.320 0.747 -0.003 -0.460 0.648  -0.006 -1.090 0.276 -0.002 -0.400 0.690 -0.003 -0.560 0.576 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Cluster by Year  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.214 0.229 0.232  0.214 0.229 0.232 
N  1,347 1,019 1,019  1,347 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity. Refer Table 5.8 for 
definition of variables. 
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Table  11.2: AEE Regression using different regression estimators 
  One-way cluster robust standard error  Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Intercept  0.135 1.930 0.027** 0.170 2.790 0.003*** 0.166 2.680 0.004***  0.135 1.880 0.030** 0.170 8.230 0.000*** 0.166 6.460 0.000*** 
TA + 0.002 0.250 0.404 -0.005 -0.610 0.273 -0.004 -0.520 0.302  0.002 0.260 0.398 -0.005 -1.190 0.118 -0.004 -0.910 0.182 
PYTAC + -0.003 -0.300 0.384 -0.011 -0.840 0.202 -0.011 -0.870 0.193  -0.003 -0.440 0.329 -0.011 -1.250 0.105 -0.011 -1.270 0.103 
DE - -0.040 -1.100 0.136 0.006 0.190 0.426 0.008 0.220 0.414  -0.040 -0.700 0.244 0.006 0.120 0.453 0.008 0.140 0.445 
GROWTH + 0.008 0.800 0.211 -0.003 -0.290 0.387 -0.003 -0.350 0.363  0.008 1.080 0.141 -0.003 -0.260 0.398 -0.003 -0.320 0.373 
MB + 0.000 0.410 0.343 0.000 0.230 0.408 0.000 0.250 0.401  0.000 0.580 0.280 0.000 0.340 0.369 0.000 0.370 0.357 
CFO - -0.048 -1.620 0.053* -0.031 -0.980 0.165 -0.028 -0.910 0.181  -0.048 -1.700 0.045** -0.031 -1.060 0.145 -0.028 -0.870 0.192 
LOSS + 0.024 1.820 0.035** 0.008 0.830 0.203 0.007 0.650 0.259  0.024 1.380 0.085* 0.008 0.810 0.210 0.007 0.630 0.265 
ALTMAN - -0.013 -2.570 0.006*** -0.008 -1.740 0.041** -0.009 -1.930 0.027**  -0.013 -2.740 0.003*** -0.008 -2.610 0.005*** -0.009 -2.550 0.006*** 
BLOCKOWN + 0.003 0.700 0.241 0.001 0.240 0.407 0.001 0.260 0.397  0.003 0.630 0.264 0.001 0.150 0.439 0.001 0.180 0.429 
BIG4 - -0.001 -0.030 0.487 -0.004 -0.260 0.399 -0.004 -0.220 0.413  -0.001 -0.070 0.471 -0.004 -0.400 0.346 -0.004 -0.370 0.355 
SECOND - -0.024 -1.670 0.048** -0.009 -0.580 0.281 -0.009 -0.610 0.273  -0.024 -1.580 0.057* -0.009 -1.830 0.034** -0.009 -1.860 0.032** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national-city framework 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1  (n=251)  -0.020 -1.820 0.070*        -0.020 -2.450 0.014**       
CITY#1_ONLY (n=112)  0.003 0.170 0.865        0.003 0.150 0.877       
NAT#1_ONLY (n=38)  -0.004 -0.300 0.766        -0.004 -0.650 0.515       
Partner national-city framework           
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY (n=39)     -0.022 -1.480 0.140        -0.022 -1.710 0.088*    
PARCITY#1_ONLY (n=123)     0.000 0.020 0.982        0.000 0.020 0.987    
PARNAT#1_ONLY (n=0)                     
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=38)        -0.028 -1.690 0.092*        -0.028 -2.250 0.025** 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=58)        0.011 0.540 0.588        0.011 0.600 0.546 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=0)                     
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=0)                     
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=1)        0.024 1.430 0.154        0.024 4.400 0.000*** 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=77)        -0.010 -0.760 0.447        -0.010 -0.410 0.679 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)                     
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=9)        -0.022 -0.780 0.438        -0.022 0.000 0.999 
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                     
NAT#1-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=113)        -0.020 -2.260 0.024**        -0.020 -4.370 0.000*** 
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                     
NAT#1-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=36)        0.002 0.150 0.881        0.002 0.310 0.758 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  (n=0)                     
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  (n=26)        0.029 0.460 0.647        0.029 0.790 0.432 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                     
Corporate Governance           
BODFEM  0.007 1.310 0.190 0.010 1.490 0.137 0.011 1.640 0.102  0.007 2.210 0.027** 0.010 3.630 0.000*** 0.011 4.300 0.000*** 
BODFOREIGN  0.003 0.560 0.574 0.002 0.400 0.693 0.002 0.380 0.706  0.003 0.670 0.501 0.002 0.430 0.667 0.002 0.480 0.635 
INTAUD  -0.013 -1.270 0.205 -0.014 -1.280 0.201 -0.013 -1.200 0.230  -0.013 -2.440 0.015 -0.014 -1.500 0.134 -0.013 -1.440 0.150 
ACSIZE  0.003 0.440 0.659 -0.004 -0.810 0.417 -0.004 -0.790 0.427  0.003 0.360 0.716 -0.004 -0.580 0.562 -0.004 -0.530 0.596 
ACINDP  0.012 1.650 0.100 0.015 2.770 0.006*** 0.015 2.660 0.008***  0.012 2.160 0.031** 0.015 2.370 0.018** 0.015 2.280 0.023** 
ACFINEXP  -0.003 -0.690 0.491 -0.003 -0.530 0.594 -0.003 -0.550 0.580  -0.003 -0.480 0.632 -0.003 -0.400 0.688 -0.003 -0.370 0.708 
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Table 11.2: AEE Regression using different regression estimators (continued) 
  One-way cluster robust standard error  Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
ACMEET  -0.008 -0.750 0.452 0.000 -0.090 0.930 -0.001 -0.240 0.810  -0.008 -1.030 0.304 0.000 -0.180 0.857 -0.001 -0.390 0.693 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Cluster by Year  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.116 0.081 0.087  0.116 0.081 0.087 
N  1,083 824 824  1,083 824 824 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not 
reported for brevity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table  11.3: PROFIT Regression using different regression estimators 
  One-way cluster robust standard error  Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
Intercept  -0.369 -0.610 0.271 -0.841 -1.070 0.143 -0.880 -1.090 0.137  0.285 0.940 0.173 0.063 2.060 0.020** 0.120 0.440 0.332 
TA + 0.102 1.310 0.096* 0.173 1.690 0.046** 0.180 1.720 0.043**  0.042 1.170 0.121 0.063 2.060 0.020** 0.063 1.930 0.028** 
LEV + -0.028 -0.080 0.467 0.086 0.220 0.415 0.077 0.190 0.426  0.032 0.340 0.367 0.055 0.430 0.333 0.052 0.410 0.340 
TAC - -1.900 -3.870 0.000*** -1.770 -2.940 0.002*** -1.867 -3.100 0.001***  -0.058 -1.220 0.112 -0.038 -0.960 0.169 -0.040 -0.980 0.164 
GROWTH + 0.071 1.150 0.125 0.122 1.430 0.076* 0.129 1.490 0.068*  0.013 0.950 0.172 0.022 0.880 0.190 0.021 0.820 0.206 
MB + 0.020 1.740 0.041** 0.015 1.230 0.109 0.018 1.460 0.072*  0.002 0.950 0.172 0.001 0.570 0.284 0.001 0.700 0.241 
CFO - 2.394 3.890 0.000*** 2.508 3.580 0.000*** 2.533 3.520 0.000***  0.451 7.240 0.000*** 0.429 9.330 0.000*** 0.424 9.440 0.000*** 
LAG LOSS + -0.780 -7.460 0.000*** -0.788 -6.500 0.000*** -0.787 -6.500 0.000***  -0.289 -25.450 0.000*** -0.283 -16.240 0.000*** -0.281 -14.990 0.000*** 
ALTMAN - 0.175 2.430 0.008*** 0.233 2.760 0.003*** 0.240 2.860 0.002***  0.061 3.970 0.000*** 0.072 5.290 0.000*** 0.075 5.800 0.000*** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.012 -0.240 0.404 -0.002 -0.040 0.486 -0.009 -0.150 0.440  0.001 0.230 0.409 0.004 0.730 0.234 0.002 0.370 0.355 
BIG4 - 0.261 1.320 0.094* -0.014 -0.080 0.468 0.245 0.970 0.167  0.060 1.370 0.086* 0.011 0.130 0.447 0.055 0.880 0.190 
SECOND - 0.193 1.420 0.078* 0.082 0.480 0.315 0.083 0.490 0.313  0.053 1.080 0.141 0.033 0.520 0.303 0.034 0.540 0.294 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national-city framework 
JOINT_NAT#3-CITY#1 (n=374)  -0.384 -2.210 0.027**        -0.071 -1.920 0.055*       
CITY#1  ONLY (n=27)  0.486 1.130 0.260        0.086 1.610 0.107       
NAT#123 ONLY (n=359)  -0.234 -1.320 0.186        -0.041 -1.440 0.151       
Partner national-city framework           
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=39)     0.153 0.590 0.556        0.033 0.690 0.489    
PARCITY#1 _ONLY (n=139)     -0.255 -1.600 0.109        -0.063 -1.850 0.065*    
PARNAT#1_ONLY (n=0)                     
Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=39)        -0.116 -0.360 0.720        -0.014 -0.220 0.827 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1  (n=119)        -0.675 -2.580 0.010**        -0.145 -5.040 0.000*** 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1  (n=0)                     
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=4)                  0.016 0.210 0.836 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)                     
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=16)        0.702 1.410 0.157        0.094 1.350 0.178 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 (n=0)                     
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#1 (n=5)                  0.050 0.620 0.538 
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                     
NAT#3-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=139)        -0.398 -1.600 0.109        -0.072 -1.140 0.255 
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                     
NAT#3-CITY#0_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0 (n=276)        -0.271 -1.160 0.247        -0.041 -1.060 0.290 
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0  (n=0)                     
NAT#0-CITY#1_PARNAT#0-PARCITY#0  (n=5)                  0.080 0.700 0.483 
NAT#0-CITY#0_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#0 (n=0)                     
Corporate Governance           
BODFEM  0.006 0.100 0.920 -0.002 -0.030 0.980 -0.007 -0.100 0.922  0.006 0.100 0.460 0.001 -0.030 0.490 0.002 -0.100 0.461 
BODFOREIGN  -0.057 -1.010 0.314 -0.087 -1.380 0.169 -0.075 -1.190 0.234  -0.026 -1.010 0.157 -0.035 -1.380 0.000*** -0.032 -1.190 0.000*** 
INTAUD  0.172 1.450 0.147 0.176 1.270 0.206 0.168 1.210 0.227  0.055 2.620 0.009 0.054 2.730 0.006*** 0.053 2.830 0.005*** 
ACSIZE  0.045 0.750 0.454 0.018 0.250 0.805 -0.001 -0.020 0.985  0.008 0.720 0.469 0.000 0.010 0.992 -0.001 -0.070 0.945 
ACINDP  0.013 0.180 0.855 0.003 0.040 0.968 0.002 0.020 0.983  0.008 1.160 0.244 0.000 0.030 0.979 -0.001 -0.130 0.900 
ACFINEXP  0.013 0.290 0.772 0.014 0.230 0.817 0.020 0.340 0.736  0.004 0.220 0.823 -0.002 -0.060 0.954 0.000 0.000 0.998 
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Table 11.3: PROFIT Regression using different regression estimators (continued) 
  One-way cluster robust standard error  Two-way cluster robust standard error 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig.  coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. coef. t-stat sig. 
ACMEET  0.005 0.090 0.925 -0.031 -0.460 0.647 -0.030 -0.440 0.662  0.001 0.070 0.944 -0.008 -0.350 0.726 -0.008 -0.310 0.753 
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects  Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Cluster by Year  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.362 0.376 0.380  0.339 0.409 0.414 
N  1,347 1,019 1,019  1,347 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for the industry specialist auditor variables and the corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity Refer Table 5.8 for 
definition of variables. 
 
.
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11.3 Alternative definitions of auditor industry leadership at audit firm level 
This section tests whether the sensitivity of the earnings quality results using the firm national-city 
framework is robust against alternative definitions of auditor industry leadership found in prior 
studies, such as; 1) at least 10 percentage points greater market share between the top-ranked and 
second-ranked industry leader in a national (city) audit market (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003), and 2) 
the cut-off approach introduced by Neal and Riley (2004) in determining national (city) industry 
leadership. Both these alternatives definitions have been discusses in detail in Section 8.5 under the 
robustness test performed for the first empirical analysis chapter.  
 
Table 11.4 below presents the results for the DAC_PERF model. Results for the 10 percent market 
share cut-off measure following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) are presented in Model 1, whereas 
results for the cut-off measures following Neal and Riley (2004) are presented Model 2. Both results 
from Model 1 and Model 2 show comparable results with the one reported in the main analysis in 
Chapter 10, except that the coefficient for national industry leadership alone has lost its significant at 
p=0.10 under the DAC_PERF analysis. However, taken together, it can be concluded that the findings 
on the importance of joint firm national city industry leadership in constraining discretionary accruals 
is robust to alternative market share cut-off for determining industry specialist. 
 
11.4 Effect of competitive pressure on auditor industry specialisation and earnings quality  
Prior research document that industry specialist auditor provides higher audit quality and earnings 
quality relative to non-specialist based on evidence of lower discretionary accruals, higher likelihood 
of issuing modified audit opinion, higher likelihood of meeting or beating earnings forecast by one 
penny share, better client’s disclosure quality and higher ERC (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003; 
Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Kwon, 2007; Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Sun and Liu, 2013). Despite that, 
more recent study by Numan and Willekens (2014) in the U.S. shows that the audit quality of the 
industry specialist auditor is affected by the competitive pressure from its close competitors. 
Competitive pressure, in their study, is measured by the closeness in the market share distance 
between the industry specialist auditor and its closest competitor at the city industry level. They find 
that when the competitive pressure effect is controlled for in their earnings quality models, the effect 
of industry specialist auditor disappears.  Thus, they report that the likelihood of issuing a going 
concern opinion to a financially distressed firm, and earnings quality (measured as the occurrence of 
restatements and absolute accruals) of the clients decrease as competitive pressure from the industry 
specialist auditor increases.   
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Table  11.4: DAC_PERF and AEE Regression using different market shares cut-off for audit firm industry specialisation 
  DAC_PERF AEE 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.104 1.730 0.042 ** 0.106 1.760 0.040 ** 0.141 2.150 0.016 ** 0.132 1.960 0.025 ** 
TA + 0.002 0.200 0.421  0.001 0.150 0.439  0.002 0.180 0.430  0.003 0.300 0.383  
PYTAC + 0.023 1.460 0.072 * 0.023 1.460 0.072 * -0.002 -0.220 0.415  -0.002 -0.200 0.421  
DE - -0.058 -2.100 0.018 ** -0.059 -2.100 0.018 ** -0.035 -0.980 0.164  -0.039 -1.080 0.141  
GROWTH + 0.003 0.500 0.310  0.003 0.530 0.299  0.008 0.770 0.220  0.008 0.830 0.205  
MB + 0.002 1.500 0.068 * 0.002 1.490 0.068 * 0.000 0.410 0.340  0.000 0.360 0.360  
CFO - -0.180 -2.930 0.002 *** -0.179 -2.920 0.002 *** -0.051 -1.720 0.043 ** -0.049 -1.680 0.046 ** 
LOSS + 0.005 0.230 0.408  0.004 0.210 0.415  0.023 1.820 0.035 ** 0.023 1.800 0.036 ** 
ALTMAN - -0.004 -0.580 0.282  -0.003 -0.490 0.311  -0.013 -2.890 0.002 *** -0.013 -2.870 0.002 *** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.003 -0.510 0.305  -0.003 -0.500 0.307  0.003 0.800 0.212  0.003 0.680 0.248  
BIG4 - -0.026 -1.380 0.084 * -0.021 -1.120 0.131  0.001 0.070 0.473  0.006 0.340 0.367  
SECOND - -0.043 -2.180 0.015 ** -0.043 -2.170 0.015 ** -0.024 -1.580 0.058 * -0.024 -1.560 0.060 * 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
JOINT_  
 
 -0.017 -1.870 0.061 ** -0.019 -2.040 0.041 ** -0.016 -1.670 0.095 * -0.029 -2.400 0.017 ** 
CITY_ONLY   -0.014 -1.060 0.288  -0.019 -1.050 0.293  -0.016 -1.170 0.244  -0.007 -0.440 0.657  
NAT_ONLY  0.013 0.550 0.581  -0.008 -0.600 0.548  -0.001 -0.070 0.944  -0.016 -1.150 0.252  
Corporate Governance     
BODFEM  0.003 0.660 0.510  0.003 0.630 0.530  0.007 1.230 0.218  0.007 1.340 0.181  
BODFOREIGN  0.008 1.280 0.200  0.008 1.300 0.193  0.002 0.340 0.731  0.003 0.510 0.612  
INTAUD  -0.012 -1.140 0.254  -0.012 -1.120 0.262  -0.014 -1.220 0.224  -0.014 -1.230 0.219  
ACSIZE  -0.005 -0.920 0.360  -0.005 -0.950 0.343  0.003 0.390 0.695  0.002 0.360 0.718  
ACINDP  -0.001 -0.120 0.907  -0.002 -0.210 0.832  0.012 1.620 0.105  0.011 1.620 0.106  
ACFINEXP  0.008 1.740 0.083 * 0.008 1.790 0.074 * -0.003 -0.630 0.528  -0.002 -0.510 0.613  
ACMEET  -0.005 -0.770 0.444  -0.005 -0.820 0.413  -0.007 -0.680 0.497  -0.007 -0.750 0.456  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects  Included Included Included Included 
R2  0.213 0.213 0.115 0.118 
N  1,347 1,347 1,083 1,083 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for industry specialist auditor variables and corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported 
for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Following Numan and Willikens (2014), this study now attempts to disentangle the effect of industry 
specialist auditor and competitive pressure on three different measures of earnings quality; 
DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT. Thus, this study tests for the effect of competitive pressure on the 
industry specialist auditor’s ability to constrain earnings management, by re-estimating the firm 
national-city framework analysis as used in the last chapter for each DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT 
analysis.  Consistent with Degryse and Ongena (2005) each model explicitly controls for potential 
market power effects due to general supplier concentration by including the Herfindahl index 
(HERFINDEX) as a control variable in the model. Competitive pressure from the closest competitor is 
defined as the absolute difference between the incumbent audit office’s market share in the client’s 
industry and the market share of the competitor that is closest (in terms of market share) to that of the 
incumbent (Numan and Willekens, 2012). Also, following Numan and Willekens (2014), in order to 
make the interpretation of the analysis more intuitive, competitive pressure is defined as a measure of 
“closeness” (rather than “distance”) and hence take the negative of this absolute distance, which 
results in the variable Competitive pressure. The audit firm industry specialist, HERFINDEX and 
competitive pressure are calculated using all observations for which audit fee and location data are 
available in FAME database.  
 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 11.5 below. All regression models in Table 11.5 are 
significant (p-value <0.01), with an adjusted R² is about 0.211. The Model 1 to Model 3 tests for the 
effect of joint national-city industry leadership on DAC_PERF, alongside the corporate governance 
variables. The results of the Model 3 in Table 10.1 under the firm national-city framework in the 
earlier chapter indicate that either the audit firm which is a joint national and city industry leader or 
national industry leader alone are able to reduce DAC_PERF, but not the city industry leader alone. 
Thus JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 will be chosen as the variable of interest, which is the experimental 
variable in this analysis, while CITY#1_ONLY and NAT#2_ONLY will be listed alongside the control 
variables. The JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 represents the auditor alignment with the client’s industry in 
the application of the spatial competition theory. Based on the Model 3 results, it can be seen that the 
variable COMPETITIVE is positively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
(coefficient=0.022, p<0.10), indicating that earnings quality is negatively affected by the competitive 
pressure from the closest auditor. Whereas the industry specialist variable JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1 
which was significant in Model 2 earlier, has now become insignificant. This finding suggests that 
earnings quality (as measured by magnitude of discretionary accruals) of the clients decreases as 
competitive pressure of the industry specialist auditor increases.   
 
Next, the same competitive pressure analysis is performed using the AEE model to determine whether 
competitive pressure has any effect in reducing accrual estimation error. Since the results of the Model 
3 in Table 10.2 under the firm national-city framework in the earlier chapter indicates that only the 
audit firm which is a joint national and city industry leader is able to reduce AEE, but not the city 
industry leader alone or the national industry leader alone, then JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1 will be the 
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variable of interest, which is the experimental variable in this analysis, while CITY#1_ONLY and 
NAT#1_ONLY will be listed alongside as the control variables. The same HERFINDEX are being 
included in the regressions in Table 11.6. All regression models in Table 11.6 are significant (p-value 
<0.01), with an adjusted R² is about 0.117. Similar results are obtained as for Model 3 as in the 
DAC_PERF analysis conducted previously. Variable COMPETITIVE is significantly positive 
(coefficient=0.035, p<0.05), which indicates supports the contention that earnings quality (as 
measured by accrual estimation error) of the clients decreases as competitive pressure of the industry 
specialist auditor increases.   
 
Finally, the same competitive pressure analysis is performed using the PROFIT model to determine 
whether competitive pressure has any effect on the industry specialist auditor likelihood of reporting a 
profit rather than a loss. Since the results of the Model 3 in Table 10.4 under the firm national-city 
framework in the earlier chapter indicates that only the audit firm which is a joint national and city 
industry leader is more likely to report a loss rather than a profit, but not the city industry leader alone 
or the national industry leader alone, then JOINT_NAT#3-CITY#1 will be the variable of interest, 
which is the experimental variable in this analysis, while CITY#1_ONLY and NAT#3_ONLY will be 
listed alongside the control variables. Similar industry HERFINDEX being included in the regressions 
in Table 11.7. All regression models in Table 11.7 are significant (p-value <0.01), with an adjusted R² 
is about 0.373. In contrast to the previous results reported for DAC_PERF and AEE earlier, variable 
COMPETITIVE in Model 3 is not significant at any conventional level. Whereas JOINT_NAT#3-
CITY#1 is significantly negative (coefficient=-0.394, p<0.10), which indicates that industry specialist 
auditor likelihood of reporting a profit rather than a loss is not affected by the competitive pressure 
from the close competitors. 
 
Taken together, two out of three of the earnings quality measures (DAC_PERF and AEE) are 
consistent with the industry expertise dominance an audit firm has over its closest competitor being a 
main driver of audit quality, rather than industry expertise per se. Overall, the results suggest that 
pressure from close competitors has a negative effect on audit quality (except for the PROFIT 
analysis). 
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Table  11.5: DAC_PERF Regression on the effect of competitive pressure on auditor industry specialisation and earnings quality  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.104 1.220 0.115  0.112 1.240 0.112  0.103 1.120 0.135  
TA + 0.000 0.000 0.500  0.000 -0.020 0.493  0.000 0.010 0.494  
PYTAC + 0.024 1.760 0.044 ** 0.024 1.770 0.043 ** 0.024 1.740 0.045 ** 
DE - -0.059 -2.810 0.004 *** -0.059 -2.780 0.005 *** -0.058 -2.790 0.005 *** 
GROWTH + 0.003 0.390 0.348  0.003 0.390 0.349  0.003 0.380 0.355  
MB + 0.002 1.890 0.034 ** 0.002 1.880 0.035 ** 0.002 1.840 0.038 ** 
CFO - -0.173 -2.180 0.019 ** -0.172 -2.190 0.018 ** -0.174 -2.210 0.017 ** 
LOSS + 0.006 0.310 0.381  0.006 0.330 0.373  0.006 0.310 0.378  
ALTMAN - -0.003 -0.460 0.323  -0.004 -0.500 0.310  -0.004 -0.490 0.315  
BLOCKOWN + -0.003 -0.610 0.274  -0.003 -0.610 0.273  -0.003 -0.660 0.258  
BIG4 - 0.002 0.100 0.462  0.002 0.090 0.464  0.002 0.110 0.455  
SECOND - -0.026 -1.700 0.049 ** -0.026 -1.690 0.051 * -0.026 -1.670 0.053 * 
CITY#1_ONLY  -0.002 -0.090 0.926  -0.001 -0.050 0.959  0.004 0.150 0.881  
NAT#2_ONLY  -0.019 -1.470 0.150  -0.019 -1.480 0.147  -0.019 -1.450 0.157  
Experimental variables: 
JOINT_NAT#2-CITY#1  -0.030 -1.790 0.082 * -0.029 -1.740 0.091 * -0.023 -1.400 0.171  
HERFINDEX      -0.011 -0.360 0.721  0.006 0.170 0.868  
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE          0.022 1.700 0.099 * 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.003 0.720 0.474  0.003 0.770 0.446  0.004 0.800 0.430  
BODFOREIGN  0.011 2.240 0.032 ** 0.011 2.240 0.032 ** 0.011 2.160 0.038 ** 
INTAUD  -0.012 -0.890 0.381  -0.012 -0.880 0.387  -0.012 -0.870 0.389  
ACSIZE  -0.004 -0.900 0.377  -0.004 -0.900 0.377  -0.004 -0.920 0.364  
ACINDP  0.000 -0.020 0.984  0.000 -0.020 0.983  0.000 -0.020 0.986  
ACFINEXP  0.009 2.190 0.036 ** 0.009 2.180 0.036 ** 0.009 2.200 0.035 ** 
ACMEET  -0.006 -0.730 0.468  -0.006 -0.710 0.483  -0.006 -0.670 0.506  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
Cluster by audit firm 34 34 34 
R2  0.211 0.211 0.211 
N  1293 1293 1293 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-it effects are not reported for brevity, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
possible correlation within an audit firm cluster, following the methodology of Rogers (1993) as used by Numan and Wilekens (2014). Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table  11.6: AEE Regression on the effect of competitive pressure on auditor industry specialisation and earnings quality  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.144 1.800 0.042 ** 0.160 1.910 0.033 ** 0.145 1.700 0.050 * 
TA + 0.001 0.100 0.462  0.001 0.050 0.959  0.001 0.120 0.453  
PYTAC + -0.003 -0.280 0.392  -0.003 -0.240 0.813  -0.003 -0.280 0.393  
DE - -0.036 -1.470 0.076 * -0.037 -1.500 0.145  -0.036 -1.430 0.082 * 
GROWTH + 0.008 0.620 0.271  0.008 0.620 0.543  0.008 0.600 0.276  
MB + 0.000 0.560 0.289  0.000 0.630 0.532  0.000 0.510 0.306  
CFO - -0.044 -2.090 0.023 ** -0.043 -2.000 0.055 * -0.045 -2.050 0.025 ** 
LOSS + 0.025 1.960 0.030 ** 0.025 2.070 0.047 ** 0.025 1.980 0.029 ** 
ALTMAN - -0.014 -4.840 0.000 *** -0.015 -5.850 0.000 *** -0.015 -6.360 0.000 *** 
BLOCKOWN + 0.003 0.550 0.293  0.003 0.520 0.606  0.002 0.450 0.328  
BIG4 - 0.002 0.140 0.446  0.002 0.150 0.879  0.003 0.180 0.428  
SECOND - -0.025 -1.970 0.029 ** -0.026 -2.020 0.053 * -0.025 -1.940 0.031 ** 
CITY#1_ONLY  0.004 0.160 0.872  0.005 0.210 0.831  0.013 0.560 0.583  
NAT#1_ONLY  -0.005 -0.350 0.729  -0.007 -0.550 0.587  -0.005 -0.380 0.707  
Experimental variables: 
JOINT_NAT#1-CITY#1  -0.020 -1.690 0.102  -0.019 -1.510 0.141  -0.010 -0.680 0.500  
HERFINDEX      -0.024 -1.390 0.174  0.004 0.220 0.831  
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE          0.035 2.060 0.048 ** 
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.007 2.060 0.049 ** 0.007 2.140 0.041 ** 0.007 2.300 0.029 ** 
BODFOREIGN  0.004 0.580 0.568  0.004 0.580 0.565  0.003 0.460 0.651  
INTAUD  -0.012 -1.440 0.161  -0.012 -1.400 0.173  -0.011 -1.370 0.180  
ACSIZE  0.003 0.390 0.698  0.003 0.380 0.705  0.003 0.360 0.722  
ACINDP  0.012 2.050 0.050 * 0.012 2.070 0.047 * 0.012 2.050 0.049 ** 
ACFINEXP  -0.003 -0.630 0.536  -0.003 -0.610 0.545  -0.003 -0.570 0.571  
ACMEET  -0.008 -0.860 0.396  -0.007 -0.850 0.404  -0.007 -0.770 0.446  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
Cluster by audit firm 30 30 30 
R2  0.116 0.116 0.118 
N  1,046 1,046 1,046 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-it effects are not reported for brevity, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
possible correlation within an audit firm cluster, following the methodology of Rogers (1993) as used by Numan and Wilekens (2014). Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table  11.7: PROFIT Regression on the effect of competitive pressure on auditor industry specialisation and earnings quality  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -0.466 -0.860 0.195  -0.230 -0.560 0.288      
TA + 0.123 1.740 0.041 ** 0.116 1.770 0.039 ** 0.114 1.800 0.036 ** 
PYTAC + 0.099 0.240 0.407  0.092 0.220 0.412  0.090 0.220 0.414  
DE - -1.942 -4.290 0.000 *** -1.915 -4.360 0.000 *** -1.912 -4.430 0.000 *** 
GROWTH + 0.069 0.840 0.201  0.069 0.840 0.200  0.069 0.850 0.199  
MB + 0.021 1.750 0.041 ** 0.022 1.820 0.035 ** 0.022 1.830 0.034 ** 
CFO - 2.459 3.380 0.001 *** 2.473 3.390 0.001 *** 2.476 3.380 0.001 *** 
LOSS + -0.804 -5.530 0.000 *** -0.799 -5.410 0.000 *** -0.800 -5.520 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN - 0.163 1.700 0.045 ** 0.157 1.660 0.049 ** 0.157 1.660 0.049 ** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.016 -0.350 0.365  -0.018 -0.380 0.353  -0.017 -0.350 0.363  
BIG4 - 0.190 0.940 0.173  0.184 0.910 0.182  0.184 0.920 0.180  
SECOND - 0.096 0.770 0.222  0.091 0.730 0.234  0.090 0.710 0.238  
CITY#1_ONLY  0.501 1.690 0.090  0.545 1.760 0.078  0.523 2.000 0.045  
NAT#3_ONLY - -0.233 -1.010 0.311  -0.230 -1.010 0.315  -0.232 -1.040 0.296  
Experimental variables: 
JOINT_NAT#3-CITY#1  -0.400 -1.740 0.081 ** -0.376 -1.510 0.132  -0.394 -1.910 0.057 * 
HERFINDEX      -0.366 -0.640 0.523  -0.418 -0.560 0.577  
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE          -0.067 -0.230 0.819  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.012 0.200 0.839  0.016 0.260 0.795  0.016 0.260 0.796  
BODFOREIGN  -0.055 -1.500 0.134  -0.055 -1.500 0.133  -0.054 -1.440 0.151  
INTAUD  0.134 1.370 0.171  0.141 1.500 0.133  0.141 1.490 0.137  
ACSIZE  0.038 0.840 0.401  0.039 0.870 0.386  0.040 0.870 0.385  
ACINDP  0.009 0.180 0.855  0.008 0.170 0.864  0.008 0.170 0.866  
ACFINEXP  0.010 0.150 0.881  0.010 0.160 0.875  0.010 0.150 0.880  
ACMEET  0.014 0.260 0.798  0.015 0.280 0.779  0.014 0.270 0.791  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
Cluster by audit firm 34 34 34 
R2  0.373 0.373 0.373 
N  1,293 1,293 1,293 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-it effects are not reported for brevity, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
possible correlation within an audit firm cluster, following the methodology of Rogers (1993) as used by Numan and Wilekens (2014). Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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11.5 Continuous market share as a measure of industry leadership 
Next, the study tests whether the industry specialist auditor main results reported earlier in Chapter 10 
are robust to the use of this alternative definition. Table 11.8 below presents the analysis for the 
DAC_PERF models, Table 11.9 presents the results for the AEE models, whereas Table 11.10 
tabulates the results for the PROFIT models. In these models, the industry specialist auditor variables 
are measured using the continuous market shares. 
 
As shown in Table 11.8, for the DAC_PERF model when the audit fee regression is estimated using 
the Firm national specialist and Firm city specialist variables in Model 1, significant and negative 
coefficient is only reported at the city level (coefficient=-0.037) at p<0.05, whereas the coefficient for 
national level is insignificant at p=0.10.  This shows that, using the continuous market share measure, 
city level industry leadership of the audit firm is more important than national-level expertise in 
reducing discretionary accruals, consistent with the main analysis findings in Chapter 10. However, 
when the same regression is estimated using the audit partner national and city market share variables 
(Partner national specialist and Partner city specialist)  in Model 2, none of the partner continuous 
market share variable is significant at p=0.10. This indicates that partner industry leadership is not an 
important condition to constrain discretionary accruals. Finally, in Model 3, when the firm and partner 
industry leadership are tested together (Firm national specialist, Firm city specialist, Partner national 
specialist and Partner city specialist), only the coefficient for the firm city specialist is negatively 
significant (coefficient=-0.073, p<0.01). Thus, the finding using the continuous market share measure 
suggests that audit firm city industry leadership matters the most as it provides differentially higher 
audit quality above the firm industry leadership at the national level and beyond the partner industry 
leadership in reducing the magnitude of discretionary accruals.  
 
Next, Table 11.9 below presents the results for the AEE models. As shown in the Table 11.9,  when 
the regression is estimated using the national and city market share variables (Firm national specialist 
and Firm city specialist) in Model 1, a negatively significant coefficient is only reported at the city 
level (coefficient=-0.032) at p<0.05, whereas the coefficient for national level is insignificant at 
p=0.10.  As with the DAC_PERF results reported in the preceding paragraph, this shows that city level 
industry leadership of the audit firm is more important than national-level expertise in reducing the 
AEE. However, when the regression is estimated using the audit partner national and city market share 
variables (Partner national specialist and Partner city specialist)  in Model 2, the Partner city 
specialist is negatively significant at p<0.10 (coefficient=-0.025), suggesting that partner industry 
specialisation at the city level is more important than its national industry leadership. Finally, in Model 
3, and similarly to Model 3 results under DAC_PERF analysis in Table 11.8 earlier, when the firm and 
partner industry leadership are combined (similar to joint firm-partner industry leadership framework), 
only the coefficient for Firm city specialist is significant and negative (coefficient=-0.040, p<0.05). 
Thus, the finding using the continuous market share measure suggest that audit firm city industry 
leadership matters the most as it provides differentially higher audit quality above the firm industry 
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leadership at the national level and beyond the partner industry leadership in reducing the magnitude 
of AEE. 
 
Finally, Table 11.10 presents the results for the PROFIT models. As shown in Table 11.10 below, 
when the regression is estimated using the audit firm national and city market share variables (Firm 
national specialist and Firm city specialist in Model 1), a negatively significant coefficient is reported 
at the national level (coefficient=-0.439, p<0.05), whereas the coefficient for city level is insignificant 
at p=0.10.  This result is different from the previous two analyses using discretionary accruals and the 
AEE, and shows that an audit firm that is an industry leader at the national level is more conservative 
in their profit reporting as they are more likely to report a loss rather than a profit. When the 
regression is estimated using the audit partner national and city market share variables (Partner 
national specialist and Partner city specialist in Model 2), none of the specialist partners continuous 
variable are significant at p=0.10. This indicates that partner industry leadership is not important in 
this model at all. Finally, in Model 3, when the firm and partner industry leadership is combined 
together (similar to joint firm-partner industry leadership framework), only the coefficient for the Firm 
national specialist is negatively significant (coefficient=-0.579, p<0.05). Thus, the finding using the 
continuous market share measure suggest that audit firm national industry leadership matters the most 
as it provides differentially higher audit quality above the firm industry leadership at the city level and 
beyond the partner industry leadership in conservative profit reporting. 
 
Taken together, these findings using the continuous measure of auditor industry expertise provide 
inconsistent results relative to the results in the main analysis in Chapter 10 earlier in respect of the 
DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT models. This inconsistency arises because the use of continuous 
market share assumes log-linear relationship between the industry specialist market share and earnings 
quality, and avoids arbitrary definition of an industry specialist (Goodwin and Wu, 2014). However, 
this assumption does not describe the actual auditing industry, where evidence from prior studies 
indicates that there is a differential audit quality between the top-ranked and second-ranked industry 
leader using the national-city framework, either at the firm (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al., 2005; 
Basioudis and Francis 2007) or partner level (Goodwin and Wu, 2014). Furthermore, there is a huge 
gap in the market shares reported between the top-ranked and second-ranked audit firm or partner in 
this thesis, as shown in Table 6.4 earlier. Thus, to accommodate such a non-linear relationship 
between the auditor industry leadership and earnings quality, this study use the indicator variables to 
investigate how different levels of industry leadership affect the earnings quality in our main 
regression model presented in Chapter 10 earlier. 
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Table  11.8: DAC_PERF Regression using continuous market share for industry specialist auditor 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.113 1.850 0.033 ** 0.126 1.460 0.073 * 0.119 1.380 0.084 * 
TA + 0.001 0.080 0.466  -0.003 -0.290 0.387  -0.002 -0.160 0.438  
PYTAC + 0.023 1.460 0.073 * 0.024 1.060 0.144  0.023 1.020 0.155  
DE - -0.053 -1.930 0.027 ** -0.047 -1.420 0.078 * -0.040 -1.220 0.111  
GROWTH + 0.003 0.520 0.303  -0.005 -0.580 0.281  -0.005 -0.660 0.255  
MB + 0.002 1.470 0.071 * 0.002 1.310 0.096 * 0.002 1.270 0.102  
CFO - -0.179 -2.940 0.002 *** -0.197 -2.670 0.004 *** -0.203 -2.730 0.003 *** 
LOSS + 0.004 0.210 0.417  0.012 0.510 0.307  0.011 0.460 0.322  
ALTMAN - -0.003 -0.480 0.317  -0.002 -0.230 0.410  -0.003 -0.350 0.364  
BLOCKOWN + -0.003 -0.530 0.298  -0.002 -0.240 0.407  -0.001 -0.170 0.433  
BIG4 - -0.019 -0.950 0.171  -0.025 -1.100 0.136  -0.020 -0.850 0.199  
SECOND - -0.040 -2.060 0.020 ** -0.043 -1.830 0.034 ** -0.043 -1.810 0.036 ** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national specialist   0.004 0.180 0.430      0.033 0.990 0.161  
Firm city specialist   -0.037 -1.930 0.027 **     -0.073 -2.430 0.008 *** 
Partner national specialist       -0.029 -0.510 0.304  -0.045 -0.840 0.201  
Partner city specialist       -0.015 -0.720 0.235  0.037 1.380 0.916  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.003 0.650 0.514  0.007 1.260 0.208  0.008 1.320 0.186  
BODFOREIGN  0.007 1.130 0.258  0.007 0.900 0.368  0.006 0.780 0.434  
INTAUD  -0.011 -1.060 0.288  -0.002 -0.160 0.870  -0.003 -0.210 0.831  
ACSIZE  -0.005 -0.950 0.342  -0.007 -1.110 0.268  -0.008 -1.150 0.251  
ACINDP  -0.002 -0.190 0.847  -0.002 -0.220 0.829  -0.003 -0.240 0.809  
ACFINEXP  0.008 1.790 0.073 * 0.012 2.000 0.046 ** 0.012 2.020 0.043 ** 
ACMEET  -0.005 -0.770 0.443  -0.002 -0.300 0.763  -0.002 -0.260 0.794  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.214 0.229 0.232 
N  1,347 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for 
brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table  11.9: AEE Regression using continuous market share for industry specialist auditor 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.141 2.060 0.020 ** 0.168 2.490 0.007 *** 0.165 2.450 0.008 *** 
TA + 0.002 0.210 0.419  -0.004 -0.490 0.313  -0.003 -0.400 0.344  
PYTAC + -0.002 -0.210 0.416  -0.011 -0.850 0.199  -0.011 -0.850 0.199  
DE - -0.032 -0.890 0.188  0.009 0.250 0.402  0.012 0.320 0.374  
GROWTH + 0.008 0.760 0.225  -0.003 -0.330 0.369  -0.003 -0.410 0.341  
MB + 0.000 0.310 0.378  0.000 0.190 0.426  0.000 0.160 0.435  
CFO - -0.052 -1.780 0.038 ** -0.031 -1.090 0.138  -0.037 -1.270 0.102  
LOSS + 0.023 1.790 0.037 ** 0.009 0.910 0.182  0.008 0.800 0.214  
ALTMAN - -0.013 -2.780 0.003 *** -0.007 -1.450 0.074 * -0.008 -1.610 0.054 * 
BLOCKOWN + 0.003 0.700 0.241  0.000 0.060 0.478  0.001 0.130 0.447  
BIG4 - 0.010 0.500 0.309  0.000 0.000 0.500  0.004 0.230 0.411  
SECOND - -0.021 -1.400 0.081 * -0.007 -0.450 0.326  -0.007 -0.430 0.335  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national specialist   -0.013 -0.560 0.287      0.014 0.550 0.291  
Firm city specialist   -0.032 -2.050 0.020 **     -0.040 -2.080 0.019 ** 
Partner national specialist       -0.039 -0.830 0.203  -0.045 -0.880 0.190  
Partner city specialist       -0.025 -1.530 0.063 * 0.004 0.190 0.426  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.007 1.330 0.184  -0.004 -0.490 0.131  0.010 1.570 0.118  
BODFOREIGN  0.002 0.310 0.759  -0.011 -0.850 0.199  0.001 0.220 0.823  
INTAUD  -0.013 -1.160 0.244  0.009 0.250 0.402  -0.014 -1.170 0.242  
ACSIZE  0.002 0.350 0.724  -0.003 -0.330 0.369  -0.005 -0.950 0.342  
ACINDP  0.011 1.560 0.118  0.000 0.190 0.426  0.015 2.520 0.012 ** 
ACFINEXP  -0.002 -0.530 0.596  -0.031 -1.090 0.138  -0.002 -0.370 0.709  
ACMEET  -0.007 -0.690 0.490  0.009 0.910 0.182  0.000 0.020 0.980  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.117 0.229 0.232 
N  1,083 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using 
the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table  11.10: PROFIT Regression using continuous market share for industry specialist auditor 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -0.399 -0.600 0.275  -0.972 -1.120 0.132  -1.023 -1.170 0.122  
TA + 0.108 1.250 0.106  0.175 1.550 0.060 * 0.183 1.610 0.053 * 
LEV - -0.067 -0.190 0.425  0.077 0.180 0.427  0.057 0.130 0.447  
TAC - -1.853 -3.760 0.000 *** -1.776 -2.940 0.002 *** -1.816 -3.030 0.001 *** 
GROWTH + 0.067 1.030 0.152  0.122 1.460 0.072 * 0.122 1.440 0.075 * 
MB + 0.020 1.650 0.050 * 0.016 1.290 0.098 * 0.017 1.340 0.090 * 
CFO + 2.388 4.540 0.000 *** 2.502 3.850 0.000 *** 2.502 3.860 0.000 *** 
LAG LOSS - -0.783 -7.620 0.000 *** -0.784 -6.610 0.000 *** -0.788 -6.640 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN + 0.177 2.460 0.007 *** 0.226 2.610 0.005 *** 0.231 2.680 0.004 *** 
BLOCKOWN - -0.011 -0.240 0.407  0.001 0.020 0.491  -0.002 -0.040 0.485  
BIG4 - 0.173 1.120 0.131  -0.034 -0.200 0.420  0.112 0.610 0.272  
SECOND - 0.203 1.430 0.076 * 0.095 0.580 0.281  0.090 0.550 0.293  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
Firm national  specialist   -0.439 -1.650 0.049 **     -0.579 -1.700 0.044 ** 
Firm city specialist   -0.088 -0.430 0.333      -0.005 -0.020 0.494  
Partner national  specialist       0.429 0.480 0.316  0.728 0.780 0.217  
Partner city specialist       -0.214 -0.880 0.189  -0.136 -0.390 0.347  
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.007 0.110 0.458  -0.001 -0.020 0.492  0.001 0.010 0.496  
BODFOREIGN  -0.063 -1.050 0.148  -0.089 -1.310 0.096 * -0.083 -1.220 0.111  
INTAUD  0.171 1.390 0.083 * 0.165 1.140 0.128  0.157 1.090 0.138  
ACSIZE  0.052 0.850 0.198  0.024 0.340 0.368  0.025 0.350 0.362  
ACINDP  0.003 0.050 0.482  -0.001 -0.020 0.493  -0.006 -0.070 0.473  
ACFINEXP  0.014 0.290 0.385  0.015 0.260 0.397  0.020 0.350 0.364  
ACMEET  0.004 0.060 0.475  -0.030 -0.450 0.327  -0.040 -0.590 0.276  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.359 0.374 0.377 
N  1,347 1,019 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using 
the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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11.6 Effect of gender and tenure on audit partner industry expertise  
Table 11.11 below presents the moderating effects of audit partner gender on the audit partner industry 
specialist ability to constrain earnings management. The experimental variable, which is PART_FEM 
represents an indicator variable, coded 1 if the audit partner is a female, and 0 if otherwise. 
Interestingly, when the gender of the audit partner (PART_FEM) is controlled of in the model, none of 
the partner variable in either the DAC_PERF model, the AEE model or the PROFIT model is 
significant at p=0.10. Even the PART_FEM is insignificant in the model. Taken together, the findings 
suggest that the gender of the audit partner do not have any significant influence over the ability of the 
partner to constrain earnings management. 
 
Next, Table 11.12 below presents the moderating effects of audit partner tenure (PART_TEN) on the 
audit partner industry specialist ability to constrain earnings management. The experimental variable, 
which is PART_TEN represents a continuous variables coded between 0 and 3, measuring the partner 
tenure period between 2009 to 2011. Therefore, the maximum value for the partner tenure variable is 
capped at 3 years, so that the tenure is measured on an equal basis over the sample period. When the 
tenure of the audit partner (PART_TEN) is controlled for in the model, significant positive relationship 
is reported with AEE, suggesting that the longer is the partner tenure, the higher woud be the AEE, 
contributing to lower accruals quality. Nevertheless, these new findings suggest that PART_TENURE 
is also an important omitted variable in the main analysis on partner national-city framework for 
auditor industry specialisation. However, there is evidence to suggest that partner tenure moderates the 
relationship between partner industry specialist and earnings quality proxies used in the study as none 
of the partner industry expert variables are significant.  
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Table  11.11: DAC_PER, AEE and PROFIT Regression on the effect of the gender of industry specialist partner on earnings quality  
  DAC_PERF AEE PROFIT 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept - 0.123 1.550 0.061 * 0.176 2.820 0.003 *** -0.965 -1.160 0.123  
TA + -0.003 -0.310 0.380  -0.005 -0.670 0.250  0.172 1.600 0.055 * 
PYTAC + 0.025 1.080 0.140  -0.012 -0.880 0.190      
DE - -0.046 -1.410 0.079 * 0.005 0.150 0.439  0.081 0.190 0.423  
TAC -         -1.777 -2.970 0.002 *** 
GROWTH + -0.005 -0.590 0.279  -0.002 -0.270 0.394  0.123 1.470 0.071 * 
MB + 0.002 1.320 0.093 * 0.000 0.240 0.405  0.015 1.210 0.113  
CFO - -0.199 -2.680 0.004 *** -0.030 -1.020 0.153  2.518 3.870 0.000 *** 
LOSS + 0.012 0.520 0.304  0.008 0.770 0.222      
LAG_LOSS -         -0.788 -6.630 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN - -0.002 -0.220 0.415  -0.009 -1.780 0.038 ** 0.231 2.680 0.004 *** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.002 -0.200 0.421  0.001 0.200 0.422  -0.003 -0.050 0.481  
BIG4 - -0.026 -1.150 0.125  -0.004 -0.260 0.396  -0.016 -0.090 0.463  
SECOND - -0.045 -1.890 0.030 ** -0.008 -0.500 0.309  0.085 0.520 0.302  
PART_FEM   0.015 0.810 0.420  -0.016 -1.200 0.229  -0.071 -0.380 0.352  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.020 -1.310 0.192  -0.021 -1.560 0.119  0.154 0.490 0.622  
PARCITY_ONLY  -0.006 -0.460 0.644  0.000 -0.010 0.991  -0.258 -1.650 0.098 * 
PARNAT_ONLY              
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.007 1.240 0.353  0.010 1.630 0.104  -0.001 -0.010 0.989  
BODFOREIGN  0.007 0.930 0.809  0.003 0.410 0.681  -0.086 -1.290 0.196  
INTAUD  -0.003 -0.240 0.299  -0.014 -1.160 0.247  0.179 1.230 0.219  
ACSIZE  -0.007 -1.040 0.798  -0.004 -0.850 0.395  0.016 0.220 0.823  
ACINDP  -0.003 -0.260 0.044**  0.016 2.590 0.010**  0.006 0.070 0.947  
ACFINEXP  0.012 2.010 0.737  -0.003 -0.550 0.583  0.012 0.210 0.831  
ACMEET  -0.002 -0.340 0.369  -0.001 -0.130 0.900  -0.032 -0.470 0.639  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.229 0.082 0.376 
N  1,019 924 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using 
the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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Table  11.12: DAC_PERF, AEE and PROFIT Regression on the effect of the tenure of industry specialist auditor on earnings quality  
  DAC_PERF AEE PROFIT 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  0.132 1.660 0.048 ** 0.165 2.650 0.004 *** -0.992 -1.190 0.117  
TA + -0.003 -0.310 0.380  -0.006 -0.720 0.237  0.173 1.600 0.055 * 
PYTAC + 0.024 1.070 0.143  -0.011 -0.830 0.203      
DE - -0.050 -1.500 0.067 * 0.010 0.270 0.396  0.089 0.210 0.415  
TAC -         -1.768 -2.940 0.002 *** 
GROWTH + -0.005 -0.610 0.273  -0.002 -0.260 0.399  0.122 1.460 0.073 * 
MB + 0.002 1.280 0.100  0.000 0.310 0.379  0.016 1.240 0.108  
CFO - -0.197 -2.670 0.004 *** -0.033 -1.130 0.129  2.506 3.840 0.000 *** 
LOSS + 0.012 0.500 0.310  0.008 0.790 0.217      
LAG_LOSS -         -0.787 -6.640 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN - -0.002 -0.260 0.397  -0.008 -1.620 0.053 * 0.233 2.710 0.004 *** 
BLOCKOWN + -0.002 -0.240 0.404  0.001 0.310 0.380  -0.002 -0.030 0.487  
BIG4 - -0.026 -1.170 0.122  -0.003 -0.210 0.419  -0.013 -0.080 0.468  
SECOND - -0.045 -1.880 0.031 ** -0.009 -0.520 0.301  0.082 0.500 0.308  
PART_TEN   -0.007 -0.740 0.462  0.011 1.750 0.080 * 0.011 0.130 0.897  
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1-PARCITY#1 -0.019 -1.250 0.213  -0.022 -1.640 0.100  0.153 0.490 0.624  
PARCITY_ONLY  -0.006 -0.510 0.609  0.001 0.060 0.956  -0.255 -1.640 0.102  
PARNAT_ONLY              
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.007 1.260 0.208  0.010 1.620 0.105  -0.001 -0.020 0.985  
BODFOREIGN  0.008 0.970 0.332  0.002 0.370 0.714  -0.087 -1.320 0.187  
INTAUD  -0.003 -0.190 0.847  -0.014 -1.210 0.228  0.176 1.210 0.225  
ACSIZE  -0.007 -1.070 0.286  -0.004 -0.830 0.409  0.017 0.240 0.812  
ACINDP  -0.002 -0.220 0.827  0.015 2.530 0.012 ** 0.003 0.040 0.969  
ACFINEXP  0.011 1.990 0.047 ** -0.003 -0.490 0.626  0.014 0.240 0.813  
ACMEET  -0.002 -0.340 0.731  0.000 -0.060 0.955  -0.031 -0.460 0.645  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
R2  0.229 0.083 0.376 
N  1,019 924 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using 
the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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11.7 The fixed-effects model 
It could be argued that the coefficient estimates produced by the main findings could be biased due to 
the omission of unobservable client characteristics (Minutti-Meza, 2013) that are not controlled for in 
the models. The extent of the client’s preference for an industry expert partner could be an example of 
this unobservable client characteristic that is possibly correlated with the audit partner industry 
expertise indicator variables, other experimental variables and with the dependent variable, earnings 
quality in the models. According to Goodwin and Wu (2014), it is difficult to solved such problem 
using instrumental variables (IVs) in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model due to 
unavailability of a suitable instrumental variable. Thus, following Goodwin and Wu (2014), dummy 
variables for client fixed-effects are included, in this section, in the regression models to address this 
possible endogeneity problem. It is assumed that the endogeneity bias problem will be corrected 
through the inclusion of the client fixed effects, which will capture any client related omitted variables 
that do not vary with time. On top of that, following Goodwin and Wu (2014) and Gul et al. (2013)
26
, 
partner fixed-effects is also included in the model, using an indicator variable for each auditor who 
signs audit reports for multiple clients for multiple years. This is based on the argument that a 
partner’s generic ability, which cannot be directly observed and measured, could also be an important 
correlated and omitted variable. In particular, generic ability could be positively correlated with the 
audit partner industry expertise indicator variables, other experimental variables and with the 
dependent variable, earnings quality. To the extent that the partner expertise experimental variables 
capture a partner’s generic ability rather than his expertise within an industry, these experimental 
variables should be insignificant in the partner fixed-effect regressions. Therefore a fixed-effect model 
is also estimated, in Table 11.13 below for each of the DAC_PERF, AEE and the PROFIT model as 
follows: 
 
For the DAC_PERF model, the inclusion of individual auditor indicators in the base model increases 
the explanatory power (R
2
) from 22.9 percent in the base model in the Table 10.5 to 66.7 percent in the 
fixed-effect model in Table 11.3 below. However, the partner industry expertise variables remain 
insignificant at p=0.10. For the AEE model, the inclusion of individual auditor indicators in the base 
model increases the explanatory power (R
2
) for the AEE model by about 45.9 percent, which is from 8 
percent in the base model in Table 10.7 to 57.5 percent in the fixed-effect model in Table 11.13 below. 
However, despite the increase in the R
2
, no significant change was observed in the AEE model as the 
partner industry expertise variables remain insignificant at any conventional level. In addition, for the 
PROFIT model in Table 11.13 below, the R
2 
is 33 percent, which is lower as compared to the base 
model, where the R
2 
reported was 37.5 percent. Despite that, all the partner industry expertise variables  
                                                     
26 In their study, Gul et al. (2013) control for client, audit firm, branch office, and year effects, and time-varying client 
characteristics to separate the effects of individual auditors on audit quality from those of clients, audit firms, and audit 
offices, and individual auditors’ effects on audit quality. The audit-quality measures used in their study are audit reporting 
(AR) aggressiveness, clients’ abnormal accruals and non-core earnings, and the presence of a small profit.  
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Table  11.13: Fixed-effects regression for earnings quality models under partner national-city framework for auditor industry specialisation 
  DAC_PERF AEE PROFIT 
Variables +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
Intercept  -1.463 -1.490 0.068 * 0.059 0.080 0.467  21.600 1.830 0.034 ** 
TA + 0.192 1.340 0.091 * 0.043 0.400 0.345  0.764 0.530 0.299  
PYTAC + -0.038 -0.770 0.221  -0.027 -1.550 0.061 * 1.978 1.020 0.154  
DE - -0.100 -0.480 0.315  0.236 1.400 0.081 * -4.652 -2.760 0.003 *** 
GROWTH + 0.003 0.200 0.420  -0.003 -0.200 0.422  1.360 3.580 0.000 *** 
MB + -0.001 -0.470 0.318  0.001 0.560 0.288  0.018 0.370 0.356  
CFO - -0.442 -2.310 0.011 ** -0.101 -1.100 0.136  5.103 3.060 0.001 *** 
LOSS + 0.046 1.670 0.048 ** -0.005 -0.200 0.420  1.237 4.100 0.000 *** 
ALTMAN - 0.070 0.940 0.175  0.017 0.250 0.403  -0.799 -0.920 0.178  
BLOCKOWN + 0.026 1.570 0.059 * 0.010 0.870 0.193  -0.181 -0.800 0.211  
BIG4  0.030 0.280 0.390  0.053 0.880 0.190  -27.453 -12.740 0.000 *** 
SECOND  0.029 0.210 0.416  0.071 1.090 0.139  -6.350 -5.840 0.000 *** 
Industry Specialist Auditor 
PARJOINT_PARNAT#1 -PARCITY#1  -0.364 -1.470 0.143  -0.524 -1.270 0.419  -1.855 -0.810 0.204  
PARCITY_ONLY  -0.064 -1.380 0.169  -0.040 -1.110 0.790  -0.172 -0.270 0.268  
PARNAT_ONLY              
Corporate Governance 
BODFEM  0.001 0.110 0.913  0.019 1.370 0.860  -0.050 -0.180 0.171  
BODFOREIGN  -0.008 -0.280 0.781  -0.011 -0.660 0.002  1.226 3.140 0.512  
INTAUD  0.003 0.110 0.909  -0.002 -0.070 0.074  -1.128 -1.790 0.947  
ACSIZE  0.002 0.150 0.883  -0.011 -0.720 0.104  0.584 1.620 0.472  
ACINDP  0.011 0.580 0.565  0.008 0.550 0.559  0.171 0.580 0.580  
ACFINEXP  0.014 1.380 0.167  0.006 0.600 0.312  0.192 1.010 0.552  
ACMEET  0.012 0.640 0.524  0.015 1.030 0.482  -0.178 -0.700 0.306  
Year fixed-effects  Included Included Included 
Industry fixed-effects Included Included Included 
Included Client fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Partner fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.667 0.575 0.333 
N  1,019 824 1,019 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed. Industry fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, client fixed-effects and partner fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and 
significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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remain insignificant as per the main analysis reported earlier. Taken together, the inclusion of the 
partner fixed-effects do not alter significantly our overall conclusion on the effect of audit partner 
expertise on earnings quality, as the results are not significant throughout all the models examined in 
the study. 
 
11.8 Alternative definition for corporate governance variables  
This analysis aims to examine whether the findings for corporate governance reported in the main 
analysis in Chapter 10 are robust to alternative measures of board diversity and audit committee 
variables. Results are presented in Table 11.14 below. The results for the alternatives definitions of 
corporate governance variables are presented separately in Panel A for DAC_PERF regression, Panel 
B for AEE regression and Panel C for PROFIT regression. Each of the panels presents the analysis 
under the firm national-city framework, partner national-city framework and joint firm-partner 
national-city framework. The definition for each of the corporate governance variables are as follows: 
 
There are four dummy variables created for board diversity. BODFEM dummy1 (BODFEM dummy1) 
is an indicator variable for only one female director (foreign director) on the board, and 0 if otherwise. 
Whereas BODFEM dummy2 (BODFOREIGN dummy2) is an indicator variable when more than a 
quarter of the board composition is comprised of female directors (foreign directors), and 0 if 
otherwise. BODFEM dummy2 is positively significant (p<0.10) in Panel B for the AEE regression 
across the firm, partner and joint firm-partner national-city framework analyses, suggesting that 
companies with more than a quarter of the board comprised of female directors have higher accrual 
estimation error. This indicates that more female directors on board lead to poor board monitoring in 
the financial reporting process. BODFOREIGN dummy1 and BODFOREIGN dummy2 are negatively 
significant at p<0.10 in Panel C of the PROFIT regression, suggesting that the likelihood of companies 
reporting a loss rather than a profit is higher when either only one or more than a quarter of the board 
is comprised of foreign directors.   
 
In respect of audit committee characteristics, the variable is further tested using the following dummy 
variables; 1) ACSIZE dummy which is coded 1 for audit committee with at least three members, 0 if 
otherwise; 2) ACINDP dummy which is coded 1 for audit committee comprised of fully independent 
non-executive directors, 0 if otherwise; 3) ACFINEXP dummy which is coded 1 for audit committee 
with at least one member with accounting and finance background/qualification, 0 if otherwise; 4) 
ACSVEXP which represents the proportion of audit committee members with supervisory 
experience
27
, and 5) ACMEET dummy which is coded 1 for audit committee that meet at least three 
times per annum. Interestingly, ACIND dummy is positively significant (p<0.05) in two out of three 
models under Panel B of the AEE regression, suggesting that companies with fully independent audit 
committee reports higher accrual estimation error (lower accrual quality). This finding is consistent 
                                                     
27 Following DeFond et al. (2005) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010), supervisory expertise refers to non-financial expertise such as 
experience as a CEO or Chairman of a company.  
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with the results reported in the main analysis for the AEE in Table 10.7 and 10.13 when the audit 
partner is controlled for in the analysis. On the other hand, ACFINEXP dummy is reported to be 
negatively significant (p<0.10) in all the three estimations in Panel C, suggesting that companies with 
audit committee comprised at least one financially expert member is more conservative in their profit 
reporting, as they are more likely to report a loss rather than a profit. 
 
Alternatively, following Zaman (2011), the four audit committee variables are decomposed into an 
audit committee effectiveness (ACE) index, to examine their effect collectively on earnings quality. 
Audit committee is considered effective when it meets all the four criteria sets by the U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code: 1) comprised of minimum three members, 2) members are fully independent, 3) at 
least one member with a recent and relevant financial experience and 4) meet at least three times a 
year. Nevertheless, there is no significant evidence to support the contention that more effective audit 
committee contributes to higher earnings quality. 
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Table  11.14: DAC_PERF, EAA and PROFIT Regression with alternative definition of corporate governance variables 
Panel A: DAC_PERF Regression 
Performance-matched Discretionary Accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) Earnings Management Regression with alternative measures of corporate governance  
  Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framework Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
BODFEM dummy1  0.006 0.710 0.480  0.013 1.230 0.220  0.013 1.270 0.205  
BODFEM dummy2  0.007 0.470 0.636  0.017 0.930 0.351  0.018 1.000 0.316  
BODFOREIGN dummy1  0.009 1.040 0.300  0.006 0.580 0.561  0.007 0.670 0.500  
BODFOREIGN dummy2  0.017 1.360 0.175  0.015 0.980 0.330  0.014 0.940 0.348  
ACSIZE dummy  -0.012 -1.120 0.264  -0.011 -0.860 0.389  -0.011 -0.800 0422  
ACINDP dummy  0.002 0.120 0.903  0.001 0.070 0.941  0.002 0.110 0.912  
ACFINEXP dummy  0.014 0.810 0.421  0.021 1.040 0.298  0.022 1.080 0.280  
ACSVEXP  -0.002 -0.300 0.763  0.000 0.050 0.957 
00.874 
 0.000 0.060 0.953  
ACMEET dummy  -0.001 -0.130 0.899  0.002 0.160 0.874  0.003 0.190 0.847  
ACE  0.003 0.320 0.747  0.004 0.340 0.369  0.005 0.420 0.675  
Panel B: AEE Regression 
Accrual Estimation Error (McNichols, 2002) Earnings Management Regression with alternative measures of corporate governance   Firm national-city framework Partner national-city fram w rk Joint firm-partner national-city framework 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
BODFEM dummy1  0.006 0.660 0.507  0.011 1.150 0.251  0.012 1.230 0.219  
BODFEM dummy2  0.034 1.670 0.095 * 0.040 1.670 0.095 * 0.042 1.770 0.078 * 
BODFOREIGN dummy1  0.006 0.730 0.468  0.003 0.320 0.748  0.003 0.300 0.766  
BODFOREIGN dummy2  0.011 0.810 0.420  0.008 0.750 0.455  0.008 0.740 0.459  
ACSIZE dummy  0.004 0.390 0.698  -0.005 -0.530 0.600  -0.006 -0.490 0.624  
ACINDP dummy  0.020 1.540 0.124  0.027 2.390 0.017 ** 0.026 2.310 0.021 ** 
ACFINEXP dummy  0.023 1.600 0.110  0.015 1.010 0.312  0.015 0.990 0.324  
ACSVEXP  -0.003 -0.650 0.517  0.000 -0.030 0.975  0.000 0.060 0.950  
ACMEET dummy  -0.007 -0.510 0.612  -0.006 -0.470 0.635  -0.007 -0.490 0.623  
ACE  -0.003 -0.300 0.761  -0.001 -0.120 0.902  -0.002 -0.200 0.843  
Panel C: PROFIT Regression 
Likelihood to Report a Profit/(Avoid a Loss):  Earnings Management Regression with alternative measures of corporate governance   Firm national-city framework Partner national-city framew rk Joint firm-partner national–city framework 
Variables  +/- coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. coef. t-stat p-value sig. 
BODFEM dummy1  0.005 0.040 0.966  -0.050 -0.400 0.689  -0.050 -0.390 0.696  
BODFEM dummy2  0.170 0.660 0.507  0.233 0.770 0.440  0.169 0.560 0.575  
BODFOREIGN dummy1  -0.148 -1.590 0.111  -0.175 -1.700 0.090 * -0.145 -1.390 0.164  
BODFOREIGN dummy2  -0.159 -1.440 0.150  -0.215 -1.760 0.079 * -0.205 -1.660 0.097 * 
ACSIZE dummy  0.021 0.190 0.846  -0.087 -0.700 0.483  -0.097 -0.780 0.438  
ACINDP dummy  -0.013 -0.090 0.926  0.009 0.060 0.952  0.010 0.070 0.948  
ACFINEXP dummy  -0.320 -1.850 0.065 * -0.502 -2.510 0.012 ** -0.503 -2.500 0.012 ** 
ACSVEXP  0.028 0.570 0.571  0.014 0.240 0.812  0.011 0.190 0.848  
ACMEET dummy  0.116 1.060 0.144  0.034 0.270 0.787  0.041 0.320 0.747  
ACE  0.134 1.260 0.208  0.029 0.230 0.818  0.034 0.270 0.791  
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All p-values are one-tailed, except for corporate governance variables which are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for 
brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Refer Table 5.8 for definition of variables. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
12.1 Conclusions 
A study on auditor industry specialisation, corporate governance, audit quality and earnings quality 
remains important to policy-makers, investors and regulators. This is because the quality of company 
reported earnings affects investors’ confidence and allocation of resources in the financial markets. 
Company reported earnings are prone to management legitimate manipulations, and the functions of 
corporate governance and external auditing serve as direct monitoring mechanisms of the company’s 
financial reporting processes. As these two functions also potentially have a direct impact on the 
degree of earnings management exercised by the companies’ management, the importance of their role 
and effectiveness cannot be overemphasised.  
 
The governance reforms following the 2007/2008 financial crisis (e.g. the implementation of the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code, the U.K. Stewardship Code and the Audit Firm Governance Code in 
2010) aim to improve the quality of governance and audit in the public listed companies, given that 
directors and auditors have been heavily criticised and blamed for lack of diligence which has 
contributed to the crisis. Furthermore, the motivation for earnings management is higher during a 
financial crisis period due to the unstable economic and financial conditions as well as pressure to 
keep in business and improve their performance in the public equity market. Thus, the financial crisis 
itself (starting around the year 2007/2008) makes it an interesting setting to analyse the effect of 
industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit quality and earnings quality during that 
period. Doing so, it also provides an opportunity to check whether the findings would turn out 
differently as compared to prior studies carried out during the non-crisis period.  Also, research in the 
corporate governance area using more recent data is important, considering the changing financial 
reporting landscape and regulatory environment which has impacted the role played by corporate 
governance and external auditors. 
 
This current thesis examines two empirical propositions. Firstly, the study examines the effect of 
industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on audit fees and audit quality. Secondly, the 
study investigates the effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate governance on earnings 
quality. Thus, the study is important to researchers, regulators and practitioners as it explores both the 
perceived corporate governance effectiveness and perceived audit quality (based on the level of audit 
fees charged by the auditor) and also the actual governance effectiveness and audit quality, based on 
the quality of earnings reported by the clients of the industry specialist auditors. The study’s research 
questions have been examined under three different levels of analysis for auditor industry 
specialisation: 1) the firm national-city framework, 2) the partner national-city framework, and 3) the 
joint firm-partner national-city framework. The corporate governance characteristics examined are 
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female directorship, foreign directorship, internal audit function, and audit committee characteristics 
relating to size, independence, expertise and activity. The earnings quality proxies examined in the 
study are the discretionary accruals, the accrual estimation error and the likelihood of reporting a 
profit (or avoiding a loss).  
 
Findings from the first empirical study in Chapter 7 suggest that the audit partner industry leadership 
at the national level drives the fee premium for auditor industry specialisation in the U.K., above and 
beyond the audit firm industry leadership. This supports the argument that industry expertise is 
uniquely attributable to the individual audit partner’s human capital in terms of their knowledge and 
experience gained from leading the audit engagements in a particular industry. This audit partner’s 
expertise could not be easily and completely transferable to other audit partners or staff within the 
same audit office or the same audit firm. However, the fact that non-specialist partners within the 
leading audit firms are also able to charge a fee premium suggests the existence of at least weak 
knowledge sharing and transfer of industry expertise between the partners within the Big 4 audit firms.  
 
In addition, findings from the various robustness tests performed in Chapter 8 indicate that the fee 
premium for auditor industry specialisation in the U.K. earned by those audit firms which enjoy the 
joint national and city industry leadership is not merely due to their successful differentiation strategy, 
but is also partly driven by the fee pressure from their closest competitor in the city-industry audit 
market. Nevertheless, the audit firm’s position as a joint national and city industry leader in the U.K. 
already gives it sufficient market power to extract a fee premium. This is because there is a distinct 
(non-interdependency) fee premium attached either to the audit firm’s joint national and city industry 
leadership or to its distance to the closest competitor. Also, female partners are found to have the 
ability to charge higher fee premiums as compared to male partners. There is no evidence of fee 
discount reported in the study.  
 
In respect of the effect of corporate governance on audit quality, the results indicate that foreign 
directors and active audit committees demand additional and extensive audit effort from their auditors 
in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in the charging of higher audit fees. However, 
there is no consistent evidence that female directorship, presence of internal audit function, and audit 
committee financial expertise are associated with higher or lower audit fees, whereas, audit committee 
size and independence have never been significant in any analysis performed. Besides this, in the 
robustness test using the alternative definition of corporate governance, this study also finds evidence 
that audit fees are higher for companies with 1) more than a quarter of the board composition 
comprised of female directors, 2) when a dummy variable for only one foreign director on the board is 
used, and 3) when more than a quarter of the board composition is comprised of foreign directors. 
Based on the sensitivity and robustness analysis in Chapter 8, the results for the main analysis are 
robust to alternative regression estimators, alternative definitions of industry specialist auditors, and 
are consistent in the presence of endogeneity. 
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Next, the findings from the second empirical study discussed in Chapter 10 suggest that audit firm 
industry leadership plays a more important role than audit partner industry leadership in promoting 
higher earnings quality, as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, lower accrual estimation error 
and higher likelihood of reporting a loss rather than a profit. Also, from the robustness test in Chapter 
11, the study has found no evidence to suggest that female partners or partners with longer tenure are 
more effective in promoting earnings quality. In addition, the study has documented that competitive 
pressure has an adverse effect on earnings quality. This is based on the evidence that discretionary 
accruals and accrual estimation error are larger when the distance between the audit firms with its 
closest competitor is smaller. 
 
In addition, the study also finds that female director as well as the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and independence contribute to accruals manipulation through larger magnitude of 
discretionary accruals and higher accrual estimation error. This finding is interesting given the data 
was tested in the period following the 2007/2008 financial crisis, suggesting that the corporate 
governance mechanisms are not effective in constraining earnings management, but somehow the 
effect is moderated by the role of industry specialist auditors. In addition, audit committee size and 
audit committee meetings constrain income-increasing discretionary accruals. The use of alternative 
definitions to measure the corporate governance variables seems to have produced mixed results.  
 
Based on the sensitivity and robustness analysis in Chapter 11, the results for the main analysis seem 
to be robust to alternative regression estimators, alternative definitions of industry specialist auditors, 
as well as when using the firm fixed-effects and partner fixed-effects model.   
 
Overall, the consistent evidence between fee premium and higher earnings quality offered by industry 
specialist auditors support the product differentiation theory and reputation theory, which suggest that 
auditors differentiate themselves through industry specialisation to meet clients’ demands for better 
financial reporting quality, and this differentiation strategy is valued in the audit market as it is priced 
at a differentially higher rate than the Big 4 brand name reputation premium. Findings for the 
corporate governance analyses are consistent with institutional theory or managerial hegemony theory, 
where the role of the board was viewed to be a passive one and more ceremonial in nature during the 
sample period investigated, as there is no evidence to suggest that they effectively constrain the 
earnings management practices in the U.K public listed companies.  
 
The findings are of potential interest to researchers, policy makers, practitioners and investors as the 
issues relating to audit quality, earnings quality and corporate governance are pertinent for investor 
protection in the financial market. For researchers, this study shows that industry leadership measured 
at the partner level better captures the concept of the audit fee premium compared to the leadership 
measured at the firm or office level. Therefore, tests based on partner-level industry leadership should 
be more powerful in detecting the effects of auditor industry expertise, and the estimates from office-
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level variables should be treated cautiously when relevant partner-level variables are not controlled 
for. 
 
For the practitioners, this study provides investors and regulators an understanding of the differential 
level of audit quality among the Big Four industry specialist auditors, and that there is quality 
differential when the industry leadership is driven by the national, city-specific or partner level. For 
the audit firms, this study provides insights on how the different sources of auditor industry 
specialisation have an effect on audit fee premiums, and whether the existence and magnitude of such 
premiums in turn translates into higher audit quality. The evidence from this study suggests that the 
fee premium for partner industry leadership is economically important. Therefore, it pays for an 
individual auditor to invest in industry specialisation and build his/her reputation as an industry expert. 
Moreover, given the fee premium associated with individual partners’ expertise and the lack of 
evidence on within-office knowledge transfers, developing more effective mechanisms to facilitate 
knowledge transfer between partners and create a broader reputation for industry expertise should be a 
profitable strategy for accounting firms. 
 
Finally, in several countries, there is an on-going policy debate on whether the engagement partner’s 
signature on the auditor’s report should be mandated. Findings from this study suggest that the U.K. 
audit market values engagement partners’ industry expertise. This behaviour implies that audits 
performed by expert partners are perceived to be more credible and thus more effective in reducing 
agency costs and, correspondingly, that clients are willing to pay higher audit fees for partner-specific 
expertise. Clearly, such a mechanism hinges on the availability of information regarding the identities 
of engagement partners as well as their market leadership before considering other costs involved. A 
direct benefit from public disclosure of the engagement auditor’s signature is to enable users of 
financial reports to infer the industry expertise of engagement partners. Such a disclosure requirement 
can also encourage engagement auditors to develop their industry expertise. 
 
For the regulators and policy makers, this study also provides an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
recent governance reforms through their impact on financial reporting quality. For the publicly listed 
companies, this study sheds light on the effectiveness of the role of corporate governance and industry 
specialist auditors in improving the quality of audit and financial reporting. 
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12.2 Limitations of the study 
This study is subject to several limitations: 
 
1) There is a risk that the audit fee model and the various earnings quality models used in the 
analyses in the preceding chapters suffer from omitted variables bias. This is because not all 
corporate governance characteristics are being included in the model. Besides this, different 
characteristics may interact with one another in a manner too complex to identify, thus 
producing possibly biased results.  
 
2) The finding of auditor industry specialisation in this study is not robust to alternative measures 
of market shares based on number of clients, clients’ total sales and clients’ total assets. 
 
3) The market share measures approach used to measure auditor industry specialisation could be 
subject to measurement error, since actual industry expertise is not directly observable from 
archival data (Reichelt and Wang, 2010). 
 
12.3 Avenues for future research 
The following are the suggestions for future research: 
 
1) While this study focuses on the main effect of industry specialist auditors and corporate 
governance on audit quality and earnings quality, it does not provide evidence of whether 
industry specialist auditors (at the firm and partner level) can help boards and audit 
committees to increase their monitoring effectiveness, which can be regarded as the benefits 
of hiring industry specialists. Thus, for future research, it may be worthwhile investigating the 
interaction effect among different corporate governance characteristics and the industry 
specialist auditor variables to examine whether auditor industry specialisation complements or 
substitutes the governance role of the board.  
 
2) It may be worthwhile to examine the effect of the individual partner demographic 
characteristics such as age, education background, and location, on both the fee premium and 
earnings quality, particularly in the U.K., when the partner signature disclosure is still new 
and very little is known about the individual partner effects on audit quality. 
 
3) Finally, future research could examine the effect of audit partner tenure in the U.K. This is 
because the partner tenure period measurement is too short to be insightful in this current 
study as data on audit partners is only available since 2009, and the earliest sample year for 
the dataset is 2011. Therefore, the maximum value for the partner tenure variable is capped at 
three years, so that the tenure is measured on an equal basis over the sample period. Future 
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research could try to examine partner tenure in the U.K. over a longer duration of years (e.g. 
studies on audit partner tenure in the U.S. which reported significant effects include Gul et al. 
(2013) and Bedard and Johnstone (2010)).  
 
4) The analyses are carried out during the global financial crisis period, and therefore more work 
is required in the future in this area to ascertain whether the current study’s results are valid in 
the long-term.  
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